The crucial debate in this issue revolves around Oman’s current position with regards to the Strait of Hormuz. Then, other topics are raised by multiple thought influencers. Lastly, selected pieces are presented in the Nashra Picks.

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Public Debates

Oman, Hormuz, and Gulf Autonomy: Should Muscat Defend Its Independent Course or Distance Itself from Tehran?

President Donald Trump’s threat against Oman sparked one of the Gulf’s most consequential debates this week. While most commentators rejected the language used against Muscat, they disagreed over the underlying question: is Oman being punished for its independent diplomacy, or paying the price for failing to distance itself clearly from Tehran’s claims regarding the Strait of Hormuz?

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Today, we shed light on the discussions on the question of Iraq and its relation with the GCC countries vs. Iran, and the future of such relation, followed with selected opinions on other issues, after which comes the Nashra Picks with special pieces.

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Public Debates

Would Iraq Return to the Gulf Sphere, or Has It Become Structurally Part of the Iranian Sphere?

The recent drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE — allegedly launched from Iraqi territory — have revived one of the Gulf’s central strategic questions: can Iraq still function as an independent Arab state connected to its Gulf environment, or has it become structurally embedded within Iran’s regional security architecture? The controversy intensified after Gulf states accused Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of carrying out attacks from inside Iraq, while Baghdad simultaneously denied the existence of conclusive evidence and promised investigations.

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The Weekly Digest by The Gulf Nashra is a weekly series highlighting the most significant public debates and opinions from the region, featuring curated picks such as books, analytical papers, academic research, podcasts, interviews, webinars, and more.

This week, we highlight the discussions around Turki Al Faisal’s article regarding Saudi’s policy toward the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, then share selected opinions on other issues, and lastly end with the thought-provoking Nashra Picks.

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Public Debates

Is This the Gulf’s War? The Debate After Prince Turki Al Faisal’s Article

The recent article by former Saudi intelligence chief and senior Saudi royal Turki Al Faisal, titled “Thus Succeeded MBS” has triggered a major debate across Gulf political and intellectual circles. At the center of the controversy was his argument that the ongoing confrontation with Iran is not fundamentally a Saudi or Gulf war, but rather a conflict Israel seeks to expand into a broader regional confrontation that would ultimately weaken everyone except itself.

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The Weekly Digest by The Gulf Nashra is a weekly series highlighting the most significant public debates and opinions from the region, featuring curated picks such as books, analytical papers, academic research, podcasts, interviews, webinars, and more. In this issue, we examine notable discussions on America’s “Freedom Project.” We bring Saudi and Emirati voices and highlight how the perspectives diverge, followed by selected opinions on other issues, after which we end with the thought-provoking Nashra Picks. If you find some value in our publication, we invite you to subscribe and share.

Public Debates

Saudi–Emirati Divergence over the American “Freedom Project”

The American “Freedom Project,” announced by President Donald Trump to reopen the Strait of Hormuz after weeks of paralysis, exposed a notable divergence between Saudi and Emirati strategic discourse. While Saudi Arabia refused participation in military escalation and emphasized de-escalation, many Emirati commentators framed the project as a strategic necessity to deter Iran and restore maritime security. The result was a rare public intellectual divide between two Gulf partners over how regional order should be preserved.

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The Weekly Digest by The Gulf Nashra is a weekly series highlighting the most significant public debates and opinions from the region, featuring curated picks such as books, analytical papers, academic research, podcasts, interviews, webinars, and more. In this issue, we explore the debate surrounding the UAE’s exit from OPEC and OPEC+. We highlight influential voices commenting on what motivated it, what the consequences are, and what it means for the Gulf, followed by stimulating Nashra Picks. If you find it valuable, we invite you to subscribe and share.

Public Debates

“OPEC has grown increasingly rigid and aged, while the UAE has transformed—its economy more diversified beyond oil, emerging as a rising power with geoeconomic and geopolitical priorities that differ from those of the 20th-century UAE.”

Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, X, United Arab Emirates

The UAE exit from OPEC has triggered a sharp Gulf debate, not simply over policy, but over the logic of oil market governance itself. Saudi voices largely frame the issue as structural: stability requires coordination, regardless of institutional form. Emirati voices, by contrast, frame the move as a rational recalibration of national strategy, rooted in capacity, diversification, and long-term positioning.

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Nashra Picks

Geopolitics

• Analysis: “MBS hosts Sudan’s Burhan in Jeddah as $1.5B Saudi-backed arms deal stalls.” Rosaleen Carroll, Al-Monitor, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Pakistan’s quiet fighter jet deployment to Saudi Arabia signals Gulf anxiety.” Sabena Siddiqui, Al-Monitor, April 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia pursues quiet diplomacy as Trump pushes Israel normalization.” Beatrice Farhat, Al-Monitor, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Hollow Promise of Arab Solidarity.” Tareq Alotaiba, AGSI, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “Egypt and the Gulf: A Relationship under Pressure.” Imad K. Harb, Arab Center, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran War Is a Stress Test for Gulf States.” Frederic Wehrey and Charles Johnson,Carnegie, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran war has forced the US-Gulf alliance out of the shadows.” Eric Alter, Atlantic Council, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “‘They have been exposed’: The Iran war upends Gulf states’ security and business model.” Stefanie Hausheer Ali, Atlantic Council, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf’s Iran Problem Isn’t Solved.” John Calabrese, AGSI, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf Security Strategies After the Iran War.” Jean-Loup Samaan, AGSI, April 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Can Qatar Still Mediate After Becoming a Target?” Faisal Al-Hanzab, AGSI, April 22, 2026.

Economics

• Analysis: “Six weeks into the conflict, which of the small Arabian Gulf economies are still seeing less activity?” Meshal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Geoeconomic Rebalancing after the Gulf Crisis.” Akram Zaoui, ORF, April 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “why asia cannot replace gulf crude easily.” Parul Bakshi and Samriddhi Vij, ORF, April 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “Catalysing the GCC’s Waste-to-Energy Prospects for Agriculture.” Leigh Mante, ORF, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Yielding to Shortage: Gulf Crisis Prompts Fertilizer and Food Shocks.” Héla Miniaoui, AGSI, April 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why did the Met Opera lose its Saudi funding deal?” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, April 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “What LIV Golf’s woes suggest about Saudi Arabia’s economic headwinds.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, April 19, 2026.

Podcasts

• Podcast: “Untold Facts About Saudi Cinema.” Fouad Al-Khatib, The Cinema Bulletin, April 23, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “Matthias Jaissle on His Career-Ending Injury to Coaching Success.” MO Show, April 18, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Is the Defense System Managed in the UAE?” Abdul Nasser Al-Hamidi, Arab Cast, April 16, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “The Beijing Agreement Has Collapsed, and Iran Drinks the ‘Poisoned Chalice’ Again,” Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, Al-Kalam Khaliji. April 21, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Webinar: “Mending the Rift: Iran and the UAE’s Post-War Ties.” MEI, April 22, 2026. [Eng].

• Webinar: “Transformations in Epistemic Consciousness: From Classical Orientalism to Contemporary Extraction,” Abdullah Habib, Middle East Council, April 21, 2026. [Eng].

Public Debates

Iran’s expansionist project after the recent war: retreat, adaptation, or entrenchment?

The war that swept across the region has left behind a question no ceasefire could resolve: whether the Iranian axis—its militias, proxies, and transnational networks stretching from Beirut to Baghdad—has been fundamentally weakened or merely recalibrated. Across commentary from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, a broad consensus emerges: the axis has not collapsed. It has adapted. The central analytical divide is not over whether Iran incurred significant costs—it clearly did—but whether those costs translate into structural retreat or simply a tactical pause within a longer-term project of regional entrenchment.

On Iraq, Ayman Al-Tamimi, writing from Saudi Arabia, argues that Iran has successfully reproduced the Lebanese model within Baghdad.

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Book: Nadeen Dakkak “Migration to the Gulf in the Arabic Novel.” Edinburgh University Press, June 2026.

Analysis: “Saudi stocks hit 2026 high, bucking global war-driven volatility.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “What LIV Golf’s woes suggest about Saudi Arabia’s economic headwinds.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “China’s Position and Strategic Considerations on the Gulf States’ Involvement in the Iran-US-Israel Conflict.” Bo Wang, MEPEI, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “Can Gulf Green Finance Survive an Oil Price Shock?” Christopher Gooding, AGSI, April 10, 2026.

Analysis: “From Shield to Target: The Gulf’s Security Dilemma.” Nour Eid, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Business as Usual in the UAE?” Rebecca Anne Proctor, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait’s Bidun in the Face of Climate Change are Invisible, yet Exposed.” Courtney Freer, Carnegie, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait Is Stripping Its People of Citizenship at an Unprecedented Rate.”Fatimah Muhammed and Sultan Alamer, New Lines Magazine, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Protection or Vulnerability? Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Iran War.” Rohan Advani, Arab Center, April 14, 2026.

Analysis: “How to Avoid Mutually Assured Devastation in the Gulf.” Daniel Brumberg, Arab Center, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Beyond the Battlefield: The Disruption of Education in the Gulf.” Ibrahim Alhouti, Gulf International Forum, April 16, 2026.

Analysis: “Post-War Dynamics: The Gulf at the Center of a New World Order.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council, April 12, 2026.

Podcast: “Trade, Diversification, and the Future of the GCC.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, April 8, 2026. [Eng].

Podcast: “I Took Responsibility from the Age of 13!” Maytha Al Mehairi, Arab Cast, April 9, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran in Gulf Media Discourse: From Political Memory to the Current War.” Mohammed Al Yahyaei, Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran’s war and the positioning of the Arab intellectual.” Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “The Gulf Is Stronger Than Iran Expects.” Obaid Al-Wasmi, Mahfoof, April 16, 2026.

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Public Debates

The announcement of a ceasefire on April 8, alongside upcoming negotiations reportedly mediated by Pakistan, has reignited a familiar regional debate: does this moment signal the beginning of a durable resolution, or merely another temporary pause that risks reproducing instability—particularly at the expense of Gulf security? At the heart of this debate lies a clear divide between two interpretive camps: one sees it as a necessary turning point driven by structural change within Iran, while the other views it as a tactical pause that may ultimately deepen, rather than resolve, the conflict.

A prominent strand of commentary argues that the ceasefire reflects a deeper transformation within Iran, driven by internal disruption and external pressure. Saudi writer Abdulrahman Al-Rashed frames this moment as historically significant, asserting that “Iran has most likely changed for two main reasons: war and peace.” He links the ceasefire to a restructuring of Iran political leadership, noting that “the leadership of the state has changed due to the assassinations that eliminated a long chain of generals and institutional leaders… at the top of the hierarchy, the Supreme Leader himself.” From this perspective, the scale of recent developments is unprecedented: “in 38 days, Iran faced what it had not faced in 38 years.” This was not a peripheral contest over influence in Syria or Lebanon, but an “existential war” in which the regime fought for survival. Consequently, Tehran now operates under severe constraint, with negotiations representing, in his words, “Tehran last card… little more than a fig leaf” masking a strategic retreat.

Complementing this structural argument is a more normative and forward-looking perspective. Kuwaiti commentator Hamad Alhamad emphasizes the necessity of the ceasefire itself, regardless of its fragility. “There is a fragile ceasefire, but it is far better than the continuation of war and destruction,” he writes, highlighting the global spillover effects of prolonged conflict. For Alhamad, the key question is not whether the truce is perfect, but whether it creates an opportunity for meaningful transformation.

Yet, optimism is not unconditional. Kuwait’s Ahmed Al Dawas introduces a geopolitical layer, questioning why external powers such as Russia and China have not meaningfully intervened on Iran’s behalf. His conclusion is blunt: both powers act strictly according to self-interest. China benefits from a distracted United States, while Russia gains from the depletion of American military resources. As he explains, “every missile… directed toward Iran is one that will not reach the battlefronts in Ukraine.” This reinforces a broader point: Iran’s strategic isolation may push it toward negotiation, but it does not guarantee a stable outcome. Indeed, Al Dawas ultimately expresses skepticism, warning that “I do not believe a ceasefire agreement with Iran will succeed—something is likely to happen.”

Moreover, a more cautious—if not pessimistic—reading of the truce suggests that ceasefires in such conflicts often function as mechanisms for recalibration rather than genuine resolution. Abdullah Khalifah, from the United Arab Emirates, articulates this argument with conceptual clarity, describing the ceasefire as “the most dangerous moment in the conflict.” His reasoning rests on the strategic value of time: “time here is a resource of power, used to rebuild capability under the cover of de-escalation.” In this sense, the truce does not freeze the conflict—it redistributes its dynamics, allowing actors to reposition and regenerate. Without strict enforcement mechanisms, he warns, the ceasefire risks becoming “a space for reproducing the threat.”

A similar conclusion emerges from Omani analyst Ahmed Alameri, though through a different lens. He interprets the truce not as Iranian weakness, but as a reflection of Western constraint. Despite the intensity of US rhetoric, “the relative decline in the pace of escalation… reflects an awareness of the cost of sliding into an open confrontation.” The result, he argues, is not a strategic breakthrough but “a tactical pause” that grants Iran time to “reorganize its political and military positions.” This reading is reinforced by Nasser Al-Zadjali, who goes further by suggesting that the truce itself signals a recovery in Iranian “deterrence.” In his view, the mere ability to impose or secure a pause indicates that Iran has regained a degree of strategic balance.

More critical still is the argument advanced by Saudi commentator Mishari Althaydy, who shifts attention to the substance—or lack thereof—behind the agreement. He raises a series of unresolved questions: “what mechanisms will compel Iran to comply…? And what monitoring and measurement standards will be used?” Without clear answers, the agreement risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. Moreover, he highlights a structural asymmetry: while Iran has absorbed significant losses, “it is impossible for Iran to declare any form of defeat.” This entrenched culture of denial, he argues, has been replicated across its regional network, making genuine concession unlikely. In this context, even the negotiation agenda itself is shifting, with “the Strait of Hormuz” emerging as a new central bargaining arena.

Finally, Saudi Arabia’s Shaher Alnahari captures the ambiguity that defines the current moment. The ceasefire, he writes, “may mark the beginning of a long de-escalation process,” but it may equally be “nothing more than a brief pause on the path to a longer and more dangerous conflict.” The outcome, in other words, remains fundamentally uncertain.

Taken together, the debate reveals a central tension: whether the truce represents structural change or strategic delay. What unites both camps, however, is a shared recognition that the ceasefire is not an endpoint, but a moment of redefinition—one that will either close the current cycle of escalation or lay the groundwork for its next phase.

Selected Gulf Opinions

“China has adopted a position characterized by neutrality and pragmatism regarding the US–Israeli war on Iran, seeking to balance the determinants and guiding principles of its foreign policy and its relations with strategic partners, while hedging against the potential repercussions of this war on its strategic interests. This includes preserving Beijing’s interests in the Middle East—particularly those related to energy and regional stability—alongside managing its relationship with the United States in a way that limits the prospects of escalation between them.”

Fahad Al-Mudahki, Al Ayam, (Bahrain), April 11, 2026.

“The Arab citizen experiences a vast gap between the dream of a ‘United Arab States’ and a reality that offers nothing but wars and closed borders. As Arab summits continue in their largely ‘protocol-driven’ form, yielding little of substance, public distrust in these meetings has grown, prompting a search for a new form of political struggle that reflects popular aspirations beyond institutions that have proven unable to end the severe crises across the Arab world.”

Nayef Sharar, Al Jarida, (Kuwait), April 10, 2026.

“One of Trump’s campaign promises was to dismantle what he called the ‘OPEC cartel monopoly.’ Today, after the United States has taken control of Venezuelan oil, it should be understood that Iran’s targeting of Gulf oil and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz primarily serve the United States by enabling it to dominate the global energy market. This also suggests the existence of a systematic plan to weaken OPEC cohesion, in which Iran is a participant.”

Meshal Al Khaldi, X, (Saudi Arabia), April 10, 2026.

“What is most regrettable about these events is the disgraceful Arab position. How can Lebanon—while it is a member of the Arab League—be left alone under this bombardment, without a word, without pressure, without action? Arab capitals merely watch the situation unfold, witnessing the fall of innocents and the destruction and devastation, while some states issue only timid condemnations. Where is Arab solidarity? Or is it merely slogans raised in meetings and Arab summits?

Even more troubling is that the so-called free world, which claims to defend human dignity, has chosen silence, turning a blind eye to the blatant violation of the international ceasefire—as if Lebanese blood were worth less than any other.”

Hamad Al-Hadrami, Al Roya, (Oman), April 9, 2025.

“In the most critical moments, such as the repeated wars on Gaza, the Iranian role has appeared largely indirect—limited to support through proxies, without political or military action matching the intensity of its declared rhetoric. This gap between verbal escalation and practical caution reinforces the impression that the Palestinian issue is used in Iranian policy more as a pretext or a pressure tool than as an independent strategic priority.”

Ahmed Alhosani, Al Etihad, (UAE), April 8, 2026.

“The firmness of Rafsanjani, his flexible political mind, his commitment to preserving the state and its institutions, his focus on reconstruction and moving beyond the phase of revolutionary slogans, and his awareness that Iran cannot remain isolated from its regional environment—these are qualities Iran needs in a leader.

There may be figures today who resemble Rafsanjani in some respects, but none possess the full range of his attributes—most importantly, his courage and his ability to persuade, and to tell the third Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, what must be said: to stop the bloodshed, end the attacks on neighboring Gulf states, and prevent the region from descending into a chaos that would harm everyone, with Iran among the first to suffer its consequences.”

Hassan Al Mustafa, Asharq Al Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), April 7, 2026.

“For decades, the prevailing model in the Middle East was based on direct deterrence, displays of power, and reliance on military superiority as a decisive tool. However, this model has begun to lose its effectiveness in an environment that has become more complex and interconnected. Wars are no longer decided solely on the battlefield; their effects now extend to the economy, supply chains, energy markets, and even the media sphere, where narratives are shaped and perceptions are redefined.

In this context, the nature of conflict has shifted from direct military confrontation to a multi-dimensional network. Influence over energy markets can carry as much weight as military strikes, managing political alliances may rival battlefield superiority in importance, and the ability to shape public opinion has become an integral part of the equation of power.”

Abdullah Aletaibi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), April 7, 2026.

“The dual veto (Russian–Chinese) yesterday revealed two points. First, that Russia and China’s interests in Iran are deeper and more important than their interests in the GCC. Second, that Iran enjoys international political cover that will positively influence its role in the future.”

Abdullah Alnefisi, X, (Kuwait), April 7, 2026.

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Five weeks of war have reshaped how Gulf publics think, debate, and disagree. The conversation is richer than most outside coverage suggests. This week's digest brings together the sharpest Gulf commentary on the conflict, curated reading and listening for those who want to go deeper, and the perspectives that aren't making it into the international press.

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Public Debates

The question of who is “winning” the current confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel has evolved into a broader intellectual divide across Gulf commentary—reflecting not only battlefield interpretations, but deeper disagreements over power, narrative, and long-term consequences. While some argue that Washington has achieved strategic gains, others insist that Iran has imposed new constraints on the region. Between these views, a third position emerges: the outcome remains unclear, but the Gulf is bearing the heaviest cost.

A balanced reading begins with Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani from Qatar, who frames the situation in terms of risk rather than victory. He warns that escalation may persist because “there are parties that want this war to continue… knowing its consequences will not directly affect them,” pointing to Israel, whose ports “remain open to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.” By contrast, the Gulf faces systemic exposure: “the continued choking of the Strait of Hormuz could lead to serious economic repercussions… not only for the region, but for the global economy.” His key question—“who benefits from this collapse?”—captures the ambiguity, especially as he suggests that “the United States is not the real beneficiary.”

This uncertainty is reinforced by Bahraini writer Jaffar Salman, who focuses on messaging rather than outcomes. He argues that Donald Trump delivers multiple narratives simultaneously: “to Europe, readiness to stop the war… to the Gulf, Iran, and Israel, continued escalation… to the American public, victory.” In this view, rhetoric itself becomes a strategic tool.

One major camp argues that Iran holds the upper hand—not through decisive military superiority, but through its ability to impose costs. Kuwaiti thinker Abdullah Alnefisi states that “Trump is looking for an exit… he fell into an Israeli trap.” Qatari analyst Mohammed Alahmari similarly argues that Washington has effectively “ceded” leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as “the real nuclear bomb of Iran.”

This view is reinforced by battlefield persistence. Saudi writer Khaled Almalik notes that despite repeated U.S. claims of victory, “Iran continues to attack Israel, American forces, and Gulf states,” raising doubts about whether its capabilities have truly been neutralized. Even if U.S. claims were accurate, he warns of a strategic vacuum that could enable Israeli expansion under full Western backing.

Economically, Iran’s leverage appears clearer. Saudi economist Hebshi Alshimary notes that roughly “20 million barrels of oil per day” pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making disruptions globally consequential. The crisis has exposed fragility: some Gulf producers cut output due to storage limits, while shipping costs surged sharply. Iran, in effect, has weaponized geography into economic pressure.

Omani perspectives extend this argument further. Abbas Alzadjali argues that Iran’s asymmetric responses have disrupted energy markets and imposed insecurity across the Gulf, raising questions about whether the war reflects strategic necessity or “overconfidence in military power.” Meanwhile, Asim Al-Shidi contends that the U.S.-led security model has lost “legitimacy,” now seen as aligned with Israeli dominance rather than regional balance.

Yet another camp insists that the United States has achieved meaningful gains. Kuwaiti writer Saad bin Tiflah Alajmi argues that U.S.-Israeli actions disrupted Iran’s plans, “confusing the timing” of a premeditated attack on Israel, noting that “85 percent of Iranian drones and missiles” were instead directed toward the Gulf and Jordan.

Emirati analyst Salah Al-Ghul emphasizes Iran’s growing isolation, arguing that continued attacks have deepened its marginalization and that any settlement must include “clear guarantees to prevent repeated aggression” across missiles, maritime pressure, and proxy networks.

From Kuwait, Muhammad Nasser Al-Atwan argues that Iranian targeting patterns reveal weakness: rather than striking fortified U.S. bases, Iran focuses on civilian infrastructure, suggesting a strategy of “economic coercion and psychological warfare” against Gulf societies.

Finally, U.S. advantage also appears in narrative control. Omani writer Mubarak Al-Hamdani notes that a single U.S. statement can move global markets within minutes, highlighting a broader “struggle over strategic narratives” and who controls them.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that framing the conflict as a simple U.S. or Iranian victory misses the larger picture. Iran has imposed asymmetric costs, particularly through energy disruption, while the United States retains structural advantages in military, financial, and narrative domains. The most consistent conclusion across Gulf commentary is not who has won, but who is absorbing the consequences: a region caught between escalation, uncertainty, and a shifting balance of power.

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Week four of the Iran war was defined by a flurry of diplomatic activity that produced no diplomacy. Washington circulated a 15-point peace proposal to Tehran via Pakistan. Iran rejected it, called it "maximalist and unreasonable," and countered with five conditions of its own, one of which is sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Trump responded by granting Iran yet another extension on his Hormuz deadline. Egypt, Pakistan, and Oman all signalled readiness to mediate. Through it all, Iran's foreign minister was unambiguous: "our policy is the continuation of resistance." The Gulf watched a negotiation take shape around it, without it, and with no clear path to an outcome.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Iran regime turns sights on UAE as war widens beyond conventional front.” Al-Monitor, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Ukraine’s Zelenskyy capitalizes on Iran war to ink security deal with Saudi Arabia.” Al-Monitor, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE Are Urging Trump to Continue a War They Did Not Want.” Hussein Ibish, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Not All Oil Is Created Equal.” Tim Callen, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Economic Impact of the Iran Conflict on the Gulf.” Tim Callen, AGSI, March 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “Ukraine’s Counterdrone Assistance to the Gulf States.” Jean-Loup Samaan, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why the Gulf Arab States Matter So Much – But Decide So Little.” Weilin Deng, AGSI, March 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf.” Frank Rose, AGSI, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “The relative resilience of GCC countries to the Iran crisis.” Karen Young, Middle East Institute, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf State investment in a time of war.” Sultan Alamer, Ekō News, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran War and the End of the US-Gulf “Oil for Security” Deal.” Jim Krane, Arab Center, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Drone superpower Ukraine is an ideal tech partner for the Gulf states.” Anatoly Motkin, Atlantic Council, March 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf Cannot Afford to Be Dragged Into War.” Robert Geist, Gulf International Forum, March 25, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Have Drones Changed the Nature of War?” with Khaled Al-Wuqayan, Bedoon Waraq +, March 22, 2026.

• Podcast: “Hormuz Will Not Return to What It Was.” Saleh Al-Mutairi, Mahfoof, March 27, 2026.

• Podcast: “Habib Bank AG Zurich UAE CEO Jamal Alvi on resilience, banking and what comes next.” Gulf Business, Mar 26, 2026.

• Podcast: “The War in the Gulf Between Escalation and Diplomacy.” ME Council, Abdullah Al-Otaibi, March 24, 2026.

This Eid, the Gulf is at war. This digest covers the first twenty two days: what happened, what it cost, and what it means. For readers joining us for the first time: welcome. For those who have been with us since Day 1: thank you.

Eid Under Fire

Eid al-Fitr arrives this year against a backdrop that would have been unthinkable twelve months ago.

Kuwait has banned public celebrations. Bahrain has intercepted 139 missiles and 238 drones in three weeks. Across the UAE, air defense systems stand on permanent alert. In Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, the oilfields that power the global economy have been absorbing drone swarms in the dark. In Oman, two expatriates were killed when drones came down in Sohar. Qatar’s Ras Laffan, the largest LNG complex in the world, has been struck. The facility that supplies 17% of global LNG output is damaged.

This is not the Eid the Gulf planned for.

Yet, the Gulf is still holding. Markets have partially recovered from their worst levels. Air defenses have performed. Governments have maintained order. The region’s states have, with discipline and at great cost, refused to be drawn into a war not of their making.

That refusal is the story of the first twenty two days, even though it’s quiet, deliberate, and expensive.

Three Weeks in Numbers

• Energy

  • Oil price rise since Feb 28: +47%

  • Brent crude peak (Mar 19): $113.71/barrel

  • War risk insurance on tankers: +1,100%

• Strait of Hormuz

  • Weekly vessel transits: 17 (down from 839 pre-war)

  • Traffic collapse: –98%

  • Maritime incidents recorded: 21

• Attacks on Gulf States

  • Missiles & drones fired: +3,917

  • Killed: 17

  • Injured: 290

• Markets & Economy

  • GCC market cap lost at peak: $380B

  • Bank deposit flight risk (S&P): $307B

  • Tadawul worst drawdown: –14.2%

Three Turning Points

Three moments defined the first three weeks.

1. The Hormuz Blockade (Day 1): Within the first 72 hours, commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz effectively collapsed. What followed was not a temporary disruption but a reconfiguration of global energy logistics. The world’s most critical chokepoint, through which roughly 20% of global oil and 25% of LNG normally moves, went from 138 daily transits to near-zero in days. Every subsequent development of the past three weeks has unfolded in the shadow of that single fact. Twenty million barrels a day backed up. Five million finding their way out through pipelines. The rest waiting.

2. The Strike on Oman (Day 12): On March 11, strikes hit oil storage facilities in Salalah, Oman’s largest port. The significance was not just strategic. It was symbolic. Oman had maintained open channels with Tehran throughout. Sultan Haitham had personally congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader days earlier. The attack shattered the assumption that neutrality provides protection. Gulf commentators were divided: Iran asserting dominance, or a third party eliminating the region’s last diplomatic bridge? The debate remains open. What is clear is that the attack changed the calculus. No Gulf state is insulated by good intentions.

3. South Pars and Ras Laffan (Day 19): On March 18, Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gasfield. Iran retaliated by hitting Qatar’s LNG mega-complex and the single most important natural gas facility on the planet: Ras Laffan. The damage cut 17% of global LNG output. The potential annual cost: $20 billion. The hit to Qatar’s GDP: an estimated 9%. This was no longer a war over military positions. It was a war over the architecture of global energy. The escalatory loop that Gulf analysts had warned about for weeks had arrived.

The Economic Toll No One Is Counting

The macro numbers (including oil prices, market indices, maritime incidents) tell one story. The story they don’t tell is the one being lived by the Gulf’s 56 million residents.

Aviation has been in effective shutdown across multiple Gulf airports. Thousands of expatriate workers (who constitute the majority of the Gulf’s population) face uncertainty about employment, mobility, and safety. The construction projects, hospitality expansions, and Vision 2030 programs that defined the region’s transformation have not stopped, but they have slowed. Food prices have risen. Fuel subsidy systems are under pressure. In Kuwait, drone debris damaged six power transmission lines on a single day. In Bahrain, visa fines were waived as a small official gesture acknowledging that normal life has been suspended.

For workers whose remittances home fund families across South Asia and Africa, the war is not an abstraction. It is a paycheck at risk, a flight that doesn’t exist, a future that has been placed on hold by a conflict they did not choose and cannot leave.

What the Gulf Is Actually Saying

The most important coverage gap in this conflict is not data. Rather, it is voice.

Western media has covered this war through the lens of US military strategy, Israeli intelligence operations, and Iranian nuclear calculations. The Gulf has been largely absent from that framing, although it’s the region absorbing the strikes, the economic damage, and the political pressure. The Gulf Nashra exists to correct that.

Across twenty two days of commentary from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain, several threads have emerged with consistency:

• On being dragged in: Gulf commentators have uniformly rejected external pressure from Washington, from Tel Aviv, and implicitly from Tehran to take sides. The dominant voice has been one of strategic autonomy: the Gulf’s interests are the Gulf’s interests, and they do not map cleanly onto any outside power’s agenda. As one Saudi analyst wrote: the Gulf states are “the pillars of the temple” and they must remain standing while others exhaust themselves.

• On Iran’s new leadership: The selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader dominated Gulf commentary in the first week. Emirati voices were largely pessimistic. “more radical, more dangerous, more aggressive.” Saudi analysts focused on whether the new leadership brings pragmatism or continuity, invoking the precedent of Khomeini’s eventual decision to end the Iraq war. Kuwaiti commentators described Iran as evolving into a “religious hereditary republic.” No one was optimistic. The assassination of Ali Larijani only deepened that pessimism. He was regarded across the Gulf as a pragmatic voice and potential negotiating partner. As one analyst put it: Israel killed not just a man, but “the opportunity for negotiation.”

• On American reliability: A recurring and pointed question: where are US intelligence assets when missiles and drones are being launched at Gulf cities? One UAE commentator asked directly “Is it possible that the technology you boast about suddenly goes blind when it comes to our security? Or do those eyes open only for your interests?” The question has not received an answer. Meanwhile, Trump branded NATO allies “cowards” for not supporting military action, and the Pentagon requested an additional $200 billion for the war. The Gulf is watching who its allies actually are.

• On Oman’s role: Oman’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran (even after being struck) has divided Gulf opinion sharply. Critics called it a provocation to Gulf brothers. Defenders argued that quiet diplomacy is not abandonment but a tool for regional stability. Omani commentators were unequivocal: Oman’s policy is guided by its own national interest, not regional alignment.

What to Watch in Week 4

• Ras Laffan and LNG recovery: Qatar’s facility supplies 17% of global LNG. The pace of damage assessment and any restart timeline will determine whether the energy crisis deepens or stabilizes. Europe and Asia are watching closely.

• Iran’s “zero restraint” threat: Tehran has signaled it has deployed only a fraction of its firepower and threatened zero restraint on further energy targeting. Whether that threat is posture or policy will define the next phase.

• UAE posture shift: Senior UAE officials have signaled readiness to support US-led efforts to secure the Strait. If the UAE moves from strategic ambiguity to active involvement, the regional map changes significantly.

• Ground operation signals: Netanyahu’s comment that “there has to be a ground component” is the most significant escalatory signal of the three weeks. A ground operation would transform the conflict entirely, and its implications for Gulf states would be direct and immediate.

• The Abraham Accords: As one Saudi commentator observed: after this war, it is difficult to imagine any Gulf state moving forward with expanding the Accords without a deep reassessment. The normalization architecture of the past five years is under fundamental review.

• Oil at $150. It is no longer a fringe scenario. If Ras Laffan damage is confirmed as severe, if Hormuz remains closed, and if Iran follows through on energy targeting threats, the market does not have a ceiling most analysts are comfortable naming.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Iran expands energy targets beyond Gulf as Red Sea and East Med come into play.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “How long can markets hold their bet on Gulf resilience as war drags on?” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran war tests Gulf dealmaking as foreign investors assess risks.”Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Geoeconomic Stabilisation.” Akram Zaoui, ORF, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “What Does the Strait of Hormuz’s Closure Mean?” Nur Arafeh, Carnegie, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Europe and the Arab Gulf Must Come Together.” Rym Momtaz, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Duqm at the Crossroads: Oman’s Strategic Port and Its Role in Vision 2040.” Giorgio Cafiero and Samuel Ramani, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “What vulnerabilities has the Iran crisis exposed in GCC economies?” Karen E. Young, Middle East Institute, March 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “How hard will war hit the Gulf’s economies?” Financial Times, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Qatar’s gas empire comes under fire.” Financial Times, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Caught in the Crossfire: Gulf Security and Strategy in the US–Israel War on Iran.” Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The GCC States and the War on Iran: Rethinking Responses to Unwanted Consequences.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Should the Gulf Arab states join the war against Iran?” Chatham House, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran war is exacting a heavy toll on Gulf oil and gas exporters – and creating risk and opportunity in North Africa.” Chatham House, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran and Gaza conflicts teach Gulf states a hard-power lesson.” Chatham House, March 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf Goes Backward.” Amr Hamzawy, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2026.

• Podcast: “The New Gulf Reality: America’s Role & What Comes Next.” Bernard Haykel, Mo Show, March 18, 2026.

Media Coverage

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Saudi Arabia Targeted with 50 Drones Within Hours as Iran Launches New Wave of Attacks on Gulf.” The National, March 13, 2026.

• “Saudi Aramco says claims it is in talks with Ukrainian firms for drones inaccurate.” Reuters, March 12, 2026.

• “Five US Air Force Refuelling Planes Damaged in Iranian Missile Attack on Prince Sultan Air Base.” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2026.

• Saudi GDP Grew 4.5% in 2025, Driven by Oil and Non-Oil Sector Gains.” Arab News, March 09, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE’s Key Oil Hub Suspends Loadings After Drone Attack, Fire.” Bloomberg, March 14, 2026.

• “FAB shareholders approve record Dh8.84b dividend after profit surges 24%.” Khaleej News, March 11, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Qatar Says It’s Evacuating Several Areas Due to Iranian Attacks.” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2026.

• “Qatar says water reserves sufficient for 4 months, food reserves for 18 months.” Khaleej Times, March 14, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Kuwait National Guard destroys drone warhead remnants from fuel tank in 7-day operation.” Khaleej News, March 14, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “U.S.-Made Launcher Fired Missiles From Bahrain Toward Iran, Video Shows - The New York Times.” The New York Times, March 13, 2026.

• “F1 races in Bahrain, Saudi ‘cancelled or postponed’.” The New Arab, March 14, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

This week, amid escalating regional tensions linked to the ongoing confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, Gulf commentators increasingly turned their attention to a broader strategic question: the need for a dedicated Gulf security framework. Several voices argued for establishing a Gulf security system capable of coordinating defense and crisis management across the region. Across the Gulf commentary space, the debate is converging around a central idea: Gulf security can no longer remain reactive or dependent on external arrangements but must evolve into an institutionalized regional system.

“In every major crisis that shakes the Gulf, the same words return: unity of destiny and the need for coordination,” writes Kuwaiti commentator Abdulaziz Mohammed Al-Anjari, warning that Gulf states still treat threats as temporary shocks rather than as a long-term challenge requiring institutions and strategic preparation. Repeated crises, he argues, reveal a persistent gap: the region may possess a Gulf Cooperation Council framework, but it still lacks a genuine Gulf security system capable of collective action. Without building such a structure before crises erupt, he cautions, Gulf unity will remain little more than “temporary truces between separate policies.”

A similar concern appears in the analysis of Kuwaiti professor of Sharia and Islamic studies Abdul Hamid Al-Shaiji, who frames the issue within a broader international context. Asking “Where does the Gulf stand in this moment of regional fluidity—does it remain an observer or move into a position of initiative?”, Al-Shaiji argues that the GCC can become a collective stabilizing power in the international system rather than a passive bystander. To achieve this, he outlines four strategic paths: strengthening internal cohesion, advancing collective security coordination, diversifying international partnerships without dependency, and actively shaping regional balance rather than merely adapting to its outcomes.

Other commentators focus on the structural foundations required to sustain such a transformation. Oman commentator Ali Al-Kathiri argues that Gulf security cannot rely on shifting alliances built on temporary interests but must instead rest on what he calls “an independent Gulf security doctrine.” This vision would move beyond symbolic coordination toward a unified Gulf military structure with a shared doctrine, joint command, and integrated intelligence and armament systems, ensuring that regional security is built within the Gulf itself rather than outsourced to external powers. From a complementary perspective, Saudi writer Shaher Al Nahari stresses that growing regional “uncertainty” means Gulf states can no longer assume the “political and economic stability” they enjoyed for decades will continue. He therefore calls for a deeper strategic vision centered on stronger defense capabilities, domestic military industries, and modernized armed forces.

Former Qatar Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani framed the current war as a strategic wake-up call for Gulf states. He argues that the conflict underscores the urgent need to establish a real and operational GCC security alliance. Writing on Twitter, he calls for the creation of a Gulf military and security pact “similar to NATO,” with Saudi Arabia playing a leading role, and insists preparations should begin immediately rather than waiting for the war to end. He also urges GCC states to overcome internal differences and prioritize collective Gulf interests in order to build coordinated military and electronic defense industries capable of deterrence and self-protection. Without such a framework, he warns, the Gulf risks remaining a frontline for wars it neither starts nor controls.

More Gulf Opinions

• “It can be said that the similarity between Marxism, late Marxism, some currents of political Islam, and the experience of Wilayat al-Faqih lies not in their intellectual content as much as in the mental mechanism through which ideas are treated, and the political structures that emerge from them. In all three cases, an idea that arose within a specific historical context is treated as a universal truth valid for all times and places. When circumstances change, the idea does not evolve at the same pace, producing tension between theory and reality. Societies that advance are not those that abandon their intellectual or spiritual heritage, but those that place ideas within their historical context. An idea, after all, is a human attempt to understand the world, not a sacred text existing outside time. When thought turns into a closed doctrine, it loses its ability to adapt to reality and becomes a burden on societies rather than a tool for understanding them.”

Mohammed Alrumaihi [Kuwait], Asharq Al Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), March 14, 2026.

• “If the Iranian regime survives the current war, it is unlikely that the region will return to the pre-war status quo. Instead, we may face a regime that emerges harsher, less confident, and more inclined to rebuild its legitimacy through security and power rather than openness. Recent reports suggest that the Revolutionary Guard has tightened its grip over decision-making during the war, while even Israel does not appear certain that the conflict will bring down the regime. At the same time, there are still no clear signs of an organized uprising capable of toppling it from within.”

Ebtisam Al Kitbi, X, (UAE), March 13, 2026.

• “The Arab world today stands before this crossroads with unprecedented clarity. Either the Arab League redefines and activates its role as a genuine instrument for shaping a shared strategic will that protects its members and deters those who attack them, or the regional reality will impose new forms of coordination and cooperation that move beyond the framework created eight decades ago.”

Abdullah Khalifa, Al Etihad, (UAE), March 12, 2026.

• “Most Arab states may have erred in their military planning by leaning almost entirely on the United States as a strategic ally in the event of conflicts or wars in the region, as seen in the war against Iran. Yet it has become clear that the purpose of American bases in the region is primarily to serve the interests of Washington and the Zionist entity; despite the defensive systems at these bases, they were not activated.”

Hameed bin Mohammed Al Busaidi, Oman Daily, (Oman), March 11, 2026.

• “Russia appears to be the biggest economic beneficiary of the crisis [the Iranian war]. It was notable that Washington granted India a thirty-day grace period to continue importing Russian oil, while Moscow no longer needs to offer discounts on its crude. Russia has also emerged as an ideal alternative through export routes passing via the Baltic Sea, the Arctic, and the Black Sea. If the conflict with Iran is considered alongside developments in Venezuela, the situation becomes almost ideal for Russia—at least in the short and medium term. As a twist on Al-Mutanabbi famous verse: ‘The misfortunes of some people become the gains of others.’”

Abdulrahman Altrairi, Okaz, (Saudi Arabia), March 9, 2026.

• “The regional landscape is not without attempts by some actors to exploit existing tensions to achieve political and strategic objectives. Among these actors is the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, which sees the escalating confrontation with Iran as an opportunity to rearrange regional alliances in a way that serves its security and political vision.”

Ibrahim Flamurzi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), March 9, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Cultural life in Saudi Arabia navigates war.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, Al-Monitor, March 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “Shockwaves Across the Gulf.” Angie Omar, Carnegie, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Stress-Test the Vital Hormuz-Malacca Artery Before It Breaks.” Gopi Bhamidipati, Middle East Institute (NUS), March 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Gulf security is critical to global security.” Omran Al-Kuwari, Atlantic Council, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Airlines gradually restore Middle East flights, Gulf still heavily grounded.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, March 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “Building A Heat Resilience Roadmap for the Gulf Region.” Leigh Mante, ORF, March 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “China’s Middle East Ties Go Far Beyond Iran.” Henry Tugendhat, The Washington Institute, March 10, 2026

• Analysis: “Strategic Consequences of the U.S.–Israel War with Iran.” Patrick Theros, Gulf International Forum, March 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “Slow Depletion of Big Reserves Exposes Kuwait to Oil Demand Risks.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Jim Krane, Mira Kadapurath, and Irini Linardos, Baker Institute, March 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Limits of Neutrality for Gulf States in the U.S.–Israel–Iran War.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Energy under attack: What the Gulf can learn from Ukraine and Iraq.” Matthew Keating, Atlantic Council, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf in the Line of Fire: The Calculations and Contradictions of Iranian Strategy.” Arab Center (D.C), March 9, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf States Play Defense.” Kristin Smith Diwan, AGSI, March 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “How Russia Benefits from Oil Disruption in the Gulf.” Noam Raydan and Anna Borshchevskaya, The Washington Institute, March 11, 2026.

• Podcast: “How the Iran War Came to the Gulf.” Hosting Dina Esfandiary and Sultan Alamer, The Lede, March 9, 2026.

• Podcast: “Who Has Sovereignty Over U.S. Bases in the Gulf?” Hosting Habib Al-Mulla, Arab Cast, March 13, 2026. [Eng Substitle].

Oil, Strait of Hormuz, and Stock Markets

Oil Price Update

As of the market close on March 6, 2026, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil settled at $90.90 per barrel. This represents a staggering 35.8% increase from the pre-war price of $66.96 on February 27. The weekly surge peaked following the direct drone attempt on the Shaybah oil field and the total closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Source: Investing.com, March 8, 2026.

Strait of Hormuz Status

UKMTO reports a total collapse in transit activity over the last seven days. Since March 1, daily commercial crossings have dropped from a baseline of ~100 to just 2 recorded today. The area is classified as “critically dangerous” following 15 confirmed maritime strikes this week.

Source: UKMTO, March 8, 2026.

Stock Markets Performance

Defense Summary

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Media Coverage

• “Arab League to hold emergency meeting over Iranian attacks.” Al Arabiya, March 07, 2026.

• “Iran to halt strikes on neighbours unless attacks from there: Pezeshkian.” Al Jazeera, March 07, 2026.

• “Pakistan, Saudi Discuss Security Measures as Iran Strikes Region.” Bloomberg, March 07, 2026.

• “UAE ‘not an easy target’, President warns enemies against misjudging strength.” Gulf News, March 07, 2026.

• “US to reinsure maritime losses in Gulf up to about $20 billion.” Reuters, March 07, 2026.

• “Emirates to Resume Flights After Brief Halt on Missile Threats.” Bloomberg, March 07, 2026.

• “Ukraine’s interceptor drone makers look at exports to the Gulf as Iran war flares.” Reuters, March 07, 2026.

• “`UAE and Kuwait Start Oil Output Cuts After Hormuz Blockage.” Bloomberg, March 07, 2026.

• “Exclusive: Saudi has told Iran not to attack it, warns of possible retaliation, sources say.” Reuters, March 07, 2026.

Gulf Opinions

This week, Gulf commentators devoted significant attention to the war involving Iran, with many voices across the region condemning the recent Iranian attacks on Gulf states and warning about the wider regional consequences of the conflict. Bahrain commentator Abdulnabi Alshoala warns that targeting Gulf Cooperation Council states will only widen the confrontation and further destabilize the region, deepening mistrust toward Iran among Gulf societies and threatening what remains of prospects for coexistence. From Kuwait, Abdullah Al Shyji cautions Gulf countries “not to be dragged into a war that is not theirs,” arguing that the US–Israeli war against Iran represents a war of choice that risks pushing the region toward dangerous escalation. While condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf territory and affirming the right of self-defense, he emphasizes that Gulf states should prioritize unity, restraint, and diplomacy in order to avoid a prolonged regional conflict.

Similarly, UAE commentator Salem Alnuaimi argues that the Gulf has been drawn into the conflict not by choice but through Iranian missile and drone strikes targeting its infrastructure, energy routes, airports, and ports, effectively turning the region into a direct battlefield. In his view, the moment represents a serious test of Gulf and broader Arab solidarity, raising questions about whether the Gulf Cooperation Council will remain merely a framework for coordination or evolve into a mechanism capable of collective deterrence and protection of sovereignty. Another UAE voice, Mohammed Khalifa, points to what he sees as a notable aspect of the Emirati position: despite repeated Iranian attacks, particularly against Emirati interests, the UAE continues to maintain neutrality and avoids direct involvement in the war. From Qatar, Ahmed Ali stresses that no country has worked harder than Doha to help reduce Iran international isolation and encourage its integration into the regional environment, yet Tehran has continued to target Gulf capitals, including Doha, and maintain hostile relations with its neighbors.

Several Saudi commentators focused on the military and political trajectory of the conflict. Abdulrahman Al Rashed argues that even after only a short period of fighting, the balance of power has already begun eroding capabilities that Tehran had previously refused to negotiate away. While he does not describe the situation as a decisive victory, he suggests the confrontation has succeeded in containing parts of the Iranian threat, although the regime itself remains cohesive and the question of what comes next in Tehran remains uncertain. Hassan Al Mustafa approaches the issue from another angle, arguing that Iranian official rhetoric toward Gulf states sharply contradicts its actions on the ground. While Iranian leaders speak publicly of cooperation and good neighborly relations, he notes that missiles and drones continue to target Gulf territory. Al Mustafa outlines several possible explanations for this contradiction, including dual messaging between diplomacy and military escalation, the growing influence of the Revolutionary Guard over foreign policy, the marginalization of moderate factions, disruption in command structures following the killing of senior figures, and the use of proxies and covert attacks to maintain pressure while preserving deniability.

From Oman, Ibrahim bin Salim Al Siyabi reflects on the broader international context, arguing that repeated strikes on sovereign states without clear international authorization reveal a deeper shift in the global order. In his view, the erosion of legal norms and the increasing reliance on force, assassinations, and regime-change rhetoric suggest that international relations are moving away from rules toward power politics. In such an environment, he warns that fragmented regions may become vulnerable to external pressure unless they strengthen cooperation and collective resilience. Echoing the uncertainty surrounding the conflict, Omani commentator Khaled Al Ghasani concludes that the world is watching with growing concern, questioning whether the war will remain contained or expand into a political and economic earthquake capable of “reshaping both the region and the wider international system.”

More Gulf Opinions on Iran War

• “Information indicates that wars fought on a religious basis account for no more than 7 percent of all wars throughout history. Most modern conflicts combine politics, nationalism, and economics, and may sometimes employ the religious factor indirectly without openly declaring it. Yet today we face a striking paradox in the third millennium, separated by centuries from the last wars that drew their causes and fuel primarily from religious motivations.”

Hamood Abu Talib, Okaz, (Saudi Arabia), March 8, 2026.

• “From here emerges the need for a gradual transition from the traditional coordination model to a more integrated model based on building an institutional framework capable of achieving greater collective effectiveness without undermining the national sovereignty of member states. This could be achieved by adopting a hybrid federal model that combines certain characteristics of both federal and confederal unions, allowing the development of joint Gulf cooperation while preserving the independence and sovereignty of the states.

Modhi Mubarak Al Buainain, Al Sharq, (Qatar), March 7, 2026.

• “Paradoxically—and somewhat naively—it has become evident how superficial the current American leadership is and how little it understands these matters. The extremist Christian Zionism represented today by influential figures in Washington and Tel Aviv speaks of an ideological war against Muslims, framed as a divine mandate to fulfill alleged Talmudic promises regarding the return of Christ. What Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador to Israel, stated in this regard can in fact be seen as an acknowledgment that a religiously framed war is being pursued to realize the goals of a “Greater Israel” stretching from the Euphrates to the Nile, in preparation for fulfilling the promises of the Torah and the Gospel.”

Mohammed Awadh Al Mashikhi, Al Roya, (Oman), March 7, 2026.

• “Iran faces three possible scenarios. The first is openness: engaging in serious negotiations with the West and building good-neighborly relations with the Gulf states in order to save Iran from collapse. The second is hardline consolidation, in which the Revolutionary Guard and the conservative hardline current impose their control and appoint a radical successor, further increasing the suffering of the Iranian people. The third is chaos, where Iran could slide into a civil war that would affect neighboring countries, trigger waves of refugees, and lead to the fragmentation of the so-called axis of resistance into rival factions.

Ahmed Al Dawas, Al Seyassah, (Kuwait), March 5, 2026.

• “Thank you [Iran] for reminding us that we in the Gulf Cooperation Council are one, that everyone asks about everyone, and that all are convinced our six states are our fortress and our stronghold, and that your regime will never gain our trust no matter how much we extend it. The second thanks is that you awakened your sleeping cells within our Gulf states, exposing yourself to those who once thought you were the sleeping princess. Thank you for revealing a dark layer that spared not even the Gulf states that once supported you and acted as mediators, rushing to your aid in times of hardship—only for you to plant a dagger in their side, bomb them just as you bomb those you openly declared enemies.”

Sawsan Al Sha’er, Al Watan, (Bahrain), March 4, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “From Passive to Active Defense: Gulf Countries’ Options in Responding to Iran’s Aggression.” Emirates Policy Center, March 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Avoiding War with Iran Is the Gulf’s Only Winning Move.” Alanoud Al Thani, Middle East Council, March 7, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran’s Regional Gamble and Its Implications for the Future of Gulf Security.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council, March 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran War Tests Qatari Mediation and Diplomacy.” Arab Gulf States Institute, March 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Caught in the Crosshairs, Gulf Arab Countries Remain Crucial to Peace.” Arab Gulf States Institute, March 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran Is Pushing Its Neighbors Toward the United States.” Carnegie, March 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “What a Middle East oil and LNG crisis means for China and East Asia.” Atlantic Council, Joseph Webster, Reid I’Anson, and Kevin Li, March 5, 2026.

• Interview: “Q&A: Sheikh Nawaf al-Sabah ’94 Describes Iran’s Attacks on Kuwait.” Princeton, March 6, 2026.

• Podcast: “Between Tehran and Washington: Where Do the Gulf States Stand?” with Bader Al-Saif, Bedoon Waraq podcast, March 5, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “How the Gulf Countries Are Responding to Iran’s Attacks.” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2026. [Eng].

• Webinar: “Fight or Flight? The Gulf States Weigh their Options.” Middle East Institute, March 4, 2026. [Eng].

• Webinar: “The Repercussions of the War on Iran and Regional Transformations.” with Rashid Al Muhannadi, Haider Saeed, and Shafiq Shqair, Middle East Council, March 5, 2026. [English subtitles].

• Webinar: “After the Shock: Implications of the U.S.–Israeli Strikes and Iran’s Leadership Transition.” Arab Gulf States Institute, March 3, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Gulf countries condemn ‘Iranian’ attacks on UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan.” Middle East Monitor, February 28, 2026.

  “In a statement, the Saudi Foreign Ministry said the kingdom “condemns and denounces in the strongest terms the blatant Iranian aggression and the flagrant violation of the sovereignty” of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan.”

  Go Deeper: “U.S. and Israel Strike Iran, Tehran Retaliates: Live Updates.” WSJ, February 28, 2026.

• “US‑Iran war: More than 260 flights cancelled across UAE, GCC and other countries today and tomorrow.” Alkhaleej News, February 28, 2026.

  “According to data shared by global aviation analytics company Cirium, 3,422 flights were scheduled to arrive, with the majority of them in Saudi Arabia (1,277), the UAE (1,067), Qatar (335), Iran (307), Oman (122), Israel (107), Jordan (105) and Bahrain (102) by 3pm from different countries.”

• “Mediator Oman urges US to pull back from Iran conflict.” Al Arabiya, February 28, 2026.

  “Oman’s foreign minister, who had been mediating US-Iran talks, lamented on Saturday a wave of US and Israeli attacks on the Islamic Republic, and urged Washington to avoid getting “sucked in further” into a war that is not theirs.”

  “‘I am dismayed. Active and serious negotiations have yet again been undermined,” Badr Albusaidi said in a statement on X.”

  Go Deeper: “Analysis-Trump’s Iran strikes mark his biggest foreign policy gamble.” Al-Monitor, Matt Spetalnick, Andrea Shalal and Idrees Ali, February 28, 2026.

Markets, Economies, and Domestics

• “IMF: Kuwait Real GDP Will Expand by 3.8% in 2026.” Asharq Al-awsat, February 28, 2026.

  “Barclays boosted its Brent crude oil futures price forecast to around $100 per barrel on Saturday, up from $80 on Friday, after the United States and Israel bombed several sites in Iran. Oil markets might have to face their worst fears on Monday. As things stand right now, we think Brent could hit $100 (per barrel), as the market grapples with the threat of a ⁠potential supply disruption amid ⁠a spiraling security situation in the Middle East,” the bank said in a report.”

  Go Deeper: “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Kuwait.” International Monetary Fund, February 23, 2026.

• “Fitch Downgrades Bahrain to ‘B’ on Rising Debt and Wider Deficits” Al Alarabiya, February 23, 2026.

  “Late last year, Bahrain announced fiscal reforms including higher fuel prices and tariffs on electricity and water to bolster public finances. The agency maintained the kingdom’s outlook at “stable.” Peer agency S&P also downgraded the kingdom’s sovereign credit rating to “B” in late November last year.”

  Go Deeper: “Fitch Downgrades Bahrain to ‘B’; Outlook Stable.” Fitch, February 23, 2026.

• “Oman’s non-oil exports rise 7.5% as diversification gains traction.” Arab News, February 22, 2026.

  “Oman’s non-oil exports rose 7.5 percent to 6.7 billion Omani rials ($17.4 billion) in 2025, highlighting diversification gains even as lower crude prices dragged overall export earnings lower.”

  “Data from the National Centre for Statistics and Information showed re-export activity grew faster, increasing 20.3 percent year on year to 2.05 billion rials, supported by stronger trade flows through the Sultanate’s ports and logistics hubs.”

  Go Deeper: “Fiscal Performance [Third Quarter 2025]: A Quarterly Bulletin Issued by the Ministry of Finance.” Oman Ministry of Finance, 2025, [PDF].

• “JPMorgan Says UAE Is Too Rich to Be an Emerging Market.” Bloomberg, February 24, 2026.

  “JPMorgan Chase & Co. said it will remove the United Arab Emirates from its emerging-market bond indexes by June after the Middle Eastern nation exceeded the bank’s measures of wealth for three successive years.”

  Go Deeper: “JPMorgan to drop UAE from emerging market bond indexes: What to know.” Al-Monitor, February 25, 2026.

• “Oman special zones investment rises 6.8% to $3.6bn.” Arab News, February 16, 2026.

  “The figure raises the total committed investment under the supervision of the Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones, known as OPAZ, to 22.4 billion rials, the Oman News Agency reported.”

  Go Deeper: “Reforms drive RO 30 billion FDI surge in Oman.” Oman Observer, February 28, 2026.

• “UAE announces petrol and diesel prices for March 2026.” Gulf News, February 28, 2026.

  “Under the new rates, Super 98 petrol will cost Dh2.59 per litre, up from Dh2.45 in February, while Special 95 petrol is priced at Dh2.48 per litre, compared to Dh2.33 last month.”

  Go Deeper: “Will UAE petrol prices drop in March 2026?.” Time Out, February 26, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

The US-Israeli attack on Iran, including the reported targeting of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, dominated social media discussions across the Gulf, particularly after Iran retaliated by striking five Gulf states in response to the US assault. Omani commentator Hatim Al Tai described the confrontation as a strategic miscalculation by Washington, arguing that the United States committed a “grave mistake” and entered a trap whose consequences remain uncertain. He maintained that the escalation is not merely an American campaign against Iran, but a broader project shaped by Israeli priorities. As he stated, “This is not simply an American war against Iran; it is Zionism’s war against the last state that openly opposes the Israeli occupation — a ‘last opportunity’ war for Israel to dominate the region, control its states, advance a colonial and violent agenda, and revive the idea of Greater Israel.” Similarly, Qatari poet and political opponent living in exile Mohamed Ibn Altheeb argued that “Iran is a Muslim country and a neighbor; it has its rights and it has its faults. However, for the United States to bomb it solely for the sake of Netanyahu’s interests, without any consideration for the interests of the Arabs and the Gulf, and from bases located within the Gulf itself, represents the height of recklessness, contempt, and manipulation in international relations.”

From another perspective, Kuwaiti commentator Ayed Al Manna argued that Iran acted recklessly by targeting most Gulf Cooperation Council states without justification, emphasizing that the presence of American bases does not legitimize violating their sovereignty, especially since no hostile action against Iran originated from those territories. He noted that the strikes extended to civilian and purely national sites such as Kuwait International Airport, as well as Kuwaiti military locations with no American presence, and asserted that even targeting American bases on Gulf soil constitutes a breach of the sovereignty of the host states and warrants a firm response. Saudi expert Hesham Alghannam focused on the broader regional security dimension, arguing that “Israel may be capable of achieving military decisiveness in the short term, but without political solutions every victory remains temporary. The United States, far stronger than Israel militarily and technologically, did not secure lasting victories in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan; Israel is not an exception in history — it is vulnerable to attrition and prolonged wars.” Connecting the developments to Yemen, UAE commentator Hani Mas’hour expressed hope that Yemenis would also “rejoice at the death of Abdulmalik al-Houthi,” while linking the confrontation to southern Yemen, which the UAE has supported and which, as he argued, did not fall under Iranian influence. He wrote, “Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa are capitals that fell — except for Aden, which stood firm thanks to the intervention of the sons of Zayed.” Meanwhile, his veteran compatriot Abdulkhaleq Abdullah characterized the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s phone call to UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed — made in response to the Iranian attacks on the Gulf states — as “the most joyful news of the day.”

More Gulf Opinions

• “The most prominent hallmark of the UAE development trajectory is its ranking among the world top ten countries in the Global Soft Power Index, which covered 193 states, with the UAE placing tenth globally.”

  “Soft power is not a fixed destination to be achieved, but a continuous process. The UAE has worked to update its policies, measure the performance of its institutions, develop its human capital, and consistently link achievement with humanitarian values, thereby transforming this form of power into a lasting asset that can be built upon and does not diminish.”

Noora Al-Tunaiji, Al Etihad, (UAE), February 27, 2026.

• “For decades, the Khor Abdullah file has been reopened whenever political calculations tighten in Baghdad, as if historical facts and international decisions could be erased by a hasty ruling or a populist speech. Between one judicial verdict and another, and between political slogans and military imagery, it is the international and historical documents that remain the decisive reference, unchanged by shifting agendas.”

Hussain Al Rawi [Kuwait], Al Roya, (Oman), February 26, 2026.

• “The impact of regional wars on the Sultanate of Oman is marked by a clear duality: potential short-term financial gains resulting from rising oil prices, contrasted with longer-term strategic and economic risks. Accordingly, a prudent reading of the national interest suggests that regional stability remains the option most consistent with the Sultanate priorities for development and security, compared to any temporary gains that may arise from geopolitical crises.”

Sultan bin Salem Al Issai, Al Roya, (Oman), February 24, 2026.

• “Today, the southern [Yemeni] issue returns once again to the arena of political debate, but this time it assumes a regional and international dimension. While this carries political significance, it also entails considerable risk, as external intervention coincides with a period of deep fragmentation and division among southerners. Consequently, any foreign involvement is likely to pursue its own interests without regard for the broader interests of the southern population. Any weakening of national cohesion and division of the South into multiple states, as was the case during the British colonial period, would ultimately serve the interests of those external powers — particularly states seeking to establish a foothold in the southern Arabian Peninsula in order to exert control over the wider region.”

Zaid Al Fadheel, Makkah, (Saudi Arabia), February 23, 2026.

• “At the global level, the decision restores credibility to the rules-based trading system. However, Trump immediate recourse to ‘Section 122’ to impose an alternative 15 percent tariff means that we have shifted from ‘emergency chaos’ to ‘temporary protectionism’ under a timeline not exceeding 150 days, placing global trade in a state of constant anticipation.”

Adnan Yousef, Akhbar Al Khaleej, (Bahrain), February 23, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Mays, Terry M., “The Establishment of the Arab League Security Force, 1961–63: Peacekeeping in Kuwait.” Springer, 2025.

• Analysis: “Asia liquefied petroleum gas prices spike after damage to Saudi facility.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “JPMorgan to drop UAE from emerging market bond indexes: What to know.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Demographics Mean That Job Creation Is Top of the Saudi Economic Policy Agenda.” Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Beyond the Cube: Rethinking Urban Ambition in Riyadh.” Yasser Elsheshtawy, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “AI, the Gulf, and the US: A Primer.” Mohammed Soliman, Middle East Institute, February 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “JPMorgan to drop UAE from emerging market bond indexes: What to know.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Demographics Mean That Job Creation Is Top of the Saudi Economic Policy Agenda.” Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?” Annelle Sheline, Quincy, February 26, 2026.[PDF].

• Analysis: “To harness Saudi Arabia’s demographic dividend, Riyadh must invest in human capital.” Khalid Azim, Atlantic Council, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Riyadh takes the helm in Yemen.” Eleonora Ardemagni, Middle East Institute, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Hearing Them Softly: Emirati Discourse Management Works the Rift.” William Roebuck, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Can the Gulf Cooperation Council Transcend Its Divisions?” Hesham Alghannam, Carnegie, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia Confronts the Israel–UAE Alignment in Somalia.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Center [DC], February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “The state of great power competition in the Gulf.” Jonathan Fulton, Atlantic Council, February 20, 2026. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Gulf Energy Transition Through Renewable Energy Development.” Salem Alhajraf, Baker Institute, February 26, 2026. [PDF

• Analysis: “Gas and Oil Pipelines in the Middle East Merits and Demerits.” Naji Abi-Aad, Gulf Research Center, February 25, 2026.

• Podcast: “Who is driving the U.S. political landscape?” with Lara Trump, Arab Cast, February 27, 2026.

• Interview: “The Tucker Carlson story.” Al-Liwan, February 20, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “US removing guardrails from proposed Saudi nuclear deal, document says.” Reuters, February 19, 2026.

  “President Donald Trump has told Congress he is pursuing a civil nuclear pact with Saudi Arabia that does not include non-proliferation safeguards the U.S. has long said would ensure the kingdom does not develop nuclear weapons, according to a copy of the document sent to Congress and reviewed by Reuters.”

• “Saudi Crown Prince and US senator Lindsey Graham discuss Iran tensions.” The National, February 20, 2026.

  “Mr Graham also spoke of another regional matter, after several weeks of intense criticism of the UAE through Saudi social media and TV channels. He urged the countries to put aside their differences and focus on the “big prize” of replacing Iran’s regime.”

• “UK Renews Push for Saudi Arabia to Invest in Fighter Jet Program.” Bloomberg, February 19, 2026.

  “Britain’s fresh diplomatic push comes as manufacturers and allies grow frustrated with the Labour administration’s delay in publishing a plan to allocate fresh defense funding. Though GCAP is expected to be handed billions of pounds in the plan, the delay has led to uncertainty around its ability to finance key contracts.”

• “Qatar PM arrives in Venezuela on first trip since Maduro’s ouster: What to know.” Al-Monitor, February 17, 2026.

  “The arrangement with Qatar had drawn criticism from Democrats, and Rep. Gregory Meeks, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday warning that the ‘offshore account could enable corruption.’”

Market & Economy

• “First Europe-Gulf Forum to take place in May.” The National, February 12, 2026.

  “The forum comes on the heels of the launch of the Alliance for Europe-Gulf Geopolitics and Investments Summit in September at the 80th UN General Assembly in New York by US think tank the Atlantic Council and Greek media company the Antenna Group.”

• “Saudi Arabia’s Humain Invests $3 Billion Into Musk’s xAI.” Bloomberg, February 18, 2026.

  “The deal strengthens Musk’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, which has made AI a central plank of its efforts to diversify its economy away from oil. Humain was formed in 2025, with backing from the country’s trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund, Public Investment Fund, and has been on a dealmaking spree to build up the infrastructure and compute capacity required to train and run AI models.”

  Go Deeper: “Elon Musk’s xAI Gets $3 Billion Investment From Saudi-Backed A.I. Firm.” The New York Times, February 18, 2026.

• “UAE economy to grow over 5% in 2026, says minister.” Zawya, February 12, 2026.

  “Al Marri pointed out that the number of companies registered in the national economic register has risen to more than 1.45 million from about 650,000 five years ago, underscoring the UAE’s attractiveness to global investors.”

  Go Deeper: “United Arab Emirates and the IM.” IMF, 2026.

• “Kuwait moves toward ‘Freelance Visa’ system to regulate labor market.” Zawya, February 20, 2026

  “According to preliminary guidelines, the first phase of the proposed system would focus on simple professions. Annual fees are expected to range between KD 750 and KD 1,000, subject to renewal and compliance with regulatory requirements. These include registering a verified residential address, providing an approved email account, submitting clear personal data and meeting additional conditions to be specified by the competent authorities.”

• “Bahrain Bourse Unveils Capital Market Development Plan (2026-2028).” Bahrain Bourse, February 9, 2026.

  “A comprehensive Capital Market Development Plan aimed at elevating the market, and designed to diversify market offerings, deepen liquidity, and streamline market operations.”

  Go Deeper: “Capital Market Development Plan 2026-2028 Elevating the Market.” Bahrain Bourse, 9, February 2026. [PDF].

• “MBS’s $100 Billion Quest Opens Mecca’s Property Market to Global Money.” Bloomberg, February 13, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia is opening Mecca’s doors to foreign investment. The move could unlock billions as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman looks to diversify the nation’s economy, Zainab Fattah reports.”

  Go Deeper: “MBS’s $100 Billion Quest Shored Up by Mecca Boom as Neom Slows.” Bloomberg, February 13, 2026.

• “Bahrain launches National Aviation Strategy 2026–2027 to reach 100 destinations, deliver $1.5 billion GDP boost.” Economy Middle East, February 16, 2026.

  “This specific collaboration is projected to contribute as much as $1.5 billion to the Gross Domestic Product of Bahrain and is expected to generate 1,200 direct employment opportunities within a five-year period.”

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Gulf Opinions

This week, Gulf commentators concentrated on Iran and President Donald Trump warning that the United States could bomb Iran if no agreement is reached between the two sides. Kuwaiti commentator Dana Al Enezy argues that what is often presented as a US–Iran confrontation is, in reality, a direct struggle between Iran and Israel, with Washington acting primarily as a strategic supporter rather than the principal combatant. She stresses that the Gulf states are inevitably exposed to the consequences through “energy market stability” and “maritime security,” yet ultimately have no interest in being drawn into a confrontation that does not serve their stability priorities. Saudi columnist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed approaches the issue from a historical angle, arguing that major wars frequently erupt from a “deceptive sense of security” and repeated miscalculations, recalling episodes from the 1967 war to Saddam’s belief that “America will not dare.” He suggests Iran risks repeating such errors if it assumes that limited nuclear understandings or investment promises can shield it from confrontation, particularly when Israel views Iran ballistic capabilities as an existential matter. In his view, convincing oneself that war is “impossible” is what produces destructive strategic mistakes, and while all options are costly, war remains “the worst choice.” Saudi writer Hassan Al Mostafa also highlights the dual track shaping the current moment, noting the simultaneous emphasis on “diplomacy” and “deterrence,” as Trump describes talks as “ongoing” while referencing major naval deployments, creating a negotiation climate in which dialogue and overt threat operate side by side and both parties signal that the cost of failure would be high.

From Bahrain, Fahad Al-Mudahki directs attention to Iran internal conditions, arguing that responsibility lies primarily with the Iranian regime, whose economic mismanagement has fueled protests and weakened domestic stability. He maintains that even if direct confrontation with Washington is avoided and unrest temporarily subsides, the continued economic downturn is likely to intensify medium- and long-term public anger, leaving the system either forced to restructure or merely postponing a deeper reckoning. In Oman, Ismail bin Shihab Al-Balushi offers a contrasting reading, suggesting that Washington is unlikely to initiate a full-scale war not because it lacks military capacity, but because it recognizes that the “cost of confrontation” could spiral beyond control, despite its insistence on “zero nuclear” and “zero enrichment.” Meanwhile, UAE commentator Al Badr Al-Shatiri presents a more critical view of US behavior, echoing Stephen Walt’s description in Foreign Affairs of a “predatory state” that seeks maximum advantage from allies and adversaries alike and treats “what is mine as mine, and what is yours as negotiable.” He points to the record of military actions and continued naval deployments as evidence that the United States is prepared to escalate further should Iran fail to comply, reinforcing the sense that the region remains suspended between negotiation and the persistent shadow of force.

More Gulf Opinions

• “Fundamental dilemma clearly stands before us: the problem is not in choosing a political or economic model, but in the absence of the institutional and cultural framework that allows any model to function successfully. Some Arab states experienced economic openness without oversight institutions, resulting in monopolies and widespread corruption, while others imposed full government control over the economy, leading to bureaucracy, stagnation, and also corruption.”

Mohammed Al Rumaihi [Kuwait], Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi Arabia), February 21, 2026.

• “The new power actors are no longer merely secondary participants; they have become central architects of information disruption, leveraging direct access to mass audiences, advanced data analytics capabilities, and organizational flexibility that surpasses traditional institutions. They are redefining the concept of ‘power’ in the digital age, where influence extends to shaping perceptions and manufacturing beliefs.”

Sameera Rajab, Akhbar Alkhaleej, (Bahrain), February 21, 2026.

• “That is why the many framings of this rift get it wrong. Riyadh’s concern is not where a consulting firm places its regional office, nor is it a desire to ‘downsize’ the UAE in regional politics. The issue is whether a close partner is widening security risks on Saudi Arabia’s periphery while still benefiting from the optics of Gulf unity.”

Ali Al Shihabi, Arab News, (Saudi Arabia), February 20, 2026.

• “If Islamic countries today suffer from political and economic weakness, the logical starting point lies in internal reform through strengthening transparency, combating corruption, investing in education, and building strong institutions. Only then can any reform project — whether grounded in Islamic reference or framed in humanistic terms — move from a slogan to an inspiring experience that serves all humanity.”

Mohammed Al Bahzad, Al Raya, (Qatar), February 20, 2026.

• “The Board of Peace will ultimately share the fate of the League of Nations, which was formed after World War I and later collapsed, as the countries that fought the first war were already inclined toward a second and merely awaited a spark. Hitler Nazi project provided that spark, leading to the outbreak of World War II, during which the United States used atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, dozens of European cities were destroyed, and more than 50 million people lost their lives.”

Awad bin Saeed, Oman Daily, (Oman), February 17, 2026.

• “Designing Arab alliances today must rest on three pillars: a strong economy that reduces internal vulnerability, cohesive security that protects borders and institutions, and a political vision that rejects ideological rigidity and affirms the nation-state. This is the distinction between a state-building project and a project of chaos, and when major Arab capitals converge around this understanding, they are not merely managing a crisis but shaping a new phase. Recent years have shown that a vacuum is more dangerous than disagreement, and that division produces crises greater than any direct confrontation. The current moment therefore demands high rationality and prioritizing supreme interests over narrow calculations, as the region cannot endure another cycle of attrition or further failed experiments.”

Abdullah Alhashmi, Al Etihad, (UAE), February 13, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Zweiri, Mahjoob, and Battaloglu, Nesibe Hicret, “The Contemporary United Arab Emirates: From Surviving State to Assertive Power” Springer, April 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi–Iranian Détente: A Strategic Imperative.” Shahram Akbarzadeh, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi-Turkish Pragmatic Realignment.” John Calabrese, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Six Flags. Formula One. Aquarabia. Saudi Arabia Bets $32 Billion On Fun.” Christine Burke, Bloomberg, February 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Oman Sets Its Economic Compass for the Year Ahead.” Robert Mogielnicki, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “The GCC’s Calculus: Financing and Securing Gaza in 2026.” Aziz Alghashian, Gulf International Forum, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why are Middle Eastern governments lobbying against a US attack on Iran?” Galip Dalay, Chatham House, February 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “IMF Staff Completes 2026 Article IV Mission to Qatar.” IMF, February 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Constraint and Competition: Saudi Arabia’s Regional Policy in a Shifting Middle East.” Arab Center [DC], February 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “The UAE’s Pitch for Cricket.” Raphaël Le Magoariec, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Bridging the Gulf: Energy Policy and Climate Governance in the GCC.” Justin Dargin, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 9, 2026.

• Podcast: “Where is the Emirati–Kuwaiti Partnership Headed?” Hosts Matar Al Neyadi, Arab Cast, February 16, 2026.

• Interview: “KDIPA and Goldman Sachs on Gulf Investments.” Interviewee Sobeeh Almukhaizim, Anthony Gutman, and Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg, January 20, 2026.

• Webinar: “Global Energy Dynamics 2026: Oil, Politics, and Power Plays From Washington to the Gulf.” Speakers Aldo R. Flores-Quiroga, Carole Nakhle, Harry Tchilinguirian, BNP Paribas, and Kate Dourian, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 19, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Trump sends second aircraft carrier to Gulf amid Iran threats.” Axios, February 13, 2026.

  “The move will increase the pressure on Tehran during the nuclear negotiations with the Trump administration, making the U.S. military threat even more menacing.”

  Go Deeper: “America’s Military Buildup Around Iran: What We Know and What It Means.” Middle East Forum, January 28, 2026.

Market & Economy

• “Saudi Firms Agree to Rebuild Syrian Aviation and Mobile Networks.” Bloomberg, February 8, 2026.

  “Saudi Telecom Co. has been awarded a contract to build a 4,500 kilometer (2,796.2 miles) fiber-optic network called Silklink, it said in a filing on Sunday. The award with the Syrian Sovereign Fund was valued at 3 billion Saudi Riyal ($800 million). It also includes agreements to develop data centers and international submarine cable landing stations.”

  Go Deeper: “Why is Saudi Arabia Investing in Syria?” New Lines Institute, October 2, 2025.

• “Saudi PIF to unveil new 2026–2030 strategy.” Gulf Business, February 12, 2026.

  “The revised roadmap for the $925bn fund will emphasise developing industry, minerals and artificial intelligence, as well as tourism, while scaling back and in some cases reconfiguring expensive real‑estate mega projects such as The Line – a futuristic mirrored city – the three people said.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia names new investment minister as Vision 2030 funding lags.” Al-Monitor, February 12, 2026.

• “Abu Dhabi’s G42 Leads $1 Billion Data Center Project in Vietnam.” Bloomberg, February 8, 2026.

  “The company is the primary developer of OpenAI’s Stargate infrastructure project in the UAE, part of a planned 5 gigawatt data center in the country. While much of its work is in the Gulf monarchy, G42 is pushing abroad, with data center and “smart city” projects across Africa and Asia.”

  Go Deeper: “The United Arab Emirates’ AI Ambitions.” CSIS, January 24, 2025.

• “GCC corporates poised for rating stability in 2026: S&P.” Arab News, February 11, 2026.

  “Economic growth across the GCC is projected at 2-4 percent in 2026-27, supported by solid domestic demand, government infrastructure spending and rising hydrocarbon output.”

  “Diversification efforts are gradually reducing volatility. Non-oil sectors now account for about 75 percent of GDP in the UAE and 71 percent in Saudi Arabia, while average inflation across the bloc is expected to hold steady at around 2 percent over the next two years.”

  Go Deeper: “GCC Corporate And Infrastructure Outlook 2026: Stability Despite Uncertainty.” S&P Global, February 10, 2026.

• “Saudi-backed Midad signs deal for sanctioned Lukoil assets.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

  “Saudi-backed Midad Energy has signed a term sheet to acquire Russia’s sanctioned Lukoil assets in a high-stakes contest against rivals including private equity giant Carlyle Group. The deal is contingent on US regulatory approval, according to three people familiar with the matter. The move highlights continued efforts by the Russian energy giant to offload overseas holdings constrained by Western sanctions.”

• “Kuwait forecasts 54.7% rise in fiscal deficit as oil revenues weaken.” Arab News, February 11, 2026.

  “Announcing the draft budget, Finance Minister Yaqoub Al-Refaei estimated total expected revenues at 16.3 billion dinars, marking a 10.5 percent decline compared with the previous fiscal year.”

  Go Deeper: “Kuwait Budget 2026-2027” Finance Ministry, February 2026. [PDF].

• “IMF urges Qatar to strengthen private sector.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

  “Qatar must step up efforts to move more citizens into the private sector by strengthening skills, small and mid-size enterprises, financing and digital adoption, International Monetary Fund officials said this week.”

  Go Deeper: “IMF Staff Completes 2026 Article IV Mission to Qatar.” IMF, February 12, 2026.

• “Omani Stocks Head for Best Week Since 2014 on EM Status Bid.” Bloomberg, February 12, 2026.

  “Muscat’s MSX 30 benchmark has advanced more than 9% since Sunday to its highest level since 2014. Gains of nearly 20% so far this year are almost double those for MSCI Inc.’s emerging-market index.”

  Go Deeper: “Beyond Oil: Accelerating Export Diversification for Sustainable Growth - Oman.” IMF, February 5, 2026.

• “Iraq makes rapid progress in GCC electricity interconnection project.” Iraq News, February 11, 2026.

  “The project is crucial as it seeks to enhance the country’s electricity supply by linking the transmission networks in southern Iraq to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) electrical grid. This connection is expected to improve the stability and reliability of the electrical network.”

  “The Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) projected in October 2023 that the project will supply Iraq with two million megawatts in the summer and 500,000 megawatts in the winter.”

  Go Deeper: “Iraq’s Electricity Shortage and the Paradox of Gas Flaring.” Baker Institute, June 17, 2025.

• “Qatar Pushes Start of Its Massive LNG Expansion to End-2026.” Bloomberg, February 9, 2026.

  “ConocoPhillips, a stakeholder in the project, said last week that the expansion is set to start in the second half of this year. North Field East is the first phase of Qatar’s massive expansion, which will almost double its export capacity to 142 million tons by 2030.”

  Go Deeper: “How Qatar’s LNG Decisions Will Impact an Oversupplied Global Market.” Columbia University (SIPA), September 2025. [PDF].

Domestics

• “Saudi investment minister among dozens in sweeping reshuffle.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia replaced more than 40 senior and regional government posts on Thursday, including the minister of investment and the attorney general, marking the most sweeping reshuffle since 2022.”

  Go Deeper: “AlSaif’s appointment reflects urgent Saudi need for FDI.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

• “Dubai-based DP World replaces chief named in Epstein files.” AlJazeera, February 13, 2026.

  “The friendly exchanges between the two include discussions about deals and also mention bin Sulayem visiting Epstein’s private island while sharing contacts in business and politics.”

  “The two men also shared salacious comments about women, with bin Sulayem’s email address featuring a correspondence in which Epstein remarked, “I loved the torture video.”.”

  Go Deeper: “Newly surfaced Epstein email ties him to Israel–UAE strategy targeting Qatar.” Middle East Monitor, February 3, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

This week Gulf commentators devoted significant attention to the Jeffrey Epstein leaks, particularly as some disclosures were said to intersect with figures from the region. From Saudi Arabia, Hailah Abdullah Almushaweh argued that in a system where the rule of law is meant to be a “red line,” the Epstein files demonstrated how immense wealth, once liberated from ethical and legal restraint, can redirect justice toward “power and pleasure” rather than principle. In her reading, the greater scandal was not confined to the criminal acts themselves but lay in the permissive architecture that granted a form of “informal immunity,” transforming justice from an absolute norm into a selective calculation. From Kuwait, Saadiah Mufarreh expanded the critique, asserting that the West—often presenting itself as a moral “guardian” and measuring others by strict democratic standards—appeared more invested in managing its “narrative” than in safeguarding victims reduced to statistics and procedural footnotes. The episode, she argued, exposed uncomfortable “double standards,” as transparency receded when scrutiny turned inward. Similarly, Hussain Al Rawi invoked John Rawls critique of “unequal systems,” warning that when elites design structures that insulate their own privilege, accountability becomes conditional: the weak face consequences, while the powerful are shielded. Qatar’s Jawaher Al Thani reinforced this theme, observing that despite hundreds of names circulating in messages, photographs, and testimonies, only two individuals were imprisoned—Epstein, who died in “suspicious” circumstances, and Ghislaine Maxwell—while alleged abusers were reportedly redacted and victims exposed, prompting the blunt question of whether justice is designed to protect the powerful or the vulnerable.

From Oman, Muammar bin Ali al-Tubi offered a more controversial geopolitical interpretation, arguing that recently released materials contain what he described as indications of a connection between Epstein and Israeli intelligence, citing reported contacts with former defense minister Ehud Barak and framing the affair within a broader narrative of “managed chaos” in parts of the Arab world, including Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria. He situated these claims within a wider argument that networks of influence operate through leverage, blackmail, and the moral compromise of decision makers, portraying Epstein’s use of intermediaries, carefully curated invitations, and concealed surveillance systems as resembling intelligence-style tradecraft designed to secure influence over political and financial elites. In the United Arab Emirates, where some leaks were also said to reference Emirati names, Dhahi Khalfan wrote on X that “the real blackmail lies in the three million documents that have not been released,” suggesting that the material already published constitutes only a “prelude.” He further questioned how Epstein could acquire a private island, host heads of state, and sustain such operations without the awareness of security agencies, concluding that the entire episode appears to target “something far more significant” than the crimes alone, thereby deepening regional skepticism toward the official narrative.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Edited by Gregory John Simons, Khaled Al-Kassimi, Kleanthis Kyriakidis “Guardians of the Gulf: Navigating Security Challenges.” Springer, May 2026.

• Research: “Activism and Community-Based Climate Adaptation in Kuwait.” Mariam AlSaad, The Middle East Journal, 2026.

• Research: “The GCC’s Economic Diplomacy in a Multi-Polar World.” Christopher M. Davidson , The Middle East Journal, 2026.

• Research: “How to Upgrade US-Saudi Defense Relations.” Bilal Y. Saab, The Middle East Journal, 2026.

• Analysis: “Mixed signals from the new Q3 2025 labor market data.” Meshaal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, January 1, 2026.

• Analysis: “From Exchange to Strategy: Making Culture a Pillar of EU-GCC Relations.” Alice Königstetter, The Euro-Gulf Information Center, January 30, 2026.

• Analysis: “The $108 Oil War: Can the Middle East Crash the World Economy?” Dina Esfandiary and Ziad Daoud, Bloomberg, February 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Saudis feel squeezed even as the economy booms.” The Economist, February 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “What’s behind Saudi outreach to Ethiopia amid UAE rift?” Rosaleen Carroll, Al-Monitor, February 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “Reassessing Saudization: Localisation and Labour Market Nationalisation in Saudi Arabia.” Swapnil Sujal, Middle East Political and Economic Institute, February 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Multipolar Trap in the New Middle East: How Gulf States Are Learning to Hedge in an Uncertain World Order.” Rabbab A. Khan, Middle East Political and Economic Institute, January 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Oman’s Space Ambitions: A Pragmatic Gulf Model” Raymond Karam, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf’s Green Rush: Financing the Future, or Just Repainting It?” Christopher Gooding, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “Regional States Test the Economic Waters in Syria.” Said Bakr, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 11, 2026.

• Podcast: “Has the Gulf Cooperation Council’s relevance expired?” with Saad Al-Ghanim, Arab Cast, February 14, 2026.

• Seminar: “Beyond Tariffs: The New India–Gulf Economic Playbook.” ORF, Feb 7, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Iran and US hold indirect talks in Oman. America’s military leader in the Mideast joins the talks.” AP, February 6, 2026.

  “The talks had initially been expected to take place in Turkey in a format that would have included regional countries as well, and would have included topics like Tehran’s ballistic missile program — something Iran apparently rejected in favor of focusing only on its nuclear program.”

  Go Deeper: “With the US and Iran on a knife-edge, can Oman once again step in to mediate?” Middle East Institute, February 5, 2026.

• “Saudi, Iranian FMs underscore need to resolve differences through diplomatic means.” Saudi Gazette, February 5, 2026.

  “The foreign ministers discussed regional developments and underscored the need to resolve differences through dialogue and diplomatic means. They also reviewed efforts to maintain security and stability in the region.”

  Go Deeper: “Analysis: A decade of Saudi-Iranian relations: from rivalry to re-engagement.” Janatan Sayeh, Long War Journal, April 19, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia may invest in Turkish fighter jet Kaan ‘any moment’, Erdogan says.” Middle East Eye, February 5, 2026.

  “‘We are signing significant defence industry cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, and we are determined to further strengthen them’” Erdogan told journalists while returning to Turkey following his visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia this week.”

  Go Deeper: “Talk of a Turkish military alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reflects Ankara’s opportunistic ‘hedging’ strategy.” Chatham House, January 30, 2026.

• “Germany’s Merz heads to Saudi, Gulf in quest for new partners.” Zawya, February 4, 2026.

  “German Chancellor Friedrich Merz began a tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United ​Arab Emirates on Wednesday aiming to forge energy and arms partnerships as Europe’s biggest and richest economy sought to reduce dependence ⁠on the U.S. and China.”

  Go Deeper: “Merz Promises Gulf Countries Easier Access to Military Goods.” Bloomberg, February 5, 2026.

Market & Economy

• “UK Says Trade Deal With Saudis, Other Gulf States ‘Imminent’.” Bloomberg, February 5, 2026.

  “The UK’s trade minister said a free-trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council was “imminent,” as the Starmer government looks to build on pacts last year with the European Union, India and the US.”

  Go Deeper: “UK chases elusive GCC trade deal that could boost exports, economic links.” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia’s $2 Billion Solar Plan Lifts Turkish Energy Stocks.” Bloomberg, February 4, 2026.

  “Saudi companies will initially develop solar projects capable of generating 2,000 megawatts in Turkey’s Sivas and Karaman provinces, followed by 3,000MW of additional wind and solar capacity to be finalized later, according to an intergovernmental agreement signed in Riyadh on Tuesday.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia to build $2 billion solar farms in Turkey, Turkish energy minister says.” Reuters, February, 3, 2026.

• “Kuwait targets 4mln bpd oil production by 2035: Report.” Zawya, February 5, 2026

  “Kuwait aims to increase its oil production to 4 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2035 from the current 3 million bpd, according to Nawaf S. Al-Sabah, Deputy Chairman and CEO of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC).”

  “Oil demand is projected to reach 100 million bpd by 2050, Al-Sabah stated, adding that the cost of producing a barrel of oil in Kuwait remains below $10.”

  Go Deeper: “Kuwait readies $7 billion pipeline deal as Gulf turns to foreign capital.” Reuters, January 28, 2026.

• “Saudi’s MBS Unleashes Months of Reforms to Draw More FDI.” Bloomberg, February 2, 2026.

  “The moves have come as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seeks to turn the nation into an investment destination and better compete with nearby Dubai. They also hint at how the Gulf nation is trying to address oil-price volatility and budget deficits that threaten to slow progress on its $2 trillion economic diversification plan.”

  Go Deeper: “Wall Street, Saudi Arabia Differ on Kingdom’s Deficit Target.” Bloomberg, December 9, 2025.

Domestics

• “Kuwait emir reshuffles Cabinet, replacing 7 ministers.” Middle East Monitor, February 1, 2026.

  “The reshuffle also named Sheikh Jarrah Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah as foreign minister, Osama Boudi as minister of commerce and industry, Reem al-Fulaij as minister of state for development and sustainability, and Tariq al-Jalahma as minister of state for youth and sports.”

  Go Deeper: “Will Kuwait’s Parliamentary Democracy Be Restored, Reformed, or Repudiated?” Carnegie, March 13, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia is lifting the alcohol ban for wealthy foreigners.” BBC, February 05, 2026.

  “To be eligible, an expat must either hold a Premium Residency permit, which costs 100,000 Saudi riyals ($27,000; £19,300) a year; or show that he or she earns at least 50,000 riyals per month.”

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Gulf Opinions

Omani commentators devoted sustained attention to the “indirect” Iranian–American negotiations hosted in Muscat, emphasizing Oman’s distinctive diplomatic positioning at a moment of heightened regional volatility. Mohammed Rams Al Rawas highlighted the importance of place, portraying Oman as a rare actor capable of “creating the impossible” in the service of peace. As global politics becomes increasingly dominated by threats, coercion, and displays of power, he argued, Oman stands apart through its “quiet, confident” diplomacy, offering a venue where the host “does not interfere” but instead operates as a disciplined and credible honest broker. This approach, he stressed, is not tactical but structural, rooted in a long-standing Omani legacy of neutrality, discretion, and dialogue, built on “the power of silence” and the conviction that wisdom and mediation provide more durable foundations for regional and international security than the “noise of weapons.” Addressing why Tehran requested moving the talks from Istanbul to Muscat, Salem Ahmed Bakhit Safarar pointed to Oman’s pivotal role in facilitating the 2014 negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, which culminated in the 2015 nuclear agreement, alongside the deep trust both negotiating sides place in the Omani mediator and the “strict confidentiality” that has historically surrounded talks in Muscat. At the same time, he cautioned that the negotiating track faces persistent obstruction from external actors, most notably Israel, which he argued continues to work actively to derail any diplomatic breakthrough.

Beyond the question of venue, several commentators reframed the negotiations within a broader strategic context that challenges dominant Western narratives. Khaled bin Salem Al-Ghasani argued that the primary engine of regional war is not Iran but the United States, contending that years of sanctions, political pressure, and coordinated media campaigns amount to a sustained strategy of coercion falsely presented as “deterrence.” From an international politics perspective, Salem bin Hamad Al Hajari maintained that the core confrontation is not between Washington and Tehran, but between Iran and Israel, with the United States acting largely as the political executor of Israeli priorities. He pointed to the June 2025 war as a critical rupture that collapsed long-standing red lines and exposed a fragile deterrence structure, making renewed conflict a matter of “when,” not “if.” In this context, US engagement with Iran appears less driven by concern over a “dangerous state” than by an effort to manage the consequences of Israeli escalation and contain a confrontation Washington itself helped push into the open. Similarly, Khamis bin Obaid Alqutaiti observed that American military deployments and pressure tactics intensified tensions, but Iran’s firm posture and explicit warnings that any attack would trigger a “regional war” forced a temporary retreat toward negotiations, widely viewed as the safer option for all parties. Mohammed bin Salem Al-Batashi concluded that Tehran’s choice of Muscat reflects not only Oman’s regional success in mediation, but also Iran’s strategic self-assurance in selecting a secure venue capable of safeguarding the rights and interests of all sides.

More Gulf Opinions

• “Libya currently faces a range of possible scenarios. On one hand, this assassination [Saif al-Islam Gaddafi] could lead to a definitive break with the political era associated with the Gaddafi lineage, potentially reducing international sensitivity surrounding the electoral file. On the other hand, there is a risk that the incident could reignite internal conflict or foster a sense of political despair among factions loyal to the former regime, with resulting security repercussions in areas of strong tribal and local influence.”

Buthaina Khalifa Qasim, Al Bilad, (Bahrain), February 7, 2026.

• “It was said that he [Epstein] committed suicide in prison after his arrest, despite widespread doubts about this account; more likely, he was eliminated so that he—and his secrets—would disappear. Such is the logic of corrupt systems when one of their members, or one of their fronts, is exposed: excision and liquidation are the most effective means of preventing further exposure, at least until internal affairs within the system are reorganized.”

Abdullah Alamadi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), February 5, 2026.

• “Those tracking the Epstein files now outnumber those following the crimes of the Zionist entity in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, while public attention has receded from the international system’s onslaught against politically and economically exhausted states such as Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and others.”

Suad bint Fahd Al Mojil, Al Qabas, (Kuwait), February 5, 2026.

• “The choice of Abu Dhabi as the venue for the trilateral talks was neither coincidental nor a gesture of courtesy. Abu Dhabi is not merely a place known for hospitality and gracious hosting, but a conducive environment for achieving the desired objectives.”

  “This hosting [of the US-Russia-Ukraine negotiation] is not a passing event, but rather a reflection of a deep-rooted strategy that shapes a distinctive Emirati diplomacy, positioning it at the forefront of the regional and international landscape.”

Ali bin Salem Al Kaabi, Al Etihad, (UAE), February 2, 2026.

• “These are not political disputes between regional states, nor a competition for influence as some imagine; this is an existential war, waged through proxy warfare, the support of militias, media campaigns, and dubious alliances, alongside the promotion of questionable doctrines and religions. Its objective is to dismantle Sunni Islam and its historic religious authorities in Mecca and Medina as the world has known them for 1,400 years, and replace them with ‘Islamist Protestantism’; for this reason, crises can at times be useful, as they expose realities and strip away the veneer of complacency and misplaced tolerance.”

Mohammad Al Saaed, Okaz, (Saudi Arabia), February 1, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Almezaini, Khalid, and Alexander, Kristian, “An Introduction to Gulf Politics.” Cambridge University Press, June 2026.

• Research: “Measuring financial integration in GCC stock markets: Dynamics, risk premia, and the path to enhanced cooperation.” Salem Boubakri and Cyriac Guillaumin, Science Direct, March 2026.

• Research: “Private health insurance in Gulf Cooperation Council countries: A scoping review.” Husein Reka, Science Direct, June 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia’s Break With Interventionism.” Sultan Alamer, Newlines Magazine, February 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Abu Dhabi Builds a New Deal Machine Around Its Crown Prince.” Dinesh Nair, Zainab Fattah, and Alex Dooler, Bloomberg, February 3, 2026.

• Analysis: “Caught in the Gulf crossfire: Pakistan navigates Saudi-UAE rivalry.” Sabena Siddiqui, Al-Monitor, February 1, 2026.

• Analysis: “UAE: Greenfield FDI surged 78% y/y to reach a record USD 33.2bn in 2025.” Mayed Alrashdi, NBD Research, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Of Course the UAE Is Not Preparing To Take Over Gaza.” Hussein Ibish, AGSI, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “Trump’s Energy Agenda: Gains and Risks for the Gulf.” Masha Kotkin, ORF, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Cost of War on the Region: A Gulf Reading of a Scenario of an Attack on Iran.” Ebtesam AlKetbi, Emirates Policy Center, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “Merz courts Gulf as Germany seeks energy alternatives to US, China.” Beatrice Farhat, Al-Monitor, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “MEI Perspectives Series 53: How Gulf States Quietly Developed Durable Soft Power in Asia.” Joshua Snider, Middle East Institute (NUS), January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi-UAE Rift: Taking the Measure of the Gulf That Separates and Unites Them.” William Roebuck, AGSI, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: ”Normalization is slipping away.” Daniel Benaim, Middle East Institute, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf Maritime Security: Balancing Partnership and Flexibility.” Leonardo Mazzucco, AGSI, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “In Saudi Arabia, Erdogan fosters security alignment, $30B trade push.” Ezgi Akin, Al-Monitor, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Yemen Is Not a Gulf Rivalry—It Is a Test of Whether Extremism Can Be Contained.” Ahmed Charai, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “With the US and Iran on a knife-edge, can Oman once again step in to mediate?” Alex Vatanka, Middle East Institute, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “Kuwait to open offshore oil, gas fields to foreign firms: What to know.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 3, 2026.

• Podcast: “What Does Saudi Arabia Want from Yemen?” Malek Al-Roqi, Yemen Podcast, January 22, 2026. [Eng subtitle].

• Interview: “The Smart Interviewer: How to Lead the Conversation and Build Rapport,” Dawood Al-Shiryan, Abdullah Al-Mudaifer, Ali Al-Alyani, and Rachid Allali, Saudi Media Forum, February 3, 2026. [Eng subtitle].

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Saudi, Israeli officials visit D.C. to talk possible U.S. strikes on Iran.” Axios, January 29, 2026.

  “The Israelis came to D.C. to share intelligence on possible targets inside Iran.”

  “The Saudis, meanwhile, are highly concerned about a potential regional war and are trying to help broker a diplomatic solution.”

  Go Deeper: “Arab and Muslim powers mount last-ditch effort to avert US-Iran conflict.” Financial Times, January 30, 2026.

• “US warship docks in Gulf of Aqaba as fears of Iran strike grow.” Middle East Eye, January 30, 2026.

  “The move is part of US-Israeli military and security coordination, including reinforced naval deployment and heightened defensive and offensive readiness in anticipation of potential developments,” Kan reported, quoting a security source.

  The report added that the step strengthens naval deployment, raising the level of defensive and offensive readiness in “anticipation of any possible field developments.”

• “Celebrations Launch in Abu Dhabi for ‘The UAE and Kuwait Are Brothers Forever’,” Al Khaleej, January 30, 2026.

  “The ‘UAE and Kuwait: Brothers Forever’ celebrations kicked off in Abu Dhabi on Thursday, as part of a comprehensive national program that will continue until February 4, 2026, across all the emirates of the country.”

• “Saudi Arabian media steps up attacks on UAE as Gulf rift deepens.” Financial Times, January 21, 2026.

  “Saudi journalist Jassir al-Jassir on Monday told Al Arabiya channel that the UAE ‘betrayed the partnership with the kingdom in Yemen’. He drew a contrast between the Emirati capital Abu Dhabi, which is often seen as the political centre that drives foreign policy, and its commercial hub Dubai which has been praised as an economic success story.”

Market & Economy

• “Abu Dhabi folds assets worth $263bn into new wealth fund controlled by crown prince.” Financial Times, January 30, 2026.

  “Greater responsibility for Sheikh Khaled within the emirate’s investment framework through L’imad echoes the establishment of the $330bn sovereign fund Mubadala, which was formed in 2002 when Sheikh Mohammed was consolidating power under his father, Sheikh Zayed.”

  Go Deeper: “Shake-Up Elevates U.A.E. Crown Prince Into $260 Billion Sovereign Wealth Role.” WSJ, January 30, 2026.

• “US to pay monthly Venezuela ‘budget’ from oil proceeds via Qatar fund.” Financial Times, January 29, 2026.

  “Rubio said the government led by Delcy Rodríguez had been “very co-operative in this regard. In fact, they have pledged to use a substantial amount of those funds to purchase medicine and equipment directly from the United States”. One $300mn payment has already been made to Caracas “because they had to meet payroll”, he said, but about $200mn is still held in Qatar.”

• “UAE launches ‘sovereign’ open AI model to counter Chinese rivals.” Financial Times, January 27, 2026.

  “The Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI) on Tuesday released its latest model, K2 Think, alongside a complete disclosure of the data, algorithms and other code that was used to build it, as the country seeks to gain an edge in a market that has become dominated by Chinese AI groups. Eric Xing, MBZUAI president, said the state-backed university was filling a gap left by Silicon Valley firms such as Meta that have pulled back from openly publishing the research behind their AI systems.”

  Go Deeper: “Can the Gulf really become an AI superpower?” Financial Times, January 01, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia opens real estate market to foreign buyers.” Arab News, January 22, 2026.

  “According to the authority, the application process varies by ownership category. Foreign residents in Saudi Arabia may apply directly through the portal using their residence permit, with legal requirements verified automatically and the process completed electronically.”

Domestics

• “Qatar’s Trade Balance Posts 14.1 bn Surplus in December 2025.” NPC, January 29, 2026.

  “In December 2025, the total value of merchandise exports amounted to around QR 26.9 bn, reflecting a 13.7% decline compared with December 2024, yet showing a 9.9% increase from November 2025. Meanwhile, merchandise imports rose to about QR 12.8 bn in December 2025, marking a year-on-year rise of 0.6% and a month-on-month increase of 6.7%.”

  Go Deeper: “Qatar’s economy records a 2.9% growth in Q3 2025 as non-hydrocarbon activities expand by 4.4%.” NPC, January 28, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia, Olympic Council Delay 2029 Asian Winter Games.” Bloomberg, January 24, 2026.

  “Trojena — estimated by business intelligence platform MEED to be a $19 billion undertaking — was designed to feature ski slopes atop luxury hotel roofs in a remote area in the northwest with little natural snowfall. It was initially envisioned to be completed by 2026.”

  “Difficulties creating sufficient artificial snow and constructing at high altitudes with complex topography were among factors that raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s ability to meet required deadlines ahead of the games, people familiar said at the time.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudis Scale Back Ambition for $1.5 Trillion Desert Project Neom.” Bloomberg, April 5, 2024.

• “Saudi Arabia Looks to Tap Wealthy Families in New Quest for Cash.” Bloomberg, January 27, 2026.

  “There are big portfolios. The wealth is sizable,” said Ayth Al Mubarak, chief executive officer of the National Center for Family Businesses in Riyadh. These entities have long dominated the Saudi economy, and close to 95% of private businesses in the kingdom are family-owned, he added.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia asks wealthy families to invest domestically as mega-projects stall: Report.” Middle East Eye, January 27, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

Following the announcement of a week celebrating Emirati–Kuwaiti relations under the slogan “UAE and Kuwait… Brothers Forever,” Gulf commentators assessed the initiative and its broader context, including its temporal overlap with Saudi–Emirati tensions. Emirati commentary largely framed the event as a natural expression of appreciation for long-standing ties with Kuwait, independent of any bilateral disagreements elsewhere in the Gulf. Noora Al Tenaiji argued that the UAE–Kuwait relationship is anchored in deep “pre-state social and commercial ties” that later evolved into sustained political alignment and strategic coordination within the GCC, positioning both states as stabilizing actors in the region. She further described Kuwait as a “trusted” political partner and a major economic pillar for the UAE, citing strong trade, mutual investment, and social integration that together underpin durable interdependence and long-term regional stability. At a broader level, Sultan Mohamed Al Nuaimi highlighted the depth of relations at the ruling-family level, noting historical ties between Kuwait’s Al Sabah family and the UAE ruling families of Al Nahyan, Al Maktoum, and Al Qasimi, a relationship he summarized as “a celebration of a shared root and a shared future, and an affirmation that the UAE and Kuwait will remain, a global model of unbreakable fraternity.”

In Kuwait, reactions were more mixed, with the discussion intersecting indirectly with sensitivities surrounding Saudi–Emirati relations. At the media level, Al Jarida published an op-ed by Emirati writer Issa Abdullah Al Zarouni, who recalled that during the formation of the UAE, Kuwait emerged as an early political and diplomatic supporter under the leadership of then Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, driven by a belief in the necessity of a stable federal state in the Gulf. He emphasized that this backing was not merely “symbolic,” pointing to Kuwait opening its embassy in Abu Dhabi in 1972—only months after the UAE was declared. While many Kuwaitis welcomed and praised the initiative, some criticism also surfaced. Kuwaiti commentator Dahem Al Qahtani underscored that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia share a deeply rooted strategic partnership shaped by more than a century of political, military, and security cooperation, arguing, however, that claims suggesting Kuwaiti appreciation of Emirati–Kuwaiti relations runs counter to Saudi Arabia are “unfounded.” By contrast, Mansour Ahmed Al Muhareb cautioned against symbolism he viewed as intrusive, stating that “the Kuwaiti does not need celebration but respect for sovereignty and specificity, and does not need slogans such as ‘the Emirati is Kuwaiti,’ but rather an Emirati who does not interfere in Kuwaiti affairs or inflame tensions around its constitutional and democratic gains.” From the Saudi perspective, some commentators interpreted the episode through a more skeptical lens, with Saud Al Muqhim arguing that “Kuwait name was dragged into a dispute that does not concern it when Gargash said ‘Kuwaitis refrain’ implying that they stood within a particular political camp,” describing this as a “cheap instrumentalization” of a sovereign state and an attempt to manufacture alignments and sow divisions within the Gulf.

More Gulf Opinions

• “Repression and economic collapse in Venezuela constitute crimes for which the regime should be held accountable by its own people, who have that right, or through international legal mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court or United Nations sanctions. By contrast, the act of a great power—long vocal about its ambitions toward Venezuela resources—abducting its president and his wife would amount to a form of piracy, turning the world into a jungle ruled by the strongest.”

Ahmed Al Saraf, Al Qabas, (Kuwait), January 26, 2026.

• “The Qatar Investment Authority is also investing in Elon Musk xAI project, alongside investment partners including Fidelity and Nvidia, as part of a funding round valued at 20 billion dollars. These investments include data centers and artificial intelligence applications under the ‘Grok’ brand.Despite ongoing discussion about inflated valuations in artificial intelligence technology companies, the broader trajectory points to an industrial revolution driven by vast and expanding capabilities. Some commercial users of artificial intelligence may ultimately achieve greater gains than the solution providers themselves.”

Fahad Abdulrahman Badar, Al Sharq, (Qatar), January 26, 2026.

• “The Peace Council promoted by Trump regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip is an unobjective process lacking credibility, particularly given the US president intent to make it a substitute for the United Nations, which he has repeatedly criticized. Against this backdrop, conditions in the Gulf region are increasingly concerning amid ongoing tensions in Yemen and the dissolution of the Arab Coalition to Support Legitimacy, both at the collective and bilateral levels. Consequently, the Yemeni crisis has become intertwined with regional tensions due to the strategic maritime corridors of Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea, and any outbreak of war between Washington and Tehran would inevitably draw the Gulf into a cycle of destruction and the closure of critical straits.”

Awadh bin Saeed Baquwair, Oman Daily, (Oman), January 27, 2026.

• “The six Gulf capitals recognize that they are not in a position to support or change the regime, as the event exceeds their capacity, yet its repercussions pose serious risks to them. Should war erupt, the scenarios range from collapse and internal overthrow to the regime endurance and re-emergence with greater strength, with dangers far exceeding those of the Iraq invasion and the swift toppling of Saddam regime. If the pillars of the Tehran system collapse, a vacuum would threaten all, and if it endures, it would return more powerful.”

Abdulrahman Al Rashed, Asharq Al-Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), January 28, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Henderson, Christian, “Monarchies of Extraction: The Gulf States in the Global Food System.” Cambridge University Press, March 2026. [Forthcoming].

• Research: “The Role of Urban Transformation in Saudi Arabia’s Nation-building: The Case of al-Balad, Jeddah.” Rufei Li, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies [Doha], June 2025. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Structural Reforms in Saudi Arabia Since 2016.” David Koll, Andrea Medici, Marina Mendes Tavares, Masashi Saito, IMF, January 23, 2026. [PDF].

• Analysis: “A Tentative Trust: What the Barzan-EDGE Deal Reveals About Gulf Reconciliation.” David Roberts, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Sotheby’s returns to Saudi Arabia with art-only auction.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, Al-monitor, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia’s Pullback Spreads, From Neom to World Cup Stadiums.” Bloomberg, Christine Burke and Mirette Magdy, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia to scale back Neom megaproject.” Andrew England and Chris Campbell, Financial Times, January 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi defense chief visits White House as Riyadh pushes against Iran strike.” Jared Szuba and Rosaleen Carroll, Al-monitor, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “The China-Gulf Green Rush: Fueling Renewable Energy Cooperation.” Chuchu Zhang, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, January 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “How the UAE Became Serbia’s Most Important Arab Partner.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “Egypt: Partnering with Saudi Arabia on Security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.” Gregory Aftandilian, Arab Center [D.C], January 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Trump’s National Security Strategy doesn’t downgrade the Middle East, it redefines it.” Kristian Alexander, Atlantic Council, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia downsizes megaprojects, chases cash amid AI push.” Samuel Wendel and Jack Dutton, Al-monitor, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Rebuilding Confidence at Home: How Kuwait Can Strengthen Its Domestic Investment Climate.” Dalal Marafie, Gulf International Forum, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “The GCC’s Evolving Trade Networks: Navigating Fragmentation and Diversification.” Frédéric Schneider, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf States on the Frontline of U.S.-Iran Volatility.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 23, 2026.

• Podcast: “What’s Next for Gulf Economies?” with Karen Young, MEnbar Podcast, January 28, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “UK sends fighter jets to Qatar as fears rise over Iran conflict.” The National, January 23, 2026.

  “There is also a fear that Iran could repeat its strike on Al Udeid, after Tehran launched a rocket attack in June last year after US strikes on nuclear sites. The airbase houses US Central Command, making it a potential target for Iranian action.”

• “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar, UAE join Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’.” Reuters, January 21, 2026.

  “DUBAI, Jan 21 (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Qatar have accepted invitations to join U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace”, the Saudi foreign ministry said in a joint statement that also included the United Arab Emirates.”

  Go Deeper: “The Trump Administration and the Fracturing Saudi-UAE Alliance.” Arab Center, January 21, 2026.

• “UAE utility withdraws from Yemen and transfers solar power plants to the government.” The New Arab, January 23, 2026.

  “GSU informed the Public Electricity Corporation of the evacuation of all operations and maintenance teams from the Aden solar power plant, which has capacity of 120 megawatts (MW), and the 53 MW Shabwa solar power plant in a letter dated January 22, its statement said.”

Market & Economy

• “Feb 9: PIF–Private Sector Forum to convene as market awaits fund’s new strategy.” Maal, January 11, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund will hold the fourth edition of the PIF–Private Sector Forum in partnership with the private sector on Feb. 9–10, 2026, in Riyadh, as anticipation builds around the fund’s upcoming strategy.”

  Go Deeper: “Private Sector Forum 2026.” PIF, January 2026.

• “PIF-backed Humain secures up to $1.2bn to expand AI infrastructure.” Arab News, January 22, 2026.

  “The non-binding agreement, announced on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos, sets out financing terms to develop as much as 250 megawatts of AI data center capacity to serve Humain’s local, regional and global customers, according to a statement.”

• “Saudi Arabia attracts 122 million tourists, pumping SR300 billion into national economy in 2025.” Gulf News, January 21, 2026.

  “Under Vision 2030, the kingdom aims to lift tourism’s contribution to GDP to 10 per cent, diversify income streams and cement its status as a competitive global destination through sustained private-sector partnerships and a focus on sustainable growth.”

  Go Deeper: “Inbound and Domestic Tourism Indicators Q3 YTD 2025.” Tourism Ministry, December 23, 2025.

• “QIA and Goldman Sachs plan to expand partnership with $25bn investment target.” Arab News, January 21, 2026.

  “Under the memorandum of understanding, QIA will commit to be an anchor investor in several of the US bank’s flagship and innovative strategies, they said in a joint statement. Goldman Sachs will also look to “meaningfully” increase its headcount in Doha, though it did not provide figures.”

  Go Deeper: “Artificial Intelligence in Qatar: Assessing the Potential Economic Impacts Tongfang Yuan.” IMF, March 2025. [PDF].

• “Commercial Bank’s Net Profit Drops by 27.3 Percent in 2025.” QNA, January 18, 2026.

  “The Commercial Bank, a Qatari public shareholding company, reported a net profit decline of 27.3 percent in 2025, reaching QAR 2.204 billion, compared to QAR 3.032 billion in 2024.”

• “Vision 2030 projects may drive corporate loans by Saudi banks to $75bln in 2026.” Global Business and Finance Magazine, January 23, 2026.

  “Retail lending, especially mortgages, is likely to grow amid continued declines in interest rates. Mortgages constitute roughly half of total retail lending, which rose by 5% in the year to November 30, 2025.”

  “Banks’ return on average assets is expected to dip slightly to 2.2% in 2026 due to the contraction and higher cost of risk.”

• “Kuwait looks to the cloud as power grid feels the strain.” AGBI, January 23, 2026.

  “Kuwait has invited bids to construct three power substations that will supply electricity to Google Cloud and Microsoft data storage centres, a move that raises questions about the country’s ability to support energy-intensive cloud infrastructure.”

• “Oman signs power deals with Qatar’s Nebras and Korea Western Power worth $2.6bln.” Zawya, January 22, 2026.

  “The projects include the Misfah Power Plant, with a total capacity of 1,700 megawatts, and the Duqm Power Plant, with a total capacity of 877 megawatts, both under 20-year ⁠agreements, QNA said.”

  “Nebras Energy acquired a ‌49% stake in the Misfah Power Plant and a 30% stake in the Duqm ‌Power Plant, ⁠QNA added.”

• “Dubai allocates $3.5bn to expand Silicon Oasis free zone.” AGBI, January 23, 2026.

  “The Dubai government has allocated AED12.8 billion ($3.5 billion) to expand the free zone, which is managed by the state-run Dubai Integrated Economic Zones Authority.”

  “District IO will account for AED11 billion of the sum and aims to provide infrastructure to support future technologies and strengthen research, development and innovation, the UAE state-run news agency said.”

• “GCC debt capital market to rise to $1.25trln in 2026.” Zawya, January 22, 2026.

  “The forecast growth of the market this year will be roughly 13.6%, from $1.1 trillion seen at the end of 2025, supported by lower oil prices, interest rate cuts and further diversification efforts.”

  “The majority of Fitch-rated sukuk in the GCC, around 84%, are investment-grade, and 90% of issuers have a stable outlook. The GCC outstanding DCM at the end of last year was up by 14% from a year ago.”

  Go Deeper: “GCC: Growth set to strengthen in 2026 as hydrocarbons production picks up.” Emirates NBD, December 18, 2025.

• “Engie doubles down on Gulf renewables as EU and US momentum slows.” AGBI, January 19, 2026.

  “French utility giant Engie has reached financial closing on ⁠a 1.5-gigawatt (GW) solar park in Abu Dhabi as it steps up projects in the Middle East amid a renewables slowdown in ⁠the US and Europe.”

  “The Khazna park is set to begin commercial operations in 2028 and will supply 160,000 homes across the UAE under a 30-year power purchase agreement with Emirates Water and Electricity ⁠Company.”

  Go Deeper: “Assessing the United Arab Emirates’ institutional and investment frameworks to catalyse the renewable energy transition.” Oxford Press, November 27, 2025.

• “UAE attracted $45bln FDI in 2025, up 50%.” Zawya, January 22, 2026.

  “The UAE attracted over $45 billion in foreign direct investment last year, up nearly 50% year-on-year, even as global FDI declined by 11%, said a senior official.”

  Go Deeper: “United Arab Emirates: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for United Arab Emirates.” IMF, December 8, 2025. [PDF].

Domestics

• “Civil service reforms clear council, await Cabinet review.” Kuwait Times, January 20, 2026.

  “The reforms follow a review by the Supreme Judicial Council in late December. The council submitted a report to Justice Minister Nasser Al-Sumait highlighting gaps in the law and recommending updates to reflect advances in digital administration, governance standards and public service management practices.”

• “Oman targets 50,000 jobs in private sector.” Oman Observer, January 21, 2026.

  “It says Oman has about 74,000 job-seekers, and through the Sahim program the Ministry of Labour has already placed most of them in permanent jobs, while the rest are waiting for budgeted salary grades to become available.”

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Gulf Opinions

Saudi-UAE Media Crossfire

A recent Al-Jazirah article by Saudi writer Dr. Ahmed bin Othman Al-Tuwaijri sparked an intense debate on X, generating sharply divided reactions over its unprecedented criticism of Abu Dhabi policies. Al-Tuwaijri argued that tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not reflect hostility toward the Emirati people, but opposition to policies he views as destabilizing to the Arab region, particularly in Yemen and other conflict zones. He contrasted Saudi Arabia historical role in supporting UAE independence and unity with what he described as Abu Dhabi geopolitical adventurism, attributing it to lingering resentments, rivalry over Saudi Arabia religious and strategic standing, and unease over the transformations driven by Vision 2030. Central to his argument was what he called “the false illusion that the shortest path to avenging past grudges and curing envy and a sense of inferiority toward the Kingdom lies in throwing itself into the arms of Zionism and accepting to act as Israel Trojan horse in the Arab world,” portraying Saudi Arabia as patient and principled while casting Abu Dhabi actions as harmful to broader Arab and Islamic interests.

Emirati commentators reacted forcefully, rejecting the article as containing baseless accusations and methodological flaws. Several aligned with Israeli journalist Barak Ravid characterization of the piece as “anti-Semitic,” while Emirati academic Abdulkhaleq Abdullah described it as “media thuggery” that spreads conspiracy narratives and fuels hatred, arguing that such rhetoric has already prompted Western pushback and the removal of inflammatory content. Mohammed Al Hammadi added that although the cited sources formally exist, they do not support the conclusions drawn, accusing the author of exaggeration and selective distortion. Ahmed Khalifa echoed this view, describing the article as “childishness” that relies on fabrications and inflammatory claims.

Saudi responses, by contrast, largely defended the article and rejected the charge of “anti-Semitism,” with most Saudi commentators viewing it as a legitimate critique of Abu Dhabi policies rather than an attack on identities. At the same time, other Saudi academics adopted a more structural and analytical approach. Saudi academic Sultan Al Amer argued that freedom of expression necessarily separates individual opinion from state policy, stressing that in open systems “freedom of expression relieves the government of bearing responsibility for the opinions of its citizens.” Meanwhile, Mohanna Alhubail described the article as a rare moment that “opens the Saudi stage,” arguing that it exposes Abu Dhabi alignment with Tel Aviv against Palestinian resistance—an alignment he called “an absolute evil against the Ummah”—while still reserving doubts about some historical details. Amid apparent editorial hesitation at Al-Jazirah, where the article was removed and reinstated more than once, the debate it triggered continues to expose a widening and more public Saudi–Emirati divergence.

Davos

On another note, Gulf commentators shared their voices on the world leaders’ gathering at the 56th World Economic Forum in Davos (19–23 January 2026), reading the event as a signal of shifting global priorities amid economic and geopolitical uncertainty. From a Saudi perspective, Dr. Abdulaziz Al Jarallah argued that Saudi Arabia participation underscored its expanding role in “global dialogue and economic transformation,” presenting Vision 2030 as a development model. He noted that the Saudi delegation sought to “enhance effective dialogue and joint cooperation” while highlighting “Saudi success stories emerging from Vision 2030,” as the Kingdom advances longer-term ambitions such as Vision 2040 and hosting Expo Riyadh 2030. Building on this theme, Saudi commentator Hamood Abu Talib contrasted Saudi Arabia’s earlier “symbolic presence” at Davos with its current prominence, arguing that this shift followed the launch of Vision 2030 and the “tremendous momentum of achievements” delivered by its programs. He concluded that such transformation is possible when states possess “the necessary resources, vision, and skilled and effective management.”

Other Saudi voices emphasized geopolitics rather than development. Mishary Dhayidi focused on the centrality of “power” at Davos, rejecting Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng warning against a return to the “law of the jungle.” Instead, Dhayidi framed Donald Trump foreign policy as an expression of the enduring “right of power,” citing Greenland as a stark example and arguing that, in Trump view, figures like Emmanuel Macron “do not register in the real balance of power.” Veteran economist Ihsan Ali Buhulaiga offered a different geopolitical reading, contending that China emerged as the principal beneficiary of Davos 2026. Beijing, he argued, presented itself as a “calm and reliable leader” amid controversy surrounding Trump foreign policy, deliberately distancing itself from “unilateralism and protectionism.” By emphasizing “multilateralism and free trade,” “rules-based engagement,” and the importance of “globalization,” China repositioned itself as a stabilizing force. From a Kuwaiti perspective, Abdulla Hassan Thakur interpreted Davos 2026 as marking a shift toward an “economy of uncertainty,” where geopolitical friction, technological disruption, and institutional trust now shape economic decision-making. As global capital is repriced toward stability, he argued, investors increasingly favor jurisdictions with “strong institutions,” policy continuity, and predictability. In this environment, Kuwait stands out, with its “fiscal strength, institutional credibility, and balanced global integration” positioning it as a “reference point for stability” at a time when such qualities are becoming increasingly scarce.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Mohammed Al-Fazari “Qaboosism in Historical Perspective: British Policy, Rule Legitimacy and Resistance in Oman.” Palgrave Macmillan, February 2026.

• Analysis: “When Gulf Allies Fall Out.” Olivia Cuthbert, Middle East Uncovered, January 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia’s Rental markets between Q3-Q4 2025.” Meshal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, January 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “In a fragmented world, strategic autonomy is the UAE’s North Star.” Ebtesam AlKetbi, Emirates Policy Center, January 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Trump Administration and the Fracturing Saudi-UAE Alliance.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Center, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf States on the Frontline of U.S.-Iran Volatility.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “A New Agreement on Economic Security: What Does It Mean for the UAE and Qatar to Join the Pax Silica Alliance?” Emirates Policy Center, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “A year into his return, Donald Trump has changed the Middle East – but he is only getting started.” Paul Salem, Middle East Institute, January 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “China-Middle East Connectivity: Iraq, Egypt, and Oman.” Nicholas Lyall, New Lines Institute, January 22, 2026. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Why US markets are betting on Saudi Arabia.” Khalid Azim, Atlantic Council, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia, Strategic Clarity, and the Architecture of Middle East Stability.” Ahmed Charai, The National Interest, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “How the UAE Became Serbia’s Most Important Arab Partner.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Is Saudi Arabia Abandoning Peace?” Hussain Abdul-Hussain, The National Interest, January 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Egypt’s Tightrope Walk Between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.” Haisam Hassanein, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 23, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Do We Understand the Yemen Issue?” with Badr Al-Qahtani, Socrates Podcast, January 19, 2026.

• Podcast: “What Happened in Financial Markets During 2025.” with Anas Al-Rajhi and Saeed Abduljabbar, Arbah Podcast, January 19, 2026.

• Podcast: “What does the Saudi-Emirati cold war mean for Israel, Trump and Iran?” with Andreas Krieg, UNAPOLOGETIC, January 23, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Gulf states pushing to avert U.S.-Iran conflict, official says.” CBS, January 15, 2026.

  “The countries involved in the diplomatic push include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Oman, according to the Gulf official. The talks have focused on lowering the temperature in public rhetoric and avoiding military action that these states feared could trigger wider regional instability.”

  Go Deeper: “Middle East governments believe US-Iran tension has ‘de-escalated’.” Financial Times, January 15, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia tells Iran its land, airspace won’t be used in strike: Sources.” Alarabiya, January 14, ,2026.

  “The message was conveyed as the United States warned it could respond to an Iranian government crackdown on protests, while Tehran has said it would strike US military and shipping assets in the event of a new attack.”

  Go Deeper: “Iran’s Gulf Rivals Warn U.S. Against Strike on Tehran.” WSJ, January 13, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia pledges $500 million Yemen development after UAE withdrawal.” Reuters, January 15, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia has announced a slew of development projects across southern Yemen worth about $500 million, many in areas long-held by the United Arab Emirates and allied separatists.”

  Go Deeper: “The Saudi–Emirati Drama in Yemen.” Arab Center [D.C], January 13, 2026.

• “Somalia cancels all agreements with the UAE, including at major ports.” Middle East Eye, January 12, 2026.

  “According to a senior Somali government source and a document seen by Middle East Eye, the move by the Mogadishu government includes all agreements with government agencies, related entities and regional administrations.”

  Go Deeper: “Why Somalia drew a line with the UAE.” Aljazeera, January 14, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia in Talks With Egypt, Somalia on Military Coalition.” Bloomberg, January 16, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia is finalizing an agreement on a new military coalition with Somalia and Egypt, part of its bid to curtail the United Arab Emirates’ regional influence.”

  “Saudi Arabian officials have pushed the Somali government to curb ties with the UAE. Tensions between the two OPEC+ members have risen after the kingdom ordered the UAE to withdraw its troops from Yemen as it seeks to reduce its rival’s sway.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia moving towards military coalition with Somalia and Egypt.” Middle East Eye, January 16, 2026.

• “US halts immigrant visas for 75 nations, including Kuwait.” Kuwait Times, January 14, 2026.

  “The countries include Kuwait, Somalia, Russia, Afghanistan, Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Nigeria, Thailand, Yemen and more, according to Fox News.”

Market & Economy

• “IMF praises Oman but urges faster diversification.” AGBI, January 16, 2026.

  “The IMF’s executive directors joined staff in applauding Oman’s reform agenda, highlighting efforts to deepen the financial sector, bolster the labour market, streamline regulations and advance renewable energy production and digitalisation.”

  Go Deeper: “Oman: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Oman.” IMF, January 15, 2026.

• “Saudi Public Investment Fund plans to spin off mining firm Manara.” Reuters, January 14, 2026.

  “Manara, a joint venture between the Saudi Arabian Mining Company, also known as Maaden, and the $925 billion PIF, was established in 2023 to invest in critical minerals abroad. But, although it has bid for assets across Africa and Asia, it has so far completed only one deal: a $2.5 billion 10% stake in Vale Base Metals, which was spun off from Brazilian iron ore giant Vale in 2024.”

  Go Deeper: “The Saudi Arabian Mining Sector: Ongoing Investments Propel Long-term Growth.” The U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council, 2019.[PDF].

• “UAE’s Masdar reaches global clean energy capacity of 65 GW.” Reuters, January 13, 2026.

  “United Arab Emirates’ state-owned firm Masdar, has reached global capacity of 65 gigawatts of clean energy as it heads towards its goal of 100 GW by 2030.”

  Go Deeper: “Delivering on the UAE Consensus: Tracking progress toward tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling energy efficiency by 2030.” IRENA, 2025. [PDF].

• “Qatar joins US-led Pax Silica Alliance to secure semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains.” Arab News, January 13, 2026.

  “The alliance was launched last month in Washington with the aim of securing global supply chains for semiconductors, artificial intelligence technology, critical minerals and digital infrastructure.”

Domestics

• “Oman hands economic control to crown prince.” SEMAFOR, January 16, 2026.

  “Oman’s Sultan Haitham Al-Said has gained plaudits for transforming the country’s economic outlook since taking power six years ago this month. Now his son and anointed successor Theyazin is set to become an increasingly important figure. A cabinet reshuffle saw him promoted from the prosaic position of culture, sports, and youth minister to become deputy prime minister for economic affairs.”

  Go Deeper: “What Oman’s Constitutional Change Means for Omanis.” Carnegie, January 14, 2021.

• “Abu Dhabi crown prince chairs new sovereign wealth fund.” SEMAFOR, January 13, 2026.

  “Bankers will be familiar with the leadership of the fund, which joins an expanding alphabet soup that includes ADIA, ADQ, and Mubadala — together controlling roughly $2 trillion in assets. L’IMAD will be chaired by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, with Mubadala’s Khaldoon Al Mubarak on the board. CEO Jassem Al Zaabi also serves as vice chairman of the UAE Central Bank.”

  Go Deeper: “Making Sense of the UAE’s Latest Leadership Appointments.” The Washington Institute, May 12, 2023.

• UAE: “Establishing General Secretariat as executive body for ‘National Anti-Money Laundering Committee’.” Emirates News Agency (WAM), January 16, 2026.

  “It will also spearhead the implementation of policies aimed at combating money laundering, terrorism financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as defined related activities.”

• “Eric Trump markets $10B in Saudi real estate projects.” SEMAFOR, January 12, 2026.

  “Dar Global CEO Ziad El Chaar said the Diriyah project will include 500 mansions, priced between $6.7 million and $24 million. The company also launched a $1 billion project in Jeddah on Monday.”

  Go Deeper: “Why Trump’s Middle East trip should set sights beyond business deals.” Atlantic Council, May 9, 2025.

• “Kuwait Cancels Licenses of 516 Companies.” Arab Times, January 11, 2026.

  “Article 1 of the decree states that the commercial licenses of 516 companies listed in the attached appendix have been revoked due to their failure to submit financial statements for three consecutive years, in accordance with Paragraph (7) of Article 266 of the Companies Law.”

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Gulf Opinions

Following unofficial mediation efforts by Gulf states—including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—to avert any military action against Iran amid repeated threats by U.S. President Donald Trump, a clear consensus has emerged among Gulf commentators rejecting external interference in Iranian affairs. Saudi columnist Mishary Dhayidi argues that if a U.S. strike is framed merely as “deterrence” or as a symbolic “message,” rather than a decisive transformation of realities, it would likely consolidate the Iranian regime rather than undermine it. Such a move would rally public opinion around the idea that “the homeland” itself is under attack, a sentiment with deep emotional resonance in a society shaped by historical pride and national consciousness. In this reading, military action would once again exhaust the region, adding to a long record of wars that have drained resources, destroyed opportunities, and repeatedly extinguished hopes for stability.

Similar concerns are echoed by Saudi writer Majid bin Nuwaisir, who warns that the collapse of the Iranian regime would not produce a viable alternative but could fracture the country along ethnic and sectarian lines, turning it into a “Middle Eastern Yugoslavia.” Such a scenario, he argues, would export instability beyond Iran’s borders, destabilizing Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Gulf, while transforming Iran’s military assets into decentralized threats spread across militias, smuggling routes, and maritime choke points. In this context, the Strait of Hormuz would shift from a strategic pressure point into an open arena of chaos, underscoring that war on Iran would endanger regional and global security rather than enhance it. From Kuwait, Dr. Abdullah Al-Shayji offers a more structural reading of U.S. intentions, suggesting that Washington aims to force Iran into concessions far beyond the 2015 nuclear agreement, moving from the permitted 3.67 percent enrichment toward a complete halt—effectively terminating Iran’s nuclear program—while simultaneously responding to pressure from Netanyahu and his far-right government to neutralize Iran’s missile capabilities.

Bahraini commentators extend this critique to the internal Iranian scene. Saad Al Rashid argues that any foreign intervention in Iranian protests would drain them of momentum and ultimately serve the regime, which would reframe popular dissent as “foreign-backed” agitation, thereby reinforcing its legitimacy. Abdulnabi Al Shoala similarly observes that Iran stands at a historic crossroads, facing a choice between undertaking deep reforms that rebuild the social contract on new foundations or persisting with old crisis-management methods that will only intensify tension and instability. From Oman, Murtada bin Hassan bin Ali concludes that even if Washington ultimately steps back from military action—as some of President Trump statements suggest—”this would not end the crisis, but merely entrench ‘a fragile deterrence.’” The Middle East shaped by the Iran question, he argues, will not necessarily be calmer, but fundamentally different, and potentially “more dangerous” during a volatile transitional phase.

Nashra Picks

• Book: McPherson-Smith, Oliver, “Crude Calculations: Regime Stability, Economic Liberalization, and the Energy Transition.” Cambridge University Press, January 8, 2026.

• Analysis: “How Gulf Engagement Could Shape Syria’s Reconstruction.” Nicholas Lyall, Gulf International Forum, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi–Emirati Drama in Yemen.” Nabeel Khoury, Arab Center [D.C], January 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “What Ankara Sees in Riyadh — and Why It Still Needs Abu Dhabi.” Gönül Tol, Middle East Institute, January 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “Should Saudi Policymakers Be Concerned About Rising Unemployment?” Tim Callen, AGSI, January 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “Venezuela, Trump, and Implications for OPEC’s Middle Eastern Core.” Kate Dourian, AGSI, January 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Emerging ‘Hybrid Professional’: GenAI’s Impact on Skill Demand Changes in the UAE.” Ahmed Dawoud & Ahmed Habashy, ORF, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Ship of Tolerance sails into Jeddah.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, Al-monitor, January 15, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Manager-Monarch Who Saved Oman.” Bobby Ghosh, Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “From partners to rivals: What the Saudi-UAE rupture means for Europeans.” Cinzia Bianco, European Council on Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2026.

• Podcast: “An Unscripted Conversation with Nada Baeshen & Ahd Kamel.” Mo Show, January 11, 2026.

• Podcast: “The Expat Experience in Saudi Arabia - Frankie Hilton & Lily Moffatt | One in Tribe - Ep 30” One in Tribe, January 7, 2026.

• Webinar: “Outlook 2026: Prospects and Priorities for U.S.-Gulf Relations in the Year Ahead” AGSI, January 16, 2026.