Why Did the Makkah Alliance Go to Tehran?

On October 26, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman traveled to Tehran alongside senior Turkish and Pakistani officials for talks with their Iranian counterparts. The three countries are signatories to the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement, signed in August, which considers an attack on one member an attack on all. The visit came amid continued Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and heightened regional tensions involving Iran.

The visit generated a debate among Gulf academics and commentators over the purpose of the defense pact, the effectiveness of deterrence, and whether negotiations with Tehran can address the threats facing Saudi Arabia.

UAE academic Abdulkhaleq Abdulla captured the apparent contradiction in a pointed question on X: “The Makkah Alliance knocks on Tehran’s doors ... and the result?!”

Ebtisam Al Ketbi, founder and president of the UAE-based Emirates Policy Center, offered a more detailed interpretation of the meeting. She argued that the Makkah Agreement countries traveled to Tehran to test whether military deterrence could be converted into diplomatic leverage. Iran, meanwhile, was pursuing a different objective: transforming its recognition as a party to the regional crisis into recognition as an indispensable partner in managing regional security. Al Ketbi warned that Iran might succeed in moving from being a threat to regional security to becoming one of its guarantors without necessarily abandoning the instruments through which it exercises pressure.

For her, the real measure of success was not the opening of diplomatic channels but a tangible change in Iranian behavior, particularly toward Gulf countries and freedom of navigation. Otherwise, she cautioned, the meeting could represent another round of managing escalation rather than a settlement that addresses its underlying causes.

Yousra Adil, writing in the UAE newspaper Al Khaleej, questioned the effectiveness of the Makkah defense agreement, noting that Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia continued despite its collective defense commitment. She pointed out that Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler had ruled out direct military confrontation with the Houthis, although this did not exclude defensive assistance. For Adil, the central question was what value a defense agreement holds when its members differ over the nature of threats and the limits of their response. She argued that deterrence depends not on written commitments alone but on convincing adversaries that challenging them carries consequences.

Kuwaiti academic Abdullah Alnefisi, meanwhile, warned Saudi Arabia against returning to negotiations with the Houthis. In a post on X a day earlier, he wrote:

“Beware of pursuing a political track with the Houthis. Remember the Geneva negotiations of 2015, Kuwait in 2016, and Sweden in 2018. All failed and allowed the Houthis to rebuild their strength and attack us again.”

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Before beginning this week’s issue, we at The Gulf Nashra would like to express our deepest condolences on the passing of Dr. Aziz Alghashian, the respected Saudi political analyst and researcher who passed away on October 18, 2026.

Dr. Alghashian was a prominent voice in Gulf affairs, particularly Saudi foreign policy and regional relations. His thoughtful analysis, intellectual openness, and contributions to understanding the region will be greatly missed by the research community.

Our heartfelt condolences go to his family, friends, and colleagues. May his pure soul rest in peace and his loved ones be granted patience and strength during this difficult time.

إنا لله وإنا إليه راجعون.

Geopolitics

• “Saudi Defence Minister leads Makkah pact delegation to Tehran in major diplomatic push.” The National, October 26, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defence Prince Khalid bin Salman made a surprise visit to Tehran on Monday in a major push for de-escalation in the Middle East amid intensifying Houthi attacks on Saudi cities and fears of a renewed full-scale war between Iran and the US.

Pakistan’s army chief of staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Ibrahim Kalin, the director of Turkey’s intelligence service, were also attending the meetings in the Iranian capital, said Rayed Krimly, Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

• “Saudi Aramco tells staff to evacuate Dhahran as clashes with Yemen’s Houthis continue.” Reuters, October 22, 2026.

“Saudi state oil company Aramco has told staff to evacuate its headquarters in Dhahran on the Gulf, six people with knowledge of the matter told Reuters on Thursday, as fighting between the world’s largest crude exporter and Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis intensifies.”

• “UK fighter jets to defend Saudi Arabia from Houthi strikes.” Semafor, October 20, 2026.

“The UK said Tuesday it will send fighter jets to protect Saudi Arabia’s cities and critical infrastructure from escalating aerial attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis.”

• “Egypt calls for Yemen talks as parliament weighs military support to Saudi Arabia.” Reuters, October 22, 2026.

“Any direct involvement of the Egyptian military, one of the region’s largest, would raise the stakes in the conflict between the kingdom and the Houthis, an increasingly destabilising front in the spreading US-Israeli war on Iran.”

• “Turkey says it is waiting for sale contract from Qatar for Eurofighter Typhoon jet procurement.” Reuters, October 22, 2026.

“Turkey is waiting for Qatar to send it a sale contract and a draft training programme as part of its deal with Britain to procure Eurofighter Typhoon jets, the Turkish Defence Ministry said on Thursday.”

Market & Economy

• “IMF forecasts UAE economic growth of 7.7% in 2027.” Zawya, October 23, 2026.

“He noted that continued investment in AI could add approximately 0.5 percentage points to the UAE’s annual economic growth.”

• “Saudi stock market loses $176bn in two months.” AGBI, October 23, 2026.

“Saudi Arabian stocks have fallen to their lowest level in more than five years as a deepening sell-off in banking, property and healthcare shares fuels concerns about further losses.”
“The sustained sell-off has wiped $176 billion off the bourse’s market capitalisation since the end of August, according to AGBI calculations.”

• “Saudi Arabia postpones its ‘Davos in the Desert’ conference after attacks.” Reuters, October 19, 2026.

“The Future Investment Initiative, or FII, was planned for October 26 to 29, but will now take place in 2027, with a new date to be announced “very soon,” the organizers said.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi postpones FII in person after Wall Street lobbying.” Semafor, October 19, 2026.

• “Gulf attracts finance firms controlling $5.8 trillion since war.” Semafor, October 22, 2026.

“Finance firms controlling over $5.8 trillion have established their first offices in the Gulf in the nearly eight months since the Iran war disrupted the region’s economies, a sign that money managers are still betting it will remain a source of new cash.”

• “Aramco’s profit expected to rise 17% to $30bln in Q3 2026: AlJazira Capital.” Zawya, October 22, 2026.

“Saudi Aramco’s net profit after minority interest is expected to increase by 16.8% year-on-year (YoY) but fall 6.5% quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) to SAR 113.6 billion ($30.16 billion) in the third quarter of 2026, according to an AlJazira Capital report.”

• “UAE pledges $17bn to expand investment in Greece.” AGBI, October 23, 2026.

“The UAE has pledged billions of dollars in new investments in Greece, targeting infrastructure, technology and hospitality as it seeks to expand its economic and investment partnership in Europe.”

• “GCC investors back Bahrain while Western capital hesitates.” AGBI, October 23, 2026.

“Bahrain’s years-long shift from capital exporter to investment destination faces a new test as the US-Iran war delays foreign funding decisions and threatens recent momentum, according to senior officials at Bahrain’s Economic Development Board.”

Go Deeper: “Gulf faces economic contraction nearly as acute as COVID shock.” Semafor, October 23, 2026.

• “Kuwait raises $3.25bn in int’l bond issuance.” Kuwait Times, October 20, 2026.

“Kuwait has raised $3.25 billion through a two-tranche international bond issuance dated Oct 19, the finance ministry said Tuesday, citing strong demand from global investors.”
“Investor demand was strong, with total orders peaking at $9.1 billion, approximately 2.8 times the size of the issuance.”

• “Oman targets investments to boost digital economy.” AGBI, October 23, 2026.

“Oman plans to attract global investment to its technology sector, particularly artificial intelligence, in the second phase of its 2026-2030 digital economy plan.”
“It also aims to attract OMR300 million in technology investment and create 3,000 jobs a year in the sector.”

Environment and Climate Change

• “Gulf water-sharing plans accelerated by Iran war.” AGBI, October 23, 2026.

“Rising consumption and security concerns are driving demand for pipelines, desalination capacity and stronger links between national networks.”

• “Masdar prices $600mln blue bond; orders top $1.4bln.” Zawya, October 23, 2026.

“Abu Dhabi’s flagship renewable energy company Masdar, rated A1/AA-/AA-, has set the final pricing for its $600 million five-year blue bond at 115 basis points (bps) over the five-year US Treasury benchmark, tightening from initial price thoughts of around 130 bps.”

Domestics

• “Sheikh Fahad: No return to ‘old chaos’ as 10,000 company files suspended over unpaid wages.” Kuwait Times, October 22, 2026.

“First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Sheikh Fahad Yousef Saud Al-Sabah said the files of 10,000 companies with five or more workers have been suspended for failing to pay salaries for between one year and a year and a half.”

“Speaking at a meeting with private sector company representatives, he said a strict automated system now suspends company files as soon as salary payments become irregular.”

• “Bahrain and France to co-develop civil nuclear energy.” AGBI, October 23, 2026.

“Bahrain and France have signed a preliminary agreement to develop a civil nuclear energy programme as part of broader efforts to strengthen economic ties.”

“The interim deal was signed in Manama in the presence of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and French President Emmanuel Macron, state-run Bahrain News Agency (BNA) reported.”

Go Deeper: “As Macron visits Gulf, can France forge its own energy-for-security future?” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2026.

• “Women’s soccer goes from bans to stadiums in Saudi.” Semafor, October 23, 2026.

“Prize money has quadrupled since the Saudi Women’s Premier League launched in 2022, and Riyadh’s Al-Nassr club took home 2 million riyals ($531,000) for last season’s title.”

• “Saudi football privatisation faces commercial reality check.” AGBI, October 23, 2026.

“Saudi football clubs face pressure to find new funding as the kingdom shifts ownership towards private investors, while high wages and limited broadcasting income make profits harder to achieve.”

In this issue, we share our conversation with Layla Ali. She is a Senior Research Associate at the Gulf Research Center (GRC), an independent think tank based in Saudi Arabia. Her research focuses on Gulf regional security, Gulf-Asia relations, South-South cooperation, the Global South, and the role of middle powers in an evolving international order. She examines how Gulf states position themselves within wider regional and global security frameworks, with particular attention to their strategic relationships across Asia and the Global South.

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How Should Saudi Arabia Respond to the Houthis’ Escalation?

The recent Houthi escalation against Saudi Arabia, particularly the attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, has prompted a debate among Saudi commentators over the group’s objectives and the appropriate response. While some view the attacks as an attempt to undermine Saudi Arabia’s reputation and public confidence, others interpret them as a reaction to recent Houthi military setbacks in Yemen. The discussion also raises questions about the effectiveness of the Yemeni government, the prospects for a decisive military victory, and the potential role of the United States.

Saudi academic Hesham Alghannam argues that the Houthis’ primary objective extends beyond damaging civilian infrastructure. Rather, he believes the group seeks to undermine confidence among airlines, travelers, and investors. “Even if you repair your airports, you will not be able to restore the confidence of airlines, travelers, and investors in them,” he writes, describing the confrontation as “a battle over confidence and reputation that goes beyond cement and concrete.”

Alghannam maintains that the response should make Houthi escalation ineffective through alternative routes, intelligent deterrence, and the continuation of development projects. He argues that experienced investors understand the region’s security challenges and place greater importance on a state’s ability to maintain its activities under pressure.

Read more

• Samin, Nadav, “Power and Anxiety in the Kingdom: The Saudi Clergy Across One Century.” Oxford University Press, 2026.

Analyses

• Analysis: “Days of Deadly Houthi Attacks Show Saudi Arabia’s Vulnerabilities.” The New York Times, October 9, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Fiscal Deficit To Be Larger Than Budgeted in 2026.” Tim Callen, AGSI, October 1, 2026.

• Analysis: “China’s Cautious but Steady Advance in the Gulf.” Robert Mogielnicki, AGSI, September 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf Oil Exporters to Build Storage in Asia.” Ben Cahill, AGSI, September 30, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran war mutes Gulf rivalries.” Semafor, Semafor, September 30, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Labor Market Holds Firm in Face of Regional Conflict.” Tim Callen, AGSI, September 30, 2026.

• Analysis: “A Saudi-UAE Thaw?“ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, AGSI, October 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Current Account Back in Deficit in the Second Quarter.” Tim Callen, AGSI, October 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “America’s Dilemma in the Middle East.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, October 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Where Does Lebanon Fit in the Emerging Regional Trade Network?” Said Bakr, AGSI, October 6, 2026.

Podcast, Webinar & interview

• Podcast: “The Dilemma of Work That Represents Saudis.” with Faisal Al-Amer, Al-Nashra Al-Sinemaiya, September 21, 2026.

• Podcast: “Saudi Homeownership: More Progress in the Last 10 Years Than the Previous 50 Combined.” Mo Show, September 30, 2026.

• Podcast: “Yemen’s Restoration Begins.” discussed by Nayef Al-Osaimi and Omar Al-Omran, Al-Fajr Podcast, October 7, 2026.

• Interview: “Former Etihad CEO James Hogan on the future of Gulf aviation.” Gulf Business, October 5, 2026.

• Webinar: “Is the U.S.-Iran Stalemate a “New Normal” or the Prelude to Another Explosion?” AGSI, October 7, 2026.

Geopolitics

• “Houthi strike on Saudi airport kills 12, worst attack on kingdom in a decade.” Al-Monitor, October 10, 2026.

“At least 12 people were killed and more than 300 wounded in an attack on Riyadh's international airport on Saturday, the deadliest in the kingdom in more than a decade.”

“The dead from the third attack this week on the airport included four Saudis, two people from Bangladesh and one person each from the US, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Sudan and Egypt, the Saudi civil aviation authority said. At the latest count, 309 were wounded, officials said.”

• “Vessel struck by unknown projectile off UAE coast amid surge in attacks, UKMTO says.” Reuters, October 9, 2026.

“While there was no claim of responsibility, maritime security sources said on Friday that the strike was outside of the Hormuz ​area and indicated a widening of risk for ships.”

• “FlyDubai Co-Pilot Planned to Crash Into Israeli Airport, U.A.E. Says.” WSJ, October 9, 2026.

“Al-Hammami “drew inspiration from the 11 September 2001 attacks, and the idea of carrying out a similar operation using an aircraft became firmly established in his thinking,” Al Shamsi said in a statement carried by the U.A.E.’s state-run WAM news agency.”

• “UK says Kuwait buys $489mln air defence system.” Zawya, October 9, 2026.

“Kuwait is buying the system, which will incorporate jammers, radars and interceptors with an AI-enabled control centre, from London-headquartered MARSS, a company owned by Australia’s EOS.”

Market, Economy & Domestic Issues

• “New construction projects in the Gulf plunge 37%.” Semafor, October 9, 2026.

“The war caught up with the Gulf’s construction sector last quarter. Project awards across the region fell 37.2% from a year earlier to $47.4 billion, according to Kuwaiti investment firm Kamco Invest. Every country was down by double digits..”

Go Deeper: “GCC Projects Market Update October-2026” KAMCO, [PDF].

• “UAE economy reaches $262bln in H1 2026.” Zawya, October 9, 2026.

“Non-oil GDP grew by 1.8 percent, increasing the contribution of non-oil activities to 79.2 percent of the national economy, compared to 78.1 percent during the corresponding period of the previous year.”

Go Deeper: “Quarterly National Accounts.” Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Centre (FCSC) , 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia quietly shelving NEOM Stadium, one of 2034 World Cup venues.” Reuters, October 4, 2026.

“According to MEED, NEOM’s stadium is expected to cost $2.5 billion. It lists the projected 46,000-seat stadium in its data as ‘on hold’.”

The stadium has no listed completion date, according to the data, which describes the remaining stadiums and facilities as in various stages of development, with completion expected between 2026 and 2033.

Go Deeper: “Joy Awards 2027 set to be cancelled in Saudi Arabia as entertainment calendar shifts.” Gulf News, October 06, 2026.

• “QatarEnergy’s LNG expansion project poised to start operations in November, sources say.” Reuters, October 7, 2026.

“QatarEnergy Chief Executive Saad al-Kaabi said last month that the project was expected to begin production in the first half of 2027 ​despite the US-Israeli war against Iran and the resulting disruption to shipping through ​the Strait of Hormuz.”

• “Saudi Tycoons Built $9 Billion Fortune Off Water Instead of Oil.” Bloomberg, October 8, 2026.

“ACWA has a market value of $34.9 billion. Saudi Arabia’s Abunayyan and Al Muhaidib families together own at least 26.3%, both directly and through their joint holding company, Vision Invest, based on filings and calculations by the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. The kingdom’s $905 billion Public Investment Fund is the biggest shareholder, controlling 44.2%.”

• “Saudi, UAE Join Japan-Led Push to Bolster Asian Oil Buffers.” Bloomberg, October 8, 2026.

“In April, Japan announced $10 billion of financial support for Southeast Asian nations struggling with soaring crude prices and supply disruptions from the Middle East war. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s initiative includes assistance for oil procurement, storage and emergency reserves aimed at strengthening the region’s ability to withstand future shocks.”

• “SoftBank seeks up to $100 billion from Gulf investors for AI push, FT reports.” Reuters, October 9, 2026.

“The move comes as Son ​ramps up AI bets, with the company announcing last week ‌that ⁠it completed its $30 billion investment in OpenAI as part of its commitment to the ChatGPT maker’s last fundraising round.”

“SoftBank also raised $11.1 ​billion last month ​in ⁠the largest high-yield corporate bond sale globally to fund its mammoth ​bet on OpenAI.”

Go Deeper: “OpenAI in $30 Billion Round Talks With UAE Funds, BlackRock.” Bloomberg, October 5, 2026.

• “Oman tests global investor appetite for funding net-zero transition.” Zawya, October 6, 2026.

“Dr Muhannad al Kalbani, Vice President (Centre of Excellence) - Oman Net Zero Centre, said the Centre recently joined the Ministry of Finance on a non-binding green finance roadshow in London, where the Omani delegation held discussions with prospective investors.”

• UAE: “Alabbar advances $18 billion Syria projects.” Semafor, October 7, 2026.

“Alabbar said he would prioritize using Syrian contractors and sourcing supplies locally for the projects, which are expected to create more than 40,000 jobs but the value of which wasn’t disclosed, according to The National.”

Go Deeper: “Abu Dhabi’s Eagle Hills to develop residential and tourism projects in Syria.” The National, October 5, 2026.

Dr. Annelle Sheline is our guest today. She is a research fellow in the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, where her research focuses on U.S. involvement in the Middle East. She previously served as a Foreign Affairs Officer in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, resigning in March 2024 in protest over the Biden administration’s support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. She is also a senior non-resident fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC and a non-resident fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. She has conducted extensive fieldwork in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and her forthcoming book, Weaponizing Tolerance: Arab Monarchies and American Support for Moderate Islam, will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2027.

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Who Gets the Credit for Yemen’s Latest Battlefield Shift?

The latest military developments around Bab al-Mandab and Mocha have produced competing interpretations across the Gulf. Saudi commentators largely present the operations as a revival of the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the beginning of a broader campaign to change the balance of power against the Houthis. Emirati voices, by contrast, emphasize the battlefield role of the UAE-backed Southern Giants Brigades. Behind the disagreement over credit is a larger debate over the future of Yemen and the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Emirati academic Abdulkhaleq Abdulla places the developments within the wider Saudi-Emirati relationship. His argument is that allies may disagree sharply without ceasing to be allies. He traces the relationship from close coordination between 2015 and 2019 to growing geopolitical and economic competition, particularly in Yemen, Sudan and regional leadership.

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• Book: Cengiz, Sinem, “Qatar’s Vision 2030 in Focus: Assessing Trajectories and Reimagining Future Pathways.” Ethics Press, 2026. [English].

Research

• Research: “Does governance effectiveness reduce carbon emissions? Shedding light on Saudi Arabia as cornerstone of GCC sustainability initiatives.” Najib H.S. Farhan, Waleed M. Alahdal and Muskan Sahu, Management & Sustainability: An Arab Review, September 15, 2026.

• Research: “Does Integrated Reporting Enhance the Value Relevance of Corporate Governance? Evidence from Saudi Arabia.” Mohammed Saleem Alatawi, Sustainability, September 13, 2026.

Analyses

• Analysis: “Bankers Who Once Chased Gulf IPOs Look Elsewhere.” Laura Gardner Cuesta, Bloomberg, September 14, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf Arab States Explore New Options as U.S. Bases Fail to Deter Iran.” Vivian Nereim, The New York Times, September 15, 2026.

• Analysis: “Few took the Houthis seriously. A coalition is now needed to stop them.” Semafor, Semafor, September 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia Has Another Option to Get Its Oil Out.” Carol Ryan, The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Economic Recovery Delayed by New Threats.” Tim Callen, AGSI, September 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “UAE-Iran Relations: Pulling Geoeconomic Levers.” Robert Mogielnicki, AGSI, September 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “The U.S. Data Center Struggle and the Gulf Offer.” Jesse Marks, AGSI, September 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf’s Shift to Layered Security.” John Calabrese, AGSI, September 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gaming in the Gulf.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, AGSI, September 25, 2026.

Podcasts & Webinars

• Podcast: “The Strategy Behind Saudi Arabia’s Push for Olympic Medals.” Guest Abdulaziz Baeshen, The Mo Show, September 8, 2026.

• Podcast: “The Dilemma of Work That Represents Saudis” The Cinematic Newsletter, September 21, 2026.

• Webinar: “Preparing for the Gulf’s Economic Infrastructure Buildout.” AGSI, September 14, 2026.

Geopolitics

• “UAE Forms Investigation Team to Probe Flydubai Flight Incident.” Asharq Al-Awsat, October 1, 2026.

“UAE Public Prosecutor Hamad Saif Al Shamsi has ordered the formation of an investigation team comprising specialized members of the Public Prosecution to investigate an incident involving Flydubai Flight FZ1073, which was traveling from Dubai International Airport to Tel Aviv yesterday and was diverted before landing safely at Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia.”

Go Deeper: “Plane to Israel Narrowly Averts Disaster After Pilot Stabbing.” New York Times, September 30, 2026.

• “Saudi Grand Mufti tells troops to ‘stand united’ against Houthis, restore stability in Yemen.” Khaleej Times, September 25, 2026.

“The rare and strongly worded message by Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Saleh bin Fawzan Al Fawzan was addressed to soldiers stationed at the country’s borders and drew on Quranic verses and recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad related to sacrifice and struggle in defence of God.”

• “Saudi coalition says it intercepts Houthi missiles, drones.” Reuters, September 25, 2026.

“Hours earlier, the military chiefs of Saudi Arabia and defence allies Pakistan and Turkey ​reviewed threats facing ​Saudi Arabia at ⁠a meeting in the Saudi capital.”

“The three signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement last month, saying they would regard ​an armed attack on any of them to be ​an ⁠attack on all. They said the pact aimed to strengthen collective deterrence and military cooperation.”

• “UAE bars Iranian airlines as US sanctions squeeze Iran’s aviation sector.” Al Jazeera, September 25, 2026.

“The United Arab Emirates has halted flights operated by Iranian airlines, joining several other countries in adopting United States sanctions aimed at pressuring Tehran’s aviation sector.”

• “Oman urges UN members to refrain from use of force.” Arab News, September 27, 2026.

“Al-Busaidi said negotiations and dialogue could have avoided the conflict in the region and its devastating effects on the Gulf, including the disruption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery for transporting oil.”

• “Saudi Arabia pledges $6 million to UN Counter-Terrorism Center programs.” Saudi Gazette, September 27, 2026.

“The announcement came on the sidelines of the high-level week of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York. The Kingdom’s contribution will be distributed over four calendar years beginning in the 2027 fiscal year.”

• “France to protect Saudi energy sites after Houthi attacks.” AGBI, September 25, 2026.

“France will provide military support to Saudi Arabia to help protect the port city of Yanbu, French president Emmanuel Macron said.”

Market & Economy

• “Qatar Reshapes Wealth Fund Strategy With New Local Platform.” Bloomberg, September 20, 2026.

“The platform, Doha Investment, will seek to accelerate long-term value creation and boost private-sector participation in the Gulf nation’s economy, Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said at the Qatar Economic Forum in New York Sunday.”

• “UAE VAT Changes Indicate Broader Shift in Administration.” Bloomberg Tax, September 25, 2026.

“The United Arab Emirates has approved a significant overhaul of its value-added tax executive regulations. The changes affect how businesses calculate input VAT recovery, make payments, structure composite supplies, and document certain transactions.”

Go Deeper: “The Executive Regulation of the Federal Decree-Law No. 8 of 2017 on Value Added Tax.” [UAE] Federal Tax Authority, 2026 [PDF].

• “Microsoft doubles down on investment in the Gulf.” Semafor, September 24, 2026.

“Microsoft is accelerating investment in the Gulf, planning to spend at least $10 billion by 2030 to shore up the region’s digital resilience. While a drop in the bucket compared with global AI spending, the move to expand data centers and lay more subsea and overland cables for backup connectivity is a vote of confidence in a region whose tech ambitions were called into question by the Iran war. Amazon Web Services said this month it won’t restore one of its three UAE availability zones or its Bahrain network after damage from Iranian strikes.”

• “Saudi Arabia contracts SLB to drill 450 wells.” AGBI, September 25, 2026.

“Following Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia shifted oil exports west to Yanbu, with the stated aim of shipping 5 million barrels per day (bpd).”

“This ambition has been hampered as conflict with the Iran-backed Houthi group prevents Saudi vessels from passing through the Bab al-Mandab strait, which connects the Red Sea to Asian oil markets.”

• “Saudi-listed MIS says HUMAIN AI-focused data centre contract valued at $2.3bln.” Zawya, September 21, 2026.

“The agreement value exceeds 689 percent of the company’s total revenue in 2025, MIS said in a statement to the Saudi stock exchange. Revenue stood at 1.27 billion Saudi riyals (2.33 billion).”

• “Saudi Arabia’s $1.3 billion biotech push following Riyadh summit.” Semafor, September 24, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia announced $1.3 billion in biotech deals following a Riyadh summit last week, part of its push to become a global hub for the industry by 2040. They include a $130 million vaccine manufacturing plant that would be the Gulf’s largest.”

Go Deeper: “MODON Signs SAR500 million Contract to Establish Vaccine Industrial Company.” SPA, September 21, 2023

• “Saudi’s Ceer unveils first EVs in bid to build regional auto powerhouse.” Reuters, September 21, 2026.

“Ceer’s efforts to impress the market coincide with the greatest period of upheaval in the established car industry in the last ​century as Chinese automakers take share from traditional rivals and lead the world in developing flashy new EVs.”

Domestics

• “Saudi government agencies adopt over 500 public proposals to improve regulations.” Saudi Gazette, September 27, 2026.

“The platform, operated by the Saudi Center for Competitiveness and Business (SCCB), enables the public and the government and private sectors to provide feedback on draft laws and regulations related to economic and development affairs before they are approved.”

• “UAE launches new freight rail service connecting Fujairah with Abu Dhabi.” Semafor, September 24, 2026.

“Three times a week, Etihad Rail will move containers about 200 kilometers (124 miles) from the port on the UAE’s Gulf of Oman coast to Abu Dhabi, where they can clear customs. Fujairah has become a crucial entry point since Iran began attacking ships in the strait early in its conflict with the US.”

• “Kuwait to host 2026-27 Saudi Super Cup in December.” Saudi Gazette, September 14, 2026.

“The tournament will be played at Jaber Al-Ahmad International Stadium and feature four clubs: Al Nassr, Al Kholood, Al Ahli and Al Qadsiah. The draw will take place on Oct. 14 to determine the two semifinal fixtures.”

As Arab and Gulf leaders gathered in New York during the UN General Assembly’s high-level week, Iran and the future of regional security dominated Gulf commentary. The debate extended beyond how to end the current confrontation to what should follow it: whether Iran represents a structural challenge requiring a different regional model, whether deterrence must precede diplomacy, or whether negotiations remain the only sustainable path despite deep skepticism toward the international system. Across these positions, the central question is how to prevent the region from returning to the same cycle of confrontation once the fighting ends.

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From the Kingdom of Bahrain, Dr. Omar Al-Ubaydli shares his thoughtful perspectives with us. He is an affiliated Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Affiliated Scholar at the Mercatus Center. His research focuses on political economy, experimental economics, the economics of science, and the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. He previously served on the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Joint Advisory Board of Economists and as a visiting professor of economics at the University of Chicago. His research has appeared in international peer-reviewed journals, while his commentary has been published in outlets including Forbes, U.S. News, and The National. Al-Ubaydli earned his BA in economics from the University of Cambridge and his MA and PhD in economics from the University of Chicago.

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Geopolitics

• “Gulf states postpone strait of Hormuz talks with Iran as Yemen conflict intensifies.” The Guardian, September 14, 2026.

“Gulf states have postponed a critical meeting with Iran on the future of the strait of Hormuz owing to a lack of Arab consensus and growing Saudi Arabian anger with Tehran for helping the Houthis loosen Riyadh’s grip in Yemen.”

• “Kuwait may join Abraham Accords within six months, Israeli envoy says.” I24, September 15, 2026.

“Yossi Shelley, Israel’s ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), told Kan on Tuesday that Kuwait may join the Abraham Accords within the next six months.”

• “US officials met Iran-backed Houthis in Oman over the weekend, sources say.” Reuters, September 16, 2026.

“The meeting, which has not been made public, was held at the US Embassy in Muscat, three of the sources said on ​the condition of anonymity. Two sources said that Oman’s government, a longtime regional mediator, helped organise the meeting.”

• “China presses Iran to help rein in Houthis after Saudi appeal, sources say.” Reuters, September 17, 2026.

“Riyadh turned to China for help after the Houthis made rapid advances along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, moves that have left Saudi oil exports and ‌shipping more exposed, the sources said.”

Go Deeper: “Iranian and Saudi panellists spar at Xiangshan Forum over Middle East attacks.” South China Morning Post, September 17, 2026.

• “Trump Moves Ahead With F-35 Jet Sales to Saudi Arabia Despite Intelligence Concerns.” New York Times, September 17, 2026.

“The package of the jets and a spare engine, valued at $24.3 billion, “will improve Saudi Arabia’s capability to deter current and future threats by strengthening its homeland defense,” the State Department said in the announcement. The agency also gave formal notification to Congress of the pending sale.”

Go Deeper: “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft.” U.S State Department, September 17, 2026.

Market & Economy

• “GCC central banks raise interest rates after US Fed rate increase.” Zawya, September 16, 2026.

“GCC central banks raised interest rates after the US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) voted unanimously to raise its benchmark interest rate to a target range of 3.75% to 4%.”

• “Aramco to boost Gulf exports to 60 million barrels in September, October, traders say.” Reuters, September 18, 2026.

“Chinese and South Korean refiners are among the top buyers of the ​spot supplies, while some volumes will be going to India and Japan, said the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity.”

Go Deeper: “Download Monthly Oil Market Report - September 2026.” OPEC, [PDF].

• “Saudi Arabia’s annual inflation rate remains at 1.8% in Aug.” Reuters, September 15, 2026.

“The August data, released ​by Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for Statistics, showed an increase by 3.9% in these sectors ​on an annual basis, slowing from ​a 4.2% rise in July.”

Go Deeper: “Average Prices of Goods and Services August 2026” General Authority for Statistics, [PDF].

• “Saudis Give European Oil Buyers No Supplies for Next Month.” Bloomberg, September 18, 2026.

“The absence of Saudi flows next month will heighten the need for European buyers to secure replacements. Already, Poland’s Orlen SA has been hunting for shipments, helping propel the prices of regional oil grades higher. Dated Brent, which is the benchmark for real-world barrels in Europe, topped $130 this week at one point.”

• “OPEC Fund earmarks $40mln for Oman’s Yiti Sustainable City project.” Zawya, September 18, 2026.

“The allocation forms part of $645 million in new financing announced by the OPEC Fund on September 16 for projects across 14 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. The package comprises $435 million for public-sector projects and $210 million for private-sector operations.”

• “Saudi Arabia discovers 110 million tonnes of uranium-bearing ore in Medina.” Reuters, September 14, 2026.

“Saudi ​Arabia has ‌discovered 110 million ​tonnes ​of raw materials ⁠containing uranium ​concentrations ​in Medina, the kingdom’s energy ​minister ​said at the ‌IAEA ⁠General Conference in Vienna, ​Saudi ​state ⁠TV reported ​on ​Monday.”

• “Little-Known UAE Investor Adds to Over $40 Billion Bet on Musk.” Bloomberg, September 10, 2026.

“Vy Capital features in the tunneling venture’s Series D round alongside Shamal Holding, which invests on behalf of Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum. The $3 billion round was backed by the United Arab Emirates and affiliated investment entities, Boring said in a statement on Thursday.”

• “Aramco says technology delivered $5 billion in value last year.” Semafor, September 17, 2026.

“The state-controlled oil producer’s “realized value” from technology, its measure of the financial impact of its tech investments, exceeded $5 billion last year. That surpassed Aramco’s targets and should grow further in coming years, senior vice president of digital and information technology Sami Al Ajmi said in an interview.”

• “Saudi Arabia’s US Treasury holdings rise by $10.7bln.” Zawya, September 17, 2026.

“The report also indicated that Saudi Arabia’s investments in US Treasury bonds and bills posted a monthly decline of 0.1 percent representing $100 million in July, reaching $142.4 billion. The Kingdom’s holdings are distributed between $110.2 billion in long-term bonds and bills, accounting for 77 percent and approximately $32.2 billion in short-term bonds and bills, that make up 23 percent.”

• Book: Mahjoob Zweiri and Nesibe Hicret Battaloglu (eds.) “The Contemporary United Arab Emirates: From Surviving State to Assertive Power.” Springer, May 2026.

• Research of the Week: “Determinants of CO2 Emissions in Hydrocarbon-Dependent Economies: A Multi-Method Panel Analysis of GCC Countries.” Ihsen Abid, Economies, September 7, 2026.

• Research: “Policy Implementation and Competitiveness Ranking Trajectories in the GCC: Examining Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 Relative to Resource-Similar Peers (2022–2026).” Fouad Ahmed Atallah, Economies, September 7, 2026.

• Research: “The Stability-Instability Paradox and the Evolving Balance of Terror in the Middle East.” Thomas Juneau, Middle East Policy, September 12, 2026.

• Analysis of the Week: “The End of Saudi Restraint in Iraq.” Muhanad Seloom, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, September 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “Emerging Technologies and U.S. Military Power in the Gulf.” Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, AGSI, September 8, 2026.

• Analysis: “Hili Forum 2026: Shaping the Post-War Gulf.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, September 8, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Mecca Pact’s Credibility Gap.” Doga Eralp, War on the Rocks, September 9, 2026.

• Analysis: “Navigating Solutions to the Strait of Hormuz Blockade.” Huzeir Ezekiel Dzulhisham and Nicholas Lim, ORF Middle East, September 9, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf corporate profits in second quarter show growing divide between economies.” Mohammed Sergie, Semafor, September 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “The case for an independent fiscal watchdog in Saudi Arabia.” Amir Khan, AGBI, September 7, 2026.

• Analysis: “Hormuz Needs a Community, Not a Condominium.” Raad Alkadiri, CSIS, September 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “Future Gulf Economic Resilience in Energy, Infrastructure, and Influence.” Karen E. Young, AGSI, September 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “Asia’s reliance on Gulf oil will outlast Hormuz crisis.” Francesca Washtell, AGBI, September 11, 2026.

• Report: “Oil Market Report – September 2026.” International Energy Agency (IEA), September 11, 2026.

• Report: “Monthly Oil Market Report – September 2026.” OPEC, September 10, 2026.

• Podcast: “The Strategy Behind Saudi Arabia’s Push for Olympic Medals.” Guest: Abdulaziz Baeshen, The Mo Show, September 8, 2026.

• Webinar: “Preparing for the Gulf’s Economic Infrastructure Buildout.” Speakers: Robert Mogielnicki, Justin Alexander, Ben Cahill and Mohammed Soliman, AGSI, September 9, 2026.

• Webinar: “The Challenge of Gulf-China Ties: Reassessing Beijing’s Role After the Iran War.” Speakers: Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Aaron Glasserman, and Chuchu Zhang, AGSI, August 27, 2026.

The latest Houthi advances in Yemen, particularly the group’s seizure of Mokha, Dhubab and Perim Island near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, have reopened a wider Gulf debate over Saudi Arabia’s security strategy and the effectiveness of the regional architecture built around it. At the same time, a drone attack targeted Saudi Arabia’s East–West oil pipeline, widening the discussion from Yemen to the vulnerability of Gulf energy infrastructure and maritime routes.

Gulf commentators have approached the escalation from several directions. Some question the effectiveness of Saudi-backed Yemeni forces and recently announced regional defense alliances; others argue that the crisis can no longer be treated primarily as a Saudi-Yemeni confrontation, but as part of a broader struggle involving Iran, the United States and Gulf security.

UAE academic Abdulkhaleq Abdulla offers one of the sharpest critiques, focusing on the regional security arrangements that were supposed to respond to this kind of crisis. He argues that Saudi Arabia should “review its policies and reconsider its relations with the countries closest to it in its Gulf neighborhood,” rather than continuing to establish alliances whose practical value remains uncertain.

Abdulla asks what has become of the maritime defense alliance established in July to protect Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, and whether there are concrete steps to activate it. He raises the same question about the Makkah alliance linking Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, established in August on the principle that an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all three. For him, the present escalation is “the moment of truth” for alliances that received considerable attention when announced but now appear uncertain in their response.

Kuwaiti academic Ayed Al-Manna shifts the criticism toward the internationally recognized Yemeni government. He focuses on the withdrawal of government forces from Hays, Al-Khawkhah, Mokha, Dhubab and Perim Island and argues that the retreat requires investigation.

His central question is how exposed Houthi forces, despite facing air strikes, were able to overrun positions held by government units that were supposedly better equipped and more capable. Al-Manna therefore places attention on the weakness of the Yemeni forces upon which any Saudi strategy against the Houthis ultimately depends.

Read more

Geopolitics

• “Saudi Arabia Shuts Down Pipeline That Was a Crucial Hormuz Bypass.” WSJ, September 11, 2026.

“The crucial East-West pipeline can carry up to 7 million barrels of crude a day 750 miles from Saudi Arabia’s oil-producing heartland on the Persian Gulf to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. From there, the Saudis had been able to ship millions of barrels of oil to customers around the world.”

Go Deeper: “Saudis shut down oil pipeline as Houthis tighten grip on Red Sea shipping.” Reuters, September 11, 2026.

• “Saudi crown prince sought US military help from Trump with Houthis, sources say.” Reuters, September 11, 2026.

“Trump held at least two phone conversations with the Saudi leader on Thursday and did not agree to the U.S. striking Houthis, the sources said. Washington told Riyadh that it would help with intelligence sharing and targeting, they added.”

Go Deeper: “Scoop: MBS urged Trump to strike Houthis amid Red Sea threat.” AXIOS, September 11, 2026.

• “Iraq Under Pressure After Drone Strikes Close Key Saudi Pipeline.” Bloomberg, September 12, 2026

“Iraq has been under pressure to try and rein in local Iran-backed militias from helping other proxy groups across the region, but has had little success and its territory has become a key base for Tehran’s retaliation across the Gulf.”

Go Deeper: “Iraq orders closure of Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran, two sources say.” Reuters, September 11, 2026.

• “Xi urges BRICS peace role in Middle East, courts Modi on India visit.” Reuters, September 12, 2026.

“Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the BRICS bloc to be a peacemaker in the Middle East conflict, in ​an address to a summit of member countries in New Delhi on ‌Saturday..”

“China will work with other BRICS members in that role, as the war ‘does not serve the common interests of the international community’, state-run CCTV quoted Xi as saying.”

• “Iran says will discuss Strait of Hormuz with Gulf states on Monday.” Al Jazeera, September 11, 2026.

“Iran is expected to meet with Gulf states in Oman on Monday to discuss the Strait of Hormuz, the country’s Foreign Ministry announced..”

“In a statement on Friday, the ministry said the meeting is intended to ‘promote better understanding among the countries of the region and help strengthen shared regional security’.”

Go Deeper: “No signed Hormuz deal expected yet from Oman meeting on Monday, Iranian official says.” Reuters, September 12, 2026.

• “As Saudi tensions with Iran-backed Houthis escalate, mediator Pakistan faces pressure to choose a side.” Reuters, September 11, 2026.

“Pakistani officials worry the Houthi threat is more likely to draw Islamabad into a war than Iranian missile strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure were earlier this year. Pakistani soldiers are deployed near the Saudi border with Yemen, two Pakistani officials told Reuters in July, increasing their direct exposure.”

Go Deeper: “Houthi advance along Yemeni coast threatens Saudi oil exports.” Reuters, September 10, 2026.

• “Algeria to sever diplomatic ties with UAE.” BBC, September 11, 2026.

“Algeria is severing diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates after ‘provocative or hostile’ acts by the Gulf state, its foreign ministry said.”

• “Saudi Arabia could give UN nuclear watchdog greater inspection powers.” SEMAFOR, September 9, 2026.

“Saudi officials are negotiating a bilateral deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency that would include additional obligations for monitoring and verification. The Saudi-US deal would favor American firms over Chinese and Russian competitors, but is less restrictive in other areas. Saudi Arabia has not signed up to the “Additional Protocol” that grants IAEA inspectors sweeping access. Iran had implemented that protocol under its 2015 nuclear deal.”

Market & Economy

• “Iran war blows hole in Qatar budget.” SEMAFOR, September 9, 2026.

“Qatar posted its widest quarterly budget deficit since 2016 as the Iran war choked off most of its liquefied natural gas exports through the Strait of Hormuz. The 21.2 billion-riyal ($5.8 billion) second-quarter shortfall was almost double the previous quarter’s, and there are few signs that passage through the strait is easing. Still, several Qatari LNG tankers are heading toward the Gulf, which suggests there are expectations that shipments could resume soon, Bloomberg reported.”

Go Deeper: “Qatar State Budget 2026” Ministry of Finance, 2026.

• “UAE revises AI data center plan after Iranian attacks, sources say.” Reuters, September 11, 2026.

“The United Arab Emirates is quietly revising plans for a 5-gigawatt AI data center project – one of the biggest outside the U.S. – after the Iran ​war prompted a rethink of how and where critical infrastructure should be built, six people familiar with the matter told Reuters.”

Go Deeper: “Data Is Now the Front Line of Warfare.” CSIS, March 19, 2026.

• “Kuwait Oil Exports Recover as Tankers Find Ways Through Hormuz.” Bloomberg, September 8, 2026.

“Kuwait’s crude shipments have recovered to almost two-thirds of the 1.6 million barrels a day it exported on average last year as more tankers find ways to navigate Hormuz. Exports had slumped to multiyear lows after the Iran war began in late February.”

• “QatarEnergy seeks US LNG deals through to 2031, sources say.” Reuters, September 11, 2026.

“The contract talks are part of the company’s efforts to replace lost volumes from its Ras Laffan facility after two of its 14 LNG trains and a gas-to-liquids (GTL) facility were damaged by Iranian strikes ​in March, the sources said. The discussions also mark a shift from QatarEnergy’s purchases of dozens of U.S. spot ​LNG cargoes to help meet commitments to some of its Asian clients, suggesting it is now ⁠seeking longer-term solutions to cover the shortfall.”

• “Kuwait endorses improved public tenders law.” Zawya, September 10, 2026.

“They also include raising the financial limit for contracts under the jurisdiction of the Central Agency for Public Tenders (CAPT) to KWD 1 million ($3.3 million), with the possibility of increasing or decreasing this limit by the cabinet.”

Go Deeper: “Decree Law No. 67 of 2026: The Corporatization of Kuwait’s Oil Sector.” Mondaq, September 10, 2026.

• “UAE Pledges $46 Billion to Germany to Diversify From US.” Bloomberg, September 10, 2026.

“The UAE’s latest plans come on top of the €34 billion it has already invested in Germany. Elsewhere in Europe, the Gulf nation has pledged a similar amount to Italy and as much as €50 billion to France. The country, among Trump’s staunchest allies, has also committed $1.4 trillion to the US.”

• “Qatar’s Estithmar Holding unit bags $228mln deal for Saudi stadium hosting FIFA World Cup 2034” Zawya, September 11, 2026.

“Elegancia Arabia Trading, the contracting services unit of the Doha-listed Estithmar Holding, has secured an 829 million Qatari riyal ($228 million) contract for Saudi Arabia’s Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Stadium, one of the sites that will host the FIFA World Cup 2034 matches.”

• “Dubai Aerospace Enterprise secures $2.1bln syndicated loan.” Zawya, September 11, 2026.

“In March, the aircraft lessor secured a $2.8 billion revolving credit facility for fleet expansion, replacing a previous $1.4 billion arrangement and increasing its revolver capacity to $4 billion.”

• “Saudis Weigh Merging EA With Savvy to Create Global Gaming Giant.” Bloomberg, September 10, 2026.

“Such a combination would represent a major shift in the structure of the Saudi sovereign wealth fund’s gaming strategy, potentially giving it a single vehicle through which to make acquisitions, develop games and exploit intellectual property across different parts of the $214 billion industry.”

• “Musk’s Boring Company raises $3bln in UAE-led round, valuing startup at $23bln.” Zawya, September 10, 2026.

“The Boring Company (TBC), founded by Elon Musk, has secured $3 billion in its Series D funding round, led by the United Arab Emirates and affiliated investment entities, valuing the tunnelling and infrastructure startup at $23 billion.”

• “Kuwait housing projects to deliver 4,750 homes under developer partnership model” Zawya, September 10, 2026.

“Last month, the authority had prequalified 22 consortiums comprising 41 Kuwaiti and international companies for the projects in East Saad Al-Abdullah City (ESA-1); Al-Mutlaa (M-3), and West Saad Al Abdullah City and Jaber Al Ahmad (WSA-1 and J-1)”

• “UAE-Based Consortium Leads $1 Billion Satellite Project.” Bloomberg, September 9, 2026.

“A consortium of companies, led by the UAE’s Marlan Space and US-French space startup Loft Orbital, plans to invest $1 billion as they add 40 satellites to an AI-infused constellation.”

• “Saudi PIF launches firm to develop tourism, residential area on Gulf coast.” Reuters, September 7, 2026.

“The project, spanning around 20 square kilometres (7.7 sq. miles) with a ​10-km waterfront, is expected to accommodate more than ​16,000 housing units alongside hotels and other commercial facilities.”

• “Anthropic flags UAE-linked misuse of AI targeting the Muslim Brotherhood.” Semafor, September 11, 2026.

“Anthropic said in a report that a UAE-linked influence operation used Claude AI to target the Muslim Brotherhood. The operation used around 300 fake social-media accounts, created a front NGO, ghost-wrote testimony to be used at the UN, and compiled files on European lawmakers, journalists, and UN officials. The company traced the campaign “with high confidence to UAE government officials.” The UAE Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.”

Go Deeper: “Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026.” Anthropic, September 10, 2026. [PDF].

• “Saudi Red Sea destination begins operations with giant off-grid renewable energy system.” Arab News, September 6, 2026.

“The system was designed to meet the destination’s initial energy needs and can be expanded as future phases come online. It is capable of generating up to 760,000 megawatt-hours of clean electricity annually, helping avoid an estimated 600,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions each year.”

• “Saudi soccer cuts spending.” SEMAFOR, September 8, 2026.

“Average fees have fallen by a third since 2023, while player sales hit a record $105 million. Saudi Arabia still ranked seventh globally for spending..”

Go Deeper: “Saudi soccer enters an era of prudent spending.” SEMAFOR, July 30, 2026.

• Book: Teitelbaum, Joshua, “King Abdullah and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Tribes and Networks in Modern Saudi Arabia.” Stanford Press, October, 2026.

• Research: “Visions of Gulf Security in an Era of Uncertainty: Between External Alignment and Regional Autonomy.” Rory Miller and Şaban Kardaş, Middle East Policy, September 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran War and the Gulf’s Clean Energy Ambitions.” Christopher Gooding, AGSI, August 31, 2026.

• Analysis: “Trump’s ‘American Opec’ is a challenge to the Gulf.” Frank Kane, AGBI, September 1, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf’s biggest port Jebel Ali waits for the war to end.” Manal Albarakati, Semafor, September 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement: The Makings of a New Security Architecture.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, September 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf States Divide the Work of Rebuilding Syria.” Dania Arayssi, AGSI, September 1, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf Economic Infrastructure Buildout.” Robert Mogielnicki, AGSI, September 3, 2026.

• Analysis: “When It Comes to US Security Arrangements, Gulf States Suffer an Agency Deficit.” Khalid Al-Jufairi, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, September 3, 2026.

• Webinar: “Operation Economic Outcast: Will Economic Pressure on Iran Work, and Are the Gulf Countries On Board?“ Speakers: Tareq Alotaiba, Sara Bazoobandi, Ryan Bohl and Kristin Smith Diwan, AGSI, September 2, 2026.

Geopolitics

• “Qatar rejects Iran’s justification for attacks, says civilian impact is ‘well-documented’.” Khaleej Times, September 5, 2025.

“Al Ansari said the document cited by Iran was a safety and security risk assessment prepared for the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference. He stressed that it was neither a comprehensive factual record nor a legal assessment of the events.”

• “U.S. approves potential sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions-Extend Range to Saudi Arabia for $5 billion.” Reuters, September 4, 2026.

“The ​State Department ​also said it had approved ‌a ⁠possible sale of AGT-1500 engines to Saudi Arabia ​for an ​estimated $750 ⁠million. The principal contractor ​for sale of ​the ⁠engines is Honeywell, the department ⁠said.”

• “Saudi Nuclear Agreement Could Open a Path to 20% Enrichment.” WSJ, September 2, 2026.

“The text of the accord was shared with lawmakers last week along with a raft of related documents. It outlines a road map for how uranium might be enriched in the kingdom’s territory after further consultations, including at a level of nearly 20%.”

• “Saudi Grain Giant Shifts Away From Black Sea as War Roils Supply.” Bloomberg, September 4, 2026.

“The Russia-Ukraine conflict has intensified this summer, damaging grain terminals and sharply reducing exports from both countries. The disruption has pushed up a raft of commodity prices, with barley delivered to Saudi Arabia now as much as 25% more expensive than two months ago, according to Aldharrab.”

Market & Economy

• “Saudis Explore About $8 Billion in Loans as War Strains Finances.” Bloomberg, August 31, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia has emerged as one of the most active emerging-market borrowers, raising about $6 billion in domestic and international bonds this year, while Aramco has raised another $4 billion. Its sovereign wealth fund raised $7 billion in May, one of the first public-market deals since the Iran war began.”

• “Kuwait issues decree allowing government to borrow from wealth fund.” Zawya, September 3, 2026.

“Kuwait’s government issued a decree on Tuesday allowing it to borrow from its more than $1 trillion sovereign wealth fund, ending a decades-old ban and helping support the state treasury as lower oil revenues and disruptions to shipping on the Strait of Hormuz weigh on public finances.”

• “Major UAE Oil Refinery Returns to Full Capacity After War Hit.” Bloomberg, August 31, 2026.

“Adnoc has been raising exports of oil products such as diesel and jet fuel from the Ruwais refinery, the people said, asking not to be identified because the information is private. The company was able to run the facility, which has the capacity to process 922,000 barrels a day of crude, at its full potential about a month ago, one person said.”

• “Chinese tech firms deepen ties in Saudi Arabia.” Semafor, Sep 4, 2026.

“AWS, for one, is building $5.3 billion worth of data centers in the kingdom. And as part of a deal to secure export licenses for advanced chips from the US government, HUMAIN will not allow Chinese frontier AI models to be trained on its compute capacity. Instead, its CEO said the firm will offer access to Chinese open-source models on its Saudi data centers.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi AI firm HUMAIN to launch giant global VC fund this year.” Semafor, September 3, 2026.

• “UAE bank credit growth surges ahead of Gulf peers.” AGBI, September 4, 2026.

“Gross credit reached AED2.76 trillion ($752 billion) at the end of June, up 18 percent from a year earlier and 7 percent since December, the latest central bank data shows.”

• “Dubai launches AI property platform, cuts registration time by up to 80%.” Zawya, September 3, 2026.

“Dubai Land Department (DLD) has launched the ‘Initial Registration’ platform to streamline the developer journey and integrate project registration, real estate transaction registration and escrow account management. By deploying artificial intelligence, automating processes and delivering more efficient and transparent digital services, the platform supports the sector’s readiness for growth and reinforces Dubai’s position as a global destination for real estate investment.”

• “Kuwait boosts oil sector spending.” Zawya, September 1, 2026.

“KPC said in its annual report that capital spending swelled to nearly 2.3 billion Kuwaiti dinars ($7.5 billion) from around KWD 1.9 billion ($6.19 billion) in the 2024/2025 fiscal year, an increase of KWD 400 million year-on-year.”

• “Oil windfall cuts Oman budget gap but subsidy worries remain.” AGBI, September 4, 2026.

“The sultanate recorded a fiscal deficit of just OMR17 million ($44 million) in the first half of 2026, down from OMR259 million in the same period last year, according to the Ministry of Finance.”

“Total public revenues rose 13 percent to OMR6.6 billion, as oil revenues rose 10 percent year on year and gas revenues increased 32 percent over the period.”

• “OPEC+ Sticks With Plan to Keep Oil Output Quotas Unchanged.” Bloomberg, September 6, 2026.

“Despite the reduced flows, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies continued to raise quotas during the war to nominally complete the reversal of output curbs made in 2023, and potentially give some members extra leeway to bolster output once the fighting subsides.”

Local Updates

• “Kuwait documents Iranian attacks in Grade 10 textbook, stresses national unity.” Khaleej Times, September 4, 2026.

“The textbook details attacks it attributes to Iran and Iranian-backed groups, carried out using missiles and drones against vital and government facilities as well as residential areas.”

• “Qatar still planning to host MotoGP and F1 races despite regional conflict.” Khaleej Times, September 1, 2026.

“‘Qatar has been safe for months now. Our airport is 100 per cent operational, including transit flights between Asia and Europe. If you visit Qatar, you will see we are back to normal life, so we’re really looking forward to hosting races again soon,’ Al Mannai said in a QA issued by the QMMF.”

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited France on August 23–24, 2026, meeting President Emmanuel Macron in a trip that marked another step in the expanding relationship between Riyadh and Paris. The visit coincided with the centenary of formal Saudi-French political relations and included the first meeting of the French-Saudi Strategic Partnership Council. The two governments presented a broad agenda spanning defense, investment, energy, artificial intelligence, culture, and entertainment, while also discussing regional security and the future of the Middle East.

Yet commentary on the visit suggests that its significance lies less in any single agreement than in the different transformations it appears to represent. For some, France offers Riyadh another pillar in an increasingly diversified foreign policy. For others, the relationship is becoming a mechanism for building the industries envisioned under Vision 2030. Still others focused on culture, gaming, and Saudi Arabia’s growing effort to project itself internationally through new forms of soft power. Taken together, these readings present the visit not simply as another episode in Saudi-French diplomacy, but as a reflection of how Saudi Arabia increasingly defines its place abroad.

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In this issue, we share our conversation with Dr. Justin Dargin. Dr. Justin Dargin is an internationally recognized expert in energy markets, climate governance, industrial policy, and economic development in emerging economies. He has advised or worked with organizations including OPEC, the World Bank, Shell, and the United Nations, and currently serves as Chairman of Tangelic, where he focuses on energy infrastructure, carbon markets, and sustainable investment across Africa and the Global South.

A former Fulbright Scholar and researcher at Harvard and Oxford, Dr. Dargin has published five books and more than 100 works on energy, climate policy, and political economy. He holds a D.Phil. from Oxford and an LL.M. from Georgetown, and speaks Arabic and Spanish. As a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, his research examines how climate investment and infrastructure can strengthen public institutions, state capacity, and long-term economic resilience in emerging economies.

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