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🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Iran has attacked Saudi Arabia’s Jubail petrochemical complex, IRGC says.” Reuters, April 7, 2026.

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Attacks Summary

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Attacks Summary

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Attacks Summary

Updates

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Exclusive: SpaceX has held talks with Saudi fund for possible $5 billion investment in IPO, sources say.” Reuters, April 2, 2026.

• “Mecca airport, metro plans move forward, says Saudi official.” Gulf News, April 02, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE and Bahrain only Middle East states joining UK coalition to pressure Iran over Hormuz.” Middle East Eye, April 2, 2026.

• “UAE non-oil private sector growth slows to near four-year low in March, PMI shows.” Reuters, April 3, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Exclusive: Italy to get LNG from QatarEnergy-Exxon's US Golden Pass from June, sources say.” Reuters, April 2, 2026.

🇴🇲 Oman

• “Three Ships Appear to Enter Hormuz by New Route Along Oman Coast.” Bloomberg, April 2, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Kuwait's Mina al-Ahmadi refinery hit by multiple drones, fire breaks out; no injuries.” Khaleej Times, April 3, 2026.

Attacks Summary

Updates

• “Gulf states considering new pipeline amid Iran curb on Hormuz Strait: Report.” Middle East Eye, April 2, 2026.

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Saudi Arabia bridles at Donald Trump’s way of waging war.” Financial Times, April 1, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia executes prominent businessman over participation in 2011 Qatif protests.” Middle East Eye, April 1, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “ADNOC Drilling shareholders approve $1 billion 2025 dividend.” The National, April 2, 2026.

• “UAE airlines update entry, transit rules for Iranian nationals.” Khaleej News, April 2, 2026.

• “’Misleading reporting’: UAE denies shift in defensive posture amid Iran war.” Khaleej News, April 1, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Iran strikes tanker off Qatar coast as Tehran’s attacks on Gulf states persist.” Euro News, April 1, 2026.

• “LNG start by US-Qatari JV to boost gas market amid war disruption.” The National, April 01, 2026.

🇴🇲 Oman

• “First LNG deliveries from Oman to German firm begin despite Iran war.” Reuters, April 1, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Kuwait says it puts out fire in airport fuel tanks after Iranian drone strike.” Reuters, April 1, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “Bahrain takes helm of UN Security Council, pledges action on Iranian aggression.” Arab News, April 01, 2026.

Attacks Summary

Updates

• “Hormuz Flows Tick Up for Iran-Approved Ships Amid Gulf Blockade.” Bloomberg, March 31, 2026.

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Major Saudi Chemical Plant Shuts Down as War Disrupts Supply.” Bloomberg, March 31, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “U.A.E. Wants to Force Hormuz Open and Is Willing to Join the Fight.” WSJ, March 31, 2026.

• “U.A.E.’s Emirates Says Iranian Nationals Barred From Entry, Transit.” WSJ, March 31, 2026.

• “UAE president, Qatar emir discuss Iran’s ‘terrorist’ attacks.” Al Arabiya, March 31, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Qatar says Gulf states ‘unified’ in calling for war de-escalation.” Arab News, March 31, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “Bahrain arrests 3 suspects linked to Hezbollah.” Arab News, March 30, 2026.

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Attacks Summary

States’ Updates

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Saudi pipeline to bypass Strait of Hormuz hits seven million barrel goal.” MSN, March 29, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE has an active role in Iran war and will be pounded if US invades, Iranian sources say.” Middle East Eye, March 27, 2026.

• “Six injured by debris from intercepted Iranian missile in Abu Dhabi” The National, March 28, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Ukraine agrees defence cooperation with UAE, Qatar as Zelenskiy visits Gulf.” Reuters, March 28, 2026.

🇴🇲 Oman

• “Oman says no party has claimed responsibility for attacks on its territory.” Reuters, March 29, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “10 Kuwaiti Soldiers Wounded After Latest Wave of Iranian Missiles and Drones.” WSJ, March. 29, 2026

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “Bahrain Aluminum Giant Alba Says Iranian Attack Targeted Its Facilities.” WSJ, March 28, 2026.

Oil Price: $97.26 (-2.96%)

As of March 25, 2026, Brent crude declined to $97.26/bbl, marking a daily loss of -$2.97 (-2.96%). The pullback follows the prior session’s strong rebound, indicating continued volatility as markets react to shifting supply expectations. Despite the drop, prices remain elevated overall. Since the baseline of February 26 ($70.75), Brent is still up +37.47%.

Source: Investing.com - Brent Oil Historical Data

LNG Price: $284.39 (-3.46%)

As of March 25, 2026, Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG) closed at $284.39, a daily loss of -$10.19 (-3.46%). The stock traded between $282.20 and $289.49, pulling back after the prior session’s strong rally. Despite the decline, LNG remains elevated amid sustained global demand for U.S. energy exports. Since the conflict began, the stock has gained +22.31% from its pre-war close of $232.51 on February 26.

Source: Investing.com - Cheniere Energy (LNG) Historical Data

Strait of Hormuz Status: Critical Blockade

The status remains critical across the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. According to the latest UKMTO update, no new security incidents were reported during the period from 1700 UTC 24 March to 1700 UTC 25 March.

Source: UKMTO

Stock Markets

Attacks Summary

States’ Updates

• “Iran Launched 83% of Missiles and Drones at the Gulf Compared to 17% at Israel.” Asharq Al-Awsat, March 26, 2026.

• “Six Arab Nations Issue Statement Condemning Attacks by Iran-aligned Iraqi Factions.” Asharq Al-Awsat, March 26, 2026.

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

“Saudi Arabia Denies it Favors Prolonging the War.” Asharq Al-Awsat, March 25, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

“Iran war damage to Qatar hits global LNG outlook, upends Asia demand growth.” Reuters, March 26, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

“Kuwait foils plan to assassinate state leaders, busts terror cells.” Khaleej News, March 26, 2026.

Public Opinion

A single tweet can sometimes reveal more than a formal poll—especially when it triggers a unified reaction among influential Gulf commentators. When Dhahi Khalfan urged, “O people of the Arab Gulf… strengthen your cooperation with Israel—this is advice. There is no good in the countries of the region at all,” the response was swift and notably cohesive, amounting to a clear intellectual and moral pushback against his premise. Rather than endorsement, these reactions reflected a shared refusal of normalization under current conditions, alongside a broader insistence on strategic autonomy, political realism, and defined moral boundaries.

From Saudi Arabia, Abdullhadi Alshihri cautioned against generalizations, arguing that each state ultimately acts according to its own interests, yet maintaining that Israel remains an adversary alongside Iran and its regional projects. He stressed that normalization cannot be acceptable or sustainable unless it is tied to a two-state solution, including an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Meanwhile, Saudi commentator Turki Al Rumaih posed a pointed question that echoed widely: “What has Israel offered its allies in the region during this war?”

From Kuwait, Naif Al Ajmi emphasized that Gulf states, despite recent policy divergences, remain “in the same boat,” arguing they are likely to emerge from the war more unified and resilient. He rejected calls to align with Israel as provocative and strategically misguided, warning that both Israel and Iran are attempting to draw the Gulf into a conflict that does not serve its interests. In a similar vein, Abdulaziz Al Anjeri argued that “the disputes within the Arab house are still curable,” while describing Israel as “a security, moral, and strategic burden,” and warning that trusting it amounts to “placing trust in the source of danger.”

Omani voices reinforced the same trajectory with sharper moral framing. Sultan Al Hasani wrote that “seeking support from the executioner is suicide,” adding that aligning with adversaries amid ongoing violence is not cooperation but “complicity in the crime.” Similarly, Mahdi Bu Saidi argued that cooperation with Israel implies acceptance of the occupation of Palestine and complicity in its consequences, effectively signaling that “my country, too, is open to occupation.” Yousef Al Qasmi, also writing from Oman, framed the issue in strategic terms, asserting that real security lies in a “Gulf strong in itself,” not in dependence on external powers that offer no “free security guarantees” and may abandon allies when interests shift.

From Qatar, Halaa Al Thani distilled the moral dimension succinctly: “Palestine is not a matter of opinion; it is a measure of whether you still possess humanity or not.” Meanwhile, Ramzan Alnuaimi captured the scale of the reaction itself, noting that “a single tweet from a ‘trivial person’ is enough to provoke entire populations.” Gulf commentators are reasserting a framework built on self-reliance, regional balance, and principled limits—where security is produced internally, and engagement with others is defined by conditions, not impulses.

Selected Gulf Opinions

• “The statement issued by the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan condemning Iran’s attacks and those of its proxies on their territories does more than express denunciation; it reflects a shift in the architecture of the regional stance. There is a clear alignment among Gulf states and their partners in defining the threat—from the state to the proxy, and from isolated incidents to a broader pattern.

  The message is decisive: aggression, in any form or under any cover, will no longer be reinterpreted or justified, and the right to self-defense is no longer a political option but a firmly established sovereign principle. What is taking shape is a consensus that regional stability cannot coexist with the logic of militias or chaos.”

Ebtisam Alkitbi, X, (UAE), March 25, 2026.

• “The role of the United Nations in this war resembles that of magazine reporters who miss the news, then return to narrate it later with more images and stories.”

Dawood Alshirian, X, (Saudi Arabia), March 25, 2026.

• “Instead of building a joint force, Gulf states have for many years relied on American protection. But Washington prioritizes Israel’s security above all else. The paradox is that some of these states still believe that strengthening their security cooperation with Israel will make them safer, while Israel is determined to dominate the entire region.”

Abdullah Ba Abood, X, (Oman), 2026.

• “It is not easy for the Iranians, after all the arrogance, superiority, and declarations of “divine victory,” to accept the negotiation announcements made by President Trump—not because they are untrue, but because they would shake their image of strength, especially domestically. Therefore, denial and rejection are entirely expected.”

Jaffar Salman, X, (Bahrain), March 25, 2026.

• “At this critical moment in the region’s history, and amid reports of ongoing talks between the United States and Iran to halt military operations, I would like to emphasize that the Gulf Cooperation Council states cannot be absent from any table where the contours of the regional future are drawn.

  The security of this region is not a secondary matter, nor a file to be discussed on our behalf; it is the essence of our stability and existence. In this context, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz must be placed in its proper position:

  The Strait of Hormuz is not a bargaining chip, nor a tool of pressure. It is an international waterway that must remain open, unconditionally and under all circumstances.”

Hamad Al Thani, X, (Qatar), March 24, 2026.

• “The first lie Trump told his people this month was that it would be a quick operation that would end in days.

  The second lie was that all Iranian capabilities had been destroyed.

  The third was that Iranian oil would not be threatened.

  The fourth was that negotiations are now underway with a senior Iranian leader and that the Iranians will agree to our terms.

  The fifth was a five-day deadline before targeting Iranian energy facilities, yet they were struck after two days.

  The final lie is that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are fighting alongside the United States and Israel—and that is false.”

Turki Al Rumaih, X, (Saudi Arabia), March 24, 2026.

Oil Price: $101.89 (+4.67%)

As of March 26, 2026, Brent crude rose to $101.89/bbl, marking a daily gain of +$4.63 (+4.76%). The increase follows the previous session’s pullback and reflects continued volatility in energy markets amid ongoing geopolitical tensions. Since the baseline of February 26 ($70.75), Brent remains up +44.02%.

Brent Oil: Investing.com - Brent Oil Historical Data

LNG Price: $291.40 (+2.46%)

As of March 26, 2026, Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG) closed at $291.40, marking a daily gain of +$7.01 (+2.46%). The stock traded between $286.30 and $292.38, recovering after the previous session’s pullback. Despite ongoing volatility, LNG remains elevated amid sustained global demand for U.S. energy exports. Since the conflict began, the stock has gained +25.33% from its pre-war close of $232.51 on February 26.

Cheniere Energy Inc (LNG): Investing.com - Cheniere Energy (LNG) Historical Data

Strait of Hormuz Status: Critical Blockade

The status remains elevated across the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. According to the latest UKMTO update, no new security incidents were reported during the period from 1700 UTC 25 March to 1700 UTC 26 March.

However, the regional security environment remains volatile, with ongoing military activity and continued underlying threats to commercial shipping. Vessels transiting the area are still advised to exercise caution despite the absence of reported incidents.

Website: UKMTO

Stock Markets

Attacks Summary

States’ Updates

• “Gulf countries want Trump to end Iran war — but not yet, officials say.” The Washington Post, March 26, 2026.

• “Gulf energy repair costs may reach $25bln, E&C to take lion’s share: Rystad.” Zawya, March 25, 2026.

• “Riyadh, Dubai Delay Finance Events as Iran War Disrupts Region.” Bloomberg, March 27, 2026.

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Ukraine announces ‘mutually beneficial’ defence deal with Saudi Arabia.” Al Jazeera, March 27, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE pushes for international force to reopen Hormuz.” Financial Times, March 27, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Kuwait foils assassination plot.” Kuwait Times, March 26, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “14 referred to criminal trial in Bahrain on charges of spying for Iran's IRGC.” Khaleej Times, March 26, 2026.

Public Opinion

Gulf commentators focused on the Strait of Hormuz as it has shifted from a logistical passage into the central arena shaping the trajectory of the conflict. What was once a transit corridor is now a core strategic lever through which military, economic, and political outcomes are contested, placing the strait at the heart of both escalation and potential resolution.

At the center of this dynamic lies a paradox. From Saudi Arabia, Akal Alakal argues that Hormuz represents both “the key to the solution” and a “trap of entanglement,” where Iran’s attempt to leverage disruption is designed to internationalize the crisis—but risks backfiring by triggering broader intervention. Also from Saudi Arabia, Mishary Dhayidi reinforces this view, warning that efforts to “blackmail the world” may provoke overwhelming global retaliation, turning the strait from a pressure tool into a pathway toward wider war rather than de-escalation.

Beyond immediate confrontation, the issue is increasingly framed as structural rather than tactical. From the UAE, Mohammed Al Dosari emphasizes that Hormuz is now embedded within the Gulf long-term security architecture, where the real danger lies not only in closure but in the erosion of trust through selective disruption and rising costs. In this sense, the conflict is no longer about access alone, but about redefining the rules governing one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

This transformation is not new but cumulative. Also from the UAE, Salah Alghoul, alongside Bahrain’s Abdullah Almadani, situate the current moment within a longer pattern of “strait bullying,” arguing that repeated Iranian threats and actions have gradually militarized the waterway and undermined international norms. What emerges is a persistent condition of instability, one that has already driven deeper Gulf coordination and sustained international military presence to secure navigation.

At the same time, the stakes extend far beyond the region. From Oman, Muhammad Al-Mashikhi frames Hormuz as both a “lifeline” and a “lethal card,” while Qatar’s Ibrahim Flamurzi highlights the systemic consequences of disruption—ranging from energy shocks and inflation to supply chain breakdowns and financial volatility. From Bahrain, Ali Al-Bastaki goes further, arguing that the overlooked risk lies in fertilizers, warning that disruptions could trigger delayed but severe global food inflation, making Hormuz a potential source of both energy and food crises.

Taken together, these perspectives point to a clear conclusion: the Strait of Hormuz is no longer simply a chokepoint to be reopened after each crisis, but a structural fault line in the global system. The emerging consensus is that temporary fixes are insufficient; what is required is a durable framework that prevents its weaponization altogether—otherwise, the strait will remain a recurring source of instability, where each escalation carries the risk of transforming regional tensions into global shocks.

More Gulf Opinions

• “Overall, there is a complex and intertwined network of Western and Eastern military presence across the Arab region. Yet there is a deliberate overlooking of what exists in Arab republics, contrasted with an exaggerated and often hostile focus—by elites and even segments of the public—on what exists in some monarchies and emirate systems, often for purposes of distortion, political pressure, or populist mobilization.

  In reality, military cooperation, shared use of airports, and designated runways between Arab armies—without exception—and Western forces are widespread and constitute sovereign decisions that do not inherently discredit those states. The real issue lies in a prevailing mindset that justifies such arrangements for some while condemning them for others, applying a double standard rooted in selective judgment rather than principle.”

Mohammad AL Saaed, Okaz, (Saudi Arabia), March 26, 2026.

• “The Gulf states, with their vast natural resources, highly strategic geographic position, and political stability, are capable—if united—of forming a formidable regional power. Such unity would not be mere political coordination, but a transition toward genuine integration that would grant the region significant political, economic, military, and security weight, with far-reaching positive impact on Gulf societies and the wider world.”

Hamad Al-Hadrami, Al Roya, (Oman), March 25, 2026.

• “The wealthy Gulf states have made significant strides in developing infrastructure, economic growth, and public services, yet this progress remains incomplete and unsustainable without deeper economic and strategic integration among them. Had such integration already been in place, it would have significantly reduced the cost of the current war—yet crises can carry opportunity.

  This moment may serve as a catalyst for advancing Gulf integration across energy production and export, diversified industries, unified markets, and transport networks, including expanding export routes across multiple seas, linking Qatari gas supply networks across the region and beyond to Europe, and strengthening interconnections in electricity grids and railway systems. Ultimately, such efforts would support broader economic diversification, market integration, and the development of shared strategic infrastructure across the Gulf.”

Khaled Alkhater, Al Sharq, (Qatar), March 25, 2026.

• “The exclusion of Oman from mediating between Iran and the United States, and its replacement with Pakistan, was not a natural development. The Sultanate had long been the preferred intermediary for both sides, and it was expected to resume this role at this stage, yet it appears that one party had a different view.

  Did the statements by Oman foreign minister Badr Al Busaidi, following the collapse of negotiations and the outbreak of war—where he placed responsibility on the American side—play a role in prompting the search for a new mediator?”

Saleh Alfahid, X, (Saudi Arabia), March 25, 2026.

• “Each time Gulf states face attacks or threats, certain voices in the Arab media space emerge that go beyond merely supporting the aggression—to outright expressions of gloating. This was evident in recent days when Iranian strikes targeted airports and civilian areas in the Gulf; instead of a unified Arab rejection of attacks on cities inhabited by Arab civilians, a small but loud segment responded with visible schadenfreude. The question here is not only moral but analytical: why does this reaction appear, and why does it recur every time Gulf states face a crisis?”

Mohammed Al Rumaihi, Annahar, (Kuwait), March 24, 2026.

• “Instead of leveraging this advantage to maintain cooperative relations with its neighbors, Iran turned to aggression, effectively eroding trust across the region. By virtue of geography, Gulf markets had long served as a vital outlet for Iran, helping to mitigate the impact of sanctions in place since 1979; today, however, Tehran has lost not only that economic space but also the trust it had spent years trying to rebuild.

  As a result, the recent war has fundamentally altered relations between neighbors, and this shift is likely to endure for decades—even if the Iranian regime were to change in the coming years—because the underlying trust has been broken.”

Fahad Al Sabah, Al Seyassah, (Kuwait), March 23, 2026.

• “In the final analysis, the war has not achieved decisive military resolution, but it has clearly revealed a new equation: military superiority alone is insufficient, and true stability is built on internal state strength and the ability to protect oneself. In this context, the UAE and other Gulf states have demonstrated that they are not merely arenas of conflict, but models of states capable of safeguarding their security and stability with efficiency and capability. In an increasingly turbulent world, the real bet lies on states that can protect their populations and preserve their stability, rather than those that pursue escalation policies which lead only to further crises.”

Abdullah Alhashmi, Al Etihad, (UAE), March 23, 2026.

Oil Price: $100.23 (+4.49%)

As of March 24, 2026, Brent crude rebounded to $100.23/bbl, marking a daily gain of +$4.31 (+4.49%). This follows a volatile session where the price recovered a significant portion of the previous day’s sharp decline. Since the baseline of February 26 ($70.75), Brent remains up +41.67%.

Source: Investing.com - Brent Oil Historical Data

LNG Price: $294.58 (+2.57%)

As of March 24, 2026, Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG) closed at $294.58, a daily gain of +$7.38 (+2.57%). The stock reached a new session high of $298.53 as demand for non-regional energy remains elevated. Since the conflict began, the stock has gained +26.70% from its pre-war close of $232.51 on February 26.

Source: Investing.com - Cheniere Energy (LNG) Historical Data

Strait of Hormuz Status: Critical Blockade

The status remains CRITICAL across the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman due to persistent operational disruption and navigation interference. Commercial traffic remains extremely limited; while monitored transits slightly increased to 6 vessels on March 23, this remains a collapse compared to the historical average of 138 vessels per day. Current strike patterns suggest a campaign of broad maritime disruption, with 21 confirmed incidents reported since March 1.

Source: UKMTO - Current Incidents & Advisories

Stock Markets

Attacks Summary

States’ Updates

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “AFC confirm Jeddah to host postponed Asian Champions League matches.” Reuters, March 24, 2026.

• “Saudi prince said to push Trump to continue Iran war in recent calls: Report.” Middle East Monitor, March 24, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Qatar Is Not Mediating U.S.-Iran Talks, Foreign Minister Says.” The New York Times, March 24, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “Civilian working for UAE Armed Forces killed in Bahrain.” Gulf News, March 24, 2026.

• “Exclusive: Amazon says AWS’ Bahrain region ‘disrupted’ following drone activity.” Reuters, March 24, 2026.

• “Bahrain pushes UN-backed action for Hormuz shipping; France tables rival text.” Reuters, March 23, 2026.

🇴🇲 Oman

• “Oman says working to secure ‘safe passage arrangements’ through Hormuz.” Middle East Eye, March 23, 2026.

Public Debates

The debate was triggered by a sudden shift in timing: Donald Trump moved from an imminent 48-hour threat to a five-day postponement, framing the delay as space for “productive negotiations” even as Iran denied any talks were underway. That single pivot immediately divided Gulf commentary. For some, the extension signaled hesitation; for others, it reflected a deliberate calibration of pressure. The question was no longer whether a strike would happen, but what it meant that it had not happened when expected.

Qatari writer Nayef Nahar saw no ambiguity in it. Trump, he argued, postponed striking Iran’s energy infrastructure out of fear of market volatility — watching Gulf economies absorb massive losses under Iranian strikes for over twenty days without adjusting course. From Oman, Mohammed Alwardi pointed to the immediate aftermath: oil prices fell sharply following the announcement, reinforcing the view that Trump’s moves were calibrated as much for markets as for military objectives. In Bahrain, Adel Marzooq stripped the logic down further — if this was a tactic, it was not working as one; if it was genuine, Trump had simply backed down, breaking the trajectory of escalation and deflating the broader ambitions tied to it.

That reading was firmly rejected elsewhere. In the UAE, Dhahi Khalfan dismissed the notion that Trump was operating under pressure, arguing instead that he has nothing to lose and is therefore free to move between coercion and flexibility without constraint. Emirati academic Ebtesam Al-Kitbi gave that argument its full architecture, describing the delay as part of a new negotiating equation sustained by military threat, where postponement signals not retreat but reconfiguration. In her reading, the contradiction is deliberate: claims of overwhelming military success paired with a measured pause are designed to weaken Iran’s position, steady markets, and lay the groundwork for a broader deal. The strike, in this framing, is not cancelled — it is being held in reserve.

Others shifted focus away from Trump entirely. Bahraini writer Sawsan Alshaer argued that what is unfolding will create an opening for Gulf states to advance, pointing to the contrast between a damaged Iran and Gulf systems that have remained intact and capable under pressure. Kuwaiti commentator Meshal Alnami sharpened that point, pushing back against any framing that cast Iran as victorious simply because it had survived destruction, while Gulf societies continued to function. For both, the central question is not whether Trump delayed a strike, but who is actually holding together.

A more measured note came from Saudi analyst Hesham Alghannam, who cautioned that the war of statements and their contradictions is a natural feature of this stage — and that reading too deeply into shifting timelines risks mistaking messaging for strategic reality. Al-Kitbi added another dimension, noting that American engagement with figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reflects a calculated effort to probe the decision-making architecture inside Iran’s security establishment. In that light, the delay is not itself the signal — it is one visible piece of a much larger, less visible process.

What emerges is not a settled interpretation of the five-day postponement, but a deeply divided one. The same move — from 48 hours to five days — is read as hesitation, as strategy, as irrelevance, or as misdirection, depending on the vantage point. The debate, in the end, is less about what Trump did, and more about what that pause reveals — or carefully conceals — about the balance of forces now shaping the region.

Selected Gulf Opinions

• “They are targeting the Gulf just as much as they are targeting Iran—this is the unspoken agenda.”

Sajed Al Abdali, X, (Kuwait), March 23, 2026.

• “In theory, at least, the Arab majority would be expected to take a clear stance against Iran in its aggression toward eight Arab states—six in the Gulf, in addition to Iraq and Jordan. Yet the reality is more complex and far less cohesive. Pockets and currents exist that do not merely remain silent, but instead raise their voices in justification, or even support, of Tehran’s attacks.”

  “Paradoxically, this confusion is not limited to countries geographically distant from Iranian missiles and drones; it can be observed within the Gulf states themselves. It is not because ‘some’ Gulf citizens are unaware, but because they, as part of the broader public, remain captive to narratives shaped by media and culture over decades: Iran as a victim targeted by the West, and ‘Hezbollah’ as a resistance movement. Even within the heart of the states confronting Iran, these convictions continue to be sold and embedded.”

Abdulrahman Al Rashed, Asharq Al-Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), March 23, 2026.

• “This simple truth should not be overlooked: Iran did not ignite this war; rather, it stems from Netanyahu’s adventurism and Trump’s humiliating acquiescence, within a broader plan to reshape the region. The choice now is between the voice of reason—articulated by Oman, as noted by Sayyid Badr bin Hamad—or allowing events to be driven by the highly personal agendas of Netanyahu and Trump at the expense of the Gulf states. Advocates of war may distort parts of history, but they cannot alter geography; they will pass, while we will remain alongside Iran in a shared Gulf. The priority, therefore, must be to pursue policies and solutions that place Gulf states first, not the interests of lobbying groups in the United States.”

Hashar Al Mandhari, X, (Oman), March 23, 2026.

• “How one wishes there were an Arab—or pan-Arab—project like the Iranian one, centered on building the self and developing capabilities.”

Abdulaziz Alkhater, X, (Qatar), March 23, 2026.

• “I believe that the transition from a phase of sharp escalation to a path of de-escalation will neither be smooth nor immediate. Stepping back from the brink typically requires complex mechanisms, foremost among them preserving face, as all parties seek to avoid appearing defeated. At the same time, the cumulative damage to energy infrastructure and the mounting global economic pressure are pushing everyone toward finding an exit that safeguards at least a minimum of capabilities and interests.”

Hesham Alghannam, X, (Saudi Arabia), March 23, 2026.

Oil Price Update (+0.59%)

As of March 22, 2026, Brent crude settled at $107.04/bbl, a daily gain of +$0.63 (+0.59%). Since February 26, Brent has risen +51.30% from its pre-war close of $70.75.

• Source: Investing.com - Brent Oil Historical Data

LNG Market Update (-0.35%)

As of March 22, 2026, Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG) closed at $280.89, a daily change of -$0.98 (-0.35%). Since February 26, the stock has gained +20.81% from its pre-war close of $232.51.

• Source: Investing.com - Cheniere Energy (LNG) Historical Data

Strait of Hormuz Status (CRITICAL)

The maritime threat environment across the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz (SoH), and Gulf of Oman remains CRITICAL. Commercial traffic through the SoH is extremely limited, with current observed transit at just 1 vessel per day, compared to a historical average of approximately 138 vessels per day.

Stock Markets

Attacks Summary

States’ Updates

• “The Gulf countries may retaliate if Iran attacks continue, Turkey says.” Middle East Eye, March 21, 2026.

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan meet as Ankara pushes for a security pact.” Middle East Eye, March 21, 2026.

• “MBS, al-Sisi warn Iranian attacks on Gulf threaten regional stability.” Alarabiya, March 21, 2026.

• “Aramco CEO Withdraws From Houston Event to Deal With War.” Bloomberg, March 22, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia orders Iranian military attache, four embassy staff to leave.” Reuters, March 21, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “Explosion reported near tanker off UAE's Sharjah coast.” Middle East Eye, March 22, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Drone attack sparks fire at Kuwait Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery, units shut.” Middle East Eye, March 22, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Seven killed in Qatar helicopter crash.” Alarabiya, March 22, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “Patriot missile involved in Bahrain blast likely US-operated, analysis finds.” Reuters, March 22, 2026.

Public Debates

Gulf commentary today converges around a single escalation axis: Donald Trump 48-hour ultimatum to Iran—linking the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to threats of destroying Iranian energy infrastructure—and Tehran’s counter-signals that any such strike would trigger reciprocal attacks across the region. What emerges is not a conventional crisis cycle, but a transition toward coercive rule-setting, where energy systems themselves become the central lever of pressure. As Ebtisam Alkitbi framed it, this is “not an ordinary threat, but a strategic warning,” reflecting a shift from crisis management to the imposition of new rules by force—rules that could either compel calibrated Iranian retreat or push the Gulf into an open-ended escalation redefining security and energy equations simultaneously.

From Saudi voices, the dominant reading interprets the ultimatum as regime-level coercion rather than tactical signaling. Jamal Al Tamimi described it as a “clear declaration” of intent to bring down the Iranian system, noting that control over the Strait remains Tehran’s most critical deterrent tool—one it cannot afford to lose. At the operational level, Faisal Alhamad outlined a spectrum of US options, from forcing compliance to targeting dual-use energy infrastructure, highlighting a key constraint: a full blackout scenario, while feasible, risks consolidating domestic Iranian support around the regime—an outcome Washington likely seeks to avoid. Meanwhile, Hamdan Alshehri emphasized internal resilience narratives, arguing that Gulf security rests not only on capability but on preparedness and continuity after decades of confronting Iranian asymmetric behavior.

In the UAE, the framing sharpens into binary strategic outcomes. Dhahi Khalfan reduced the moment to two options for Tehran: compliance or collapse. This reflects a broader Emirati analytical line that sees the ultimatum as a forced decision point rather than a negotiable phase. The underlying assumption is that the cost of defiance has been deliberately raised to existential levels, narrowing Iran’s maneuvering space and compressing timelines for response.

Omani and Qatari commentary, however, foreground the regional spillover risks embedded in this logic. Yahya Al Wahibi pointed to explicit Iranian signaling that any strike on electricity or desalination infrastructure would be mirrored across the Gulf, reinforcing a doctrine of symmetrical retaliation. Saeed Jadad went further, warning that such an exchange would collapse Gulf neutrality entirely, triggering full-scale military engagement supported by allied powers. From Qatar, Khaled Al Kuwari and Al Qatari framed the escalation as indirectly targeting Gulf states themselves, arguing that Washington is fully aware that striking Iran’s energy sector would inevitably draw retaliation against regional infrastructure—effectively widening the war’s scope by design rather than accident.

Across Kuwait and Bahrain, the endpoint of this trajectory is articulated with clarity: escalation beyond infrastructure targeting would mark the definitive end of restraint. Meshal Alnami observed early signs of partial Iranian compliance in maritime signaling, but questioned whether this would satisfy US demands or invite further pressure. Abdulaziz Al-Buainain concluded that any Iranian strike on Gulf energy or water systems would transform the conflict from managed confrontation into total mobilization aimed at decisive defeat. Taken together, Gulf discourse today reflects a shared recognition that the current moment is not about deterrence signaling alone, but about crossing a threshold—where energy infrastructure becomes both the trigger and the battlefield of a potentially system-wide regional war.

Selected Gulf Opinions

• “Trump and his backward team—especially his disastrous Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth—whose mindset is no different from that of Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Khomeini, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Bezalel Smotrich. Anyone who thinks in a theocratic way has brought nothing to human societies but bloodshed and destruction—something both history and our present reality, which we see with our own eyes, clearly demonstrate.”

Anwar Al Rasheed, X, (Kuwait), March 22, 2026.

• “I would not rule out the possibility that many units within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are led by operatives acting as Mossad agents, carrying out strikes on Gulf targets in ways that serve Israeli objectives. We recall the extent of Israeli infiltration into Iranian officials, to the point that the head of the committee tasked with countering Mossad was himself revealed to be a Mossad agent.”

Khaled Al Kuwari, X, (Qatar), March 22, 2026.

• “The Omani foreign minister is the only Arab official to describe the American war as illegitimate and US policy as compromised and subject to Israeli dominance; this position reflects a model of Omani self-confidence, independent decision-making, and refusal to submit to the dictates of bullying powers.”

Zakaria Almuharami, X, (Oman), March 19, 2026.

• “While it launches thousands of missiles and drones against all Gulf states, it maintains a deceptive diplomatic tone through its president and foreign minister, claiming it targets what it considers American facilities. This is false, as airports, civilian neighborhoods, and economic sites have been struck. At the same time, Tehran appears to be preparing to recalibrate its relations for the post-war phase once the conflict ends.”

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, Asharq Al-Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), March 18, 2026.

Oil Price: $103.42 (+3.20%)

As of March 17, 2026, Brent crude is trading at $103.42/bbl, a daily gain of +$3.21 (+3.20%). Since the war began on February 27, Brent has risen +42.69% from its pre-war close of $72.48. Investing, March 17, 2026.

LNG Price: $251.50 (+0.08%)

As of March 17, 2026, Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG) is trading at $251.50, a daily gain of +$0.21 (+0.08%). Since the war began, the stock has gained +6.69% from its pre-war close of $235.73 on February 27. Investing, March 17, 2026.

Strait of Hormuz: CRITICAL threat level.

For the week of March 9–15, 2026, JMIC recorded 6 serious attacks and 1 near-miss, with bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels among those targeted — most recently on March 10–12. Weekly transits through the Strait have collapsed to just 17 vessels, a 56.4% decline from the prior week and a fraction of the 2023 historical average of ~839/week. The maritime threat level remains CRITICAL. JMIC/UKMTO, Week 11 Dashboard [PDF].

Stock Markets

Attacks Summary

States’ Updates

• “Over 200 Ukrainian military experts in Gulf region to counter Iran’s drones.” Al Jazeera, March 18, 2026.

• “Inside the Ukrainian interceptor drones wanted around the Gulf.” Reuters, March 17, 2026.

• “Gulf oil producers scramble to bypass Hormuz as Iran locks down the strait.” Reuters, March 17, 2026.

• “Gulf banks face $307 billion deposit flight risk if war worsens, S&P says.” Reuters, March 17, 2026.

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “UN body finds Saudi executions on drug charges ‘inexcusable’, document shows.” Reuters, March 17, 2026.

• “Iran Ups Attacks on Oil-Rich Saudi Arabia as War Rages On.” Bloomberg, March 17, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE could join any US-led effort to secure Strait of Hormuz, says senior official.” Reuters, March 17, 2026.

• “UAE Official Says Iran War Tightens Gulf Ties to US, Israel.” Bloomberg, March 17, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Exclusive: Macquarie walks away from Kuwait oil pipelines deal amid Iran war, sources say.” Reuters, March 17, 2026.

🇴🇲 Oman

• “Oman Keeps Trickle of LNG Flowing from Middle East Amid Iran War.” Bloomberg, March 17, 2026.

Public Debates

The killing of Iran high-ranking leader and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, dominates Gulf commentary, with analysts converging on its implications for negotiation and escalation. From Kuwait, Saad bin Tiflah Al Ajmi describes Larijani as “a pragmatic conservative” and “a pillar of the ruling establishment,” arguing that his killing may be seen as “the assassination of the opportunity for negotiation with the Americans,” while raising the question: “will they be the next targets, or will they try to save what can be saved to preserve the system?” Similarly, Qatar’s Abdullah Al Etaibi stresses that Larijani was a rare bridge between security rigidity and diplomatic “pragmatism,” and that his removal weakens negotiation prospects while strengthening hardline dynamics.

Saudi voices reinforce this view, emphasizing that the killing undermines diplomatic pathways. Abdulrahman Al Rashed notes that despite being labeled a hardliner, Larijani was regarded by insiders as a “pragmatic figure” and among the few remaining moderates, concluding that “the assassination of Larijani strips the Iranian leadership of its moderates, not the other way around.” Dawood Alshirian adds that “the killing of Larijani raises the cost of a political solution with Iran and weakens the prospects for negotiation,” while Hesham Alghannam frames the act as “a deliberate Israeli undermining of any pathways based on de-escalation,” aimed at eliminating “any room for maneuver or compromise.”

From a more technical perspective, Abdullah Al-Jadi’a, from Saudi Arabia, describes Iran as a “medieval fighter,” arguing that “intelligence” has become the decisive factor in the war, an area where Israel has dominated while Iran has failed to produce precise targeting. Echoing this concern, Kuwait’s Sajed Al Abdali questions whether this “staggering intelligence exposure” is uniquely Iranian or reflects a broader vulnerability, asking: “is this a uniquely Iranian failure, or is everyone exposed in the same way—we just have not seen it yet?” In the UAE, Ebtisam Al Kitbi warns that the killing represents “a dual strike against the structure of the Iranian system,” marking a shift toward a “strategy of dismantling the system” and the “reconfiguration of Iran internal order.”

In Oman, commentary reflects both convergence and divergence. Zakaria Al Muharrami aligns with the dominant Gulf view, arguing that the region has lost one of the most balanced and diplomatic figures, and that his removal strengthens hardliners while signaling a more chaotic phase ahead. In contrast, Naser Al Busaidi sees the killing as a strategic miscalculation that may transform Larijani into a symbol of “sacrifice and dignity,” warning that silencing such a figure empowers a more dominant “military, retaliatory voice” and deepens escalation.

Finally, Khalifa Al Mahmood offers a far more pessimistic reading, arguing that “with the assassination of Larijani, Iran… has reached what can be described as a stage of certain death,” where only the “decision to remove life support” remains, driven by leadership fragility and widening internal breaches. Yet he does not present this as a closed end-state, instead outlining two possible paths: either “comprehensive destruction” with limited capacity to respond, or a shift toward “the logic of wars and settlements,” similar to post-war reconstruction models. In this sense, the moment is not necessarily the final collapse, but a “decisive turning point” whose outcome depends on whether Iran continues escalation or pivots toward strategic recalibration.

Selected Gulf Opinions

• “If we compare this [Iran], for example, to the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, despite all attempts by both East and West, the leadership remained cohesive and secure, and no key figures were assassinated until the full ground invasion occurred, after which the state security structure naturally collapsed. Even the resistance in Gaza, despite its limited capabilities, proved difficult to penetrate and endured for a long period—unlike the cases of Hezbollah, Iran, or the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, whose leaders are now being systematically targeted with apparent ease. This suggests not isolated breaches, but rather a condition of near-total exposure, which typically points to one of two possibilities: either internal betrayal at the highest levels by those with access to comprehensive data networks, or that the Iranian and Western projects were once in a form of partnership, and once that alignment ended, the weaker side became exposed to the stronger.”

Mohammed Aiash Alkibisi, X, (Qatar), March 17, 2026.

• “We will soon discover that the greatest deception Iran tried to pass on us as Shiites was the claim that it was a state preparing for the emergence of Al Mahdi [awaited savior] at the end of times. We will realize that it was nothing more than an attempt to mobilize us politically under a religious banner.”

Jaffar Salman, X, (Bahrain), March 17, 2026.

• “The arrival of a US vessel carrying thousands of Marines near the Middle East is not a routine move, but a clear strategic signal marking a shift from managing escalation to preparing for worst-case scenarios. This deployment reflects three overlapping dimensions: strengthening deterrence against Iran, protecting global trade arteries, and reassuring Washington allies in the Gulf. More importantly, the region is no longer merely a theater of containment, but has become a central arena in global power balances, where geography intersects with energy, security, and economics.”

Ebtisam Al Kitbi, X, (UAE), March 17, 2026.

• “Iran appears as a peculiar case in modern history; a revolution that began with grand slogans but ended in a reality defined by aggressive policies. It came to lead in the fragmentation of states and the spread of hatred, until the slogan became merely a façade, and practice something entirely different. Iran has not prevailed as it may seem, nor will it return to what it was after this war. The blows have been severe and different, and the internal landscape itself has changed; a broad segment of Iranians lives in disconnection from the path imposed by the religious system. Sentiments toward America and Israel remain rejecting, yet the idea of liberation from the rule of the mullahs persists despite the consequences of war.”

Dawood Alshirian, X, (Saudi Arabia), March 17, 2026.

Oil Price: $100.21 (−3.55%)

As of March 16, 2026, Brent crude settled at $100.21/bbl, a daily decline of −$3.69 (−3.55%) Since the war began on February 28, Brent has risen +38.26% from its pre-war close of $72.48. Investing, March 16, 2026.

LNG Market: $251.29 (−0.39%)

As of March 16, 2026, Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG) closed at $251.29, a daily decline of −$0.98 (−0.39%) Since the war began, the stock has gained +8.08% from its pre-war close of $232.51 on February 26. Investing, March 16, 2026.

Strait of Hormuz: CRITICAL threat level.

As of March 16, 2026, a tanker was struck by an unknown projectile 23NM east of Fujairah while at anchor, causing minor structural damage with no crew injuries — bringing confirmed incidents to at least 21 since March 1. The maritime threat level remains CRITICAL. Daily transits through the Strait remain at approximately 2 vessels/day versus a historical average of ~138. UKMTO, March 17, 2026. [PDF].

Stock Markets

Attacks Summary

States’ Updates

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “UAE President receives phone call from Saudi Crown Prince to discuss regional developments and their repercussions on security and stability.” WAM, March 16, 2026.

• “Saudi air defenses destroy 31 drones across Riyadh and Eastern regions.” Saudi Gazette, March 15, 2026.

• “King Salman orders establishment of Riyadh University of Arts.” Saudi Gazette, March 14, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE says consulate in Iraqi Kurdistan targeted for second time in a week.” Arab News, March 14, 2026.

• “Iran hits UAE oil hub, vows retaliation for US strike on Kharg Island.” Middle East Eye, March 14, 2026.

• “UAE arrests 35 for misinformation related to Iran’s aggression: Who are they, what did they post?” Gulf News, March 16, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “MotoGP postpones Qatar Grand Prix due to Middle East conflict.” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2026.

• “Fitch Affirms Qatar at ‘AA’; Outlook Stable.” Fitch, Mar 13, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Drones hit radar system at Kuwait Airport: Civil aviation authority.” Kuwait Times, March 15, 2026.

• “Kuwait arrests 16 accused of Hezbollah-linked sabotage plot.” Middle East Eye, March 16, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “Five people arrested in Bahrain for disclosing information to IRGC: ministry statement.” Arab News, March 15, 2026.

Public Debates

Although the issue is not new, the outbreak of the war has revived debate among Gulf commentators over the role of U.S. military bases in the region. For Iran, these bases represent the core infrastructure of American military power and therefore a primary target in any confrontation. At the same time, voices across parts of the Arab world have renewed criticism of their presence, questioning the logic of hosting foreign military installations that could draw the region deeper into conflict.

Yet many Gulf commentators argue the debate is not ultimately about whether these bases exist. The more consequential question concerns their purpose and reliability. Even assuming that U.S. bases, defense agreements, and advanced weapons systems are firmly in place across the Gulf, do they truly translate into protection? Or does the presence of American military infrastructure fail to guarantee that Washington will act decisively to safeguard the region—especially in a war the United States itself helped ignite?

On March 3, 2026, the Emirati newspaper Al Khaleej published an unsigned commentary titled “Iran’s Big Lie: U.S. Bases Are Safe… While the Gulf Pays the Price.” The article rejected Iran’s claim that its attacks target American installations in the UAE, arguing that in reality the strikes have hit Gulf states and civilian infrastructure. The article suggested the objective is not merely to strike U.S. bases but to undermine the region’s economic and political stability. UAE commentator Ibrahim bin Hatim also questioned the logic behind Iranian attacks on the Gulf. He asked whether Tehran has the right to dictate Gulf alliances while maintaining its own partnerships with Russia and China. Bin Hatim noted that American forces are “spread across large parts of the Middle East,” not limited to the Gulf, and highlighted the contradiction of Iran targeting the UAE despite the presence of “more than half a million Iranians living and trading freely” there. He ultimately framed the issue in moral terms, asking whether “hotels, civilian airports, residential towers, and commercial ports” can be treated as legitimate military targets, or whether “safe cities built on trade and openness” are being turned into arenas for missile messages.

In a veiled message—likely aimed at Arab states hosting Israeli embassies—Kuwaiti commentator Ahmed Al-Maimoni questioned what he saw as inconsistencies in the debate. Writing on social media, he remarked: “He speaks about U.S. bases while being the largest economic, tourism, and political partner of the Zionist entity in the region.” In essence, Al-Maimoni argued that some critics accusing Gulf states of hosting U.S. forces to protect Israel maintain their own diplomatic and economic ties with Israel. Qatari commentator Omar Ghanim dismissed calls to remove foreign bases from the Gulf, describing them as a fashionable slogan that has “turned into a ball rolling between lips and fingers,” repeating the phrase “remove the foreign bases.” He noted that the United States operates about 750 military installations across 86 countries, including advanced economies such as Japan, Germany, Britain, and Singapore. In his view, the presence of U.S. bases reflects “the interests of states that consider them appropriate,” not the demands of what he called “keyboard enthusiasts.”

Other commentators focused on clarifying the legal nature of U.S. military access. Omani commentator Ali Mohammed Gaboob emphasized that “there are no American bases in the Sultanate of Oman,” explaining that what exists are “defense cooperation agreements.” Under these arrangements, the United States may receive “facilities at specific bases,” but this does not constitute “permanent bases or occupation.” Instead, access is granted “when needed” and only with “the approval of the Omani government.” Similarly, Omani commentator Sultan Al-Maqrashi argued there is no evidence that U.S. bases in the Gulf were used to launch attacks against Iran. In his view, Tehran’s narrative about American military infrastructure serves primarily as a “justification” for targeting Gulf states.

Other Gulf commentators have taken a more critical view of the U.S. military presence and the region’s security arrangements. Kuwaiti commentator Obaid Al-Wasmi argued that Washington’s leadership places little value on “Gulf security” and is effectively contributing to the erosion of the region’s “security architecture.” He described the American presence as “temporary,” serving mainly to “militarily exhaust the region” and “economically exploit it,” while “creating conflicts” that ultimately benefit Israel. Omani commentator Mohammed bin Saeed Al-Fateesi pointed to another lesson from the confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel: “a state that manufactures its own weapons can defend itself, respond to its enemies, and prolong the conflict until the very last breath,” highlighting the strategic advantage of domestic military production. Meanwhile, Malik Alyahmadi reacted to reports that the U.S. military had deployed roughly 10,000 AI-enabled drones across the Middle East, asking: “After this, does it really require great effort to identify who is attacking our countries and our vital facilities with drones?”

Finally, Omani commentator Mukhtar Al-Hannani criticized Gulf states for their reliance on imported Western weapons, arguing that such dependence constrains their ability to make independent decisions in moments of crisis. He wrote: “Gulf states that have spent billions purchasing weapons from abroad—had even a quarter of this money been invested in education and building local technology and military industries—would today be far more capable of protecting themselves and shaping their own decisions.” His argument, however, drew strong criticism online, with many respondents insisting that U.S. weapon systems remain the first line of defense against repeated Iranian attacks.