Expert Interviews is a new series at The Gulf Nashra, where we sit down with leading researchers, policymakers, and analysts to examine the political, economic, and geopolitical dynamics shaping the Gulf, and what they mean for the rest of the world.

We're starting this week with Kate Dourian, an energy expert and nonresident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI) in Washington D.C., with extensive experience in global energy markets and Middle East energy dynamics. She previously served as editor of Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) and has held senior roles in energy analysis and media. Her work focuses on oil markets, energy security, and the geopolitical implications of energy developments in the Gulf and beyond.

In the context of the ongoing Gulf war, energy infrastructure and supply chains have emerged as central vulnerabilities shaping both regional stability and global markets. Disruptions to shipping routes, attacks on production facilities, and uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have underscored the strategic importance of Gulf energy systems as critical nodes in the global energy order.

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Q&A

1. The war has exposed the vulnerability of critical Gulf energy infrastructure. How structurally resilient are current systems, and what does this reveal about long-term energy security in the region?

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has set a precedent and it’s difficult to see how flows through the chokepoint can return to pre-conflict status without a comprehensive solution. Iran for years repeatedly threatened to shut down the waterway but never did until now. Given this ever-present risk, only two GCC countries – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – were prepared, having invested in bypass routes. Saudi Aramco once again showed itself to be an efficient operator and reliable supplier, having switched exports to Yanbu at the start of the Iran war and quickly ramp up flows through the East-West pipeline. Abu Dhabi was already exporting Murban crude through Fujairah and a new pipeline linking its offshore fields should be completed in 2027, allowing it to export oil without going through the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait, which has no other option, could eventually link up with Saudi pipeline infrastructure. But that would not allow the UAE to export LNG. Qatar has no fallback option and could be the most affected by a protracted shutdown.

2. To what extent has the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz reshaped global energy flows, and are we seeing the early stages of a permanent reconfiguration of export routes?

The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has already reshaped global energy flows, accelerating a shift towards alternative export routes, particularly Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea outlet at Yanbu and the UAE’s Fujairah terminal, which are likely to become more permanent features of regional export strategy. While seaborne trade will remain dominant, recent events have underscored the vulnerability of Gulf transit routes and prompted producers to prioritize bypass options where available. At the same time, Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure across the GCC have eroded the fragile trust that had emerged during the recent period of détente, raising longer-term political risk. Taken together, these developments point not to a wholesale reconfiguration of global energy flows, but to a gradual and likely lasting adjustment, with greater emphasis on diversification, redundancy and security of export routes. It’s worth noting that many of the changes in energy flows that were due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in 2023 have become permanent as some ship owners still avoid the Bab el Mandeb.

3. Gulf states have long relied on energy exports for economic and geopolitical leverage. Does the current conflict strengthen or undermine that leverage?

The conflict has had a mixed impact on Gulf leverage. On the one hand, higher prices should in theory strengthen the region’s economic and geopolitical weight. But in practice, the inability of several producers to fully access export markets has limited those gains. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and, to a lesser extent, Oman have been best placed to benefit thanks to their ability to route volumes outside the Strait of Hormuz, while Qatar — heavily reliant on uninterrupted LNG flows — is among the most exposed, and Kuwait remains constrained until it can secure alternative outlets for its crude and products. More broadly, the disruption risks undermining the Gulf’s role as a stabilizing force in the global economy: strong GCC balance sheets and outward investment, particularly via sovereign wealth funds, have been an important source of global liquidity. A prolonged hit to export revenues would therefore have knock-on effects not just for domestic economies, but for global investment flows as well.

4. How viable are proposed alternatives, such as pipeline diversification or bypass routes, for reducing dependence on chokepoints like Hormuz?

The viability of alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz is limited. The most credible is the UAE’s planned new pipeline to enable exports from its offshore fields, for which a contract has already been awarded, building on existing bypass infrastructure. Beyond that, most proposed pipeline projects have been discussed for decades but have failed to materialize due to political disputes, security concerns and a lack of sustained commitment or funding. Many of these proposals also target the European market but the main growth in demand is in Asia, undermining their commercial logic. Crucially, even if export routes can be diversified, Hormuz remains indispensable as a conduit for imports, with most countries in the region reliant on it for seaborne inflows. As a result, while bypass options can provide some mitigation, they are unlikely to significantly reduce the region’s structural dependence on the strait.

5. In a scenario where Iran retains or increases its influence over maritime routes, what would be the most immediate economic consequences for Gulf producers and global markets?

If Iran retains or expands its influence over maritime routes, the immediate economic consequences would be severe for both Gulf producers and global markets. For exporters, the key impact would be constrained volumes rather than higher revenues: even as prices rise — with crude already pushed above $100/b following tanker attacks — the inability to move barrels would limit income, particularly for producers without alternative routes. At the same time, shipping risks would surge, with insurance premiums spiking and vessel traffic collapsing, effectively throttling trade regardless of physical supply availability. For global markets, the result would be a sustained supply shock.

6. What are the most critical lessons Gulf energy policymakers should draw from this conflict, particularly regarding balancing market stability, infrastructure protection, and geopolitical risk?

The conflict underscores three core lessons for Gulf energy policymakers. First, market stability cannot be taken for granted: even short-lived disruptions can upend supply flows and undermine confidence, reinforcing the need for diversified export routes and greater redundancy. Second, infrastructure protection has become as critical as production capacity, with attacks on ports, pipelines and storage facilities highlighting the vulnerability of concentrated energy systems and the importance of investing in both physical and cyber resilience. Third, geopolitical risk is no longer a vague threat but a reality that needs to shape future energy strategy. GCC policymakers should consider closer integration and interconnections to insulate themselves and withstand this type of shock. A common gas grid, train links and a focus on shared economic benefits rather than political and ideological differences would make for a much stronger bloc and benefit all.

7. Do you see this war accelerating the Gulf’s long-term energy transition strategies, or reinforcing its dependence on hydrocarbons as a security asset?

I think the current crisis will accelerate the energy transition in importing countries but will likely delay some renewables projects in the Gulf as the priority will be to recoup the loss of oil and gas import revenues in the aftermath of the war. The conflict has reinforced the world’s dependence on hydrocarbons while exposing the vulnerability of the world’s most important energy chokepoint. Solar and wind offer not only lower emissions but a degree of insulation. The crisis has also exposed just how concentrated the global energy system remains. A solar panel once installed stays in place and produces energy that does not require a tanker to travel by sea and neither does a wind turbine.

Nashra Picks

Geopolitics

• Analysis: “MBS hosts Sudan’s Burhan in Jeddah as $1.5B Saudi-backed arms deal stalls.” Rosaleen Carroll, Al-Monitor, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Pakistan’s quiet fighter jet deployment to Saudi Arabia signals Gulf anxiety.” Sabena Siddiqui, Al-Monitor, April 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia pursues quiet diplomacy as Trump pushes Israel normalization.” Beatrice Farhat, Al-Monitor, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Hollow Promise of Arab Solidarity.” Tareq Alotaiba, AGSI, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “Egypt and the Gulf: A Relationship under Pressure.” Imad K. Harb, Arab Center, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran War Is a Stress Test for Gulf States.” Frederic Wehrey and Charles Johnson,Carnegie, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran war has forced the US-Gulf alliance out of the shadows.” Eric Alter, Atlantic Council, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “‘They have been exposed’: The Iran war upends Gulf states’ security and business model.” Stefanie Hausheer Ali, Atlantic Council, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf’s Iran Problem Isn’t Solved.” John Calabrese, AGSI, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf Security Strategies After the Iran War.” Jean-Loup Samaan, AGSI, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Can Qatar Still Mediate After Becoming a Target?” Faisal Al-Hanzab, AGSI, April 22, 2026.

Economics

• Analysis: “Six weeks into the conflict, which of the small Arabian Gulf economies are still seeing less activity?” Meshal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Geoeconomic Rebalancing after the Gulf Crisis.” Akram Zaoui, ORF, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “why asia cannot replace gulf crude easily.” Parul Bakshi and Samriddhi Vij, ORF, April 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “Catalysing the GCC’s Waste-to-Energy Prospects for Agriculture.” Leigh Mante, ORF, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Yielding to Shortage: Gulf Crisis Prompts Fertilizer and Food Shocks.” Héla Miniaoui, AGSI, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why did the Met Opera lose its Saudi funding deal?” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “What LIV Golf’s woes suggest about Saudi Arabia’s economic headwinds.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, April 19, 2026.

Podcasts

• Podcast: “Untold Facts About Saudi Cinema.” Fouad Al-Khatib, The Cinema Bulletin, April 23, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “Matthias Jaissle on His Career-Ending Injury to Coaching Success.” MO Show, April 18, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Is the Defense System Managed in the UAE?” Abdul Nasser Al-Hamidi, Arab Cast, April 16, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “The Beijing Agreement Has Collapsed, and Iran Drinks the ‘Poisoned Chalice’ Again,” Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, Al-Kalam Khaliji. April 21, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Webinar: “Mending the Rift: Iran and the UAE’s Post-War Ties.” MEI, April 22, 2026. [Eng].

• Webinar: “Transformations in Epistemic Consciousness: From Classical Orientalism to Contemporary Extraction,” Abdullah Habib, Middle East Council, April 21, 2026. [Eng].

Public Debates

Iran’s expansionist project after the recent war: retreat, adaptation, or entrenchment?

The war that swept across the region has left behind a question no ceasefire could resolve: whether the Iranian axis—its militias, proxies, and transnational networks stretching from Beirut to Baghdad—has been fundamentally weakened or merely recalibrated. Across commentary from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, a broad consensus emerges: the axis has not collapsed. It has adapted. The central analytical divide is not over whether Iran incurred significant costs—it clearly did—but whether those costs translate into structural retreat or simply a tactical pause within a longer-term project of regional entrenchment.

On Iraq, Ayman Al-Tamimi, writing from Saudi Arabia, argues that Iran has successfully reproduced the Lebanese model within Baghdad.

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Starting today, Iran War Daily becomes The Daily Roundup. The war shaped this series. However, the Gulf’s story is bigger than any single conflict. Hence, we’re shifting to covering a broader set of topics in the region.

Energy & Stock Markets

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Book: Nadeen Dakkak “Migration to the Gulf in the Arabic Novel.” Edinburgh University Press, June 2026.

Analysis: “Saudi stocks hit 2026 high, bucking global war-driven volatility.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “What LIV Golf’s woes suggest about Saudi Arabia’s economic headwinds.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “China’s Position and Strategic Considerations on the Gulf States’ Involvement in the Iran-US-Israel Conflict.” Bo Wang, MEPEI, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “Can Gulf Green Finance Survive an Oil Price Shock?” Christopher Gooding, AGSI, April 10, 2026.

Analysis: “From Shield to Target: The Gulf’s Security Dilemma.” Nour Eid, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Business as Usual in the UAE?” Rebecca Anne Proctor, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait’s Bidun in the Face of Climate Change are Invisible, yet Exposed.” Courtney Freer, Carnegie, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait Is Stripping Its People of Citizenship at an Unprecedented Rate.”Fatimah Muhammed and Sultan Alamer, New Lines Magazine, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Protection or Vulnerability? Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Iran War.” Rohan Advani, Arab Center, April 14, 2026.

Analysis: “How to Avoid Mutually Assured Devastation in the Gulf.” Daniel Brumberg, Arab Center, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Beyond the Battlefield: The Disruption of Education in the Gulf.” Ibrahim Alhouti, Gulf International Forum, April 16, 2026.

Analysis: “Post-War Dynamics: The Gulf at the Center of a New World Order.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council, April 12, 2026.

Podcast: “Trade, Diversification, and the Future of the GCC.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, April 8, 2026. [Eng].

Podcast: “I Took Responsibility from the Age of 13!” Maytha Al Mehairi, Arab Cast, April 9, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran in Gulf Media Discourse: From Political Memory to the Current War.” Mohammed Al Yahyaei, Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran’s war and the positioning of the Arab intellectual.” Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “The Gulf Is Stronger Than Iran Expects.” Obaid Al-Wasmi, Mahfoof, April 16, 2026.

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Public Debates

The announcement of a ceasefire on April 8, alongside upcoming negotiations reportedly mediated by Pakistan, has reignited a familiar regional debate: does this moment signal the beginning of a durable resolution, or merely another temporary pause that risks reproducing instability—particularly at the expense of Gulf security? At the heart of this debate lies a clear divide between two interpretive camps: one sees it as a necessary turning point driven by structural change within Iran, while the other views it as a tactical pause that may ultimately deepen, rather than resolve, the conflict.

A prominent strand of commentary argues that the ceasefire reflects a deeper transformation within Iran, driven by internal disruption and external pressure. Saudi writer Abdulrahman Al-Rashed frames this moment as historically significant, asserting that “Iran has most likely changed for two main reasons: war and peace.” He links the ceasefire to a restructuring of Iran political leadership, noting that “the leadership of the state has changed due to the assassinations that eliminated a long chain of generals and institutional leaders… at the top of the hierarchy, the Supreme Leader himself.” From this perspective, the scale of recent developments is unprecedented: “in 38 days, Iran faced what it had not faced in 38 years.” This was not a peripheral contest over influence in Syria or Lebanon, but an “existential war” in which the regime fought for survival. Consequently, Tehran now operates under severe constraint, with negotiations representing, in his words, “Tehran last card… little more than a fig leaf” masking a strategic retreat.

Complementing this structural argument is a more normative and forward-looking perspective. Kuwaiti commentator Hamad Alhamad emphasizes the necessity of the ceasefire itself, regardless of its fragility. “There is a fragile ceasefire, but it is far better than the continuation of war and destruction,” he writes, highlighting the global spillover effects of prolonged conflict. For Alhamad, the key question is not whether the truce is perfect, but whether it creates an opportunity for meaningful transformation.

Yet, optimism is not unconditional. Kuwait’s Ahmed Al Dawas introduces a geopolitical layer, questioning why external powers such as Russia and China have not meaningfully intervened on Iran’s behalf. His conclusion is blunt: both powers act strictly according to self-interest. China benefits from a distracted United States, while Russia gains from the depletion of American military resources. As he explains, “every missile… directed toward Iran is one that will not reach the battlefronts in Ukraine.” This reinforces a broader point: Iran’s strategic isolation may push it toward negotiation, but it does not guarantee a stable outcome. Indeed, Al Dawas ultimately expresses skepticism, warning that “I do not believe a ceasefire agreement with Iran will succeed—something is likely to happen.”

Moreover, a more cautious—if not pessimistic—reading of the truce suggests that ceasefires in such conflicts often function as mechanisms for recalibration rather than genuine resolution. Abdullah Khalifah, from the United Arab Emirates, articulates this argument with conceptual clarity, describing the ceasefire as “the most dangerous moment in the conflict.” His reasoning rests on the strategic value of time: “time here is a resource of power, used to rebuild capability under the cover of de-escalation.” In this sense, the truce does not freeze the conflict—it redistributes its dynamics, allowing actors to reposition and regenerate. Without strict enforcement mechanisms, he warns, the ceasefire risks becoming “a space for reproducing the threat.”

A similar conclusion emerges from Omani analyst Ahmed Alameri, though through a different lens. He interprets the truce not as Iranian weakness, but as a reflection of Western constraint. Despite the intensity of US rhetoric, “the relative decline in the pace of escalation… reflects an awareness of the cost of sliding into an open confrontation.” The result, he argues, is not a strategic breakthrough but “a tactical pause” that grants Iran time to “reorganize its political and military positions.” This reading is reinforced by Nasser Al-Zadjali, who goes further by suggesting that the truce itself signals a recovery in Iranian “deterrence.” In his view, the mere ability to impose or secure a pause indicates that Iran has regained a degree of strategic balance.

More critical still is the argument advanced by Saudi commentator Mishari Althaydy, who shifts attention to the substance—or lack thereof—behind the agreement. He raises a series of unresolved questions: “what mechanisms will compel Iran to comply…? And what monitoring and measurement standards will be used?” Without clear answers, the agreement risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. Moreover, he highlights a structural asymmetry: while Iran has absorbed significant losses, “it is impossible for Iran to declare any form of defeat.” This entrenched culture of denial, he argues, has been replicated across its regional network, making genuine concession unlikely. In this context, even the negotiation agenda itself is shifting, with “the Strait of Hormuz” emerging as a new central bargaining arena.

Finally, Saudi Arabia’s Shaher Alnahari captures the ambiguity that defines the current moment. The ceasefire, he writes, “may mark the beginning of a long de-escalation process,” but it may equally be “nothing more than a brief pause on the path to a longer and more dangerous conflict.” The outcome, in other words, remains fundamentally uncertain.

Taken together, the debate reveals a central tension: whether the truce represents structural change or strategic delay. What unites both camps, however, is a shared recognition that the ceasefire is not an endpoint, but a moment of redefinition—one that will either close the current cycle of escalation or lay the groundwork for its next phase.

Selected Gulf Opinions

“China has adopted a position characterized by neutrality and pragmatism regarding the US–Israeli war on Iran, seeking to balance the determinants and guiding principles of its foreign policy and its relations with strategic partners, while hedging against the potential repercussions of this war on its strategic interests. This includes preserving Beijing’s interests in the Middle East—particularly those related to energy and regional stability—alongside managing its relationship with the United States in a way that limits the prospects of escalation between them.”

Fahad Al-Mudahki, Al Ayam, (Bahrain), April 11, 2026.

“The Arab citizen experiences a vast gap between the dream of a ‘United Arab States’ and a reality that offers nothing but wars and closed borders. As Arab summits continue in their largely ‘protocol-driven’ form, yielding little of substance, public distrust in these meetings has grown, prompting a search for a new form of political struggle that reflects popular aspirations beyond institutions that have proven unable to end the severe crises across the Arab world.”

Nayef Sharar, Al Jarida, (Kuwait), April 10, 2026.

“One of Trump’s campaign promises was to dismantle what he called the ‘OPEC cartel monopoly.’ Today, after the United States has taken control of Venezuelan oil, it should be understood that Iran’s targeting of Gulf oil and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz primarily serve the United States by enabling it to dominate the global energy market. This also suggests the existence of a systematic plan to weaken OPEC cohesion, in which Iran is a participant.”

Meshal Al Khaldi, X, (Saudi Arabia), April 10, 2026.

“What is most regrettable about these events is the disgraceful Arab position. How can Lebanon—while it is a member of the Arab League—be left alone under this bombardment, without a word, without pressure, without action? Arab capitals merely watch the situation unfold, witnessing the fall of innocents and the destruction and devastation, while some states issue only timid condemnations. Where is Arab solidarity? Or is it merely slogans raised in meetings and Arab summits?

Even more troubling is that the so-called free world, which claims to defend human dignity, has chosen silence, turning a blind eye to the blatant violation of the international ceasefire—as if Lebanese blood were worth less than any other.”

Hamad Al-Hadrami, Al Roya, (Oman), April 9, 2025.

“In the most critical moments, such as the repeated wars on Gaza, the Iranian role has appeared largely indirect—limited to support through proxies, without political or military action matching the intensity of its declared rhetoric. This gap between verbal escalation and practical caution reinforces the impression that the Palestinian issue is used in Iranian policy more as a pretext or a pressure tool than as an independent strategic priority.”

Ahmed Alhosani, Al Etihad, (UAE), April 8, 2026.

“The firmness of Rafsanjani, his flexible political mind, his commitment to preserving the state and its institutions, his focus on reconstruction and moving beyond the phase of revolutionary slogans, and his awareness that Iran cannot remain isolated from its regional environment—these are qualities Iran needs in a leader.

There may be figures today who resemble Rafsanjani in some respects, but none possess the full range of his attributes—most importantly, his courage and his ability to persuade, and to tell the third Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, what must be said: to stop the bloodshed, end the attacks on neighboring Gulf states, and prevent the region from descending into a chaos that would harm everyone, with Iran among the first to suffer its consequences.”

Hassan Al Mustafa, Asharq Al Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), April 7, 2026.

“For decades, the prevailing model in the Middle East was based on direct deterrence, displays of power, and reliance on military superiority as a decisive tool. However, this model has begun to lose its effectiveness in an environment that has become more complex and interconnected. Wars are no longer decided solely on the battlefield; their effects now extend to the economy, supply chains, energy markets, and even the media sphere, where narratives are shaped and perceptions are redefined.

In this context, the nature of conflict has shifted from direct military confrontation to a multi-dimensional network. Influence over energy markets can carry as much weight as military strikes, managing political alliances may rival battlefield superiority in importance, and the ability to shape public opinion has become an integral part of the equation of power.”

Abdullah Aletaibi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), April 7, 2026.

“The dual veto (Russian–Chinese) yesterday revealed two points. First, that Russia and China’s interests in Iran are deeper and more important than their interests in the GCC. Second, that Iran enjoys international political cover that will positively influence its role in the future.”

Abdullah Alnefisi, X, (Kuwait), April 7, 2026.

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🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Iran has attacked Saudi Arabia’s Jubail petrochemical complex, IRGC says.” Reuters, April 7, 2026.

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Five weeks of war have reshaped how Gulf publics think, debate, and disagree. The conversation is richer than most outside coverage suggests. This week's digest brings together the sharpest Gulf commentary on the conflict, curated reading and listening for those who want to go deeper, and the perspectives that aren't making it into the international press.

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Public Debates

The question of who is “winning” the current confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel has evolved into a broader intellectual divide across Gulf commentary—reflecting not only battlefield interpretations, but deeper disagreements over power, narrative, and long-term consequences. While some argue that Washington has achieved strategic gains, others insist that Iran has imposed new constraints on the region. Between these views, a third position emerges: the outcome remains unclear, but the Gulf is bearing the heaviest cost.

A balanced reading begins with Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani from Qatar, who frames the situation in terms of risk rather than victory. He warns that escalation may persist because “there are parties that want this war to continue… knowing its consequences will not directly affect them,” pointing to Israel, whose ports “remain open to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.” By contrast, the Gulf faces systemic exposure: “the continued choking of the Strait of Hormuz could lead to serious economic repercussions… not only for the region, but for the global economy.” His key question—“who benefits from this collapse?”—captures the ambiguity, especially as he suggests that “the United States is not the real beneficiary.”

This uncertainty is reinforced by Bahraini writer Jaffar Salman, who focuses on messaging rather than outcomes. He argues that Donald Trump delivers multiple narratives simultaneously: “to Europe, readiness to stop the war… to the Gulf, Iran, and Israel, continued escalation… to the American public, victory.” In this view, rhetoric itself becomes a strategic tool.

One major camp argues that Iran holds the upper hand—not through decisive military superiority, but through its ability to impose costs. Kuwaiti thinker Abdullah Alnefisi states that “Trump is looking for an exit… he fell into an Israeli trap.” Qatari analyst Mohammed Alahmari similarly argues that Washington has effectively “ceded” leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as “the real nuclear bomb of Iran.”

This view is reinforced by battlefield persistence. Saudi writer Khaled Almalik notes that despite repeated U.S. claims of victory, “Iran continues to attack Israel, American forces, and Gulf states,” raising doubts about whether its capabilities have truly been neutralized. Even if U.S. claims were accurate, he warns of a strategic vacuum that could enable Israeli expansion under full Western backing.

Economically, Iran’s leverage appears clearer. Saudi economist Hebshi Alshimary notes that roughly “20 million barrels of oil per day” pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making disruptions globally consequential. The crisis has exposed fragility: some Gulf producers cut output due to storage limits, while shipping costs surged sharply. Iran, in effect, has weaponized geography into economic pressure.

Omani perspectives extend this argument further. Abbas Alzadjali argues that Iran’s asymmetric responses have disrupted energy markets and imposed insecurity across the Gulf, raising questions about whether the war reflects strategic necessity or “overconfidence in military power.” Meanwhile, Asim Al-Shidi contends that the U.S.-led security model has lost “legitimacy,” now seen as aligned with Israeli dominance rather than regional balance.

Yet another camp insists that the United States has achieved meaningful gains. Kuwaiti writer Saad bin Tiflah Alajmi argues that U.S.-Israeli actions disrupted Iran’s plans, “confusing the timing” of a premeditated attack on Israel, noting that “85 percent of Iranian drones and missiles” were instead directed toward the Gulf and Jordan.

Emirati analyst Salah Al-Ghul emphasizes Iran’s growing isolation, arguing that continued attacks have deepened its marginalization and that any settlement must include “clear guarantees to prevent repeated aggression” across missiles, maritime pressure, and proxy networks.

From Kuwait, Muhammad Nasser Al-Atwan argues that Iranian targeting patterns reveal weakness: rather than striking fortified U.S. bases, Iran focuses on civilian infrastructure, suggesting a strategy of “economic coercion and psychological warfare” against Gulf societies.

Finally, U.S. advantage also appears in narrative control. Omani writer Mubarak Al-Hamdani notes that a single U.S. statement can move global markets within minutes, highlighting a broader “struggle over strategic narratives” and who controls them.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that framing the conflict as a simple U.S. or Iranian victory misses the larger picture. Iran has imposed asymmetric costs, particularly through energy disruption, while the United States retains structural advantages in military, financial, and narrative domains. The most consistent conclusion across Gulf commentary is not who has won, but who is absorbing the consequences: a region caught between escalation, uncertainty, and a shifting balance of power.

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🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Exclusive: SpaceX has held talks with Saudi fund for possible $5 billion investment in IPO, sources say.” Reuters, April 2, 2026.

• “Mecca airport, metro plans move forward, says Saudi official.” Gulf News, April 02, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE and Bahrain only Middle East states joining UK coalition to pressure Iran over Hormuz.” Middle East Eye, April 2, 2026.

• “UAE non-oil private sector growth slows to near four-year low in March, PMI shows.” Reuters, April 3, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Exclusive: Italy to get LNG from QatarEnergy-Exxon's US Golden Pass from June, sources say.” Reuters, April 2, 2026.

🇴🇲 Oman

• “Three Ships Appear to Enter Hormuz by New Route Along Oman Coast.” Bloomberg, April 2, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Kuwait's Mina al-Ahmadi refinery hit by multiple drones, fire breaks out; no injuries.” Khaleej Times, April 3, 2026.