Geopolitics

• “Trump Sends Nuclear Agreement With Saudi Arabia to Congress.” WSJ, August 25, 2026.

“Trump’s political requirement that Saudi Arabia normalize relations with Israel by joining the Abraham Accords has introduced a fresh obstacle for implementing the nuclear agreement. Trump announced that condition last month after the deal was negotiated and signed and is sticking by it.”

Go Deeper: “To Enrich or Not to Enrich? The Saudi-U.S. Nuclear Deal.” Australian Institute of International Affairs, Aug 27, 2026.

• “Qatar steps in to mediate as Trump says US not talking to Iran.” Reuters, August 26, 2026.

“Major combat operations have been paused for weeks but there has been little progress toward a wider peace agreement or reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping route. Six months after U.S. and Israeli forces attacked Iran, killing its ​supreme leader and maiming his son and successor, the Iranian government is under economic siege, but it still holds power and has shown little urgency to negotiate.”

Go Deeper: Nayef Al-Naama “Qatar between Israel and Iran -and Beyond: Mediation, Diplomacy and the Double Standards of Applying International Law in the Attempt of War.” SSRN, July 29, 2026.

• “US Moves Against Egyptian Bank’s UAE Branches Over Iran Ties.” Bloomberg, August 28, 2026.

“The Treasury Department is moving to sever an Egyptian bank’s United Arab Emirates branches from the US financial system as part of efforts to pressure Iran into ending the war in the Middle East.”

Go Deeper: “Treasury moves to sanction UAE branch of Egyptian bank over Iran ties.” August 28, 2026.

• “Kuwaiti tanker hit in latest Hormuz shipping attack - UK maritime monitor.” Arab News, August 27, 2026.

“Al-Salam II was heading east through the waterway on Tuesday evening when it was hit by a projectile above the waterline, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported.”

Go Deeper: “The Gulf’s critical infrastructure presents a lasting vulnerability for Iran to exploit.” ACLED, August 4, 2026.

• “France, Saudi Arabia agree on €6 billion Dragon Ball Z theme park project near Paris.” Reuters, August 24, 2026.

“The project, inspired by the world of the hit Japanese manga ​and anime franchise Dragon Ball Z, will be built ​near Cergy-Pontoise, northwest of Paris, and is expected ⁠to create around 22,000 jobs, the Elysee said.”

• “Abu Dhabi provides $300m to support Jordan’s budget.” AGBI, August 28, 2026.

“The state-backed Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) has signed an agreement with Jordan’s planning ministry to provide AED1.1 billion ($300 million) in support for the general budget, the fund said in a statement.”

• “UAE company begins wheat supplies to Egypt in $500m deal.” AGBI, August 26, 2026.

“The pact between Abu Dhabi’s Al Dahra Holding and Egypt’s General Authority for Supply Commodities is valued at up to $500 million and will be supported by the Abu Dhabi Exports Office, the export-financing arm of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, the Emirati company said in a statement.”

Market & Economy

• “Saudi Arabia’s trade surplus surges 53% to SR155 billion in 1H 2026.” Saudi Gazette, August 26, 2026.

“The Saudi trade surplus surged by 53.17 percent year-on-year during the first half of 2026, with the value of foreign trade exceeding SR1 trillion. The increase coincided with a 7.3 percent rise in exports and a 2.7 percent decline in imports compared to the same period last year.”

• “UAE real estate sector records strong H1 2026 growth.” Zawya, August 27, 2026.

In Abu Dhabi, the total value of real estate transactions reached around AED117 billion during the first half, up 112 percent compared with the same period in 2025, while the number of transactions increased by 61.7 percent.

Sales transactions led activity, reaching AED86.1 billion through 16,838 transactions, up 163.7 percent, while mortgage transactions amounted to AED26.7 billion.

• “Bahrain’s non-oil economy grows 2.2% in Q1 despite regional headwinds.” Arab News, August 27, 2026.

“According to a quarterly report by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, real GDP fell 3.8 percent year on year, driven largely by a 37.2 percent contraction in oil activities, linked to restrictions on maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and scheduled maintenance, the Bahrain News Agency reported.”

Go Deeper: “Bahrain Economic Quarterly Report.” Ministry of Finance and National Economy, August, 2026. [PDF].

• “Saudi intensifies $13.3 billion buildout of indoor entertainment centers.” Semafor, August 20, 2026,

“Even as some economic diversification projects are put on the back burner, Saudi Arabia is intensifying its $13.3 billion push to build indoor entertainment centers across the country.”

• “LNG WRAP: Asian LNG Above $23 as Qatar Extends Force Majeure.” Bloomberg, August 28, 2026.

“Spot prices rose to $23.388 per million British thermal units, according to traders. State-owned QatarEnergy this week notified Pakistani buyers that LNG cargo cancellations will continue into October, traders familiar with the matter said. The company didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.”

• “Kuwait’s Al-Zour oil refinery partially restarted, IIR says.” Zawya, August 28, 2026.

“State-owned Kuwait Integrated Petroleum Industries Company had restarted all three crude units at its 615,000 barrel-per-day Al-Zour oil refinery at 60% capacity as of August 19, consultancy IIR said.”

“KIPIC shut down parts of the refinery on July 18 due to a power cut, having reduced processing ​rates earlier in the year during a round of attacks by Iran.”

• “Saudis Sell Oil from Gulf of Oman in Sign of More Hormuz Exits.” Bloomberg, August 28, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia has sold its heavier crude grades to Chinese refiners for a second time this month, a sign that flows through the Strait of Hormuz are likely to remain elevated.”

Go Deeper: “China Buys Saudi Crude in Rare Tender as Imports Stay Muted.” Bloomberg, August 20, 2026.

• “Kuwait and Qatar Add to Growing Oil Flows Getting Through Hormuz.” Bloomberg, August 27, 2026.

“The two countries, which exported a combined 2 million barrels a day of oil before the outbreak of the Iran war, have managed to get shipments back to 70% of pre-conflict levels, according to traders, who asked not to be named as they’re not allowed to speak to media.”

• “Axel Springer enters crowded Gulf media market.” Semafor, August 27, 2026.

“Axel Springer is the latest media company to plant a flag in the Gulf, with a new entity headquartered in Abu Dhabi that is on the hunt for “opportunities.” The move comes shortly after the publisher of Politico and Business Insider completed a deal to acquire The Telegraph newspaper from Abu Dhabi-backed RedBird IMI; an investment in The Circuit, a regional digital publication, is also part of the expansion.”

• “Saudi Brothers Mint Billion-Dollar Fortune From AI Boom.” Bloomberg, August 26, 2026.

“Two Saudi brothers have amassed a fortune of about $1.4 billion as the technology company they control rides the kingdom’s multibillion-dollar push to build artificial intelligence infrastructure.”

• “RSGT, CMA CGM to invest $434mln in Jeddah port container terminal.” Zawya, August 25, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) and France’s CMA CGM Group have signed definitive agreements to jointly develop and operate Terminal 4 at Jeddah Islamic Port, with an investment of approximately $434 million (SAR1.6 billion), RSGT said in a statement.”

• “Saudi Capital Markets Shakeup Raises Liberalization Optimism.” Bloomberg, August 24, 2026.

“Morgan Stanley estimates that a partial relaxation of the limit to 75% could attract about $4.3 billion of passive inflows into Saudi equities, while a full removal could generate about $7.4 billion. Still, Nguyen said the window for implementing changes this year is narrowing, as any moves would need to take effect by late October to be reflected in MSCI’s November review of its global equity indexes.”

Climate, Renewable and Green Energy

• “Saudi’s Alfanar Group backs Indian wind turbine maker’s global expansion.” Zawya, August 26, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia-based Alfanar Group will inject $100 million in capital into Senvion, an Indian wind turbine manufacturer, to drive global and local expansion.”

“The first tranche of $34 million was received this month, while the remaining amount will be invested in a couple of weeks, Senvion said in a statement.”

• “Kuwait’s Action Energy to acquire Warah Environmental Consultants.” Zawya, August 26, 2026.

“Kuwait-listed Action Energy Company is set to acquire consultancy firm Warah Environmental Consultants.”

“Warah offers environmental and technical consultations, including environmental and social impact assessments, technical advisory and professional and specialised training services.”

Other

• “Kuwait continues to tighten citizenship rules.” Semafor, August 25, 2026.

“.. in May 2024 before embarking on a regulatory overhaul that has stripped at least 50,000 people of citizenship. Authorities say some of them held dual nationality, which is illegal for Kuwaitis, while others had obtained citizenship through fraud; rights groups say the government’s political opponents have also been targeted.”

• “Saudi Arabia real estate gigaproject developer replaces chief executive.” Zawya, August 28, 2026.

“New Murabba, owned by the country’s wealth fund PIF, has appointed Sabah Barakat as acting chief executive, according to the company’s website and was mentioned in that role in a company statement this week about an investment partnership. He replaces British manager Michael Dyke, chief executive since 2024.”

• “Saudi Arabia backs Infantino amid fallout from failed FIFA investment plan.” Arab News, August 27, 2026.

“In a statement, the Saudi Arabian Football Federation (SAFF) welcomed FIFA’s acknowledgement of mistakes, its apology and the decision to scrap the proposal, while calling for direct dialogue among football’s stakeholders to restore unity.”

• “Abu Dhabi to host first Euroleague Basketball SuperCup.” Arab News, August 25, 2026.

“The SuperCup is an exciting addition to Euroleague Basketball’s competition portfolio, creating an annual event featuring elite European club basketball while further expanding the league’s global footprint. Hosting the first competition in Abu Dhabi highlights the emirate’s growing involvement in international basketball.”

• “Formula One confirms Abu Dhabi Grand Prix to take place in December.” Arab News, August 23, 2026.

“President and CEO of Formula One Stefano Domenicali has confirmed the 2026 season will conclude as planned with the Formula 1 Etihad Airways Abu Dhabi Grand Prix at Yas Marina Circuit.”

“Domenicali expects remaining tickets to be sold and said that preparations for the Dec. 3-6 event were nearing completion.”

Go Deeper: “From Shakira to F1: How Iran war is disrupting Gulf economy.” First Post, August 21, 2026.

• “2026 Saudi Toyota Championship Time Attack gets underway at Jeddah Corniche Circuit.” Arab News, August 27, 2026.

“The championship is being held under the supervision of the Saudi Automobile and Motorcycle Federation, the owner of the competition, managed by Bakhashab Motorsport, and in partnership with Jameel Motorsport, the official partner.”

Go Deeper: “‘It’s come at the wrong time’: how Iran war has floored the Gulf as a sports hub.” The Guardian, March 21, 2026.

Geopolitics

• “MBS meets top US general for Middle East to discuss defense cooperation, reducing tensions.” Al Arabiya, August 14, 2026.

“United States Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Adm. Brad Cooper and MBS discussed defense cooperation and efforts to reduce regional tensions, according to the SPA.”

• “UAE accuses Iran of attacks on two ADNOC vessels in Strait of Hormuz.” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2026.

“The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) confirmed that ‘two of its vessels were attacked while transiting’ the waterway on Thursday evening, adding that the situation was “brought under control”, Emirati media reported.”

• “Prince Khalid meets Iraq’s top general to discuss Saudi-Iraqi defense ties.” Al Arabiya, August 13, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief, Khalid al-Hmeidan, visited Baghdad last week to discuss regional security developments with Iraq’s prime minister and conveyed a renewed invitation for him to visit Riyadh after an earlier trip was scrapped over attacks on the Kingdom emanating from Iraq.”

Go Deeper: “Iraq seeks Saudi, Syrian ties as it faces pressure to rein in Iran-backed militias - analysis.” The Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2026.

• “UAE Reportedly Released Iran’s Frozen Assets Worth Billions of Dollars, Bitcoin Rebounds.” Yahoo, August 13, 2026.

“Oil prices fell on Thursday after reports that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) released Iran’s frozen assets held in Emirati banks, including gold valued at roughly $200-283 million. As a result, Bitcoin and the broader crypto market witnessed a much-needed rebound.”

Go Deeper: “UAE to unlock billions of dollars for Iran, sources say.” Reuters, June 12, 2026.

• “Tanker Seen Loading at Key Saudi Hub for First Time in Weeks.” Bloomberg, August 12, 2026.

“A satellite image from the European Union’s Sentinel 2 orbiter, captured on Tuesday, shows a very large crude carrier, capable of loading about 2 million barrels of crude, moored at one of Ju’aymah’s single-point moorings, which form part of the giant Ras Tanura oil export complex. The last time a ship was seen there was in the middle of July, though satellite images aren’t available every day, so it’s possible vessels have called there since.”

• “UAE Shuttles Iraqi Oil Exports Through the Strait of Hormuz.” Bloomberg, August 12, 2026.

“The United Arab Emirates’ state oil company has been the most successful producer at getting its crude out of the Persian Gulf through the Hormuz. It has used so-called shuttling tactics, where vessels make short trips — often with their transponders turned off to avoid detection — before typically transferring their cargoes to other ships just outside the gulf.”

Market & Economy

• “Qatar National Bank Tests Investor Appetite for $2 Billion Loan.” Bloomberg, August 12, 2026.

“Qatar National Bank is seeking a $2 billion syndicated loan, according to people familiar with the matter, in a test of whether banks, particularly from Asia, are willing to lend in the region as the US war with Iran drags on.”

Go Deeper: “Abu Dhabi, Qatar Turn to Private Markets to Raise Billions.” Bloomberg, April 9, 2026.

• “UAE banks face margin pressure despite strong H1 earnings.” Zawya, August 13, 2026.

“The notable exception among the UAE banks was First Abu Dhabi Bank (FAB), the UAE’s largest lender by market capitalisation. Its NIM rose to 1.99% in Q2 and by 14 bps YoY, thanks to a more favourable funding mix and better liability repricing. “As a result, we see less downside to FAB’s margin compared with banks that are seeing a faster migration from CASA into term deposits,” Singh said. “

• “Saudi PIF-backed Emaar Economic City posts $5.87mln net loss in Q2 2026.” Zawya, August 12, 2026.

“Revenue for the second quarter of 2026 reached SAR 127 million, up from SAR 118 million a year ago.”

“For the first six months of the year, total shareholders’ equity surged by nearly 80% to SAR 9.08 billion. Loss per share stood at -SAR 0.23, down from -SAR 0.41 in the first half of last year.”

• “Saudi data center capacity projected to boom, but financing a challenge.” Semafor, August 11, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia’s data center capacity is forecast to reach 1 gigawatt by 2030, making it the fastest-growing Gulf market in a sector awash in cash and FOMO. The pipeline of announced projects is larger still — PIF’s HUMAIN alone is targeting more than 6 GW in the coming decade. Financing even half of that will require up to $32 billion in debt, more than the kingdom’s banks are likely to be willing to assemble themselves, according to a report from consulting firm Alvarez & Marsal.”

Go Deeper: “Financing Saudi Arabia’s Data Center Build-Out.” Alvarez & Marsal, August 6, 2026. [PDF].

• “UAE, Qatari Firms Debut in Venezuela Through BP-Led Gas Deal.” Bloomberg, August 13, 2026.

“Arab Gulf companies are making their debut in Venezuela through an offshore natural gas project to be operated by BP Plc.”

Go Deeper: “Abu Dhabi’s Adnoc Is Said to Mull Investing in Venezuela Gas.” Bloomberg, January 15, 2026.

• “UAE extends corporate tax relief for small businesses until 2029.” Khaleej Times, August 7, 2026.

“Under the decision, the threshold prescribed under Ministerial Decision No. (73) of 2023 will continue to apply to tax periods commencing on or after June 1, 2023, and shall apply to subsequent tax periods ending on or before December 31, 2029.”

Go Deeper: “Dubai enlists businesses to help secure hub status after Iran war shock.” Reuters, June 25, 2026.

• “Qatar: Significant increase in compliance as tax return filing rate reaches 90% for 2025.” Zawya, August 7, 2026.

“Continued enhancements to the Dhareeba Portal have made tax services faster, easier, and more accessible. Improvements to electronic services have also helped simplify tax return filing procedures and support taxpayers in meeting their obligations.”

Go Deeper: “What Are the Changes in Qatar’s Corporate Tax Rate for 2026?” SwissMENA, April 30, 2026.

• “Qatar LNG Loading Jumps Ahead of Potential Hormuz Reopening.” Bloomberg, August 11, 2026.

“The 10-day moving average for loadings from the giant Ras Laffan complex was about 80,000 tons, according to ship-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg. While 60% lower than this time last year, it is still the highest level since March, right after the war began and Iranian attacks on the facility forced Qatar to shut production.”

• “Riyadh Presses ahead with Housing Market Stabilization Through Real Estate Balance Measures.” Asharq Al-Awsat, August 12, 2026

“The RCRC aims to provide between 10,000 and 40,000 plots annually at prices not exceeding SAR1,500 per square meter, helping narrow the gap between supply and demand and support stability in Riyadh’s real estate market.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia Residential Real Estate Market Report 2026-2030” Yahoo, January 20, 2026.

• “Saudi inflation reaches 1.8% in July, driven by 4.2% rise in housing costs.” Saudi Gazette, August 13, 2026.

“Personal care, social protection and other goods and services prices rose 2.9 percent year-on-year, driven by an 11.1 percent increase in other personal effects, which was affected by a 12 percent rise in jewelry and watch prices.”

Go Deeper: “Inflation in Saudi Arabia reaches 1.8% in July 2026 compared to July 2025.” Maaal, August 13, 2026.

Climate, Renewable and Green Energy

• “Construction is ‘finished’ on world’s largest green hydrogen and ammonia complex in Saudi Arabia.” Hydrogeninsight, August 11, 2026.

“The 2.2GW Neom green hydrogen and ammonia project in Saudi Arabia has completed construction and is currently being commissioned for a start of operations in 2027, according to one of its developers, Acwa.”

Go Deeper: Ali Q. Al-Shetwi “Energy transition for sustainable development in Saudi Arabia: Renewable energy growth and emission reduction” Next Energy, Volume 12, 2026.

• “Oman says the oil spill from a grounded tanker has reached its coastline.” AP, August 12, 2026

“Crude oil has been leaking from the tanker Caroline Bezengi — a sanctioned tanker believed to be part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” — that was carrying nearly 1 million barrels of oil when it reported an explosion in June.”

Go Deeper: “Oman says massive oil spill reaches coastline: What damage could it do?” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia raises ozone-depleting substance disposal rate to 69% in 2026.” FC, August 14, 2026.

“More than 8,000 metric tons of ozone-depleting substances and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) have been cleared since the start of the year under a national project regulating their import and circulation in line with environmental requirements and international commitments.”

• “EDF consortium achieves financial close for 120MW Oman wind project.” Zawya, August 11, 2026.

“The project supports Oman Vision 2040 and the sultanate’s objective of increasing the share of renewable energy in the national electricity mix to at least 30% by 2030, while advancing the country’s Net Zero 2050 ambitions.”

Go Deeper: Mohamed Amur Al-Shidhani, Maan Hayyan “Oman’s energy transition roadmap to net zero 2050” Energy Nexus, Volume 19, 2025.

Other

• “King orders Cabinet reshuffle under Crown Prince, retains current ministers.” Saudi Gazette, August 13, 2026.

“As per a third decree, the King appointed Mazen Al-Sudairi as chairman of the Capital Market Authority with the rank of a minister after relieving Mohammed Al-Quwaiz of his position as its chairman.”

Go Deeper: “Biography of new CMA Chairman Mazen Al-Sudairi.” Maaal, August 13, 2026.

• “Kuwait foils ISIS plot targeting ‘vital facility,’ arrests suspect.” Anadolu Agansi, August 12, 2026.

“Kuwaiti authorities said Wednesday that security forces foiled “a terrorist plot” targeting a vital facility and arrested a Kuwaiti national affiliated with the ISIS (Daesh) terror group before the plan could be carried out.”

• “Qatar, Morocco among six Arab federations backing FIFA’s Infantino.” Reuters, August 13, 2026.

“The full backing by the six national federations, many of them AFC members, shows that block voting is extremely unlikely, even if the confederations themselves have taken a clear position, ⁠with each ​national federation having one vote. The Confederation of African Football has also supported Infantino.”

Geopolitics

• “Saudi ⁠Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye sign defence deal amid regional turmoil.” Al Jazeera, August 7, 2026.

“Saudi ⁠Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye have signed a ⁠joint defence agreement, deepening ‌security cooperation amid heightened military tensions and conflicts in the Middle East.”

“Reporting from the Turkish capital, Ankara, Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar Atas said that while the deal was purely defensive, such agreements bring about cooperation in other sectors, too. ‘It’s all about the trust now,’ Serdar said. ‘There are expectations in Ankara that this will also boost economic ties with Riyadh and Islamabad.’”

Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia names commander for maritime defence coalition.” Al Jazeera, August 6, 2026.

• “Saudi expects imminent two-pronged attack from Iran’s allies, official says.” Reuters, August 6, 2026.

“The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said late on Thursday that intelligence reports from Saudi Arabia, the United States and other regional countries indicated civilian and economic sites could be targeted, including energy infrastructure, ports and airports.”

• “Iran, Oman, US ‘close’ to Hormuz deal: What do they all want?” Al Jazeera, August 5, 2026.

“On Thursday, Tehran said it had agreed coordinates for new shipping routes through the strait with Oman.”

“Only eight vessels transited the strait on Monday, compared with roughly 130 ships per day before the US-Israel war on Iran erupted on February 28.”

Go Deeper: “Iran and Oman exchange proposals to manage Strait of Hormuz.” Al Jazeera, July 28, 2026.

• “Qatar Keeps Washington-Tehran Dialogue Channel Open as Mediators Push for Lasting Deal.” Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 4, 2026.

“Advisor to the Prime Minister and Official Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Majed bin Mohammed Al Ansari affirmed Tuesday that the State of Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman and Pakistan have been bending constant efforts to facilitate engagement between Iran and the United States to bridge their viewpoints.”

“Dr. Al Ansari said the current priority is to contain the escalation and reopen the way for diplomatic efforts. He stressed the importance of returning to the negotiating table as the optimal off-ramp to address the ongoing disputes.”

Market & Economy

• “Saudi Crude Shipments to US Plunge to Zero as Oil Refiners Pivot.” Bloomberg, August 6, 2026.

“Venezuela has been a big winner in the pivot away from Saudi crude. American refiners imported around 600,000 barrels of the Latin American country’s crude in July, up from roughly 100,000 at the start of the year.”

• Aramco announces second quarter and half year 2026 results. Aramco, August 4, 2026.

“Commenting on the results, Aramco President & CEO Amin H. Nasser said: ‘Aramco’s first-half performance in 2026 has been defined by the remarkable resilience of our people and the agility of our business and operations to withstand and respond to rapidly changing market conditions. Despite the unprecedented supply disruption through the Strait of Hormuz, we continued to demonstrate our ability to maintain business continuity by capitalizing on our diverse asset base and multi-decade planning, including strategic infrastructure such as the East-West Pipeline, storage capacity, and export terminals. That enabled us to sustain production and exports while advancing key projects, despite the challenging regional environment.’.”

Go Deeper: “2026 Aramco Second Quarter and Half-Year Interim Report.” Aramco, August 4, 2026. [PDF].

• “Gulf investors turn to Asia for AI opportunities.” Semafor, August 7, 2026.

“Qatari telecom Ooredoo is the lead investor in Zankore, a new AI compute platform in Indonesia, committing $800 million to support its launch. The company plans to deliver 200 megawatts of capacity next year, with Nvidia and Nokia as suppliers. Ooredoo, which has had a foothold in Indonesia for nearly two decades, sees data center demand more than tripling in Southeast Asia by 2030.”

• “UAE Fund Weighs $6.3 Billion for Japan AI Data Center.” Bloomberg, August 6, 2026.

“Total investment surrounding the project, including by suppliers and other companies looking to establish operations nearby, could reach as much as ¥2 trillion, the person said. A consortium of Japanese companies would likely handle construction and related infrastructure, they added.”

• “Kuwait Investment Authority Secures $4.25 Billion Loan.” Bloomberg, August 5, 2026.

“Kuwait has been targeted repeatedly by Tehran, with US bases, as well as Kuwaiti power and water plants, being damaged. Even so, the country managed to raise $6 billion from a bond sale last month, highlighting resilient demand for the OPEC member’s debt.”

Go Deeper: “Kuwait Sells $6 Billion of Bonds Despite Iran Strikes.” Bloomberg, July 22, 2026.

• “Saudi investments expand 5.1% in Q1 2026.” Zawya, August 6, 2026.

“Private and public-sector investments continued to pour into new fixed assets and infrastructure in Saudi Arabia amid ongoing economic expansion efforts.”

• “Saudi Arabia’s POS transactions surge 33% as education and freight spending lead the rally.” Arab News, August 07, 2026.

“Saudi Arabia’s total point-of-sale transactions reached SR16.3 billion ($4.35 billion) in the week ending Aug. 1, a 33 percent jump from the previous week, according to the latest data from the Saudi Central Bank, also known as SAMA.”

• “UAE’s Adnoc Buys $1.3 Billion of Tankers as Oil Exports Boom.” Bloomberg, August 7, 2026.

“The UAE has also been able to route oil through a cross-country pipeline skirting Hormuz. Since the pipeline can carry less than half of the roughly 3.6 million barrels a day of crude the UAE has exported over the past two months, tanker availability has proved key.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia sustains non-oil growth and Kuwait rebounds.” AGBI, August 2026.

• “Qatar’s transport infrastructure market to reach QR47.8bn in 2026.” The Peninsula, August 2, 2026.

“Qatar’s transportation infrastructure construction industry is entering a new phase of long-term, strategy-led growth, with the sector projected to expand to $13.12bn (QR47.82bn) this year from $12.48bn (QR45.48bn) in 2025, according to a recent market analysis by Mordor Intelligence.”

• Oman issues $949m in tenders as project awards reach $1.9bn. Arab News, August 2, 2026.

“Oman awarded projects worth 734 million Omani rials ($1.9 billion) and issued new tenders valued at 365 million rials in the first seven months of 2026, as the sultanate stepped up infrastructure and public service investment.”

Go Deeper: “Backers brush off conflict to pour FDI into Oman.” AGBI, August 3, 2026.

• “Dubai’s Emaar Properties Q2 profit rises 9% on strong demand.” Zwaya, August 7, 2026.

“Dubai-listed Emaar Properties reported a Q2 2026 net profit attributable to shareholders of AED 3.67 billion ($999 million), up 9% year-on-year, despite regional geopolitical tensions during the period.”

Green and Climate

• “Gulf renewable projects forecasted to grow despite wartime pressure.” Semafor, August 07, 2026.

“The Iran war has made financing Gulf solar and wind projects more difficult, but the economics still stack up firmly in their favor. The region is expected to add 12 gigawatts of renewable energy capacity this year and twice as much next year, according to a BloombergNEF report. While some delays can be expected, the recent delivery of turbines to Saudi Arabia and the commissioning of a 1.1 GW wind farm in the kingdom indicate the region has been able to access the equipment and material required to complete projects.”

• “UN’s Agricultural Development Fund aims to attract Saudi investors in sustainable bonds, says special envoy.” Arab News, August 07, 2026.

“Dina Saleh, IFAD’s special envoy for the Middle East, confirmed in an interview with Al-Eqtisadiah the fund’s focus on investing in Saudi Arabia’s rural sectors and supporting supply chains to boost coffee and mango production in Jazan.”

• “EAD, DMT strengthen collaboration on Abu Dhabi Waste Management Strategy initiatives.” Zawya, August 7, 2026.

“The initiative goes beyond removing waste from targeted sites. It adopts a systematic methodology that includes waste classification, weighing, and documentation within a structured field database under the Sahim – Citizen Science programme. This data is then analysed to identify the most prevalent waste types across terrestrial and marine environments, providing a clear picture of waste patterns and spatial distribution.”

• “More than 800 arrested in UAE-led operation to tackle environmental crime in Amazon basin.” The National, August 4, 2026.

“The UAE has led a major international operation against environmental crime in the Amazon basin, with 839 suspects arrested and assets valued at more than $280 million seized in 17 days.”

“The arrests were carried out under the UAE’s Law Enforcement for Climate programme, which was launched at the Cop28 summit in Dubai in partnership with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.”

• “King Fahad Industrial Port receives largest wind energy shipment for Saudi projects.” Zawya, August 5, 2026.

“The components are designated for the Starah and Shaqra wind energy projects, which are part of the Kingdom’s National Renewable Energy Programme aimed at diversifying energy sources and increasing the contribution of renewable energy to electricity generation.”

• “Acwa granted exclusive mandate to export Saudi green hydrogen.” Arab News, July 7, 2026.

“At the heart of this mission lies Neom Green Hydrogen Co., through which the Kingdom aims to become a leading producer and exporter of green hydrogen. The company, a joint venture between Acwa, Neom and Air Products, is expected to produce up to 600 tonnes of carbon-free hydrogen per day by the end of 2026.”

• “Qatar, Saudi Arabia sign deal for cooperation in fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection.” Zawya, August 7, 2026.

“HE Undersecretary of the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Engineer Abdulaziz bin Ahmed bin Abdullah Al Mahmoud affirmed that the MoU represents a significant addition to the cooperation between the State of Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and it embodies the deep-rooted fraternal relations and historical ties that bind the two brotherly nations.”

Local (sports, culture, education)

• “Heritage villages transform Baha into cultural tourism hub.” Arab News, August 4, 2026.

“More than 72 heritage villages and historical sites are being restored and developed through partnerships between government authorities and local communities, preserving Saudi Arabia’s cultural identity while creating new economic opportunities for residents through tourism, hospitality and small businesses.”

• “Hopes high for spikers: Bahrain set to chase Arab youth volleyball gold on home court.” Gulf Daily News, August 3, 2026.

“Bahrain named yesterday their final 15-player line-up that will be going for gold at home in the second Arab Youth Volleyball Championship.”

“The under-17 tournament, organised by the Bahrain Volleyball Association (BVA) in coordination with the Arab Volleyball Association (AVA), gets underway on Sunday next week at Isa bin Rashid Volleyball Arena at Isa Sports City in Riffa.”

Geopolitics

• “Trump pegs Saudi nuclear deal to Israel talks.” Semafor, July 23, 2026.

“Riyadh has long pegged normalization with Israel to the establishment of a Palestinian state, which Israel’s government opposes. But Iran’s attacks across the Middle East have placed the Gulf and Israel on the same side of the conflict, which could at least “make normalization easier,” Semafor’s Gulf editor wrote.”

Go Deeper: “Trump Adds New Israel Hurdle to Saudi Nuclear Deal.” WSJ, July 23, 2026.

• “Yemen’s Houthis to Impose Maritime Blockade on Saudi Arabia.” Bloomberg, July 20, 2026.

“The kingdom diverted its oil supplies to key Red Sea port of Yanbu following the outbreak of the war and Iran’s effective closure of Hormuz. Those exports, which rose to a record 4.19 million barrels a day last month, have helped limit the disruption to global supplies, but the route remains fragile as it exposes tankers to the Houthi militants who have previously attacked ships in the Red Sea.”

Go Deeper: “The Houthis just announced a blockade on Saudi Arabia. What does it mean for the global economy?” Atlantic Council, July 20, 2026.

• “Saudi, UAE officials use social media to signal unity after months of tension.” Reuters, July 22, 2026.

“The two Gulf heavyweights have seen their ​interests diverge for years on everything from oil quotas to geopolitics, with the disagreements coming into the open late last year over ​their support for opposing sides in the war in Yemen.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia, UAE Officials Signal Unity After Months of Tensions.” Bloomberg, July 22, 2026.

• “Brent Hits $100 Again as Houthi Attacks Threaten Further Supply Squeeze.” WSJ, July 23, 2026.

“The global oil benchmark soared 7.2% to $100.82 a barrel on Thursday, its highest level since the end of May, while West Texas Intermediate futures climbed 5.8% to $91.83 a barrel. The contracts have gained more than 19% and 16%, respectively, this week.”

Go Deeper: “Oil Prices Waver as Gulf Ship Traffic Falls to Lowest Level in Months.” New York Times, July 24, 2026.

• “US approves $41bn of arms sales to GCC in six months.” AGBI, July 24, 2026.

“Agreements announced by the State Department from January until the end of June reached $41 billion, compared with $9 billion for all of last year. The total is higher still when expansions to previously announced deals are included.”

Go Deeper: “The Gulf States Need Better Defense Integration, Not More Weapons.” Gulf International Forum, Jun 2, 2026.

Market, Economy, and Local News

• “Kuwait Sells $6 Billion of Bonds Despite Iran Strikes.” Bloomberg, July 22, 2026.

“Investor orders for the Gulf Arab country’s three-part dollar deal reached about $14.8 billion at final terms, allowing it to tighten spreads by 25 basis points across all tranches from the initial price talk, according to a person familiar with the matter.”

Go Deeper: “Kuwait: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report.” IMF, Feb 24, 2026.

• “UAE Doubles Down on $1.4 Trillion US Pledge, Faults EU on Trade.” Bloomberg, July 23, 2026.

“The United Arab Emirates says it’s ahead of schedule with a plan to invest $1.4 trillion in the US over the next decade, and criticized the European Union for stalling trade talks.”

Go Deeper: “Staff warned of major security risks from giving UAE new tech access. The White House went ahead anyway.” Politico, July 22, 2026.

• “Buyers to press Qatar, UAE for cheaper, more flexible LNG deals after Hormuz shock.” Reuters, July 23, 2026.

“Qatar’s vast reserves helped the country become the dominant force in the global gas market. It and the neighbouring UAE, where production volumes are ​increasing, account for around one-fifth of global LNG export capacity - all of which relies on the strait to reach global ⁠markets.”

Go Deeper: “Price volatility: A double-edged sword for the LNG industry.” IEEFA, July 21, 2026.

• “Abu Dhabi National Oil Company invests in $6.2B domestic gas project,” Semafor, July 21, 2026.

“The project is expected to produce more than 600 million cubic feet of gas a day from 2030, equivalent to almost 10% of the UAE’s current daily consumption.”

Go Deeper: “Abu Dhabi’s national oil company is committing $6.2 billion to a massive offshore gas field.” Quartz, July 21, 2026.

• “DP World plans two ports in booming Fujairah.” July 23, 2026.

“The war has been a windfall for Fujairah, which has favorable access to the Indian Ocean outside Gulf waters — the UAE’s six other emirates largely sit within the Strait of Hormuz. An overground logistics network will link DP World’s flagship terminal in Dubai with the new ports in Fujairah, the company said, emphasizing the emirate’s growing importance as a maritime gateway.”

Go Deeper: “Dubai’s DP World to Build Two New Terminals on U.A.E. East Coast, Bypassing Hormuz.” WSJ, July 23, 2026.

• “Blackstone plans Dubai office as it eyes further Gulf expansion, sources say.” Reuters, July 24, 2026.

“Since the beginning of the conflict, Blackstone has announced a deal with ​Dubai’s DAE for a joint ​aircraft leasing investment programme ⁠and has invested $250 million in a UAE-based payments and data intelligence technology platform.”

Go Deeper: “Lessons from business leaders in Dubai: How to continue operating during a conflict.” World Economic Forum, May 1, 2026.

• “Iran war costs squeeze Gulf’s protein boom.” Semafor, July 24, 2026.

“Gulf consumers have long embraced the global protein craze, but the Iran conflict is squeezing the margins of food companies seeking to profit from the trend. Riyadh-based National Agricultural Development Co., better known for its dairy brand Nadec, doubled sales in its protein segment, helping lift second-quarter revenue by 5.5%. But profit for the period fell 44% as higher feed and shipping costs erased those gains.”

• “King Salman appoints new ministers, reshuffles cabinet.” Al Arabiya, July 11, 2026.

“King Salman appointed Ihsan bin Abbas bin Hamza Bafaqih Secretary of Jeddah Governorate, Abdullah al-Dahim as Deputy Governor of the Saudi Central Bank for Executive Affairs, and Talal al-Hamoud as Deputy Governor of the Saudi Central Bank for Technical Affairs.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia adds industry, mineral resources portfolio to Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz’s role.” Reuters, July 11, 2026.

• “Middle East Green Initiative targets 35.4 billion trees, 99.4 million hectares of land restoration.” Saudi Gazette, July 23, 2026.

“Member states of the Middle East Green Initiative aim to plant 35.4 billion trees and rehabilitate 99.4 million hectares of degraded land, the initiative’s Executive Committee said during its 20th meeting.”

Go Deeper: Adel M. Ghanem, Yosef A. Alamri “The impact of the green Middle East initiative on sustainable development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” Journal of the Saudi Society of Agricultural Sciences, Volume 22, Issue 1, 2023.

• “DEWA expands power grid with $2.7bln transmission investment.” Zawya, July 23, 2026.

“Announcing this, Managing Director and CEO Saeed Mohammed Al Tayer said Dewa commissioned eight 132-kilovolt (kV) transmission substations in the first half of 2026 with a combined conversion capacity of 1,200 megavolt-amperes (MVA). The projects included 20 km of transmission cables, worth AED970 million.”

Go Deeper: “Gulf Energy Transition Through Renewable Energy Development.” Baker Institute, February 26, 2026.

• “Malaysia May Again Host Formula One Racing With Bahrain in Doubt.” Bloomberg, July 24, 2026.

“The Bahrain Grand Prix was supposed to be held in April this year, but the contest was one of two Middle East races indefinitely postponed due to the the ongoing war between the US and Iran. Bahrain has sought to reschedule the race for early October, ESPN reported on Thursday, citing unidentified sources, but uncertainty persists due to fresh escalation of the conflict this month.”

• “Kuwaitis cut down AC use in peak summer to save electricity as Iran hits power grid.” Khaleej Times, July 21, 2026.

“Kuwaiti authorities have called on the public to consume less energy so that they can maintain round-the-clock electricity as the grid comes under Iranian attack. Nasser Al Dhafiri, a civil servant in his forties, described “immense psychological pressure” on ordinary people as the attacks sparked fears of electricity outages.”

Geopolitics

• “Iran attacks Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait after deadly U.S. strikes.” CNBC, July 9, 2026.

“Iran says it has attacked U.S. forces in Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait after the U.S. bombed Iranian cities for a second consecutive night. CNBC’s Emma Graham reports from Abu Dhabi.”

Go Deeper: “Iran Update Special Report, July 9, 2026.” ISW, July 9, 2026.

• “Canada’s Carney defends his visit to Saudi Arabia and slams criticism from afar.” AP, July 9, 2026.

“Carney has been seeking to expand his country’s economic ties beyond its heavy reliance on the United States, and diversify trade and attract investments against the backdrop of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and threats to the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement.”

Go Deeper: “Canada wants broader Saudi ties, won’t lecture from ‘afar’: Carney.” Al-Monitor, July 9, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia considers expansion of oil pipeline to Red Sea, sources say.” Reuters, July 7, 2026.

“The kingdom is in preliminary talks with ⁠some of its neighbours about the potential expansion of the pipeline’s capacity by up to 2 million bpd, the sources said..”

“It was unclear if Aramco’s ​planned capacity increase would involve upgrades to existing infrastructure or construction of a new pipeline. One of the sources said the increase would include a ​smaller second pipe for oil products.”

Go Deeper: “New Middle East corridors are about more than just bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.” Allison Minor, Atlantic Council, July 6, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia explores IMEC route through Syria, sidestepping Israel, sources tell ‘Post’.” The Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2026.

“The initiative envisioned a network of railways, ports, and shipping lanes, connecting India to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Greece. It would provide a faster alternative to traditional maritime routes while strengthening economic integration across the region.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia,Turkey: Battle Over IMEC,What It Means for Haifa, Piraeus and Eilat.” The Times of Israel, June 13, 2026.

• “Saudis Slash Main Oil Price to Rare Discount as Market Dives.” Bloomberg, July 6, 2026.

“State producer Saudi Aramco will lower Arab Light oil for next month by $11 a barrel to $1.50 below the regional benchmark, according to a price list published Monday. The last two times it sold the grade at a discount were during price wars in 2020 and 2015, while it marks the largest monthly reduction in official selling prices since at least 2000.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi oil price cut unlikely to convince sated Asia buyers, traders say.” Reuters, July 7, 2026.

• “UAE president arrives in Kuwait for talks with emir.” Arab News, July 09, 2026.

“It affirmed the UAE’s full support for the two Gulf Cooperation Council member countries and all measures aimed at safeguarding their security and stability, the Emirates News Agency reported.”

Go Deeper: “The UAE Woos Kuwait… In Confrontation with Saudi Arabia?” Al Hurra, Feb 3, 2026.

Economy, Markets and Domestics

• “Saudi Arabia, Canada launch investment pact talks, deepen mining partnership.” Saudi Gazette, July 10, 2026.

“The two countries also pledged to deepen cooperation in defense, cybersecurity, counterterrorism and combating transnational organized crime, while expanding collaboration in healthcare, biotechnology, digital health, pharmaceuticals, medical technologies, research and workforce development.”

Go Deeper: “Carney’s Saudi Arabia trip a ‘high-water mark’ for relations: Business leader.” Kyle Duggan, Canada National Observer, July 9, 2026

• “Canada tells UAE it is not ready for its C$70bn investment.” Financial Times, July 7, 2026.

“The reason was a lack of projects at a stage where they could deploy the money. Former Quebec premier Jean Charest..”

Go Deeper: “Canada tells UAE it has no projects ready for billions in pledged investment - report.” I24 News, July 7, 2026.

• “Qatar Pauses Push to Ramp Up LNG After Hormuz Tanker Attack.” Bloomberg, July 9, 2026.

“The pause is one of the most high-profile fallouts of the heightened tensions this week with attacks on a number of ships near Hormuz and the US striking Iran for two consecutive days. President Donald Trump on Wednesday even raised the prospect of a return to all-out war, a worst-case scenario for energy producers in the region who were gradually recovering from the impact of the conflict.”

Go Deeper: “Qatar LNG under constraint: capacity loss and export dislocation.” Irina Mironova, Cedigaz, April 23, 2026.

• “UAE tops Arab region in FDI inflows in 2025 with $48.2 billion.” Arab News, July 08, 2026.

“According to UNCTAD estimates cited in Dhaman’s annual report, FDI inflows to Arab countries fell 10 percent to US$119.3 billion in 2025. More than 80 percent of total inflows were concentrated in three Arab countries, while the region’s share of global FDI declined to 7.3 percent and its share of FDI to developing economies fell to 13.3 percent.”

Go Deeper: “UAE Foreign Direct Investment, report 2025.” [UAE] Ministry of Investment, 2025. [PDF].

• “Businesses report blocked payments from Saudi Arabia to the UAE, raising fears of worsening ties.” Middle East Eye, July 08, 2026.

“Several sources told the Financial Times that payments from Saudi banks to UAE-based accounts belonging to companies and individuals in Dubai had been returned or held up since May, often without explanation.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi-UAE tensions hit money flows.” Yahoo, July 8, 2026.

• “Al-Hogail launches SR1.67 billion municipal, housing projects in Al-Baha.” Saudi Gazette, July 10, 2026.

“Municipal projects included completed developments worth SR464 million and new projects valued at SR873.5 million, covering roads, sidewalks, street lighting, flood mitigation, parks, public facilities and other infrastructure aimed at improving services for residents and visitors.”

Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia’s Residential Property Market Analysis 2026.” Global Property Guide, Mar 1, 2026.

• “Abu Dhabi’s e& exits Vodafone investment in $5.95bln deal.” Zawya, July 10, 2026.

“The sale covers 3.94 billion Vodafone shares at 112.5 GB pence ($1.51) per share, comprising about 110.5 pence in cash and a 2.02 pence FY26 dividend, payable on July 30, 2026..”

“The shares will initially be transferred through off-market block trades to three financial institutions who will hold them until Vega completes the regulatory requirements.”

• “United Solar completes $1.6bln funding for Oman polysilicon plant with IFC investment.” Zawya, July 6, 2026.

“In a separate statement that month, United Solar had announced that it secured $480 million in term debt financing from IFC and partner banks and more than $400 million in term debt and working capital facilities from local commercial banks led by Sohar International for the project.”

Go Deeper: “The Gulf could turn extreme heat to its advantage.” AGBI, July 8, 2026.

• “Abu Dhabi’s ADNEC reports record $2.5 bln economic contribution in 2025.” Zawya, July 6, 2026.

“In 2025, ADNEC Group generated AED9.2 billion in economic impact, an 8% increase from AED8.5 billion in 2024. Through its business and leisure tourism activities, the group generated 2.17 million hotel room nights, reflecting its growing role in driving economic growth and supporting the UAE’s strategic objective of building a diversified, knowledge‑based economy.”

• “Kuwait renewable energy firm plans equity raise to expand across MENA.” Zawya, July 8, 2026.

“AEP had recently secured several competitive solar projects in Kuwait and Oman, further validating the strength of its pipeline, commercial competitiveness, and ability to convert opportunities into awarded projects.”

• “Exclusive / Microsoft deepens AI ties with UAE to automate government work.” Semafor, July 8, 2026.

“Microsoft’s ties to the emirates are already significant: It has committed $15.2 billion to the country by 2030 and taken a stake in G42. Microsoft President Brad Smith previously told Semafor the company has broad ambitions for the UAE, seeing it as a gateway for computing power and data storage across the wider region.”

Go Deeper: “Abu Dhabi Ruler’s Family Office Is a Global Dealmaking Force.” Bloomberg, July 6, 2026.

• “ADNOC spends $1B on gas stations in South Africa.” Semafor, July 7, 2026.

“The Abu Dhabi state oil company’s retail arm, ADNOC Distribution, has bought Shell’s downstream business in South Africa for $1 billion, adding to a string of foreign acquisitions in recent months. The deal hands ADNOC 580 gas stations and a 10% market share in Africa’s largest economy.”

• “Qatar: Mortgage transactions reach $3.56bln in Q1.” Zawya, July 10, 2026.

“The volume of mortgage transactions achieved during Q1 2025 reached 434 transactions, with a total amount of QR10.037bn where Doha Municipality registered the highest number of mortgage transactions with 164 equivalent to 37.8 percent, followed by Al Rayyan Municipality with 117 transactions equivalent to 27 percent, then Al Daayen Municipality with 50 transactions equivalent to 11.5 percent of the total number of mortgaged properties.”

• “Acwa Power sets new dividend policy until 2030.” AGBI, July 8, 2026.

“The board also recommended a dividend payment of SAR353 million ($96 million), or SAR0.46 per share, for 2025 subject to shareholders’ approval.”

“Acwa Power reported a 19 percent year-on-year drop in net profit to SAR345 million in the first quarter of 2026 despite a 3 percent annual increase in revenue to SAR2 billion.”

• “Kuwait Investment Company’s German subsidiary secures €23mln loan.” Zawya, July 8, 2026.

“Wisaly is a real estate entity operated by the publicly listed KIC, one of Kuwait’s oldest investment firms that is 62.04% owned by the country’s wealth fund, the Kuwait Investment Authority, according to LSEG data.”

In today’s issue, we shed some light on the public debate around the question of trusting the Iranian regime, both on the short- and long-term. Views from various perspectives are highlighted, and the debate is concluded with selected opinions on other topics.

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Public Debates

Can Iran Be Trusted? Gulf Commentators Debate the Prospects of a New Regional Understanding

Amid preparations for a potential understanding between the United States, Iran, and the Gulf states, Gulf commentators have increasingly focused on a broader strategic question: Can Iran be trusted to uphold a new regional agreement? Reports of parallel Gulf-Iranian discussions, renewed diplomatic outreach, and disagreements surrounding the future of the Strait of Hormuz have generated a lively debate across the Gulf. While one camp argues that Iran’s past conduct leaves little room for confidence without fundamental changes in its behavior, another contends that diplomacy remains the only realistic path toward long-term regional stability.

The debate is best introduced by Saad bin Tiflah, the Kuwaiti former Minister of Information, whose article frames the discussion by outlining the two competing perspectives emerging across the Gulf. Rather than immediately taking sides, Bin Tiflah explains that Gulf societies are divided between those who believe engagement with Iran could create a new environment of stability and those who believe that genuine trust cannot exist without a fundamental change in the behavior of the Iranian regime. As he writes:

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Today, we highlight the public debate around a crucial topic: the US-Iran agreement. We include both optimistic and skeptical voices, and conclude with selected opinions on other topics.

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Beyond the Memorandum: Gulf Commentators Debate the US-Iran Agreement

The signing of the US-Iran Memorandum has generated an intense debate across Gulf commentary. While the agreement halted a costly confrontation and launched a sixty-day negotiating process, commentators remain deeply divided over its implications. For some, the memorandum risks restoring Iranian influence and repeating the mistakes of previous U.S. engagement with Tehran. Others argue that judgment should be postponed until the agreement’s implementation becomes clearer. A third group shifts the discussion away from immediate winners and losers, arguing that the real issues concern Gulf security, the Strait of Hormuz, regional geography, and the narratives surrounding the conflict itself.

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The public debate highlighted in this issue is all about the recent Saudi-Turkey railway deal that links Turkey to Saudi Arabia through Syria and Jordan, and could eventually connect to the GCC railway network. After that, we highlight other topics, and lastly share several selected pieces in the Nashra Picks.

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Public Debates

Railway of Integration or Railway of Empire? Gulf Commentators Debate the Saudi-Turkey Corridor

The June 9 signing of a Saudi-Turkish memorandum of understanding on railway cooperation has revived discussion of one of the most ambitious connectivity projects proposed in the modern Middle East. The planned corridor would link Turkey to Saudi Arabia through Syria and Jordan and could eventually connect to the GCC railway network, creating an overland route stretching from the Gulf to Europe. Supporters see the project as a transformative economic corridor capable of reshaping regional trade, strengthening supply chains, and reducing dependence on vulnerable maritime routes. Critics, however, argue that the initiative cannot be separated from its historical roots and warn that the revival of the old Hejaz Railway route may reflect a broader Turkish geopolitical vision rather than a purely economic undertaking.

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In today’s issue, we highlight the public debate around the Abraham Accords, particularly after a recent renewed push by president Donald Trump’s. Other topics are highlighted afterward. Lastly, selected pieces are presented in the Nashra Picks.

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Public Debates

Beyond the Abraham Accords: How Gulf Commentators View Normalization, Palestine, and the Emerging Regional Order

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The crucial debate in this issue revolves around Oman’s current position with regards to the Strait of Hormuz. Then, other topics are raised by multiple thought influencers. Lastly, selected pieces are presented in the Nashra Picks.

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Public Debates

Oman, Hormuz, and Gulf Autonomy: Should Muscat Defend Its Independent Course or Distance Itself from Tehran?

President Donald Trump’s threat against Oman sparked one of the Gulf’s most consequential debates this week. While most commentators rejected the language used against Muscat, they disagreed over the underlying question: is Oman being punished for its independent diplomacy, or paying the price for failing to distance itself clearly from Tehran’s claims regarding the Strait of Hormuz?

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Today, we shed light on the discussions on the question of Iraq and its relation with the GCC countries vs. Iran, and the future of such relation, followed with selected opinions on other issues, after which comes the Nashra Picks with special pieces.

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Public Debates

Would Iraq Return to the Gulf Sphere, or Has It Become Structurally Part of the Iranian Sphere?

The recent drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE — allegedly launched from Iraqi territory — have revived one of the Gulf’s central strategic questions: can Iraq still function as an independent Arab state connected to its Gulf environment, or has it become structurally embedded within Iran’s regional security architecture? The controversy intensified after Gulf states accused Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of carrying out attacks from inside Iraq, while Baghdad simultaneously denied the existence of conclusive evidence and promised investigations.

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The Weekly Digest by The Gulf Nashra is a weekly series highlighting the most significant public debates and opinions from the region, featuring curated picks such as books, analytical papers, academic research, podcasts, interviews, webinars, and more.

This week, we highlight the discussions around Turki Al Faisal’s article regarding Saudi’s policy toward the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, then share selected opinions on other issues, and lastly end with the thought-provoking Nashra Picks.

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Public Debates

Is This the Gulf’s War? The Debate After Prince Turki Al Faisal’s Article

The recent article by former Saudi intelligence chief and senior Saudi royal Turki Al Faisal, titled “Thus Succeeded MBS” has triggered a major debate across Gulf political and intellectual circles. At the center of the controversy was his argument that the ongoing confrontation with Iran is not fundamentally a Saudi or Gulf war, but rather a conflict Israel seeks to expand into a broader regional confrontation that would ultimately weaken everyone except itself.

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The Weekly Digest by The Gulf Nashra is a weekly series highlighting the most significant public debates and opinions from the region, featuring curated picks such as books, analytical papers, academic research, podcasts, interviews, webinars, and more. In this issue, we examine notable discussions on America’s “Freedom Project.” We bring Saudi and Emirati voices and highlight how the perspectives diverge, followed by selected opinions on other issues, after which we end with the thought-provoking Nashra Picks. If you find some value in our publication, we invite you to subscribe and share.

Public Debates

Saudi–Emirati Divergence over the American “Freedom Project”

The American “Freedom Project,” announced by President Donald Trump to reopen the Strait of Hormuz after weeks of paralysis, exposed a notable divergence between Saudi and Emirati strategic discourse. While Saudi Arabia refused participation in military escalation and emphasized de-escalation, many Emirati commentators framed the project as a strategic necessity to deter Iran and restore maritime security. The result was a rare public intellectual divide between two Gulf partners over how regional order should be preserved.

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The Weekly Digest by The Gulf Nashra is a weekly series highlighting the most significant public debates and opinions from the region, featuring curated picks such as books, analytical papers, academic research, podcasts, interviews, webinars, and more. In this issue, we explore the debate surrounding the UAE’s exit from OPEC and OPEC+. We highlight influential voices commenting on what motivated it, what the consequences are, and what it means for the Gulf, followed by stimulating Nashra Picks. If you find it valuable, we invite you to subscribe and share.

Public Debates

“OPEC has grown increasingly rigid and aged, while the UAE has transformed—its economy more diversified beyond oil, emerging as a rising power with geoeconomic and geopolitical priorities that differ from those of the 20th-century UAE.”

Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, X, United Arab Emirates

The UAE exit from OPEC has triggered a sharp Gulf debate, not simply over policy, but over the logic of oil market governance itself. Saudi voices largely frame the issue as structural: stability requires coordination, regardless of institutional form. Emirati voices, by contrast, frame the move as a rational recalibration of national strategy, rooted in capacity, diversification, and long-term positioning.

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Nashra Picks

Geopolitics

• Analysis: “MBS hosts Sudan’s Burhan in Jeddah as $1.5B Saudi-backed arms deal stalls.” Rosaleen Carroll, Al-Monitor, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Pakistan’s quiet fighter jet deployment to Saudi Arabia signals Gulf anxiety.” Sabena Siddiqui, Al-Monitor, April 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia pursues quiet diplomacy as Trump pushes Israel normalization.” Beatrice Farhat, Al-Monitor, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Hollow Promise of Arab Solidarity.” Tareq Alotaiba, AGSI, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “Egypt and the Gulf: A Relationship under Pressure.” Imad K. Harb, Arab Center, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran War Is a Stress Test for Gulf States.” Frederic Wehrey and Charles Johnson,Carnegie, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran war has forced the US-Gulf alliance out of the shadows.” Eric Alter, Atlantic Council, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “‘They have been exposed’: The Iran war upends Gulf states’ security and business model.” Stefanie Hausheer Ali, Atlantic Council, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf’s Iran Problem Isn’t Solved.” John Calabrese, AGSI, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf Security Strategies After the Iran War.” Jean-Loup Samaan, AGSI, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Can Qatar Still Mediate After Becoming a Target?” Faisal Al-Hanzab, AGSI, April 22, 2026.

Economics

• Analysis: “Six weeks into the conflict, which of the small Arabian Gulf economies are still seeing less activity?” Meshal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Geoeconomic Rebalancing after the Gulf Crisis.” Akram Zaoui, ORF, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “why asia cannot replace gulf crude easily.” Parul Bakshi and Samriddhi Vij, ORF, April 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “Catalysing the GCC’s Waste-to-Energy Prospects for Agriculture.” Leigh Mante, ORF, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Yielding to Shortage: Gulf Crisis Prompts Fertilizer and Food Shocks.” Héla Miniaoui, AGSI, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why did the Met Opera lose its Saudi funding deal?” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “What LIV Golf’s woes suggest about Saudi Arabia’s economic headwinds.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, April 19, 2026.

Podcasts

• Podcast: “Untold Facts About Saudi Cinema.” Fouad Al-Khatib, The Cinema Bulletin, April 23, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “Matthias Jaissle on His Career-Ending Injury to Coaching Success.” MO Show, April 18, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Is the Defense System Managed in the UAE?” Abdul Nasser Al-Hamidi, Arab Cast, April 16, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “The Beijing Agreement Has Collapsed, and Iran Drinks the ‘Poisoned Chalice’ Again,” Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, Al-Kalam Khaliji. April 21, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Webinar: “Mending the Rift: Iran and the UAE’s Post-War Ties.” MEI, April 22, 2026. [Eng].

• Webinar: “Transformations in Epistemic Consciousness: From Classical Orientalism to Contemporary Extraction,” Abdullah Habib, Middle East Council, April 21, 2026. [Eng].

Public Debates

Iran’s expansionist project after the recent war: retreat, adaptation, or entrenchment?

The war that swept across the region has left behind a question no ceasefire could resolve: whether the Iranian axis—its militias, proxies, and transnational networks stretching from Beirut to Baghdad—has been fundamentally weakened or merely recalibrated. Across commentary from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, a broad consensus emerges: the axis has not collapsed. It has adapted. The central analytical divide is not over whether Iran incurred significant costs—it clearly did—but whether those costs translate into structural retreat or simply a tactical pause within a longer-term project of regional entrenchment.

On Iraq, Ayman Al-Tamimi, writing from Saudi Arabia, argues that Iran has successfully reproduced the Lebanese model within Baghdad.

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Book: Nadeen Dakkak “Migration to the Gulf in the Arabic Novel.” Edinburgh University Press, June 2026.

Analysis: “Saudi stocks hit 2026 high, bucking global war-driven volatility.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “What LIV Golf’s woes suggest about Saudi Arabia’s economic headwinds.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “China’s Position and Strategic Considerations on the Gulf States’ Involvement in the Iran-US-Israel Conflict.” Bo Wang, MEPEI, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “Can Gulf Green Finance Survive an Oil Price Shock?” Christopher Gooding, AGSI, April 10, 2026.

Analysis: “From Shield to Target: The Gulf’s Security Dilemma.” Nour Eid, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Business as Usual in the UAE?” Rebecca Anne Proctor, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait’s Bidun in the Face of Climate Change are Invisible, yet Exposed.” Courtney Freer, Carnegie, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait Is Stripping Its People of Citizenship at an Unprecedented Rate.”Fatimah Muhammed and Sultan Alamer, New Lines Magazine, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Protection or Vulnerability? Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Iran War.” Rohan Advani, Arab Center, April 14, 2026.

Analysis: “How to Avoid Mutually Assured Devastation in the Gulf.” Daniel Brumberg, Arab Center, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Beyond the Battlefield: The Disruption of Education in the Gulf.” Ibrahim Alhouti, Gulf International Forum, April 16, 2026.

Analysis: “Post-War Dynamics: The Gulf at the Center of a New World Order.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council, April 12, 2026.

Podcast: “Trade, Diversification, and the Future of the GCC.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, April 8, 2026. [Eng].

Podcast: “I Took Responsibility from the Age of 13!” Maytha Al Mehairi, Arab Cast, April 9, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran in Gulf Media Discourse: From Political Memory to the Current War.” Mohammed Al Yahyaei, Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran’s war and the positioning of the Arab intellectual.” Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “The Gulf Is Stronger Than Iran Expects.” Obaid Al-Wasmi, Mahfoof, April 16, 2026.

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Public Debates

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Public Debates

The announcement of a ceasefire on April 8, alongside upcoming negotiations reportedly mediated by Pakistan, has reignited a familiar regional debate: does this moment signal the beginning of a durable resolution, or merely another temporary pause that risks reproducing instability—particularly at the expense of Gulf security? At the heart of this debate lies a clear divide between two interpretive camps: one sees it as a necessary turning point driven by structural change within Iran, while the other views it as a tactical pause that may ultimately deepen, rather than resolve, the conflict.

A prominent strand of commentary argues that the ceasefire reflects a deeper transformation within Iran, driven by internal disruption and external pressure. Saudi writer Abdulrahman Al-Rashed frames this moment as historically significant, asserting that “Iran has most likely changed for two main reasons: war and peace.” He links the ceasefire to a restructuring of Iran political leadership, noting that “the leadership of the state has changed due to the assassinations that eliminated a long chain of generals and institutional leaders… at the top of the hierarchy, the Supreme Leader himself.” From this perspective, the scale of recent developments is unprecedented: “in 38 days, Iran faced what it had not faced in 38 years.” This was not a peripheral contest over influence in Syria or Lebanon, but an “existential war” in which the regime fought for survival. Consequently, Tehran now operates under severe constraint, with negotiations representing, in his words, “Tehran last card… little more than a fig leaf” masking a strategic retreat.

Complementing this structural argument is a more normative and forward-looking perspective. Kuwaiti commentator Hamad Alhamad emphasizes the necessity of the ceasefire itself, regardless of its fragility. “There is a fragile ceasefire, but it is far better than the continuation of war and destruction,” he writes, highlighting the global spillover effects of prolonged conflict. For Alhamad, the key question is not whether the truce is perfect, but whether it creates an opportunity for meaningful transformation.

Yet, optimism is not unconditional. Kuwait’s Ahmed Al Dawas introduces a geopolitical layer, questioning why external powers such as Russia and China have not meaningfully intervened on Iran’s behalf. His conclusion is blunt: both powers act strictly according to self-interest. China benefits from a distracted United States, while Russia gains from the depletion of American military resources. As he explains, “every missile… directed toward Iran is one that will not reach the battlefronts in Ukraine.” This reinforces a broader point: Iran’s strategic isolation may push it toward negotiation, but it does not guarantee a stable outcome. Indeed, Al Dawas ultimately expresses skepticism, warning that “I do not believe a ceasefire agreement with Iran will succeed—something is likely to happen.”

Moreover, a more cautious—if not pessimistic—reading of the truce suggests that ceasefires in such conflicts often function as mechanisms for recalibration rather than genuine resolution. Abdullah Khalifah, from the United Arab Emirates, articulates this argument with conceptual clarity, describing the ceasefire as “the most dangerous moment in the conflict.” His reasoning rests on the strategic value of time: “time here is a resource of power, used to rebuild capability under the cover of de-escalation.” In this sense, the truce does not freeze the conflict—it redistributes its dynamics, allowing actors to reposition and regenerate. Without strict enforcement mechanisms, he warns, the ceasefire risks becoming “a space for reproducing the threat.”

A similar conclusion emerges from Omani analyst Ahmed Alameri, though through a different lens. He interprets the truce not as Iranian weakness, but as a reflection of Western constraint. Despite the intensity of US rhetoric, “the relative decline in the pace of escalation… reflects an awareness of the cost of sliding into an open confrontation.” The result, he argues, is not a strategic breakthrough but “a tactical pause” that grants Iran time to “reorganize its political and military positions.” This reading is reinforced by Nasser Al-Zadjali, who goes further by suggesting that the truce itself signals a recovery in Iranian “deterrence.” In his view, the mere ability to impose or secure a pause indicates that Iran has regained a degree of strategic balance.

More critical still is the argument advanced by Saudi commentator Mishari Althaydy, who shifts attention to the substance—or lack thereof—behind the agreement. He raises a series of unresolved questions: “what mechanisms will compel Iran to comply…? And what monitoring and measurement standards will be used?” Without clear answers, the agreement risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. Moreover, he highlights a structural asymmetry: while Iran has absorbed significant losses, “it is impossible for Iran to declare any form of defeat.” This entrenched culture of denial, he argues, has been replicated across its regional network, making genuine concession unlikely. In this context, even the negotiation agenda itself is shifting, with “the Strait of Hormuz” emerging as a new central bargaining arena.

Finally, Saudi Arabia’s Shaher Alnahari captures the ambiguity that defines the current moment. The ceasefire, he writes, “may mark the beginning of a long de-escalation process,” but it may equally be “nothing more than a brief pause on the path to a longer and more dangerous conflict.” The outcome, in other words, remains fundamentally uncertain.

Taken together, the debate reveals a central tension: whether the truce represents structural change or strategic delay. What unites both camps, however, is a shared recognition that the ceasefire is not an endpoint, but a moment of redefinition—one that will either close the current cycle of escalation or lay the groundwork for its next phase.

Selected Gulf Opinions

“China has adopted a position characterized by neutrality and pragmatism regarding the US–Israeli war on Iran, seeking to balance the determinants and guiding principles of its foreign policy and its relations with strategic partners, while hedging against the potential repercussions of this war on its strategic interests. This includes preserving Beijing’s interests in the Middle East—particularly those related to energy and regional stability—alongside managing its relationship with the United States in a way that limits the prospects of escalation between them.”

Fahad Al-Mudahki, Al Ayam, (Bahrain), April 11, 2026.

“The Arab citizen experiences a vast gap between the dream of a ‘United Arab States’ and a reality that offers nothing but wars and closed borders. As Arab summits continue in their largely ‘protocol-driven’ form, yielding little of substance, public distrust in these meetings has grown, prompting a search for a new form of political struggle that reflects popular aspirations beyond institutions that have proven unable to end the severe crises across the Arab world.”

Nayef Sharar, Al Jarida, (Kuwait), April 10, 2026.

“One of Trump’s campaign promises was to dismantle what he called the ‘OPEC cartel monopoly.’ Today, after the United States has taken control of Venezuelan oil, it should be understood that Iran’s targeting of Gulf oil and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz primarily serve the United States by enabling it to dominate the global energy market. This also suggests the existence of a systematic plan to weaken OPEC cohesion, in which Iran is a participant.”

Meshal Al Khaldi, X, (Saudi Arabia), April 10, 2026.

“What is most regrettable about these events is the disgraceful Arab position. How can Lebanon—while it is a member of the Arab League—be left alone under this bombardment, without a word, without pressure, without action? Arab capitals merely watch the situation unfold, witnessing the fall of innocents and the destruction and devastation, while some states issue only timid condemnations. Where is Arab solidarity? Or is it merely slogans raised in meetings and Arab summits?

Even more troubling is that the so-called free world, which claims to defend human dignity, has chosen silence, turning a blind eye to the blatant violation of the international ceasefire—as if Lebanese blood were worth less than any other.”

Hamad Al-Hadrami, Al Roya, (Oman), April 9, 2025.

“In the most critical moments, such as the repeated wars on Gaza, the Iranian role has appeared largely indirect—limited to support through proxies, without political or military action matching the intensity of its declared rhetoric. This gap between verbal escalation and practical caution reinforces the impression that the Palestinian issue is used in Iranian policy more as a pretext or a pressure tool than as an independent strategic priority.”

Ahmed Alhosani, Al Etihad, (UAE), April 8, 2026.

“The firmness of Rafsanjani, his flexible political mind, his commitment to preserving the state and its institutions, his focus on reconstruction and moving beyond the phase of revolutionary slogans, and his awareness that Iran cannot remain isolated from its regional environment—these are qualities Iran needs in a leader.

There may be figures today who resemble Rafsanjani in some respects, but none possess the full range of his attributes—most importantly, his courage and his ability to persuade, and to tell the third Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, what must be said: to stop the bloodshed, end the attacks on neighboring Gulf states, and prevent the region from descending into a chaos that would harm everyone, with Iran among the first to suffer its consequences.”

Hassan Al Mustafa, Asharq Al Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), April 7, 2026.

“For decades, the prevailing model in the Middle East was based on direct deterrence, displays of power, and reliance on military superiority as a decisive tool. However, this model has begun to lose its effectiveness in an environment that has become more complex and interconnected. Wars are no longer decided solely on the battlefield; their effects now extend to the economy, supply chains, energy markets, and even the media sphere, where narratives are shaped and perceptions are redefined.

In this context, the nature of conflict has shifted from direct military confrontation to a multi-dimensional network. Influence over energy markets can carry as much weight as military strikes, managing political alliances may rival battlefield superiority in importance, and the ability to shape public opinion has become an integral part of the equation of power.”

Abdullah Aletaibi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), April 7, 2026.

“The dual veto (Russian–Chinese) yesterday revealed two points. First, that Russia and China’s interests in Iran are deeper and more important than their interests in the GCC. Second, that Iran enjoys international political cover that will positively influence its role in the future.”

Abdullah Alnefisi, X, (Kuwait), April 7, 2026.

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Nashra Picks

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Five weeks of war have reshaped how Gulf publics think, debate, and disagree. The conversation is richer than most outside coverage suggests. This week's digest brings together the sharpest Gulf commentary on the conflict, curated reading and listening for those who want to go deeper, and the perspectives that aren't making it into the international press.

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Public Debates

The question of who is “winning” the current confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel has evolved into a broader intellectual divide across Gulf commentary—reflecting not only battlefield interpretations, but deeper disagreements over power, narrative, and long-term consequences. While some argue that Washington has achieved strategic gains, others insist that Iran has imposed new constraints on the region. Between these views, a third position emerges: the outcome remains unclear, but the Gulf is bearing the heaviest cost.

A balanced reading begins with Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani from Qatar, who frames the situation in terms of risk rather than victory. He warns that escalation may persist because “there are parties that want this war to continue… knowing its consequences will not directly affect them,” pointing to Israel, whose ports “remain open to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.” By contrast, the Gulf faces systemic exposure: “the continued choking of the Strait of Hormuz could lead to serious economic repercussions… not only for the region, but for the global economy.” His key question—“who benefits from this collapse?”—captures the ambiguity, especially as he suggests that “the United States is not the real beneficiary.”

This uncertainty is reinforced by Bahraini writer Jaffar Salman, who focuses on messaging rather than outcomes. He argues that Donald Trump delivers multiple narratives simultaneously: “to Europe, readiness to stop the war… to the Gulf, Iran, and Israel, continued escalation… to the American public, victory.” In this view, rhetoric itself becomes a strategic tool.

One major camp argues that Iran holds the upper hand—not through decisive military superiority, but through its ability to impose costs. Kuwaiti thinker Abdullah Alnefisi states that “Trump is looking for an exit… he fell into an Israeli trap.” Qatari analyst Mohammed Alahmari similarly argues that Washington has effectively “ceded” leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as “the real nuclear bomb of Iran.”

This view is reinforced by battlefield persistence. Saudi writer Khaled Almalik notes that despite repeated U.S. claims of victory, “Iran continues to attack Israel, American forces, and Gulf states,” raising doubts about whether its capabilities have truly been neutralized. Even if U.S. claims were accurate, he warns of a strategic vacuum that could enable Israeli expansion under full Western backing.

Economically, Iran’s leverage appears clearer. Saudi economist Hebshi Alshimary notes that roughly “20 million barrels of oil per day” pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making disruptions globally consequential. The crisis has exposed fragility: some Gulf producers cut output due to storage limits, while shipping costs surged sharply. Iran, in effect, has weaponized geography into economic pressure.

Omani perspectives extend this argument further. Abbas Alzadjali argues that Iran’s asymmetric responses have disrupted energy markets and imposed insecurity across the Gulf, raising questions about whether the war reflects strategic necessity or “overconfidence in military power.” Meanwhile, Asim Al-Shidi contends that the U.S.-led security model has lost “legitimacy,” now seen as aligned with Israeli dominance rather than regional balance.

Yet another camp insists that the United States has achieved meaningful gains. Kuwaiti writer Saad bin Tiflah Alajmi argues that U.S.-Israeli actions disrupted Iran’s plans, “confusing the timing” of a premeditated attack on Israel, noting that “85 percent of Iranian drones and missiles” were instead directed toward the Gulf and Jordan.

Emirati analyst Salah Al-Ghul emphasizes Iran’s growing isolation, arguing that continued attacks have deepened its marginalization and that any settlement must include “clear guarantees to prevent repeated aggression” across missiles, maritime pressure, and proxy networks.

From Kuwait, Muhammad Nasser Al-Atwan argues that Iranian targeting patterns reveal weakness: rather than striking fortified U.S. bases, Iran focuses on civilian infrastructure, suggesting a strategy of “economic coercion and psychological warfare” against Gulf societies.

Finally, U.S. advantage also appears in narrative control. Omani writer Mubarak Al-Hamdani notes that a single U.S. statement can move global markets within minutes, highlighting a broader “struggle over strategic narratives” and who controls them.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that framing the conflict as a simple U.S. or Iranian victory misses the larger picture. Iran has imposed asymmetric costs, particularly through energy disruption, while the United States retains structural advantages in military, financial, and narrative domains. The most consistent conclusion across Gulf commentary is not who has won, but who is absorbing the consequences: a region caught between escalation, uncertainty, and a shifting balance of power.

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Week four of the Iran war was defined by a flurry of diplomatic activity that produced no diplomacy. Washington circulated a 15-point peace proposal to Tehran via Pakistan. Iran rejected it, called it "maximalist and unreasonable," and countered with five conditions of its own, one of which is sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Trump responded by granting Iran yet another extension on his Hormuz deadline. Egypt, Pakistan, and Oman all signalled readiness to mediate. Through it all, Iran's foreign minister was unambiguous: "our policy is the continuation of resistance." The Gulf watched a negotiation take shape around it, without it, and with no clear path to an outcome.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Iran regime turns sights on UAE as war widens beyond conventional front.” Al-Monitor, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Ukraine’s Zelenskyy capitalizes on Iran war to ink security deal with Saudi Arabia.” Al-Monitor, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE Are Urging Trump to Continue a War They Did Not Want.” Hussein Ibish, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Not All Oil Is Created Equal.” Tim Callen, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Economic Impact of the Iran Conflict on the Gulf.” Tim Callen, AGSI, March 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “Ukraine’s Counterdrone Assistance to the Gulf States.” Jean-Loup Samaan, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why the Gulf Arab States Matter So Much – But Decide So Little.” Weilin Deng, AGSI, March 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf.” Frank Rose, AGSI, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “The relative resilience of GCC countries to the Iran crisis.” Karen Young, Middle East Institute, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf State investment in a time of war.” Sultan Alamer, Ekō News, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran War and the End of the US-Gulf “Oil for Security” Deal.” Jim Krane, Arab Center, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Drone superpower Ukraine is an ideal tech partner for the Gulf states.” Anatoly Motkin, Atlantic Council, March 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf Cannot Afford to Be Dragged Into War.” Robert Geist, Gulf International Forum, March 25, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Have Drones Changed the Nature of War?” with Khaled Al-Wuqayan, Bedoon Waraq +, March 22, 2026.

• Podcast: “Hormuz Will Not Return to What It Was.” Saleh Al-Mutairi, Mahfoof, March 27, 2026.

• Podcast: “Habib Bank AG Zurich UAE CEO Jamal Alvi on resilience, banking and what comes next.” Gulf Business, Mar 26, 2026.

• Podcast: “The War in the Gulf Between Escalation and Diplomacy.” ME Council, Abdullah Al-Otaibi, March 24, 2026.

This Eid, the Gulf is at war. This digest covers the first twenty two days: what happened, what it cost, and what it means. For readers joining us for the first time: welcome. For those who have been with us since Day 1: thank you.

Eid Under Fire

Eid al-Fitr arrives this year against a backdrop that would have been unthinkable twelve months ago.

Kuwait has banned public celebrations. Bahrain has intercepted 139 missiles and 238 drones in three weeks. Across the UAE, air defense systems stand on permanent alert. In Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, the oilfields that power the global economy have been absorbing drone swarms in the dark. In Oman, two expatriates were killed when drones came down in Sohar. Qatar’s Ras Laffan, the largest LNG complex in the world, has been struck. The facility that supplies 17% of global LNG output is damaged.

This is not the Eid the Gulf planned for.

Yet, the Gulf is still holding. Markets have partially recovered from their worst levels. Air defenses have performed. Governments have maintained order. The region’s states have, with discipline and at great cost, refused to be drawn into a war not of their making.

That refusal is the story of the first twenty two days, even though it’s quiet, deliberate, and expensive.

Three Weeks in Numbers

• Energy

  • Oil price rise since Feb 28: +47%

  • Brent crude peak (Mar 19): $113.71/barrel

  • War risk insurance on tankers: +1,100%

• Strait of Hormuz

  • Weekly vessel transits: 17 (down from 839 pre-war)

  • Traffic collapse: –98%

  • Maritime incidents recorded: 21

• Attacks on Gulf States

  • Missiles & drones fired: +3,917

  • Killed: 17

  • Injured: 290

• Markets & Economy

  • GCC market cap lost at peak: $380B

  • Bank deposit flight risk (S&P): $307B

  • Tadawul worst drawdown: –14.2%

Three Turning Points

Three moments defined the first three weeks.

1. The Hormuz Blockade (Day 1): Within the first 72 hours, commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz effectively collapsed. What followed was not a temporary disruption but a reconfiguration of global energy logistics. The world’s most critical chokepoint, through which roughly 20% of global oil and 25% of LNG normally moves, went from 138 daily transits to near-zero in days. Every subsequent development of the past three weeks has unfolded in the shadow of that single fact. Twenty million barrels a day backed up. Five million finding their way out through pipelines. The rest waiting.

2. The Strike on Oman (Day 12): On March 11, strikes hit oil storage facilities in Salalah, Oman’s largest port. The significance was not just strategic. It was symbolic. Oman had maintained open channels with Tehran throughout. Sultan Haitham had personally congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader days earlier. The attack shattered the assumption that neutrality provides protection. Gulf commentators were divided: Iran asserting dominance, or a third party eliminating the region’s last diplomatic bridge? The debate remains open. What is clear is that the attack changed the calculus. No Gulf state is insulated by good intentions.

3. South Pars and Ras Laffan (Day 19): On March 18, Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gasfield. Iran retaliated by hitting Qatar’s LNG mega-complex and the single most important natural gas facility on the planet: Ras Laffan. The damage cut 17% of global LNG output. The potential annual cost: $20 billion. The hit to Qatar’s GDP: an estimated 9%. This was no longer a war over military positions. It was a war over the architecture of global energy. The escalatory loop that Gulf analysts had warned about for weeks had arrived.

The Economic Toll No One Is Counting

The macro numbers (including oil prices, market indices, maritime incidents) tell one story. The story they don’t tell is the one being lived by the Gulf’s 56 million residents.

Aviation has been in effective shutdown across multiple Gulf airports. Thousands of expatriate workers (who constitute the majority of the Gulf’s population) face uncertainty about employment, mobility, and safety. The construction projects, hospitality expansions, and Vision 2030 programs that defined the region’s transformation have not stopped, but they have slowed. Food prices have risen. Fuel subsidy systems are under pressure. In Kuwait, drone debris damaged six power transmission lines on a single day. In Bahrain, visa fines were waived as a small official gesture acknowledging that normal life has been suspended.

For workers whose remittances home fund families across South Asia and Africa, the war is not an abstraction. It is a paycheck at risk, a flight that doesn’t exist, a future that has been placed on hold by a conflict they did not choose and cannot leave.

What the Gulf Is Actually Saying

The most important coverage gap in this conflict is not data. Rather, it is voice.

Western media has covered this war through the lens of US military strategy, Israeli intelligence operations, and Iranian nuclear calculations. The Gulf has been largely absent from that framing, although it’s the region absorbing the strikes, the economic damage, and the political pressure. The Gulf Nashra exists to correct that.

Across twenty two days of commentary from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain, several threads have emerged with consistency:

• On being dragged in: Gulf commentators have uniformly rejected external pressure from Washington, from Tel Aviv, and implicitly from Tehran to take sides. The dominant voice has been one of strategic autonomy: the Gulf’s interests are the Gulf’s interests, and they do not map cleanly onto any outside power’s agenda. As one Saudi analyst wrote: the Gulf states are “the pillars of the temple” and they must remain standing while others exhaust themselves.

• On Iran’s new leadership: The selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader dominated Gulf commentary in the first week. Emirati voices were largely pessimistic. “more radical, more dangerous, more aggressive.” Saudi analysts focused on whether the new leadership brings pragmatism or continuity, invoking the precedent of Khomeini’s eventual decision to end the Iraq war. Kuwaiti commentators described Iran as evolving into a “religious hereditary republic.” No one was optimistic. The assassination of Ali Larijani only deepened that pessimism. He was regarded across the Gulf as a pragmatic voice and potential negotiating partner. As one analyst put it: Israel killed not just a man, but “the opportunity for negotiation.”

• On American reliability: A recurring and pointed question: where are US intelligence assets when missiles and drones are being launched at Gulf cities? One UAE commentator asked directly “Is it possible that the technology you boast about suddenly goes blind when it comes to our security? Or do those eyes open only for your interests?” The question has not received an answer. Meanwhile, Trump branded NATO allies “cowards” for not supporting military action, and the Pentagon requested an additional $200 billion for the war. The Gulf is watching who its allies actually are.

• On Oman’s role: Oman’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran (even after being struck) has divided Gulf opinion sharply. Critics called it a provocation to Gulf brothers. Defenders argued that quiet diplomacy is not abandonment but a tool for regional stability. Omani commentators were unequivocal: Oman’s policy is guided by its own national interest, not regional alignment.

What to Watch in Week 4

• Ras Laffan and LNG recovery: Qatar’s facility supplies 17% of global LNG. The pace of damage assessment and any restart timeline will determine whether the energy crisis deepens or stabilizes. Europe and Asia are watching closely.

• Iran’s “zero restraint” threat: Tehran has signaled it has deployed only a fraction of its firepower and threatened zero restraint on further energy targeting. Whether that threat is posture or policy will define the next phase.

• UAE posture shift: Senior UAE officials have signaled readiness to support US-led efforts to secure the Strait. If the UAE moves from strategic ambiguity to active involvement, the regional map changes significantly.

• Ground operation signals: Netanyahu’s comment that “there has to be a ground component” is the most significant escalatory signal of the three weeks. A ground operation would transform the conflict entirely, and its implications for Gulf states would be direct and immediate.

• The Abraham Accords: As one Saudi commentator observed: after this war, it is difficult to imagine any Gulf state moving forward with expanding the Accords without a deep reassessment. The normalization architecture of the past five years is under fundamental review.

• Oil at $150. It is no longer a fringe scenario. If Ras Laffan damage is confirmed as severe, if Hormuz remains closed, and if Iran follows through on energy targeting threats, the market does not have a ceiling most analysts are comfortable naming.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Iran expands energy targets beyond Gulf as Red Sea and East Med come into play.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “How long can markets hold their bet on Gulf resilience as war drags on?” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran war tests Gulf dealmaking as foreign investors assess risks.”Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Geoeconomic Stabilisation.” Akram Zaoui, ORF, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “What Does the Strait of Hormuz’s Closure Mean?” Nur Arafeh, Carnegie, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Europe and the Arab Gulf Must Come Together.” Rym Momtaz, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Duqm at the Crossroads: Oman’s Strategic Port and Its Role in Vision 2040.” Giorgio Cafiero and Samuel Ramani, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “What vulnerabilities has the Iran crisis exposed in GCC economies?” Karen E. Young, Middle East Institute, March 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “How hard will war hit the Gulf’s economies?” Financial Times, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Qatar’s gas empire comes under fire.” Financial Times, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Caught in the Crossfire: Gulf Security and Strategy in the US–Israel War on Iran.” Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The GCC States and the War on Iran: Rethinking Responses to Unwanted Consequences.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Should the Gulf Arab states join the war against Iran?” Chatham House, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran war is exacting a heavy toll on Gulf oil and gas exporters – and creating risk and opportunity in North Africa.” Chatham House, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran and Gaza conflicts teach Gulf states a hard-power lesson.” Chatham House, March 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf Goes Backward.” Amr Hamzawy, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2026.

• Podcast: “The New Gulf Reality: America’s Role & What Comes Next.” Bernard Haykel, Mo Show, March 18, 2026.