Book: Nadeen Dakkak “Migration to the Gulf in the Arabic Novel.” Edinburgh University Press, June 2026.

Analysis: “Saudi stocks hit 2026 high, bucking global war-driven volatility.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “What LIV Golf’s woes suggest about Saudi Arabia’s economic headwinds.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “China’s Position and Strategic Considerations on the Gulf States’ Involvement in the Iran-US-Israel Conflict.” Bo Wang, MEPEI, April 15, 2026.

Analysis: “Can Gulf Green Finance Survive an Oil Price Shock?” Christopher Gooding, AGSI, April 10, 2026.

Analysis: “From Shield to Target: The Gulf’s Security Dilemma.” Nour Eid, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Business as Usual in the UAE?” Rebecca Anne Proctor, AGSI, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait’s Bidun in the Face of Climate Change are Invisible, yet Exposed.” Courtney Freer, Carnegie, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Kuwait Is Stripping Its People of Citizenship at an Unprecedented Rate.”Fatimah Muhammed and Sultan Alamer, New Lines Magazine, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Protection or Vulnerability? Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Iran War.” Rohan Advani, Arab Center, April 14, 2026.

Analysis: “How to Avoid Mutually Assured Devastation in the Gulf.” Daniel Brumberg, Arab Center, April 17, 2026.

Analysis: “Beyond the Battlefield: The Disruption of Education in the Gulf.” Ibrahim Alhouti, Gulf International Forum, April 16, 2026.

Analysis: “Post-War Dynamics: The Gulf at the Center of a New World Order.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council, April 12, 2026.

Podcast: “Trade, Diversification, and the Future of the GCC.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, April 8, 2026. [Eng].

Podcast: “I Took Responsibility from the Age of 13!” Maytha Al Mehairi, Arab Cast, April 9, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran in Gulf Media Discourse: From Political Memory to the Current War.” Mohammed Al Yahyaei, Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “Iran’s war and the positioning of the Arab intellectual.” Middle East Council, April 14, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

Podcast: “The Gulf Is Stronger Than Iran Expects.” Obaid Al-Wasmi, Mahfoof, April 16, 2026.

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Public Debates

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Public Debates

The announcement of a ceasefire on April 8, alongside upcoming negotiations reportedly mediated by Pakistan, has reignited a familiar regional debate: does this moment signal the beginning of a durable resolution, or merely another temporary pause that risks reproducing instability—particularly at the expense of Gulf security? At the heart of this debate lies a clear divide between two interpretive camps: one sees it as a necessary turning point driven by structural change within Iran, while the other views it as a tactical pause that may ultimately deepen, rather than resolve, the conflict.

A prominent strand of commentary argues that the ceasefire reflects a deeper transformation within Iran, driven by internal disruption and external pressure. Saudi writer Abdulrahman Al-Rashed frames this moment as historically significant, asserting that “Iran has most likely changed for two main reasons: war and peace.” He links the ceasefire to a restructuring of Iran political leadership, noting that “the leadership of the state has changed due to the assassinations that eliminated a long chain of generals and institutional leaders… at the top of the hierarchy, the Supreme Leader himself.” From this perspective, the scale of recent developments is unprecedented: “in 38 days, Iran faced what it had not faced in 38 years.” This was not a peripheral contest over influence in Syria or Lebanon, but an “existential war” in which the regime fought for survival. Consequently, Tehran now operates under severe constraint, with negotiations representing, in his words, “Tehran last card… little more than a fig leaf” masking a strategic retreat.

Complementing this structural argument is a more normative and forward-looking perspective. Kuwaiti commentator Hamad Alhamad emphasizes the necessity of the ceasefire itself, regardless of its fragility. “There is a fragile ceasefire, but it is far better than the continuation of war and destruction,” he writes, highlighting the global spillover effects of prolonged conflict. For Alhamad, the key question is not whether the truce is perfect, but whether it creates an opportunity for meaningful transformation.

Yet, optimism is not unconditional. Kuwait’s Ahmed Al Dawas introduces a geopolitical layer, questioning why external powers such as Russia and China have not meaningfully intervened on Iran’s behalf. His conclusion is blunt: both powers act strictly according to self-interest. China benefits from a distracted United States, while Russia gains from the depletion of American military resources. As he explains, “every missile… directed toward Iran is one that will not reach the battlefronts in Ukraine.” This reinforces a broader point: Iran’s strategic isolation may push it toward negotiation, but it does not guarantee a stable outcome. Indeed, Al Dawas ultimately expresses skepticism, warning that “I do not believe a ceasefire agreement with Iran will succeed—something is likely to happen.”

Moreover, a more cautious—if not pessimistic—reading of the truce suggests that ceasefires in such conflicts often function as mechanisms for recalibration rather than genuine resolution. Abdullah Khalifah, from the United Arab Emirates, articulates this argument with conceptual clarity, describing the ceasefire as “the most dangerous moment in the conflict.” His reasoning rests on the strategic value of time: “time here is a resource of power, used to rebuild capability under the cover of de-escalation.” In this sense, the truce does not freeze the conflict—it redistributes its dynamics, allowing actors to reposition and regenerate. Without strict enforcement mechanisms, he warns, the ceasefire risks becoming “a space for reproducing the threat.”

A similar conclusion emerges from Omani analyst Ahmed Alameri, though through a different lens. He interprets the truce not as Iranian weakness, but as a reflection of Western constraint. Despite the intensity of US rhetoric, “the relative decline in the pace of escalation… reflects an awareness of the cost of sliding into an open confrontation.” The result, he argues, is not a strategic breakthrough but “a tactical pause” that grants Iran time to “reorganize its political and military positions.” This reading is reinforced by Nasser Al-Zadjali, who goes further by suggesting that the truce itself signals a recovery in Iranian “deterrence.” In his view, the mere ability to impose or secure a pause indicates that Iran has regained a degree of strategic balance.

More critical still is the argument advanced by Saudi commentator Mishari Althaydy, who shifts attention to the substance—or lack thereof—behind the agreement. He raises a series of unresolved questions: “what mechanisms will compel Iran to comply…? And what monitoring and measurement standards will be used?” Without clear answers, the agreement risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. Moreover, he highlights a structural asymmetry: while Iran has absorbed significant losses, “it is impossible for Iran to declare any form of defeat.” This entrenched culture of denial, he argues, has been replicated across its regional network, making genuine concession unlikely. In this context, even the negotiation agenda itself is shifting, with “the Strait of Hormuz” emerging as a new central bargaining arena.

Finally, Saudi Arabia’s Shaher Alnahari captures the ambiguity that defines the current moment. The ceasefire, he writes, “may mark the beginning of a long de-escalation process,” but it may equally be “nothing more than a brief pause on the path to a longer and more dangerous conflict.” The outcome, in other words, remains fundamentally uncertain.

Taken together, the debate reveals a central tension: whether the truce represents structural change or strategic delay. What unites both camps, however, is a shared recognition that the ceasefire is not an endpoint, but a moment of redefinition—one that will either close the current cycle of escalation or lay the groundwork for its next phase.

Selected Gulf Opinions

“China has adopted a position characterized by neutrality and pragmatism regarding the US–Israeli war on Iran, seeking to balance the determinants and guiding principles of its foreign policy and its relations with strategic partners, while hedging against the potential repercussions of this war on its strategic interests. This includes preserving Beijing’s interests in the Middle East—particularly those related to energy and regional stability—alongside managing its relationship with the United States in a way that limits the prospects of escalation between them.”

Fahad Al-Mudahki, Al Ayam, (Bahrain), April 11, 2026.

“The Arab citizen experiences a vast gap between the dream of a ‘United Arab States’ and a reality that offers nothing but wars and closed borders. As Arab summits continue in their largely ‘protocol-driven’ form, yielding little of substance, public distrust in these meetings has grown, prompting a search for a new form of political struggle that reflects popular aspirations beyond institutions that have proven unable to end the severe crises across the Arab world.”

Nayef Sharar, Al Jarida, (Kuwait), April 10, 2026.

“One of Trump’s campaign promises was to dismantle what he called the ‘OPEC cartel monopoly.’ Today, after the United States has taken control of Venezuelan oil, it should be understood that Iran’s targeting of Gulf oil and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz primarily serve the United States by enabling it to dominate the global energy market. This also suggests the existence of a systematic plan to weaken OPEC cohesion, in which Iran is a participant.”

Meshal Al Khaldi, X, (Saudi Arabia), April 10, 2026.

“What is most regrettable about these events is the disgraceful Arab position. How can Lebanon—while it is a member of the Arab League—be left alone under this bombardment, without a word, without pressure, without action? Arab capitals merely watch the situation unfold, witnessing the fall of innocents and the destruction and devastation, while some states issue only timid condemnations. Where is Arab solidarity? Or is it merely slogans raised in meetings and Arab summits?

Even more troubling is that the so-called free world, which claims to defend human dignity, has chosen silence, turning a blind eye to the blatant violation of the international ceasefire—as if Lebanese blood were worth less than any other.”

Hamad Al-Hadrami, Al Roya, (Oman), April 9, 2025.

“In the most critical moments, such as the repeated wars on Gaza, the Iranian role has appeared largely indirect—limited to support through proxies, without political or military action matching the intensity of its declared rhetoric. This gap between verbal escalation and practical caution reinforces the impression that the Palestinian issue is used in Iranian policy more as a pretext or a pressure tool than as an independent strategic priority.”

Ahmed Alhosani, Al Etihad, (UAE), April 8, 2026.

“The firmness of Rafsanjani, his flexible political mind, his commitment to preserving the state and its institutions, his focus on reconstruction and moving beyond the phase of revolutionary slogans, and his awareness that Iran cannot remain isolated from its regional environment—these are qualities Iran needs in a leader.

There may be figures today who resemble Rafsanjani in some respects, but none possess the full range of his attributes—most importantly, his courage and his ability to persuade, and to tell the third Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, what must be said: to stop the bloodshed, end the attacks on neighboring Gulf states, and prevent the region from descending into a chaos that would harm everyone, with Iran among the first to suffer its consequences.”

Hassan Al Mustafa, Asharq Al Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), April 7, 2026.

“For decades, the prevailing model in the Middle East was based on direct deterrence, displays of power, and reliance on military superiority as a decisive tool. However, this model has begun to lose its effectiveness in an environment that has become more complex and interconnected. Wars are no longer decided solely on the battlefield; their effects now extend to the economy, supply chains, energy markets, and even the media sphere, where narratives are shaped and perceptions are redefined.

In this context, the nature of conflict has shifted from direct military confrontation to a multi-dimensional network. Influence over energy markets can carry as much weight as military strikes, managing political alliances may rival battlefield superiority in importance, and the ability to shape public opinion has become an integral part of the equation of power.”

Abdullah Aletaibi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), April 7, 2026.

“The dual veto (Russian–Chinese) yesterday revealed two points. First, that Russia and China’s interests in Iran are deeper and more important than their interests in the GCC. Second, that Iran enjoys international political cover that will positively influence its role in the future.”

Abdullah Alnefisi, X, (Kuwait), April 7, 2026.

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Nashra Picks

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Five weeks of war have reshaped how Gulf publics think, debate, and disagree. The conversation is richer than most outside coverage suggests. This week's digest brings together the sharpest Gulf commentary on the conflict, curated reading and listening for those who want to go deeper, and the perspectives that aren't making it into the international press.

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Public Debates

The question of who is “winning” the current confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel has evolved into a broader intellectual divide across Gulf commentary—reflecting not only battlefield interpretations, but deeper disagreements over power, narrative, and long-term consequences. While some argue that Washington has achieved strategic gains, others insist that Iran has imposed new constraints on the region. Between these views, a third position emerges: the outcome remains unclear, but the Gulf is bearing the heaviest cost.

A balanced reading begins with Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani from Qatar, who frames the situation in terms of risk rather than victory. He warns that escalation may persist because “there are parties that want this war to continue… knowing its consequences will not directly affect them,” pointing to Israel, whose ports “remain open to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.” By contrast, the Gulf faces systemic exposure: “the continued choking of the Strait of Hormuz could lead to serious economic repercussions… not only for the region, but for the global economy.” His key question—“who benefits from this collapse?”—captures the ambiguity, especially as he suggests that “the United States is not the real beneficiary.”

This uncertainty is reinforced by Bahraini writer Jaffar Salman, who focuses on messaging rather than outcomes. He argues that Donald Trump delivers multiple narratives simultaneously: “to Europe, readiness to stop the war… to the Gulf, Iran, and Israel, continued escalation… to the American public, victory.” In this view, rhetoric itself becomes a strategic tool.

One major camp argues that Iran holds the upper hand—not through decisive military superiority, but through its ability to impose costs. Kuwaiti thinker Abdullah Alnefisi states that “Trump is looking for an exit… he fell into an Israeli trap.” Qatari analyst Mohammed Alahmari similarly argues that Washington has effectively “ceded” leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as “the real nuclear bomb of Iran.”

This view is reinforced by battlefield persistence. Saudi writer Khaled Almalik notes that despite repeated U.S. claims of victory, “Iran continues to attack Israel, American forces, and Gulf states,” raising doubts about whether its capabilities have truly been neutralized. Even if U.S. claims were accurate, he warns of a strategic vacuum that could enable Israeli expansion under full Western backing.

Economically, Iran’s leverage appears clearer. Saudi economist Hebshi Alshimary notes that roughly “20 million barrels of oil per day” pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making disruptions globally consequential. The crisis has exposed fragility: some Gulf producers cut output due to storage limits, while shipping costs surged sharply. Iran, in effect, has weaponized geography into economic pressure.

Omani perspectives extend this argument further. Abbas Alzadjali argues that Iran’s asymmetric responses have disrupted energy markets and imposed insecurity across the Gulf, raising questions about whether the war reflects strategic necessity or “overconfidence in military power.” Meanwhile, Asim Al-Shidi contends that the U.S.-led security model has lost “legitimacy,” now seen as aligned with Israeli dominance rather than regional balance.

Yet another camp insists that the United States has achieved meaningful gains. Kuwaiti writer Saad bin Tiflah Alajmi argues that U.S.-Israeli actions disrupted Iran’s plans, “confusing the timing” of a premeditated attack on Israel, noting that “85 percent of Iranian drones and missiles” were instead directed toward the Gulf and Jordan.

Emirati analyst Salah Al-Ghul emphasizes Iran’s growing isolation, arguing that continued attacks have deepened its marginalization and that any settlement must include “clear guarantees to prevent repeated aggression” across missiles, maritime pressure, and proxy networks.

From Kuwait, Muhammad Nasser Al-Atwan argues that Iranian targeting patterns reveal weakness: rather than striking fortified U.S. bases, Iran focuses on civilian infrastructure, suggesting a strategy of “economic coercion and psychological warfare” against Gulf societies.

Finally, U.S. advantage also appears in narrative control. Omani writer Mubarak Al-Hamdani notes that a single U.S. statement can move global markets within minutes, highlighting a broader “struggle over strategic narratives” and who controls them.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that framing the conflict as a simple U.S. or Iranian victory misses the larger picture. Iran has imposed asymmetric costs, particularly through energy disruption, while the United States retains structural advantages in military, financial, and narrative domains. The most consistent conclusion across Gulf commentary is not who has won, but who is absorbing the consequences: a region caught between escalation, uncertainty, and a shifting balance of power.

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Week four of the Iran war was defined by a flurry of diplomatic activity that produced no diplomacy. Washington circulated a 15-point peace proposal to Tehran via Pakistan. Iran rejected it, called it "maximalist and unreasonable," and countered with five conditions of its own, one of which is sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Trump responded by granting Iran yet another extension on his Hormuz deadline. Egypt, Pakistan, and Oman all signalled readiness to mediate. Through it all, Iran's foreign minister was unambiguous: "our policy is the continuation of resistance." The Gulf watched a negotiation take shape around it, without it, and with no clear path to an outcome.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Iran regime turns sights on UAE as war widens beyond conventional front.” Al-Monitor, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Ukraine’s Zelenskyy capitalizes on Iran war to ink security deal with Saudi Arabia.” Al-Monitor, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE Are Urging Trump to Continue a War They Did Not Want.” Hussein Ibish, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Not All Oil Is Created Equal.” Tim Callen, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Economic Impact of the Iran Conflict on the Gulf.” Tim Callen, AGSI, March 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “Ukraine’s Counterdrone Assistance to the Gulf States.” Jean-Loup Samaan, AGSI, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why the Gulf Arab States Matter So Much – But Decide So Little.” Weilin Deng, AGSI, March 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf.” Frank Rose, AGSI, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “The relative resilience of GCC countries to the Iran crisis.” Karen Young, Middle East Institute, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf State investment in a time of war.” Sultan Alamer, Ekō News, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran War and the End of the US-Gulf “Oil for Security” Deal.” Jim Krane, Arab Center, March 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Drone superpower Ukraine is an ideal tech partner for the Gulf states.” Anatoly Motkin, Atlantic Council, March 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf Cannot Afford to Be Dragged Into War.” Robert Geist, Gulf International Forum, March 25, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Have Drones Changed the Nature of War?” with Khaled Al-Wuqayan, Bedoon Waraq +, March 22, 2026.

• Podcast: “Hormuz Will Not Return to What It Was.” Saleh Al-Mutairi, Mahfoof, March 27, 2026.

• Podcast: “Habib Bank AG Zurich UAE CEO Jamal Alvi on resilience, banking and what comes next.” Gulf Business, Mar 26, 2026.

• Podcast: “The War in the Gulf Between Escalation and Diplomacy.” ME Council, Abdullah Al-Otaibi, March 24, 2026.

This Eid, the Gulf is at war. This digest covers the first twenty two days: what happened, what it cost, and what it means. For readers joining us for the first time: welcome. For those who have been with us since Day 1: thank you.

Eid Under Fire

Eid al-Fitr arrives this year against a backdrop that would have been unthinkable twelve months ago.

Kuwait has banned public celebrations. Bahrain has intercepted 139 missiles and 238 drones in three weeks. Across the UAE, air defense systems stand on permanent alert. In Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, the oilfields that power the global economy have been absorbing drone swarms in the dark. In Oman, two expatriates were killed when drones came down in Sohar. Qatar’s Ras Laffan, the largest LNG complex in the world, has been struck. The facility that supplies 17% of global LNG output is damaged.

This is not the Eid the Gulf planned for.

Yet, the Gulf is still holding. Markets have partially recovered from their worst levels. Air defenses have performed. Governments have maintained order. The region’s states have, with discipline and at great cost, refused to be drawn into a war not of their making.

That refusal is the story of the first twenty two days, even though it’s quiet, deliberate, and expensive.

Three Weeks in Numbers

• Energy

  • Oil price rise since Feb 28: +47%

  • Brent crude peak (Mar 19): $113.71/barrel

  • War risk insurance on tankers: +1,100%

• Strait of Hormuz

  • Weekly vessel transits: 17 (down from 839 pre-war)

  • Traffic collapse: –98%

  • Maritime incidents recorded: 21

• Attacks on Gulf States

  • Missiles & drones fired: +3,917

  • Killed: 17

  • Injured: 290

• Markets & Economy

  • GCC market cap lost at peak: $380B

  • Bank deposit flight risk (S&P): $307B

  • Tadawul worst drawdown: –14.2%

Three Turning Points

Three moments defined the first three weeks.

1. The Hormuz Blockade (Day 1): Within the first 72 hours, commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz effectively collapsed. What followed was not a temporary disruption but a reconfiguration of global energy logistics. The world’s most critical chokepoint, through which roughly 20% of global oil and 25% of LNG normally moves, went from 138 daily transits to near-zero in days. Every subsequent development of the past three weeks has unfolded in the shadow of that single fact. Twenty million barrels a day backed up. Five million finding their way out through pipelines. The rest waiting.

2. The Strike on Oman (Day 12): On March 11, strikes hit oil storage facilities in Salalah, Oman’s largest port. The significance was not just strategic. It was symbolic. Oman had maintained open channels with Tehran throughout. Sultan Haitham had personally congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader days earlier. The attack shattered the assumption that neutrality provides protection. Gulf commentators were divided: Iran asserting dominance, or a third party eliminating the region’s last diplomatic bridge? The debate remains open. What is clear is that the attack changed the calculus. No Gulf state is insulated by good intentions.

3. South Pars and Ras Laffan (Day 19): On March 18, Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gasfield. Iran retaliated by hitting Qatar’s LNG mega-complex and the single most important natural gas facility on the planet: Ras Laffan. The damage cut 17% of global LNG output. The potential annual cost: $20 billion. The hit to Qatar’s GDP: an estimated 9%. This was no longer a war over military positions. It was a war over the architecture of global energy. The escalatory loop that Gulf analysts had warned about for weeks had arrived.

The Economic Toll No One Is Counting

The macro numbers (including oil prices, market indices, maritime incidents) tell one story. The story they don’t tell is the one being lived by the Gulf’s 56 million residents.

Aviation has been in effective shutdown across multiple Gulf airports. Thousands of expatriate workers (who constitute the majority of the Gulf’s population) face uncertainty about employment, mobility, and safety. The construction projects, hospitality expansions, and Vision 2030 programs that defined the region’s transformation have not stopped, but they have slowed. Food prices have risen. Fuel subsidy systems are under pressure. In Kuwait, drone debris damaged six power transmission lines on a single day. In Bahrain, visa fines were waived as a small official gesture acknowledging that normal life has been suspended.

For workers whose remittances home fund families across South Asia and Africa, the war is not an abstraction. It is a paycheck at risk, a flight that doesn’t exist, a future that has been placed on hold by a conflict they did not choose and cannot leave.

What the Gulf Is Actually Saying

The most important coverage gap in this conflict is not data. Rather, it is voice.

Western media has covered this war through the lens of US military strategy, Israeli intelligence operations, and Iranian nuclear calculations. The Gulf has been largely absent from that framing, although it’s the region absorbing the strikes, the economic damage, and the political pressure. The Gulf Nashra exists to correct that.

Across twenty two days of commentary from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain, several threads have emerged with consistency:

• On being dragged in: Gulf commentators have uniformly rejected external pressure from Washington, from Tel Aviv, and implicitly from Tehran to take sides. The dominant voice has been one of strategic autonomy: the Gulf’s interests are the Gulf’s interests, and they do not map cleanly onto any outside power’s agenda. As one Saudi analyst wrote: the Gulf states are “the pillars of the temple” and they must remain standing while others exhaust themselves.

• On Iran’s new leadership: The selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader dominated Gulf commentary in the first week. Emirati voices were largely pessimistic. “more radical, more dangerous, more aggressive.” Saudi analysts focused on whether the new leadership brings pragmatism or continuity, invoking the precedent of Khomeini’s eventual decision to end the Iraq war. Kuwaiti commentators described Iran as evolving into a “religious hereditary republic.” No one was optimistic. The assassination of Ali Larijani only deepened that pessimism. He was regarded across the Gulf as a pragmatic voice and potential negotiating partner. As one analyst put it: Israel killed not just a man, but “the opportunity for negotiation.”

• On American reliability: A recurring and pointed question: where are US intelligence assets when missiles and drones are being launched at Gulf cities? One UAE commentator asked directly “Is it possible that the technology you boast about suddenly goes blind when it comes to our security? Or do those eyes open only for your interests?” The question has not received an answer. Meanwhile, Trump branded NATO allies “cowards” for not supporting military action, and the Pentagon requested an additional $200 billion for the war. The Gulf is watching who its allies actually are.

• On Oman’s role: Oman’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran (even after being struck) has divided Gulf opinion sharply. Critics called it a provocation to Gulf brothers. Defenders argued that quiet diplomacy is not abandonment but a tool for regional stability. Omani commentators were unequivocal: Oman’s policy is guided by its own national interest, not regional alignment.

What to Watch in Week 4

• Ras Laffan and LNG recovery: Qatar’s facility supplies 17% of global LNG. The pace of damage assessment and any restart timeline will determine whether the energy crisis deepens or stabilizes. Europe and Asia are watching closely.

• Iran’s “zero restraint” threat: Tehran has signaled it has deployed only a fraction of its firepower and threatened zero restraint on further energy targeting. Whether that threat is posture or policy will define the next phase.

• UAE posture shift: Senior UAE officials have signaled readiness to support US-led efforts to secure the Strait. If the UAE moves from strategic ambiguity to active involvement, the regional map changes significantly.

• Ground operation signals: Netanyahu’s comment that “there has to be a ground component” is the most significant escalatory signal of the three weeks. A ground operation would transform the conflict entirely, and its implications for Gulf states would be direct and immediate.

• The Abraham Accords: As one Saudi commentator observed: after this war, it is difficult to imagine any Gulf state moving forward with expanding the Accords without a deep reassessment. The normalization architecture of the past five years is under fundamental review.

• Oil at $150. It is no longer a fringe scenario. If Ras Laffan damage is confirmed as severe, if Hormuz remains closed, and if Iran follows through on energy targeting threats, the market does not have a ceiling most analysts are comfortable naming.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Iran expands energy targets beyond Gulf as Red Sea and East Med come into play.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “How long can markets hold their bet on Gulf resilience as war drags on?” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran war tests Gulf dealmaking as foreign investors assess risks.”Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Geoeconomic Stabilisation.” Akram Zaoui, ORF, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “What Does the Strait of Hormuz’s Closure Mean?” Nur Arafeh, Carnegie, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Europe and the Arab Gulf Must Come Together.” Rym Momtaz, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Duqm at the Crossroads: Oman’s Strategic Port and Its Role in Vision 2040.” Giorgio Cafiero and Samuel Ramani, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “What vulnerabilities has the Iran crisis exposed in GCC economies?” Karen E. Young, Middle East Institute, March 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “How hard will war hit the Gulf’s economies?” Financial Times, March 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Qatar’s gas empire comes under fire.” Financial Times, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Caught in the Crossfire: Gulf Security and Strategy in the US–Israel War on Iran.” Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The GCC States and the War on Iran: Rethinking Responses to Unwanted Consequences.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Should the Gulf Arab states join the war against Iran?” Chatham House, March 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Iran war is exacting a heavy toll on Gulf oil and gas exporters – and creating risk and opportunity in North Africa.” Chatham House, March 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran and Gaza conflicts teach Gulf states a hard-power lesson.” Chatham House, March 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf Goes Backward.” Amr Hamzawy, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2026.

• Podcast: “The New Gulf Reality: America’s Role & What Comes Next.” Bernard Haykel, Mo Show, March 18, 2026.

Media Coverage

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia

• “Saudi Arabia Targeted with 50 Drones Within Hours as Iran Launches New Wave of Attacks on Gulf.” The National, March 13, 2026.

• “Saudi Aramco says claims it is in talks with Ukrainian firms for drones inaccurate.” Reuters, March 12, 2026.

• “Five US Air Force Refuelling Planes Damaged in Iranian Missile Attack on Prince Sultan Air Base.” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2026.

• Saudi GDP Grew 4.5% in 2025, Driven by Oil and Non-Oil Sector Gains.” Arab News, March 09, 2026.

🇦🇪 UAE

• “UAE’s Key Oil Hub Suspends Loadings After Drone Attack, Fire.” Bloomberg, March 14, 2026.

• “FAB shareholders approve record Dh8.84b dividend after profit surges 24%.” Khaleej News, March 11, 2026.

🇶🇦 Qatar

• “Qatar Says It’s Evacuating Several Areas Due to Iranian Attacks.” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2026.

• “Qatar says water reserves sufficient for 4 months, food reserves for 18 months.” Khaleej Times, March 14, 2026.

🇰🇼 Kuwait

• “Kuwait National Guard destroys drone warhead remnants from fuel tank in 7-day operation.” Khaleej News, March 14, 2026.

🇧🇭 Bahrain

• “U.S.-Made Launcher Fired Missiles From Bahrain Toward Iran, Video Shows - The New York Times.” The New York Times, March 13, 2026.

• “F1 races in Bahrain, Saudi ‘cancelled or postponed’.” The New Arab, March 14, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

This week, amid escalating regional tensions linked to the ongoing confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, Gulf commentators increasingly turned their attention to a broader strategic question: the need for a dedicated Gulf security framework. Several voices argued for establishing a Gulf security system capable of coordinating defense and crisis management across the region. Across the Gulf commentary space, the debate is converging around a central idea: Gulf security can no longer remain reactive or dependent on external arrangements but must evolve into an institutionalized regional system.

“In every major crisis that shakes the Gulf, the same words return: unity of destiny and the need for coordination,” writes Kuwaiti commentator Abdulaziz Mohammed Al-Anjari, warning that Gulf states still treat threats as temporary shocks rather than as a long-term challenge requiring institutions and strategic preparation. Repeated crises, he argues, reveal a persistent gap: the region may possess a Gulf Cooperation Council framework, but it still lacks a genuine Gulf security system capable of collective action. Without building such a structure before crises erupt, he cautions, Gulf unity will remain little more than “temporary truces between separate policies.”

A similar concern appears in the analysis of Kuwaiti professor of Sharia and Islamic studies Abdul Hamid Al-Shaiji, who frames the issue within a broader international context. Asking “Where does the Gulf stand in this moment of regional fluidity—does it remain an observer or move into a position of initiative?”, Al-Shaiji argues that the GCC can become a collective stabilizing power in the international system rather than a passive bystander. To achieve this, he outlines four strategic paths: strengthening internal cohesion, advancing collective security coordination, diversifying international partnerships without dependency, and actively shaping regional balance rather than merely adapting to its outcomes.

Other commentators focus on the structural foundations required to sustain such a transformation. Oman commentator Ali Al-Kathiri argues that Gulf security cannot rely on shifting alliances built on temporary interests but must instead rest on what he calls “an independent Gulf security doctrine.” This vision would move beyond symbolic coordination toward a unified Gulf military structure with a shared doctrine, joint command, and integrated intelligence and armament systems, ensuring that regional security is built within the Gulf itself rather than outsourced to external powers. From a complementary perspective, Saudi writer Shaher Al Nahari stresses that growing regional “uncertainty” means Gulf states can no longer assume the “political and economic stability” they enjoyed for decades will continue. He therefore calls for a deeper strategic vision centered on stronger defense capabilities, domestic military industries, and modernized armed forces.

Former Qatar Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani framed the current war as a strategic wake-up call for Gulf states. He argues that the conflict underscores the urgent need to establish a real and operational GCC security alliance. Writing on Twitter, he calls for the creation of a Gulf military and security pact “similar to NATO,” with Saudi Arabia playing a leading role, and insists preparations should begin immediately rather than waiting for the war to end. He also urges GCC states to overcome internal differences and prioritize collective Gulf interests in order to build coordinated military and electronic defense industries capable of deterrence and self-protection. Without such a framework, he warns, the Gulf risks remaining a frontline for wars it neither starts nor controls.

More Gulf Opinions

• “It can be said that the similarity between Marxism, late Marxism, some currents of political Islam, and the experience of Wilayat al-Faqih lies not in their intellectual content as much as in the mental mechanism through which ideas are treated, and the political structures that emerge from them. In all three cases, an idea that arose within a specific historical context is treated as a universal truth valid for all times and places. When circumstances change, the idea does not evolve at the same pace, producing tension between theory and reality. Societies that advance are not those that abandon their intellectual or spiritual heritage, but those that place ideas within their historical context. An idea, after all, is a human attempt to understand the world, not a sacred text existing outside time. When thought turns into a closed doctrine, it loses its ability to adapt to reality and becomes a burden on societies rather than a tool for understanding them.”

Mohammed Alrumaihi [Kuwait], Asharq Al Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), March 14, 2026.

• “If the Iranian regime survives the current war, it is unlikely that the region will return to the pre-war status quo. Instead, we may face a regime that emerges harsher, less confident, and more inclined to rebuild its legitimacy through security and power rather than openness. Recent reports suggest that the Revolutionary Guard has tightened its grip over decision-making during the war, while even Israel does not appear certain that the conflict will bring down the regime. At the same time, there are still no clear signs of an organized uprising capable of toppling it from within.”

Ebtisam Al Kitbi, X, (UAE), March 13, 2026.

• “The Arab world today stands before this crossroads with unprecedented clarity. Either the Arab League redefines and activates its role as a genuine instrument for shaping a shared strategic will that protects its members and deters those who attack them, or the regional reality will impose new forms of coordination and cooperation that move beyond the framework created eight decades ago.”

Abdullah Khalifa, Al Etihad, (UAE), March 12, 2026.

• “Most Arab states may have erred in their military planning by leaning almost entirely on the United States as a strategic ally in the event of conflicts or wars in the region, as seen in the war against Iran. Yet it has become clear that the purpose of American bases in the region is primarily to serve the interests of Washington and the Zionist entity; despite the defensive systems at these bases, they were not activated.”

Hameed bin Mohammed Al Busaidi, Oman Daily, (Oman), March 11, 2026.

• “Russia appears to be the biggest economic beneficiary of the crisis [the Iranian war]. It was notable that Washington granted India a thirty-day grace period to continue importing Russian oil, while Moscow no longer needs to offer discounts on its crude. Russia has also emerged as an ideal alternative through export routes passing via the Baltic Sea, the Arctic, and the Black Sea. If the conflict with Iran is considered alongside developments in Venezuela, the situation becomes almost ideal for Russia—at least in the short and medium term. As a twist on Al-Mutanabbi famous verse: ‘The misfortunes of some people become the gains of others.’”

Abdulrahman Altrairi, Okaz, (Saudi Arabia), March 9, 2026.

• “The regional landscape is not without attempts by some actors to exploit existing tensions to achieve political and strategic objectives. Among these actors is the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, which sees the escalating confrontation with Iran as an opportunity to rearrange regional alliances in a way that serves its security and political vision.”

Ibrahim Flamurzi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), March 9, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Cultural life in Saudi Arabia navigates war.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, Al-Monitor, March 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “Shockwaves Across the Gulf.” Angie Omar, Carnegie, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Stress-Test the Vital Hormuz-Malacca Artery Before It Breaks.” Gopi Bhamidipati, Middle East Institute (NUS), March 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Gulf security is critical to global security.” Omran Al-Kuwari, Atlantic Council, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Airlines gradually restore Middle East flights, Gulf still heavily grounded.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, March 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “Building A Heat Resilience Roadmap for the Gulf Region.” Leigh Mante, ORF, March 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “China’s Middle East Ties Go Far Beyond Iran.” Henry Tugendhat, The Washington Institute, March 10, 2026

• Analysis: “Strategic Consequences of the U.S.–Israel War with Iran.” Patrick Theros, Gulf International Forum, March 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “Slow Depletion of Big Reserves Exposes Kuwait to Oil Demand Risks.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Jim Krane, Mira Kadapurath, and Irini Linardos, Baker Institute, March 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Limits of Neutrality for Gulf States in the U.S.–Israel–Iran War.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Energy under attack: What the Gulf can learn from Ukraine and Iraq.” Matthew Keating, Atlantic Council, March 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf in the Line of Fire: The Calculations and Contradictions of Iranian Strategy.” Arab Center (D.C), March 9, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf States Play Defense.” Kristin Smith Diwan, AGSI, March 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “How Russia Benefits from Oil Disruption in the Gulf.” Noam Raydan and Anna Borshchevskaya, The Washington Institute, March 11, 2026.

• Podcast: “How the Iran War Came to the Gulf.” Hosting Dina Esfandiary and Sultan Alamer, The Lede, March 9, 2026.

• Podcast: “Who Has Sovereignty Over U.S. Bases in the Gulf?” Hosting Habib Al-Mulla, Arab Cast, March 13, 2026. [Eng Substitle].

Oil, Strait of Hormuz, and Stock Markets

Oil Price Update

As of the market close on March 6, 2026, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil settled at $90.90 per barrel. This represents a staggering 35.8% increase from the pre-war price of $66.96 on February 27. The weekly surge peaked following the direct drone attempt on the Shaybah oil field and the total closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Source: Investing.com, March 8, 2026.

Strait of Hormuz Status

UKMTO reports a total collapse in transit activity over the last seven days. Since March 1, daily commercial crossings have dropped from a baseline of ~100 to just 2 recorded today. The area is classified as “critically dangerous” following 15 confirmed maritime strikes this week.

Source: UKMTO, March 8, 2026.

Stock Markets Performance

Defense Summary

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Media Coverage

• “Arab League to hold emergency meeting over Iranian attacks.” Al Arabiya, March 07, 2026.

• “Iran to halt strikes on neighbours unless attacks from there: Pezeshkian.” Al Jazeera, March 07, 2026.

• “Pakistan, Saudi Discuss Security Measures as Iran Strikes Region.” Bloomberg, March 07, 2026.

• “UAE ‘not an easy target’, President warns enemies against misjudging strength.” Gulf News, March 07, 2026.

• “US to reinsure maritime losses in Gulf up to about $20 billion.” Reuters, March 07, 2026.

• “Emirates to Resume Flights After Brief Halt on Missile Threats.” Bloomberg, March 07, 2026.

• “Ukraine’s interceptor drone makers look at exports to the Gulf as Iran war flares.” Reuters, March 07, 2026.

• “`UAE and Kuwait Start Oil Output Cuts After Hormuz Blockage.” Bloomberg, March 07, 2026.

• “Exclusive: Saudi has told Iran not to attack it, warns of possible retaliation, sources say.” Reuters, March 07, 2026.

Gulf Opinions

This week, Gulf commentators devoted significant attention to the war involving Iran, with many voices across the region condemning the recent Iranian attacks on Gulf states and warning about the wider regional consequences of the conflict. Bahrain commentator Abdulnabi Alshoala warns that targeting Gulf Cooperation Council states will only widen the confrontation and further destabilize the region, deepening mistrust toward Iran among Gulf societies and threatening what remains of prospects for coexistence. From Kuwait, Abdullah Al Shyji cautions Gulf countries “not to be dragged into a war that is not theirs,” arguing that the US–Israeli war against Iran represents a war of choice that risks pushing the region toward dangerous escalation. While condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf territory and affirming the right of self-defense, he emphasizes that Gulf states should prioritize unity, restraint, and diplomacy in order to avoid a prolonged regional conflict.

Similarly, UAE commentator Salem Alnuaimi argues that the Gulf has been drawn into the conflict not by choice but through Iranian missile and drone strikes targeting its infrastructure, energy routes, airports, and ports, effectively turning the region into a direct battlefield. In his view, the moment represents a serious test of Gulf and broader Arab solidarity, raising questions about whether the Gulf Cooperation Council will remain merely a framework for coordination or evolve into a mechanism capable of collective deterrence and protection of sovereignty. Another UAE voice, Mohammed Khalifa, points to what he sees as a notable aspect of the Emirati position: despite repeated Iranian attacks, particularly against Emirati interests, the UAE continues to maintain neutrality and avoids direct involvement in the war. From Qatar, Ahmed Ali stresses that no country has worked harder than Doha to help reduce Iran international isolation and encourage its integration into the regional environment, yet Tehran has continued to target Gulf capitals, including Doha, and maintain hostile relations with its neighbors.

Several Saudi commentators focused on the military and political trajectory of the conflict. Abdulrahman Al Rashed argues that even after only a short period of fighting, the balance of power has already begun eroding capabilities that Tehran had previously refused to negotiate away. While he does not describe the situation as a decisive victory, he suggests the confrontation has succeeded in containing parts of the Iranian threat, although the regime itself remains cohesive and the question of what comes next in Tehran remains uncertain. Hassan Al Mustafa approaches the issue from another angle, arguing that Iranian official rhetoric toward Gulf states sharply contradicts its actions on the ground. While Iranian leaders speak publicly of cooperation and good neighborly relations, he notes that missiles and drones continue to target Gulf territory. Al Mustafa outlines several possible explanations for this contradiction, including dual messaging between diplomacy and military escalation, the growing influence of the Revolutionary Guard over foreign policy, the marginalization of moderate factions, disruption in command structures following the killing of senior figures, and the use of proxies and covert attacks to maintain pressure while preserving deniability.

From Oman, Ibrahim bin Salim Al Siyabi reflects on the broader international context, arguing that repeated strikes on sovereign states without clear international authorization reveal a deeper shift in the global order. In his view, the erosion of legal norms and the increasing reliance on force, assassinations, and regime-change rhetoric suggest that international relations are moving away from rules toward power politics. In such an environment, he warns that fragmented regions may become vulnerable to external pressure unless they strengthen cooperation and collective resilience. Echoing the uncertainty surrounding the conflict, Omani commentator Khaled Al Ghasani concludes that the world is watching with growing concern, questioning whether the war will remain contained or expand into a political and economic earthquake capable of “reshaping both the region and the wider international system.”

More Gulf Opinions on Iran War

• “Information indicates that wars fought on a religious basis account for no more than 7 percent of all wars throughout history. Most modern conflicts combine politics, nationalism, and economics, and may sometimes employ the religious factor indirectly without openly declaring it. Yet today we face a striking paradox in the third millennium, separated by centuries from the last wars that drew their causes and fuel primarily from religious motivations.”

Hamood Abu Talib, Okaz, (Saudi Arabia), March 8, 2026.

• “From here emerges the need for a gradual transition from the traditional coordination model to a more integrated model based on building an institutional framework capable of achieving greater collective effectiveness without undermining the national sovereignty of member states. This could be achieved by adopting a hybrid federal model that combines certain characteristics of both federal and confederal unions, allowing the development of joint Gulf cooperation while preserving the independence and sovereignty of the states.

Modhi Mubarak Al Buainain, Al Sharq, (Qatar), March 7, 2026.

• “Paradoxically—and somewhat naively—it has become evident how superficial the current American leadership is and how little it understands these matters. The extremist Christian Zionism represented today by influential figures in Washington and Tel Aviv speaks of an ideological war against Muslims, framed as a divine mandate to fulfill alleged Talmudic promises regarding the return of Christ. What Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador to Israel, stated in this regard can in fact be seen as an acknowledgment that a religiously framed war is being pursued to realize the goals of a “Greater Israel” stretching from the Euphrates to the Nile, in preparation for fulfilling the promises of the Torah and the Gospel.”

Mohammed Awadh Al Mashikhi, Al Roya, (Oman), March 7, 2026.

• “Iran faces three possible scenarios. The first is openness: engaging in serious negotiations with the West and building good-neighborly relations with the Gulf states in order to save Iran from collapse. The second is hardline consolidation, in which the Revolutionary Guard and the conservative hardline current impose their control and appoint a radical successor, further increasing the suffering of the Iranian people. The third is chaos, where Iran could slide into a civil war that would affect neighboring countries, trigger waves of refugees, and lead to the fragmentation of the so-called axis of resistance into rival factions.

Ahmed Al Dawas, Al Seyassah, (Kuwait), March 5, 2026.

• “Thank you [Iran] for reminding us that we in the Gulf Cooperation Council are one, that everyone asks about everyone, and that all are convinced our six states are our fortress and our stronghold, and that your regime will never gain our trust no matter how much we extend it. The second thanks is that you awakened your sleeping cells within our Gulf states, exposing yourself to those who once thought you were the sleeping princess. Thank you for revealing a dark layer that spared not even the Gulf states that once supported you and acted as mediators, rushing to your aid in times of hardship—only for you to plant a dagger in their side, bomb them just as you bomb those you openly declared enemies.”

Sawsan Al Sha’er, Al Watan, (Bahrain), March 4, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “From Passive to Active Defense: Gulf Countries’ Options in Responding to Iran’s Aggression.” Emirates Policy Center, March 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Avoiding War with Iran Is the Gulf’s Only Winning Move.” Alanoud Al Thani, Middle East Council, March 7, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran’s Regional Gamble and Its Implications for the Future of Gulf Security.” Khalid Al-Jaber, Middle East Council, March 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran War Tests Qatari Mediation and Diplomacy.” Arab Gulf States Institute, March 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Caught in the Crosshairs, Gulf Arab Countries Remain Crucial to Peace.” Arab Gulf States Institute, March 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Iran Is Pushing Its Neighbors Toward the United States.” Carnegie, March 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “What a Middle East oil and LNG crisis means for China and East Asia.” Atlantic Council, Joseph Webster, Reid I’Anson, and Kevin Li, March 5, 2026.

• Interview: “Q&A: Sheikh Nawaf al-Sabah ’94 Describes Iran’s Attacks on Kuwait.” Princeton, March 6, 2026.

• Podcast: “Between Tehran and Washington: Where Do the Gulf States Stand?” with Bader Al-Saif, Bedoon Waraq podcast, March 5, 2026. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “How the Gulf Countries Are Responding to Iran’s Attacks.” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2026. [Eng].

• Webinar: “Fight or Flight? The Gulf States Weigh their Options.” Middle East Institute, March 4, 2026. [Eng].

• Webinar: “The Repercussions of the War on Iran and Regional Transformations.” with Rashid Al Muhannadi, Haider Saeed, and Shafiq Shqair, Middle East Council, March 5, 2026. [English subtitles].

• Webinar: “After the Shock: Implications of the U.S.–Israeli Strikes and Iran’s Leadership Transition.” Arab Gulf States Institute, March 3, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Gulf countries condemn ‘Iranian’ attacks on UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan.” Middle East Monitor, February 28, 2026.

  “In a statement, the Saudi Foreign Ministry said the kingdom “condemns and denounces in the strongest terms the blatant Iranian aggression and the flagrant violation of the sovereignty” of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan.”

  Go Deeper: “U.S. and Israel Strike Iran, Tehran Retaliates: Live Updates.” WSJ, February 28, 2026.

• “US‑Iran war: More than 260 flights cancelled across UAE, GCC and other countries today and tomorrow.” Alkhaleej News, February 28, 2026.

  “According to data shared by global aviation analytics company Cirium, 3,422 flights were scheduled to arrive, with the majority of them in Saudi Arabia (1,277), the UAE (1,067), Qatar (335), Iran (307), Oman (122), Israel (107), Jordan (105) and Bahrain (102) by 3pm from different countries.”

• “Mediator Oman urges US to pull back from Iran conflict.” Al Arabiya, February 28, 2026.

  “Oman’s foreign minister, who had been mediating US-Iran talks, lamented on Saturday a wave of US and Israeli attacks on the Islamic Republic, and urged Washington to avoid getting “sucked in further” into a war that is not theirs.”

  “‘I am dismayed. Active and serious negotiations have yet again been undermined,” Badr Albusaidi said in a statement on X.”

  Go Deeper: “Analysis-Trump’s Iran strikes mark his biggest foreign policy gamble.” Al-Monitor, Matt Spetalnick, Andrea Shalal and Idrees Ali, February 28, 2026.

Markets, Economies, and Domestics

• “IMF: Kuwait Real GDP Will Expand by 3.8% in 2026.” Asharq Al-awsat, February 28, 2026.

  “Barclays boosted its Brent crude oil futures price forecast to around $100 per barrel on Saturday, up from $80 on Friday, after the United States and Israel bombed several sites in Iran. Oil markets might have to face their worst fears on Monday. As things stand right now, we think Brent could hit $100 (per barrel), as the market grapples with the threat of a ⁠potential supply disruption amid ⁠a spiraling security situation in the Middle East,” the bank said in a report.”

  Go Deeper: “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Kuwait.” International Monetary Fund, February 23, 2026.

• “Fitch Downgrades Bahrain to ‘B’ on Rising Debt and Wider Deficits” Al Alarabiya, February 23, 2026.

  “Late last year, Bahrain announced fiscal reforms including higher fuel prices and tariffs on electricity and water to bolster public finances. The agency maintained the kingdom’s outlook at “stable.” Peer agency S&P also downgraded the kingdom’s sovereign credit rating to “B” in late November last year.”

  Go Deeper: “Fitch Downgrades Bahrain to ‘B’; Outlook Stable.” Fitch, February 23, 2026.

• “Oman’s non-oil exports rise 7.5% as diversification gains traction.” Arab News, February 22, 2026.

  “Oman’s non-oil exports rose 7.5 percent to 6.7 billion Omani rials ($17.4 billion) in 2025, highlighting diversification gains even as lower crude prices dragged overall export earnings lower.”

  “Data from the National Centre for Statistics and Information showed re-export activity grew faster, increasing 20.3 percent year on year to 2.05 billion rials, supported by stronger trade flows through the Sultanate’s ports and logistics hubs.”

  Go Deeper: “Fiscal Performance [Third Quarter 2025]: A Quarterly Bulletin Issued by the Ministry of Finance.” Oman Ministry of Finance, 2025, [PDF].

• “JPMorgan Says UAE Is Too Rich to Be an Emerging Market.” Bloomberg, February 24, 2026.

  “JPMorgan Chase & Co. said it will remove the United Arab Emirates from its emerging-market bond indexes by June after the Middle Eastern nation exceeded the bank’s measures of wealth for three successive years.”

  Go Deeper: “JPMorgan to drop UAE from emerging market bond indexes: What to know.” Al-Monitor, February 25, 2026.

• “Oman special zones investment rises 6.8% to $3.6bn.” Arab News, February 16, 2026.

  “The figure raises the total committed investment under the supervision of the Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones, known as OPAZ, to 22.4 billion rials, the Oman News Agency reported.”

  Go Deeper: “Reforms drive RO 30 billion FDI surge in Oman.” Oman Observer, February 28, 2026.

• “UAE announces petrol and diesel prices for March 2026.” Gulf News, February 28, 2026.

  “Under the new rates, Super 98 petrol will cost Dh2.59 per litre, up from Dh2.45 in February, while Special 95 petrol is priced at Dh2.48 per litre, compared to Dh2.33 last month.”

  Go Deeper: “Will UAE petrol prices drop in March 2026?.” Time Out, February 26, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

The US-Israeli attack on Iran, including the reported targeting of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, dominated social media discussions across the Gulf, particularly after Iran retaliated by striking five Gulf states in response to the US assault. Omani commentator Hatim Al Tai described the confrontation as a strategic miscalculation by Washington, arguing that the United States committed a “grave mistake” and entered a trap whose consequences remain uncertain. He maintained that the escalation is not merely an American campaign against Iran, but a broader project shaped by Israeli priorities. As he stated, “This is not simply an American war against Iran; it is Zionism’s war against the last state that openly opposes the Israeli occupation — a ‘last opportunity’ war for Israel to dominate the region, control its states, advance a colonial and violent agenda, and revive the idea of Greater Israel.” Similarly, Qatari poet and political opponent living in exile Mohamed Ibn Altheeb argued that “Iran is a Muslim country and a neighbor; it has its rights and it has its faults. However, for the United States to bomb it solely for the sake of Netanyahu’s interests, without any consideration for the interests of the Arabs and the Gulf, and from bases located within the Gulf itself, represents the height of recklessness, contempt, and manipulation in international relations.”

From another perspective, Kuwaiti commentator Ayed Al Manna argued that Iran acted recklessly by targeting most Gulf Cooperation Council states without justification, emphasizing that the presence of American bases does not legitimize violating their sovereignty, especially since no hostile action against Iran originated from those territories. He noted that the strikes extended to civilian and purely national sites such as Kuwait International Airport, as well as Kuwaiti military locations with no American presence, and asserted that even targeting American bases on Gulf soil constitutes a breach of the sovereignty of the host states and warrants a firm response. Saudi expert Hesham Alghannam focused on the broader regional security dimension, arguing that “Israel may be capable of achieving military decisiveness in the short term, but without political solutions every victory remains temporary. The United States, far stronger than Israel militarily and technologically, did not secure lasting victories in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan; Israel is not an exception in history — it is vulnerable to attrition and prolonged wars.” Connecting the developments to Yemen, UAE commentator Hani Mas’hour expressed hope that Yemenis would also “rejoice at the death of Abdulmalik al-Houthi,” while linking the confrontation to southern Yemen, which the UAE has supported and which, as he argued, did not fall under Iranian influence. He wrote, “Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa are capitals that fell — except for Aden, which stood firm thanks to the intervention of the sons of Zayed.” Meanwhile, his veteran compatriot Abdulkhaleq Abdullah characterized the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s phone call to UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed — made in response to the Iranian attacks on the Gulf states — as “the most joyful news of the day.”

More Gulf Opinions

• “The most prominent hallmark of the UAE development trajectory is its ranking among the world top ten countries in the Global Soft Power Index, which covered 193 states, with the UAE placing tenth globally.”

  “Soft power is not a fixed destination to be achieved, but a continuous process. The UAE has worked to update its policies, measure the performance of its institutions, develop its human capital, and consistently link achievement with humanitarian values, thereby transforming this form of power into a lasting asset that can be built upon and does not diminish.”

Noora Al-Tunaiji, Al Etihad, (UAE), February 27, 2026.

• “For decades, the Khor Abdullah file has been reopened whenever political calculations tighten in Baghdad, as if historical facts and international decisions could be erased by a hasty ruling or a populist speech. Between one judicial verdict and another, and between political slogans and military imagery, it is the international and historical documents that remain the decisive reference, unchanged by shifting agendas.”

Hussain Al Rawi [Kuwait], Al Roya, (Oman), February 26, 2026.

• “The impact of regional wars on the Sultanate of Oman is marked by a clear duality: potential short-term financial gains resulting from rising oil prices, contrasted with longer-term strategic and economic risks. Accordingly, a prudent reading of the national interest suggests that regional stability remains the option most consistent with the Sultanate priorities for development and security, compared to any temporary gains that may arise from geopolitical crises.”

Sultan bin Salem Al Issai, Al Roya, (Oman), February 24, 2026.

• “Today, the southern [Yemeni] issue returns once again to the arena of political debate, but this time it assumes a regional and international dimension. While this carries political significance, it also entails considerable risk, as external intervention coincides with a period of deep fragmentation and division among southerners. Consequently, any foreign involvement is likely to pursue its own interests without regard for the broader interests of the southern population. Any weakening of national cohesion and division of the South into multiple states, as was the case during the British colonial period, would ultimately serve the interests of those external powers — particularly states seeking to establish a foothold in the southern Arabian Peninsula in order to exert control over the wider region.”

Zaid Al Fadheel, Makkah, (Saudi Arabia), February 23, 2026.

• “At the global level, the decision restores credibility to the rules-based trading system. However, Trump immediate recourse to ‘Section 122’ to impose an alternative 15 percent tariff means that we have shifted from ‘emergency chaos’ to ‘temporary protectionism’ under a timeline not exceeding 150 days, placing global trade in a state of constant anticipation.”

Adnan Yousef, Akhbar Al Khaleej, (Bahrain), February 23, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Mays, Terry M., “The Establishment of the Arab League Security Force, 1961–63: Peacekeeping in Kuwait.” Springer, 2025.

• Analysis: “Asia liquefied petroleum gas prices spike after damage to Saudi facility.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “JPMorgan to drop UAE from emerging market bond indexes: What to know.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Demographics Mean That Job Creation Is Top of the Saudi Economic Policy Agenda.” Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Beyond the Cube: Rethinking Urban Ambition in Riyadh.” Yasser Elsheshtawy, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 24, 2026.

• Analysis: “AI, the Gulf, and the US: A Primer.” Mohammed Soliman, Middle East Institute, February 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “JPMorgan to drop UAE from emerging market bond indexes: What to know.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Demographics Mean That Job Creation Is Top of the Saudi Economic Policy Agenda.” Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?” Annelle Sheline, Quincy, February 26, 2026.[PDF].

• Analysis: “To harness Saudi Arabia’s demographic dividend, Riyadh must invest in human capital.” Khalid Azim, Atlantic Council, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Riyadh takes the helm in Yemen.” Eleonora Ardemagni, Middle East Institute, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Hearing Them Softly: Emirati Discourse Management Works the Rift.” William Roebuck, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Can the Gulf Cooperation Council Transcend Its Divisions?” Hesham Alghannam, Carnegie, February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia Confronts the Israel–UAE Alignment in Somalia.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Center [DC], February 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “The state of great power competition in the Gulf.” Jonathan Fulton, Atlantic Council, February 20, 2026. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Gulf Energy Transition Through Renewable Energy Development.” Salem Alhajraf, Baker Institute, February 26, 2026. [PDF

• Analysis: “Gas and Oil Pipelines in the Middle East Merits and Demerits.” Naji Abi-Aad, Gulf Research Center, February 25, 2026.

• Podcast: “Who is driving the U.S. political landscape?” with Lara Trump, Arab Cast, February 27, 2026.

• Interview: “The Tucker Carlson story.” Al-Liwan, February 20, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “US removing guardrails from proposed Saudi nuclear deal, document says.” Reuters, February 19, 2026.

  “President Donald Trump has told Congress he is pursuing a civil nuclear pact with Saudi Arabia that does not include non-proliferation safeguards the U.S. has long said would ensure the kingdom does not develop nuclear weapons, according to a copy of the document sent to Congress and reviewed by Reuters.”

• “Saudi Crown Prince and US senator Lindsey Graham discuss Iran tensions.” The National, February 20, 2026.

  “Mr Graham also spoke of another regional matter, after several weeks of intense criticism of the UAE through Saudi social media and TV channels. He urged the countries to put aside their differences and focus on the “big prize” of replacing Iran’s regime.”

• “UK Renews Push for Saudi Arabia to Invest in Fighter Jet Program.” Bloomberg, February 19, 2026.

  “Britain’s fresh diplomatic push comes as manufacturers and allies grow frustrated with the Labour administration’s delay in publishing a plan to allocate fresh defense funding. Though GCAP is expected to be handed billions of pounds in the plan, the delay has led to uncertainty around its ability to finance key contracts.”

• “Qatar PM arrives in Venezuela on first trip since Maduro’s ouster: What to know.” Al-Monitor, February 17, 2026.

  “The arrangement with Qatar had drawn criticism from Democrats, and Rep. Gregory Meeks, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday warning that the ‘offshore account could enable corruption.’”

Market & Economy

• “First Europe-Gulf Forum to take place in May.” The National, February 12, 2026.

  “The forum comes on the heels of the launch of the Alliance for Europe-Gulf Geopolitics and Investments Summit in September at the 80th UN General Assembly in New York by US think tank the Atlantic Council and Greek media company the Antenna Group.”

• “Saudi Arabia’s Humain Invests $3 Billion Into Musk’s xAI.” Bloomberg, February 18, 2026.

  “The deal strengthens Musk’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, which has made AI a central plank of its efforts to diversify its economy away from oil. Humain was formed in 2025, with backing from the country’s trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund, Public Investment Fund, and has been on a dealmaking spree to build up the infrastructure and compute capacity required to train and run AI models.”

  Go Deeper: “Elon Musk’s xAI Gets $3 Billion Investment From Saudi-Backed A.I. Firm.” The New York Times, February 18, 2026.

• “UAE economy to grow over 5% in 2026, says minister.” Zawya, February 12, 2026.

  “Al Marri pointed out that the number of companies registered in the national economic register has risen to more than 1.45 million from about 650,000 five years ago, underscoring the UAE’s attractiveness to global investors.”

  Go Deeper: “United Arab Emirates and the IM.” IMF, 2026.

• “Kuwait moves toward ‘Freelance Visa’ system to regulate labor market.” Zawya, February 20, 2026

  “According to preliminary guidelines, the first phase of the proposed system would focus on simple professions. Annual fees are expected to range between KD 750 and KD 1,000, subject to renewal and compliance with regulatory requirements. These include registering a verified residential address, providing an approved email account, submitting clear personal data and meeting additional conditions to be specified by the competent authorities.”

• “Bahrain Bourse Unveils Capital Market Development Plan (2026-2028).” Bahrain Bourse, February 9, 2026.

  “A comprehensive Capital Market Development Plan aimed at elevating the market, and designed to diversify market offerings, deepen liquidity, and streamline market operations.”

  Go Deeper: “Capital Market Development Plan 2026-2028 Elevating the Market.” Bahrain Bourse, 9, February 2026. [PDF].

• “MBS’s $100 Billion Quest Opens Mecca’s Property Market to Global Money.” Bloomberg, February 13, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia is opening Mecca’s doors to foreign investment. The move could unlock billions as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman looks to diversify the nation’s economy, Zainab Fattah reports.”

  Go Deeper: “MBS’s $100 Billion Quest Shored Up by Mecca Boom as Neom Slows.” Bloomberg, February 13, 2026.

• “Bahrain launches National Aviation Strategy 2026–2027 to reach 100 destinations, deliver $1.5 billion GDP boost.” Economy Middle East, February 16, 2026.

  “This specific collaboration is projected to contribute as much as $1.5 billion to the Gross Domestic Product of Bahrain and is expected to generate 1,200 direct employment opportunities within a five-year period.”

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Gulf Opinions

This week, Gulf commentators concentrated on Iran and President Donald Trump warning that the United States could bomb Iran if no agreement is reached between the two sides. Kuwaiti commentator Dana Al Enezy argues that what is often presented as a US–Iran confrontation is, in reality, a direct struggle between Iran and Israel, with Washington acting primarily as a strategic supporter rather than the principal combatant. She stresses that the Gulf states are inevitably exposed to the consequences through “energy market stability” and “maritime security,” yet ultimately have no interest in being drawn into a confrontation that does not serve their stability priorities. Saudi columnist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed approaches the issue from a historical angle, arguing that major wars frequently erupt from a “deceptive sense of security” and repeated miscalculations, recalling episodes from the 1967 war to Saddam’s belief that “America will not dare.” He suggests Iran risks repeating such errors if it assumes that limited nuclear understandings or investment promises can shield it from confrontation, particularly when Israel views Iran ballistic capabilities as an existential matter. In his view, convincing oneself that war is “impossible” is what produces destructive strategic mistakes, and while all options are costly, war remains “the worst choice.” Saudi writer Hassan Al Mostafa also highlights the dual track shaping the current moment, noting the simultaneous emphasis on “diplomacy” and “deterrence,” as Trump describes talks as “ongoing” while referencing major naval deployments, creating a negotiation climate in which dialogue and overt threat operate side by side and both parties signal that the cost of failure would be high.

From Bahrain, Fahad Al-Mudahki directs attention to Iran internal conditions, arguing that responsibility lies primarily with the Iranian regime, whose economic mismanagement has fueled protests and weakened domestic stability. He maintains that even if direct confrontation with Washington is avoided and unrest temporarily subsides, the continued economic downturn is likely to intensify medium- and long-term public anger, leaving the system either forced to restructure or merely postponing a deeper reckoning. In Oman, Ismail bin Shihab Al-Balushi offers a contrasting reading, suggesting that Washington is unlikely to initiate a full-scale war not because it lacks military capacity, but because it recognizes that the “cost of confrontation” could spiral beyond control, despite its insistence on “zero nuclear” and “zero enrichment.” Meanwhile, UAE commentator Al Badr Al-Shatiri presents a more critical view of US behavior, echoing Stephen Walt’s description in Foreign Affairs of a “predatory state” that seeks maximum advantage from allies and adversaries alike and treats “what is mine as mine, and what is yours as negotiable.” He points to the record of military actions and continued naval deployments as evidence that the United States is prepared to escalate further should Iran fail to comply, reinforcing the sense that the region remains suspended between negotiation and the persistent shadow of force.

More Gulf Opinions

• “Fundamental dilemma clearly stands before us: the problem is not in choosing a political or economic model, but in the absence of the institutional and cultural framework that allows any model to function successfully. Some Arab states experienced economic openness without oversight institutions, resulting in monopolies and widespread corruption, while others imposed full government control over the economy, leading to bureaucracy, stagnation, and also corruption.”

Mohammed Al Rumaihi [Kuwait], Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi Arabia), February 21, 2026.

• “The new power actors are no longer merely secondary participants; they have become central architects of information disruption, leveraging direct access to mass audiences, advanced data analytics capabilities, and organizational flexibility that surpasses traditional institutions. They are redefining the concept of ‘power’ in the digital age, where influence extends to shaping perceptions and manufacturing beliefs.”

Sameera Rajab, Akhbar Alkhaleej, (Bahrain), February 21, 2026.

• “That is why the many framings of this rift get it wrong. Riyadh’s concern is not where a consulting firm places its regional office, nor is it a desire to ‘downsize’ the UAE in regional politics. The issue is whether a close partner is widening security risks on Saudi Arabia’s periphery while still benefiting from the optics of Gulf unity.”

Ali Al Shihabi, Arab News, (Saudi Arabia), February 20, 2026.

• “If Islamic countries today suffer from political and economic weakness, the logical starting point lies in internal reform through strengthening transparency, combating corruption, investing in education, and building strong institutions. Only then can any reform project — whether grounded in Islamic reference or framed in humanistic terms — move from a slogan to an inspiring experience that serves all humanity.”

Mohammed Al Bahzad, Al Raya, (Qatar), February 20, 2026.

• “The Board of Peace will ultimately share the fate of the League of Nations, which was formed after World War I and later collapsed, as the countries that fought the first war were already inclined toward a second and merely awaited a spark. Hitler Nazi project provided that spark, leading to the outbreak of World War II, during which the United States used atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, dozens of European cities were destroyed, and more than 50 million people lost their lives.”

Awad bin Saeed, Oman Daily, (Oman), February 17, 2026.

• “Designing Arab alliances today must rest on three pillars: a strong economy that reduces internal vulnerability, cohesive security that protects borders and institutions, and a political vision that rejects ideological rigidity and affirms the nation-state. This is the distinction between a state-building project and a project of chaos, and when major Arab capitals converge around this understanding, they are not merely managing a crisis but shaping a new phase. Recent years have shown that a vacuum is more dangerous than disagreement, and that division produces crises greater than any direct confrontation. The current moment therefore demands high rationality and prioritizing supreme interests over narrow calculations, as the region cannot endure another cycle of attrition or further failed experiments.”

Abdullah Alhashmi, Al Etihad, (UAE), February 13, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Zweiri, Mahjoob, and Battaloglu, Nesibe Hicret, “The Contemporary United Arab Emirates: From Surviving State to Assertive Power” Springer, April 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi–Iranian Détente: A Strategic Imperative.” Shahram Akbarzadeh, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi-Turkish Pragmatic Realignment.” John Calabrese, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “Six Flags. Formula One. Aquarabia. Saudi Arabia Bets $32 Billion On Fun.” Christine Burke, Bloomberg, February 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Oman Sets Its Economic Compass for the Year Ahead.” Robert Mogielnicki, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “The GCC’s Calculus: Financing and Securing Gaza in 2026.” Aziz Alghashian, Gulf International Forum, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why are Middle Eastern governments lobbying against a US attack on Iran?” Galip Dalay, Chatham House, February 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “IMF Staff Completes 2026 Article IV Mission to Qatar.” IMF, February 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “Constraint and Competition: Saudi Arabia’s Regional Policy in a Shifting Middle East.” Arab Center [DC], February 17, 2026.

• Analysis: “The UAE’s Pitch for Cricket.” Raphaël Le Magoariec, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 19, 2026.

• Analysis: “Bridging the Gulf: Energy Policy and Climate Governance in the GCC.” Justin Dargin, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 9, 2026.

• Podcast: “Where is the Emirati–Kuwaiti Partnership Headed?” Hosts Matar Al Neyadi, Arab Cast, February 16, 2026.

• Interview: “KDIPA and Goldman Sachs on Gulf Investments.” Interviewee Sobeeh Almukhaizim, Anthony Gutman, and Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg, January 20, 2026.

• Webinar: “Global Energy Dynamics 2026: Oil, Politics, and Power Plays From Washington to the Gulf.” Speakers Aldo R. Flores-Quiroga, Carole Nakhle, Harry Tchilinguirian, BNP Paribas, and Kate Dourian, Arab Gulf States Institute, February 19, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Trump sends second aircraft carrier to Gulf amid Iran threats.” Axios, February 13, 2026.

  “The move will increase the pressure on Tehran during the nuclear negotiations with the Trump administration, making the U.S. military threat even more menacing.”

  Go Deeper: “America’s Military Buildup Around Iran: What We Know and What It Means.” Middle East Forum, January 28, 2026.

Market & Economy

• “Saudi Firms Agree to Rebuild Syrian Aviation and Mobile Networks.” Bloomberg, February 8, 2026.

  “Saudi Telecom Co. has been awarded a contract to build a 4,500 kilometer (2,796.2 miles) fiber-optic network called Silklink, it said in a filing on Sunday. The award with the Syrian Sovereign Fund was valued at 3 billion Saudi Riyal ($800 million). It also includes agreements to develop data centers and international submarine cable landing stations.”

  Go Deeper: “Why is Saudi Arabia Investing in Syria?” New Lines Institute, October 2, 2025.

• “Saudi PIF to unveil new 2026–2030 strategy.” Gulf Business, February 12, 2026.

  “The revised roadmap for the $925bn fund will emphasise developing industry, minerals and artificial intelligence, as well as tourism, while scaling back and in some cases reconfiguring expensive real‑estate mega projects such as The Line – a futuristic mirrored city – the three people said.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia names new investment minister as Vision 2030 funding lags.” Al-Monitor, February 12, 2026.

• “Abu Dhabi’s G42 Leads $1 Billion Data Center Project in Vietnam.” Bloomberg, February 8, 2026.

  “The company is the primary developer of OpenAI’s Stargate infrastructure project in the UAE, part of a planned 5 gigawatt data center in the country. While much of its work is in the Gulf monarchy, G42 is pushing abroad, with data center and “smart city” projects across Africa and Asia.”

  Go Deeper: “The United Arab Emirates’ AI Ambitions.” CSIS, January 24, 2025.

• “GCC corporates poised for rating stability in 2026: S&P.” Arab News, February 11, 2026.

  “Economic growth across the GCC is projected at 2-4 percent in 2026-27, supported by solid domestic demand, government infrastructure spending and rising hydrocarbon output.”

  “Diversification efforts are gradually reducing volatility. Non-oil sectors now account for about 75 percent of GDP in the UAE and 71 percent in Saudi Arabia, while average inflation across the bloc is expected to hold steady at around 2 percent over the next two years.”

  Go Deeper: “GCC Corporate And Infrastructure Outlook 2026: Stability Despite Uncertainty.” S&P Global, February 10, 2026.

• “Saudi-backed Midad signs deal for sanctioned Lukoil assets.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

  “Saudi-backed Midad Energy has signed a term sheet to acquire Russia’s sanctioned Lukoil assets in a high-stakes contest against rivals including private equity giant Carlyle Group. The deal is contingent on US regulatory approval, according to three people familiar with the matter. The move highlights continued efforts by the Russian energy giant to offload overseas holdings constrained by Western sanctions.”

• “Kuwait forecasts 54.7% rise in fiscal deficit as oil revenues weaken.” Arab News, February 11, 2026.

  “Announcing the draft budget, Finance Minister Yaqoub Al-Refaei estimated total expected revenues at 16.3 billion dinars, marking a 10.5 percent decline compared with the previous fiscal year.”

  Go Deeper: “Kuwait Budget 2026-2027” Finance Ministry, February 2026. [PDF].

• “IMF urges Qatar to strengthen private sector.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

  “Qatar must step up efforts to move more citizens into the private sector by strengthening skills, small and mid-size enterprises, financing and digital adoption, International Monetary Fund officials said this week.”

  Go Deeper: “IMF Staff Completes 2026 Article IV Mission to Qatar.” IMF, February 12, 2026.

• “Omani Stocks Head for Best Week Since 2014 on EM Status Bid.” Bloomberg, February 12, 2026.

  “Muscat’s MSX 30 benchmark has advanced more than 9% since Sunday to its highest level since 2014. Gains of nearly 20% so far this year are almost double those for MSCI Inc.’s emerging-market index.”

  Go Deeper: “Beyond Oil: Accelerating Export Diversification for Sustainable Growth - Oman.” IMF, February 5, 2026.

• “Iraq makes rapid progress in GCC electricity interconnection project.” Iraq News, February 11, 2026.

  “The project is crucial as it seeks to enhance the country’s electricity supply by linking the transmission networks in southern Iraq to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) electrical grid. This connection is expected to improve the stability and reliability of the electrical network.”

  “The Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) projected in October 2023 that the project will supply Iraq with two million megawatts in the summer and 500,000 megawatts in the winter.”

  Go Deeper: “Iraq’s Electricity Shortage and the Paradox of Gas Flaring.” Baker Institute, June 17, 2025.

• “Qatar Pushes Start of Its Massive LNG Expansion to End-2026.” Bloomberg, February 9, 2026.

  “ConocoPhillips, a stakeholder in the project, said last week that the expansion is set to start in the second half of this year. North Field East is the first phase of Qatar’s massive expansion, which will almost double its export capacity to 142 million tons by 2030.”

  Go Deeper: “How Qatar’s LNG Decisions Will Impact an Oversupplied Global Market.” Columbia University (SIPA), September 2025. [PDF].

Domestics

• “Saudi investment minister among dozens in sweeping reshuffle.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia replaced more than 40 senior and regional government posts on Thursday, including the minister of investment and the attorney general, marking the most sweeping reshuffle since 2022.”

  Go Deeper: “AlSaif’s appointment reflects urgent Saudi need for FDI.” AGBI, February 13, 2026.

• “Dubai-based DP World replaces chief named in Epstein files.” AlJazeera, February 13, 2026.

  “The friendly exchanges between the two include discussions about deals and also mention bin Sulayem visiting Epstein’s private island while sharing contacts in business and politics.”

  “The two men also shared salacious comments about women, with bin Sulayem’s email address featuring a correspondence in which Epstein remarked, “I loved the torture video.”.”

  Go Deeper: “Newly surfaced Epstein email ties him to Israel–UAE strategy targeting Qatar.” Middle East Monitor, February 3, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

This week Gulf commentators devoted significant attention to the Jeffrey Epstein leaks, particularly as some disclosures were said to intersect with figures from the region. From Saudi Arabia, Hailah Abdullah Almushaweh argued that in a system where the rule of law is meant to be a “red line,” the Epstein files demonstrated how immense wealth, once liberated from ethical and legal restraint, can redirect justice toward “power and pleasure” rather than principle. In her reading, the greater scandal was not confined to the criminal acts themselves but lay in the permissive architecture that granted a form of “informal immunity,” transforming justice from an absolute norm into a selective calculation. From Kuwait, Saadiah Mufarreh expanded the critique, asserting that the West—often presenting itself as a moral “guardian” and measuring others by strict democratic standards—appeared more invested in managing its “narrative” than in safeguarding victims reduced to statistics and procedural footnotes. The episode, she argued, exposed uncomfortable “double standards,” as transparency receded when scrutiny turned inward. Similarly, Hussain Al Rawi invoked John Rawls critique of “unequal systems,” warning that when elites design structures that insulate their own privilege, accountability becomes conditional: the weak face consequences, while the powerful are shielded. Qatar’s Jawaher Al Thani reinforced this theme, observing that despite hundreds of names circulating in messages, photographs, and testimonies, only two individuals were imprisoned—Epstein, who died in “suspicious” circumstances, and Ghislaine Maxwell—while alleged abusers were reportedly redacted and victims exposed, prompting the blunt question of whether justice is designed to protect the powerful or the vulnerable.

From Oman, Muammar bin Ali al-Tubi offered a more controversial geopolitical interpretation, arguing that recently released materials contain what he described as indications of a connection between Epstein and Israeli intelligence, citing reported contacts with former defense minister Ehud Barak and framing the affair within a broader narrative of “managed chaos” in parts of the Arab world, including Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria. He situated these claims within a wider argument that networks of influence operate through leverage, blackmail, and the moral compromise of decision makers, portraying Epstein’s use of intermediaries, carefully curated invitations, and concealed surveillance systems as resembling intelligence-style tradecraft designed to secure influence over political and financial elites. In the United Arab Emirates, where some leaks were also said to reference Emirati names, Dhahi Khalfan wrote on X that “the real blackmail lies in the three million documents that have not been released,” suggesting that the material already published constitutes only a “prelude.” He further questioned how Epstein could acquire a private island, host heads of state, and sustain such operations without the awareness of security agencies, concluding that the entire episode appears to target “something far more significant” than the crimes alone, thereby deepening regional skepticism toward the official narrative.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Edited by Gregory John Simons, Khaled Al-Kassimi, Kleanthis Kyriakidis “Guardians of the Gulf: Navigating Security Challenges.” Springer, May 2026.

• Research: “Activism and Community-Based Climate Adaptation in Kuwait.” Mariam AlSaad, The Middle East Journal, 2026.

• Research: “The GCC’s Economic Diplomacy in a Multi-Polar World.” Christopher M. Davidson , The Middle East Journal, 2026.

• Research: “How to Upgrade US-Saudi Defense Relations.” Bilal Y. Saab, The Middle East Journal, 2026.

• Analysis: “Mixed signals from the new Q3 2025 labor market data.” Meshaal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, January 1, 2026.

• Analysis: “From Exchange to Strategy: Making Culture a Pillar of EU-GCC Relations.” Alice Königstetter, The Euro-Gulf Information Center, January 30, 2026.

• Analysis: “The $108 Oil War: Can the Middle East Crash the World Economy?” Dina Esfandiary and Ziad Daoud, Bloomberg, February 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Saudis feel squeezed even as the economy booms.” The Economist, February 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “What’s behind Saudi outreach to Ethiopia amid UAE rift?” Rosaleen Carroll, Al-Monitor, February 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “Reassessing Saudization: Localisation and Labour Market Nationalisation in Saudi Arabia.” Swapnil Sujal, Middle East Political and Economic Institute, February 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Multipolar Trap in the New Middle East: How Gulf States Are Learning to Hedge in an Uncertain World Order.” Rabbab A. Khan, Middle East Political and Economic Institute, January 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “Oman’s Space Ambitions: A Pragmatic Gulf Model” Raymond Karam, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 11, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Gulf’s Green Rush: Financing the Future, or Just Repainting It?” Christopher Gooding, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 10, 2026.

• Analysis: “Regional States Test the Economic Waters in Syria.” Said Bakr, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 11, 2026.

• Podcast: “Has the Gulf Cooperation Council’s relevance expired?” with Saad Al-Ghanim, Arab Cast, February 14, 2026.

• Seminar: “Beyond Tariffs: The New India–Gulf Economic Playbook.” ORF, Feb 7, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Iran and US hold indirect talks in Oman. America’s military leader in the Mideast joins the talks.” AP, February 6, 2026.

  “The talks had initially been expected to take place in Turkey in a format that would have included regional countries as well, and would have included topics like Tehran’s ballistic missile program — something Iran apparently rejected in favor of focusing only on its nuclear program.”

  Go Deeper: “With the US and Iran on a knife-edge, can Oman once again step in to mediate?” Middle East Institute, February 5, 2026.

• “Saudi, Iranian FMs underscore need to resolve differences through diplomatic means.” Saudi Gazette, February 5, 2026.

  “The foreign ministers discussed regional developments and underscored the need to resolve differences through dialogue and diplomatic means. They also reviewed efforts to maintain security and stability in the region.”

  Go Deeper: “Analysis: A decade of Saudi-Iranian relations: from rivalry to re-engagement.” Janatan Sayeh, Long War Journal, April 19, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia may invest in Turkish fighter jet Kaan ‘any moment’, Erdogan says.” Middle East Eye, February 5, 2026.

  “‘We are signing significant defence industry cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, and we are determined to further strengthen them’” Erdogan told journalists while returning to Turkey following his visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia this week.”

  Go Deeper: “Talk of a Turkish military alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reflects Ankara’s opportunistic ‘hedging’ strategy.” Chatham House, January 30, 2026.

• “Germany’s Merz heads to Saudi, Gulf in quest for new partners.” Zawya, February 4, 2026.

  “German Chancellor Friedrich Merz began a tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United ​Arab Emirates on Wednesday aiming to forge energy and arms partnerships as Europe’s biggest and richest economy sought to reduce dependence ⁠on the U.S. and China.”

  Go Deeper: “Merz Promises Gulf Countries Easier Access to Military Goods.” Bloomberg, February 5, 2026.

Market & Economy

• “UK Says Trade Deal With Saudis, Other Gulf States ‘Imminent’.” Bloomberg, February 5, 2026.

  “The UK’s trade minister said a free-trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council was “imminent,” as the Starmer government looks to build on pacts last year with the European Union, India and the US.”

  Go Deeper: “UK chases elusive GCC trade deal that could boost exports, economic links.” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia’s $2 Billion Solar Plan Lifts Turkish Energy Stocks.” Bloomberg, February 4, 2026.

  “Saudi companies will initially develop solar projects capable of generating 2,000 megawatts in Turkey’s Sivas and Karaman provinces, followed by 3,000MW of additional wind and solar capacity to be finalized later, according to an intergovernmental agreement signed in Riyadh on Tuesday.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia to build $2 billion solar farms in Turkey, Turkish energy minister says.” Reuters, February, 3, 2026.

• “Kuwait targets 4mln bpd oil production by 2035: Report.” Zawya, February 5, 2026

  “Kuwait aims to increase its oil production to 4 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2035 from the current 3 million bpd, according to Nawaf S. Al-Sabah, Deputy Chairman and CEO of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC).”

  “Oil demand is projected to reach 100 million bpd by 2050, Al-Sabah stated, adding that the cost of producing a barrel of oil in Kuwait remains below $10.”

  Go Deeper: “Kuwait readies $7 billion pipeline deal as Gulf turns to foreign capital.” Reuters, January 28, 2026.

• “Saudi’s MBS Unleashes Months of Reforms to Draw More FDI.” Bloomberg, February 2, 2026.

  “The moves have come as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seeks to turn the nation into an investment destination and better compete with nearby Dubai. They also hint at how the Gulf nation is trying to address oil-price volatility and budget deficits that threaten to slow progress on its $2 trillion economic diversification plan.”

  Go Deeper: “Wall Street, Saudi Arabia Differ on Kingdom’s Deficit Target.” Bloomberg, December 9, 2025.

Domestics

• “Kuwait emir reshuffles Cabinet, replacing 7 ministers.” Middle East Monitor, February 1, 2026.

  “The reshuffle also named Sheikh Jarrah Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah as foreign minister, Osama Boudi as minister of commerce and industry, Reem al-Fulaij as minister of state for development and sustainability, and Tariq al-Jalahma as minister of state for youth and sports.”

  Go Deeper: “Will Kuwait’s Parliamentary Democracy Be Restored, Reformed, or Repudiated?” Carnegie, March 13, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia is lifting the alcohol ban for wealthy foreigners.” BBC, February 05, 2026.

  “To be eligible, an expat must either hold a Premium Residency permit, which costs 100,000 Saudi riyals ($27,000; £19,300) a year; or show that he or she earns at least 50,000 riyals per month.”

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Gulf Opinions

Omani commentators devoted sustained attention to the “indirect” Iranian–American negotiations hosted in Muscat, emphasizing Oman’s distinctive diplomatic positioning at a moment of heightened regional volatility. Mohammed Rams Al Rawas highlighted the importance of place, portraying Oman as a rare actor capable of “creating the impossible” in the service of peace. As global politics becomes increasingly dominated by threats, coercion, and displays of power, he argued, Oman stands apart through its “quiet, confident” diplomacy, offering a venue where the host “does not interfere” but instead operates as a disciplined and credible honest broker. This approach, he stressed, is not tactical but structural, rooted in a long-standing Omani legacy of neutrality, discretion, and dialogue, built on “the power of silence” and the conviction that wisdom and mediation provide more durable foundations for regional and international security than the “noise of weapons.” Addressing why Tehran requested moving the talks from Istanbul to Muscat, Salem Ahmed Bakhit Safarar pointed to Oman’s pivotal role in facilitating the 2014 negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, which culminated in the 2015 nuclear agreement, alongside the deep trust both negotiating sides place in the Omani mediator and the “strict confidentiality” that has historically surrounded talks in Muscat. At the same time, he cautioned that the negotiating track faces persistent obstruction from external actors, most notably Israel, which he argued continues to work actively to derail any diplomatic breakthrough.

Beyond the question of venue, several commentators reframed the negotiations within a broader strategic context that challenges dominant Western narratives. Khaled bin Salem Al-Ghasani argued that the primary engine of regional war is not Iran but the United States, contending that years of sanctions, political pressure, and coordinated media campaigns amount to a sustained strategy of coercion falsely presented as “deterrence.” From an international politics perspective, Salem bin Hamad Al Hajari maintained that the core confrontation is not between Washington and Tehran, but between Iran and Israel, with the United States acting largely as the political executor of Israeli priorities. He pointed to the June 2025 war as a critical rupture that collapsed long-standing red lines and exposed a fragile deterrence structure, making renewed conflict a matter of “when,” not “if.” In this context, US engagement with Iran appears less driven by concern over a “dangerous state” than by an effort to manage the consequences of Israeli escalation and contain a confrontation Washington itself helped push into the open. Similarly, Khamis bin Obaid Alqutaiti observed that American military deployments and pressure tactics intensified tensions, but Iran’s firm posture and explicit warnings that any attack would trigger a “regional war” forced a temporary retreat toward negotiations, widely viewed as the safer option for all parties. Mohammed bin Salem Al-Batashi concluded that Tehran’s choice of Muscat reflects not only Oman’s regional success in mediation, but also Iran’s strategic self-assurance in selecting a secure venue capable of safeguarding the rights and interests of all sides.

More Gulf Opinions

• “Libya currently faces a range of possible scenarios. On one hand, this assassination [Saif al-Islam Gaddafi] could lead to a definitive break with the political era associated with the Gaddafi lineage, potentially reducing international sensitivity surrounding the electoral file. On the other hand, there is a risk that the incident could reignite internal conflict or foster a sense of political despair among factions loyal to the former regime, with resulting security repercussions in areas of strong tribal and local influence.”

Buthaina Khalifa Qasim, Al Bilad, (Bahrain), February 7, 2026.

• “It was said that he [Epstein] committed suicide in prison after his arrest, despite widespread doubts about this account; more likely, he was eliminated so that he—and his secrets—would disappear. Such is the logic of corrupt systems when one of their members, or one of their fronts, is exposed: excision and liquidation are the most effective means of preventing further exposure, at least until internal affairs within the system are reorganized.”

Abdullah Alamadi, Al Sharq, (Qatar), February 5, 2026.

• “Those tracking the Epstein files now outnumber those following the crimes of the Zionist entity in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, while public attention has receded from the international system’s onslaught against politically and economically exhausted states such as Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and others.”

Suad bint Fahd Al Mojil, Al Qabas, (Kuwait), February 5, 2026.

• “The choice of Abu Dhabi as the venue for the trilateral talks was neither coincidental nor a gesture of courtesy. Abu Dhabi is not merely a place known for hospitality and gracious hosting, but a conducive environment for achieving the desired objectives.”

  “This hosting [of the US-Russia-Ukraine negotiation] is not a passing event, but rather a reflection of a deep-rooted strategy that shapes a distinctive Emirati diplomacy, positioning it at the forefront of the regional and international landscape.”

Ali bin Salem Al Kaabi, Al Etihad, (UAE), February 2, 2026.

• “These are not political disputes between regional states, nor a competition for influence as some imagine; this is an existential war, waged through proxy warfare, the support of militias, media campaigns, and dubious alliances, alongside the promotion of questionable doctrines and religions. Its objective is to dismantle Sunni Islam and its historic religious authorities in Mecca and Medina as the world has known them for 1,400 years, and replace them with ‘Islamist Protestantism’; for this reason, crises can at times be useful, as they expose realities and strip away the veneer of complacency and misplaced tolerance.”

Mohammad Al Saaed, Okaz, (Saudi Arabia), February 1, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Almezaini, Khalid, and Alexander, Kristian, “An Introduction to Gulf Politics.” Cambridge University Press, June 2026.

• Research: “Measuring financial integration in GCC stock markets: Dynamics, risk premia, and the path to enhanced cooperation.” Salem Boubakri and Cyriac Guillaumin, Science Direct, March 2026.

• Research: “Private health insurance in Gulf Cooperation Council countries: A scoping review.” Husein Reka, Science Direct, June 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia’s Break With Interventionism.” Sultan Alamer, Newlines Magazine, February 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Abu Dhabi Builds a New Deal Machine Around Its Crown Prince.” Dinesh Nair, Zainab Fattah, and Alex Dooler, Bloomberg, February 3, 2026.

• Analysis: “Caught in the Gulf crossfire: Pakistan navigates Saudi-UAE rivalry.” Sabena Siddiqui, Al-Monitor, February 1, 2026.

• Analysis: “UAE: Greenfield FDI surged 78% y/y to reach a record USD 33.2bn in 2025.” Mayed Alrashdi, NBD Research, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Of Course the UAE Is Not Preparing To Take Over Gaza.” Hussein Ibish, AGSI, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “Trump’s Energy Agenda: Gains and Risks for the Gulf.” Masha Kotkin, ORF, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Cost of War on the Region: A Gulf Reading of a Scenario of an Attack on Iran.” Ebtesam AlKetbi, Emirates Policy Center, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “Merz courts Gulf as Germany seeks energy alternatives to US, China.” Beatrice Farhat, Al-Monitor, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “MEI Perspectives Series 53: How Gulf States Quietly Developed Durable Soft Power in Asia.” Joshua Snider, Middle East Institute (NUS), January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi-UAE Rift: Taking the Measure of the Gulf That Separates and Unites Them.” William Roebuck, AGSI, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: ”Normalization is slipping away.” Daniel Benaim, Middle East Institute, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf Maritime Security: Balancing Partnership and Flexibility.” Leonardo Mazzucco, AGSI, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “In Saudi Arabia, Erdogan fosters security alignment, $30B trade push.” Ezgi Akin, Al-Monitor, February 4, 2026.

• Analysis: “Yemen Is Not a Gulf Rivalry—It Is a Test of Whether Extremism Can Be Contained.” Ahmed Charai, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “With the US and Iran on a knife-edge, can Oman once again step in to mediate?” Alex Vatanka, Middle East Institute, February 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “Kuwait to open offshore oil, gas fields to foreign firms: What to know.” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, February 3, 2026.

• Podcast: “What Does Saudi Arabia Want from Yemen?” Malek Al-Roqi, Yemen Podcast, January 22, 2026. [Eng subtitle].

• Interview: “The Smart Interviewer: How to Lead the Conversation and Build Rapport,” Dawood Al-Shiryan, Abdullah Al-Mudaifer, Ali Al-Alyani, and Rachid Allali, Saudi Media Forum, February 3, 2026. [Eng subtitle].

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Saudi, Israeli officials visit D.C. to talk possible U.S. strikes on Iran.” Axios, January 29, 2026.

  “The Israelis came to D.C. to share intelligence on possible targets inside Iran.”

  “The Saudis, meanwhile, are highly concerned about a potential regional war and are trying to help broker a diplomatic solution.”

  Go Deeper: “Arab and Muslim powers mount last-ditch effort to avert US-Iran conflict.” Financial Times, January 30, 2026.

• “US warship docks in Gulf of Aqaba as fears of Iran strike grow.” Middle East Eye, January 30, 2026.

  “The move is part of US-Israeli military and security coordination, including reinforced naval deployment and heightened defensive and offensive readiness in anticipation of potential developments,” Kan reported, quoting a security source.

  The report added that the step strengthens naval deployment, raising the level of defensive and offensive readiness in “anticipation of any possible field developments.”

• “Celebrations Launch in Abu Dhabi for ‘The UAE and Kuwait Are Brothers Forever’,” Al Khaleej, January 30, 2026.

  “The ‘UAE and Kuwait: Brothers Forever’ celebrations kicked off in Abu Dhabi on Thursday, as part of a comprehensive national program that will continue until February 4, 2026, across all the emirates of the country.”

• “Saudi Arabian media steps up attacks on UAE as Gulf rift deepens.” Financial Times, January 21, 2026.

  “Saudi journalist Jassir al-Jassir on Monday told Al Arabiya channel that the UAE ‘betrayed the partnership with the kingdom in Yemen’. He drew a contrast between the Emirati capital Abu Dhabi, which is often seen as the political centre that drives foreign policy, and its commercial hub Dubai which has been praised as an economic success story.”

Market & Economy

• “Abu Dhabi folds assets worth $263bn into new wealth fund controlled by crown prince.” Financial Times, January 30, 2026.

  “Greater responsibility for Sheikh Khaled within the emirate’s investment framework through L’imad echoes the establishment of the $330bn sovereign fund Mubadala, which was formed in 2002 when Sheikh Mohammed was consolidating power under his father, Sheikh Zayed.”

  Go Deeper: “Shake-Up Elevates U.A.E. Crown Prince Into $260 Billion Sovereign Wealth Role.” WSJ, January 30, 2026.

• “US to pay monthly Venezuela ‘budget’ from oil proceeds via Qatar fund.” Financial Times, January 29, 2026.

  “Rubio said the government led by Delcy Rodríguez had been “very co-operative in this regard. In fact, they have pledged to use a substantial amount of those funds to purchase medicine and equipment directly from the United States”. One $300mn payment has already been made to Caracas “because they had to meet payroll”, he said, but about $200mn is still held in Qatar.”

• “UAE launches ‘sovereign’ open AI model to counter Chinese rivals.” Financial Times, January 27, 2026.

  “The Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI) on Tuesday released its latest model, K2 Think, alongside a complete disclosure of the data, algorithms and other code that was used to build it, as the country seeks to gain an edge in a market that has become dominated by Chinese AI groups. Eric Xing, MBZUAI president, said the state-backed university was filling a gap left by Silicon Valley firms such as Meta that have pulled back from openly publishing the research behind their AI systems.”

  Go Deeper: “Can the Gulf really become an AI superpower?” Financial Times, January 01, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia opens real estate market to foreign buyers.” Arab News, January 22, 2026.

  “According to the authority, the application process varies by ownership category. Foreign residents in Saudi Arabia may apply directly through the portal using their residence permit, with legal requirements verified automatically and the process completed electronically.”

Domestics

• “Qatar’s Trade Balance Posts 14.1 bn Surplus in December 2025.” NPC, January 29, 2026.

  “In December 2025, the total value of merchandise exports amounted to around QR 26.9 bn, reflecting a 13.7% decline compared with December 2024, yet showing a 9.9% increase from November 2025. Meanwhile, merchandise imports rose to about QR 12.8 bn in December 2025, marking a year-on-year rise of 0.6% and a month-on-month increase of 6.7%.”

  Go Deeper: “Qatar’s economy records a 2.9% growth in Q3 2025 as non-hydrocarbon activities expand by 4.4%.” NPC, January 28, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia, Olympic Council Delay 2029 Asian Winter Games.” Bloomberg, January 24, 2026.

  “Trojena — estimated by business intelligence platform MEED to be a $19 billion undertaking — was designed to feature ski slopes atop luxury hotel roofs in a remote area in the northwest with little natural snowfall. It was initially envisioned to be completed by 2026.”

  “Difficulties creating sufficient artificial snow and constructing at high altitudes with complex topography were among factors that raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s ability to meet required deadlines ahead of the games, people familiar said at the time.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudis Scale Back Ambition for $1.5 Trillion Desert Project Neom.” Bloomberg, April 5, 2024.

• “Saudi Arabia Looks to Tap Wealthy Families in New Quest for Cash.” Bloomberg, January 27, 2026.

  “There are big portfolios. The wealth is sizable,” said Ayth Al Mubarak, chief executive officer of the National Center for Family Businesses in Riyadh. These entities have long dominated the Saudi economy, and close to 95% of private businesses in the kingdom are family-owned, he added.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia asks wealthy families to invest domestically as mega-projects stall: Report.” Middle East Eye, January 27, 2026.

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Gulf Opinions

Following the announcement of a week celebrating Emirati–Kuwaiti relations under the slogan “UAE and Kuwait… Brothers Forever,” Gulf commentators assessed the initiative and its broader context, including its temporal overlap with Saudi–Emirati tensions. Emirati commentary largely framed the event as a natural expression of appreciation for long-standing ties with Kuwait, independent of any bilateral disagreements elsewhere in the Gulf. Noora Al Tenaiji argued that the UAE–Kuwait relationship is anchored in deep “pre-state social and commercial ties” that later evolved into sustained political alignment and strategic coordination within the GCC, positioning both states as stabilizing actors in the region. She further described Kuwait as a “trusted” political partner and a major economic pillar for the UAE, citing strong trade, mutual investment, and social integration that together underpin durable interdependence and long-term regional stability. At a broader level, Sultan Mohamed Al Nuaimi highlighted the depth of relations at the ruling-family level, noting historical ties between Kuwait’s Al Sabah family and the UAE ruling families of Al Nahyan, Al Maktoum, and Al Qasimi, a relationship he summarized as “a celebration of a shared root and a shared future, and an affirmation that the UAE and Kuwait will remain, a global model of unbreakable fraternity.”

In Kuwait, reactions were more mixed, with the discussion intersecting indirectly with sensitivities surrounding Saudi–Emirati relations. At the media level, Al Jarida published an op-ed by Emirati writer Issa Abdullah Al Zarouni, who recalled that during the formation of the UAE, Kuwait emerged as an early political and diplomatic supporter under the leadership of then Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, driven by a belief in the necessity of a stable federal state in the Gulf. He emphasized that this backing was not merely “symbolic,” pointing to Kuwait opening its embassy in Abu Dhabi in 1972—only months after the UAE was declared. While many Kuwaitis welcomed and praised the initiative, some criticism also surfaced. Kuwaiti commentator Dahem Al Qahtani underscored that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia share a deeply rooted strategic partnership shaped by more than a century of political, military, and security cooperation, arguing, however, that claims suggesting Kuwaiti appreciation of Emirati–Kuwaiti relations runs counter to Saudi Arabia are “unfounded.” By contrast, Mansour Ahmed Al Muhareb cautioned against symbolism he viewed as intrusive, stating that “the Kuwaiti does not need celebration but respect for sovereignty and specificity, and does not need slogans such as ‘the Emirati is Kuwaiti,’ but rather an Emirati who does not interfere in Kuwaiti affairs or inflame tensions around its constitutional and democratic gains.” From the Saudi perspective, some commentators interpreted the episode through a more skeptical lens, with Saud Al Muqhim arguing that “Kuwait name was dragged into a dispute that does not concern it when Gargash said ‘Kuwaitis refrain’ implying that they stood within a particular political camp,” describing this as a “cheap instrumentalization” of a sovereign state and an attempt to manufacture alignments and sow divisions within the Gulf.

More Gulf Opinions

• “Repression and economic collapse in Venezuela constitute crimes for which the regime should be held accountable by its own people, who have that right, or through international legal mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court or United Nations sanctions. By contrast, the act of a great power—long vocal about its ambitions toward Venezuela resources—abducting its president and his wife would amount to a form of piracy, turning the world into a jungle ruled by the strongest.”

Ahmed Al Saraf, Al Qabas, (Kuwait), January 26, 2026.

• “The Qatar Investment Authority is also investing in Elon Musk xAI project, alongside investment partners including Fidelity and Nvidia, as part of a funding round valued at 20 billion dollars. These investments include data centers and artificial intelligence applications under the ‘Grok’ brand.Despite ongoing discussion about inflated valuations in artificial intelligence technology companies, the broader trajectory points to an industrial revolution driven by vast and expanding capabilities. Some commercial users of artificial intelligence may ultimately achieve greater gains than the solution providers themselves.”

Fahad Abdulrahman Badar, Al Sharq, (Qatar), January 26, 2026.

• “The Peace Council promoted by Trump regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip is an unobjective process lacking credibility, particularly given the US president intent to make it a substitute for the United Nations, which he has repeatedly criticized. Against this backdrop, conditions in the Gulf region are increasingly concerning amid ongoing tensions in Yemen and the dissolution of the Arab Coalition to Support Legitimacy, both at the collective and bilateral levels. Consequently, the Yemeni crisis has become intertwined with regional tensions due to the strategic maritime corridors of Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea, and any outbreak of war between Washington and Tehran would inevitably draw the Gulf into a cycle of destruction and the closure of critical straits.”

Awadh bin Saeed Baquwair, Oman Daily, (Oman), January 27, 2026.

• “The six Gulf capitals recognize that they are not in a position to support or change the regime, as the event exceeds their capacity, yet its repercussions pose serious risks to them. Should war erupt, the scenarios range from collapse and internal overthrow to the regime endurance and re-emergence with greater strength, with dangers far exceeding those of the Iraq invasion and the swift toppling of Saddam regime. If the pillars of the Tehran system collapse, a vacuum would threaten all, and if it endures, it would return more powerful.”

Abdulrahman Al Rashed, Asharq Al-Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), January 28, 2026.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Henderson, Christian, “Monarchies of Extraction: The Gulf States in the Global Food System.” Cambridge University Press, March 2026. [Forthcoming].

• Research: “The Role of Urban Transformation in Saudi Arabia’s Nation-building: The Case of al-Balad, Jeddah.” Rufei Li, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies [Doha], June 2025. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Structural Reforms in Saudi Arabia Since 2016.” David Koll, Andrea Medici, Marina Mendes Tavares, Masashi Saito, IMF, January 23, 2026. [PDF].

• Analysis: “A Tentative Trust: What the Barzan-EDGE Deal Reveals About Gulf Reconciliation.” David Roberts, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Sotheby’s returns to Saudi Arabia with art-only auction.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, Al-monitor, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia’s Pullback Spreads, From Neom to World Cup Stadiums.” Bloomberg, Christine Burke and Mirette Magdy, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia to scale back Neom megaproject.” Andrew England and Chris Campbell, Financial Times, January 25, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi defense chief visits White House as Riyadh pushes against Iran strike.” Jared Szuba and Rosaleen Carroll, Al-monitor, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “The China-Gulf Green Rush: Fueling Renewable Energy Cooperation.” Chuchu Zhang, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, January 26, 2026.

• Analysis: “How the UAE Became Serbia’s Most Important Arab Partner.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “Egypt: Partnering with Saudi Arabia on Security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.” Gregory Aftandilian, Arab Center [D.C], January 27, 2026.

• Analysis: “Trump’s National Security Strategy doesn’t downgrade the Middle East, it redefines it.” Kristian Alexander, Atlantic Council, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia downsizes megaprojects, chases cash amid AI push.” Samuel Wendel and Jack Dutton, Al-monitor, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Rebuilding Confidence at Home: How Kuwait Can Strengthen Its Domestic Investment Climate.” Dalal Marafie, Gulf International Forum, January 29, 2026.

• Analysis: “The GCC’s Evolving Trade Networks: Navigating Fragmentation and Diversification.” Frédéric Schneider, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, January 28, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf States on the Frontline of U.S.-Iran Volatility.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 23, 2026.

• Podcast: “What’s Next for Gulf Economies?” with Karen Young, MEnbar Podcast, January 28, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “UK sends fighter jets to Qatar as fears rise over Iran conflict.” The National, January 23, 2026.

  “There is also a fear that Iran could repeat its strike on Al Udeid, after Tehran launched a rocket attack in June last year after US strikes on nuclear sites. The airbase houses US Central Command, making it a potential target for Iranian action.”

• “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar, UAE join Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’.” Reuters, January 21, 2026.

  “DUBAI, Jan 21 (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Qatar have accepted invitations to join U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace”, the Saudi foreign ministry said in a joint statement that also included the United Arab Emirates.”

  Go Deeper: “The Trump Administration and the Fracturing Saudi-UAE Alliance.” Arab Center, January 21, 2026.

• “UAE utility withdraws from Yemen and transfers solar power plants to the government.” The New Arab, January 23, 2026.

  “GSU informed the Public Electricity Corporation of the evacuation of all operations and maintenance teams from the Aden solar power plant, which has capacity of 120 megawatts (MW), and the 53 MW Shabwa solar power plant in a letter dated January 22, its statement said.”

Market & Economy

• “Feb 9: PIF–Private Sector Forum to convene as market awaits fund’s new strategy.” Maal, January 11, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund will hold the fourth edition of the PIF–Private Sector Forum in partnership with the private sector on Feb. 9–10, 2026, in Riyadh, as anticipation builds around the fund’s upcoming strategy.”

  Go Deeper: “Private Sector Forum 2026.” PIF, January 2026.

• “PIF-backed Humain secures up to $1.2bn to expand AI infrastructure.” Arab News, January 22, 2026.

  “The non-binding agreement, announced on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos, sets out financing terms to develop as much as 250 megawatts of AI data center capacity to serve Humain’s local, regional and global customers, according to a statement.”

• “Saudi Arabia attracts 122 million tourists, pumping SR300 billion into national economy in 2025.” Gulf News, January 21, 2026.

  “Under Vision 2030, the kingdom aims to lift tourism’s contribution to GDP to 10 per cent, diversify income streams and cement its status as a competitive global destination through sustained private-sector partnerships and a focus on sustainable growth.”

  Go Deeper: “Inbound and Domestic Tourism Indicators Q3 YTD 2025.” Tourism Ministry, December 23, 2025.

• “QIA and Goldman Sachs plan to expand partnership with $25bn investment target.” Arab News, January 21, 2026.

  “Under the memorandum of understanding, QIA will commit to be an anchor investor in several of the US bank’s flagship and innovative strategies, they said in a joint statement. Goldman Sachs will also look to “meaningfully” increase its headcount in Doha, though it did not provide figures.”

  Go Deeper: “Artificial Intelligence in Qatar: Assessing the Potential Economic Impacts Tongfang Yuan.” IMF, March 2025. [PDF].

• “Commercial Bank’s Net Profit Drops by 27.3 Percent in 2025.” QNA, January 18, 2026.

  “The Commercial Bank, a Qatari public shareholding company, reported a net profit decline of 27.3 percent in 2025, reaching QAR 2.204 billion, compared to QAR 3.032 billion in 2024.”

• “Vision 2030 projects may drive corporate loans by Saudi banks to $75bln in 2026.” Global Business and Finance Magazine, January 23, 2026.

  “Retail lending, especially mortgages, is likely to grow amid continued declines in interest rates. Mortgages constitute roughly half of total retail lending, which rose by 5% in the year to November 30, 2025.”

  “Banks’ return on average assets is expected to dip slightly to 2.2% in 2026 due to the contraction and higher cost of risk.”

• “Kuwait looks to the cloud as power grid feels the strain.” AGBI, January 23, 2026.

  “Kuwait has invited bids to construct three power substations that will supply electricity to Google Cloud and Microsoft data storage centres, a move that raises questions about the country’s ability to support energy-intensive cloud infrastructure.”

• “Oman signs power deals with Qatar’s Nebras and Korea Western Power worth $2.6bln.” Zawya, January 22, 2026.

  “The projects include the Misfah Power Plant, with a total capacity of 1,700 megawatts, and the Duqm Power Plant, with a total capacity of 877 megawatts, both under 20-year ⁠agreements, QNA said.”

  “Nebras Energy acquired a ‌49% stake in the Misfah Power Plant and a 30% stake in the Duqm ‌Power Plant, ⁠QNA added.”

• “Dubai allocates $3.5bn to expand Silicon Oasis free zone.” AGBI, January 23, 2026.

  “The Dubai government has allocated AED12.8 billion ($3.5 billion) to expand the free zone, which is managed by the state-run Dubai Integrated Economic Zones Authority.”

  “District IO will account for AED11 billion of the sum and aims to provide infrastructure to support future technologies and strengthen research, development and innovation, the UAE state-run news agency said.”

• “GCC debt capital market to rise to $1.25trln in 2026.” Zawya, January 22, 2026.

  “The forecast growth of the market this year will be roughly 13.6%, from $1.1 trillion seen at the end of 2025, supported by lower oil prices, interest rate cuts and further diversification efforts.”

  “The majority of Fitch-rated sukuk in the GCC, around 84%, are investment-grade, and 90% of issuers have a stable outlook. The GCC outstanding DCM at the end of last year was up by 14% from a year ago.”

  Go Deeper: “GCC: Growth set to strengthen in 2026 as hydrocarbons production picks up.” Emirates NBD, December 18, 2025.

• “Engie doubles down on Gulf renewables as EU and US momentum slows.” AGBI, January 19, 2026.

  “French utility giant Engie has reached financial closing on ⁠a 1.5-gigawatt (GW) solar park in Abu Dhabi as it steps up projects in the Middle East amid a renewables slowdown in ⁠the US and Europe.”

  “The Khazna park is set to begin commercial operations in 2028 and will supply 160,000 homes across the UAE under a 30-year power purchase agreement with Emirates Water and Electricity ⁠Company.”

  Go Deeper: “Assessing the United Arab Emirates’ institutional and investment frameworks to catalyse the renewable energy transition.” Oxford Press, November 27, 2025.

• “UAE attracted $45bln FDI in 2025, up 50%.” Zawya, January 22, 2026.

  “The UAE attracted over $45 billion in foreign direct investment last year, up nearly 50% year-on-year, even as global FDI declined by 11%, said a senior official.”

  Go Deeper: “United Arab Emirates: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for United Arab Emirates.” IMF, December 8, 2025. [PDF].

Domestics

• “Civil service reforms clear council, await Cabinet review.” Kuwait Times, January 20, 2026.

  “The reforms follow a review by the Supreme Judicial Council in late December. The council submitted a report to Justice Minister Nasser Al-Sumait highlighting gaps in the law and recommending updates to reflect advances in digital administration, governance standards and public service management practices.”

• “Oman targets 50,000 jobs in private sector.” Oman Observer, January 21, 2026.

  “It says Oman has about 74,000 job-seekers, and through the Sahim program the Ministry of Labour has already placed most of them in permanent jobs, while the rest are waiting for budgeted salary grades to become available.”

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Gulf Opinions

Saudi-UAE Media Crossfire

A recent Al-Jazirah article by Saudi writer Dr. Ahmed bin Othman Al-Tuwaijri sparked an intense debate on X, generating sharply divided reactions over its unprecedented criticism of Abu Dhabi policies. Al-Tuwaijri argued that tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not reflect hostility toward the Emirati people, but opposition to policies he views as destabilizing to the Arab region, particularly in Yemen and other conflict zones. He contrasted Saudi Arabia historical role in supporting UAE independence and unity with what he described as Abu Dhabi geopolitical adventurism, attributing it to lingering resentments, rivalry over Saudi Arabia religious and strategic standing, and unease over the transformations driven by Vision 2030. Central to his argument was what he called “the false illusion that the shortest path to avenging past grudges and curing envy and a sense of inferiority toward the Kingdom lies in throwing itself into the arms of Zionism and accepting to act as Israel Trojan horse in the Arab world,” portraying Saudi Arabia as patient and principled while casting Abu Dhabi actions as harmful to broader Arab and Islamic interests.

Emirati commentators reacted forcefully, rejecting the article as containing baseless accusations and methodological flaws. Several aligned with Israeli journalist Barak Ravid characterization of the piece as “anti-Semitic,” while Emirati academic Abdulkhaleq Abdullah described it as “media thuggery” that spreads conspiracy narratives and fuels hatred, arguing that such rhetoric has already prompted Western pushback and the removal of inflammatory content. Mohammed Al Hammadi added that although the cited sources formally exist, they do not support the conclusions drawn, accusing the author of exaggeration and selective distortion. Ahmed Khalifa echoed this view, describing the article as “childishness” that relies on fabrications and inflammatory claims.

Saudi responses, by contrast, largely defended the article and rejected the charge of “anti-Semitism,” with most Saudi commentators viewing it as a legitimate critique of Abu Dhabi policies rather than an attack on identities. At the same time, other Saudi academics adopted a more structural and analytical approach. Saudi academic Sultan Al Amer argued that freedom of expression necessarily separates individual opinion from state policy, stressing that in open systems “freedom of expression relieves the government of bearing responsibility for the opinions of its citizens.” Meanwhile, Mohanna Alhubail described the article as a rare moment that “opens the Saudi stage,” arguing that it exposes Abu Dhabi alignment with Tel Aviv against Palestinian resistance—an alignment he called “an absolute evil against the Ummah”—while still reserving doubts about some historical details. Amid apparent editorial hesitation at Al-Jazirah, where the article was removed and reinstated more than once, the debate it triggered continues to expose a widening and more public Saudi–Emirati divergence.

Davos

On another note, Gulf commentators shared their voices on the world leaders’ gathering at the 56th World Economic Forum in Davos (19–23 January 2026), reading the event as a signal of shifting global priorities amid economic and geopolitical uncertainty. From a Saudi perspective, Dr. Abdulaziz Al Jarallah argued that Saudi Arabia participation underscored its expanding role in “global dialogue and economic transformation,” presenting Vision 2030 as a development model. He noted that the Saudi delegation sought to “enhance effective dialogue and joint cooperation” while highlighting “Saudi success stories emerging from Vision 2030,” as the Kingdom advances longer-term ambitions such as Vision 2040 and hosting Expo Riyadh 2030. Building on this theme, Saudi commentator Hamood Abu Talib contrasted Saudi Arabia’s earlier “symbolic presence” at Davos with its current prominence, arguing that this shift followed the launch of Vision 2030 and the “tremendous momentum of achievements” delivered by its programs. He concluded that such transformation is possible when states possess “the necessary resources, vision, and skilled and effective management.”

Other Saudi voices emphasized geopolitics rather than development. Mishary Dhayidi focused on the centrality of “power” at Davos, rejecting Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng warning against a return to the “law of the jungle.” Instead, Dhayidi framed Donald Trump foreign policy as an expression of the enduring “right of power,” citing Greenland as a stark example and arguing that, in Trump view, figures like Emmanuel Macron “do not register in the real balance of power.” Veteran economist Ihsan Ali Buhulaiga offered a different geopolitical reading, contending that China emerged as the principal beneficiary of Davos 2026. Beijing, he argued, presented itself as a “calm and reliable leader” amid controversy surrounding Trump foreign policy, deliberately distancing itself from “unilateralism and protectionism.” By emphasizing “multilateralism and free trade,” “rules-based engagement,” and the importance of “globalization,” China repositioned itself as a stabilizing force. From a Kuwaiti perspective, Abdulla Hassan Thakur interpreted Davos 2026 as marking a shift toward an “economy of uncertainty,” where geopolitical friction, technological disruption, and institutional trust now shape economic decision-making. As global capital is repriced toward stability, he argued, investors increasingly favor jurisdictions with “strong institutions,” policy continuity, and predictability. In this environment, Kuwait stands out, with its “fiscal strength, institutional credibility, and balanced global integration” positioning it as a “reference point for stability” at a time when such qualities are becoming increasingly scarce.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Mohammed Al-Fazari “Qaboosism in Historical Perspective: British Policy, Rule Legitimacy and Resistance in Oman.” Palgrave Macmillan, February 2026.

• Analysis: “When Gulf Allies Fall Out.” Olivia Cuthbert, Middle East Uncovered, January 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia’s Rental markets between Q3-Q4 2025.” Meshal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, January 18, 2026.

• Analysis: “In a fragmented world, strategic autonomy is the UAE’s North Star.” Ebtesam AlKetbi, Emirates Policy Center, January 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Trump Administration and the Fracturing Saudi-UAE Alliance.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Center, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Gulf States on the Frontline of U.S.-Iran Volatility.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “A New Agreement on Economic Security: What Does It Mean for the UAE and Qatar to Join the Pax Silica Alliance?” Emirates Policy Center, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “A year into his return, Donald Trump has changed the Middle East – but he is only getting started.” Paul Salem, Middle East Institute, January 20, 2026.

• Analysis: “China-Middle East Connectivity: Iraq, Egypt, and Oman.” Nicholas Lyall, New Lines Institute, January 22, 2026. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Why US markets are betting on Saudi Arabia.” Khalid Azim, Atlantic Council, January 21, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia, Strategic Clarity, and the Architecture of Middle East Stability.” Ahmed Charai, The National Interest, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “How the UAE Became Serbia’s Most Important Arab Partner.” Giorgio Cafiero, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 22, 2026.

• Analysis: “Why Is Saudi Arabia Abandoning Peace?” Hussain Abdul-Hussain, The National Interest, January 23, 2026.

• Analysis: “Egypt’s Tightrope Walk Between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.” Haisam Hassanein, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 23, 2026.

• Podcast: “How Do We Understand the Yemen Issue?” with Badr Al-Qahtani, Socrates Podcast, January 19, 2026.

• Podcast: “What Happened in Financial Markets During 2025.” with Anas Al-Rajhi and Saeed Abduljabbar, Arbah Podcast, January 19, 2026.

• Podcast: “What does the Saudi-Emirati cold war mean for Israel, Trump and Iran?” with Andreas Krieg, UNAPOLOGETIC, January 23, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Gulf states pushing to avert U.S.-Iran conflict, official says.” CBS, January 15, 2026.

  “The countries involved in the diplomatic push include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Oman, according to the Gulf official. The talks have focused on lowering the temperature in public rhetoric and avoiding military action that these states feared could trigger wider regional instability.”

  Go Deeper: “Middle East governments believe US-Iran tension has ‘de-escalated’.” Financial Times, January 15, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia tells Iran its land, airspace won’t be used in strike: Sources.” Alarabiya, January 14, ,2026.

  “The message was conveyed as the United States warned it could respond to an Iranian government crackdown on protests, while Tehran has said it would strike US military and shipping assets in the event of a new attack.”

  Go Deeper: “Iran’s Gulf Rivals Warn U.S. Against Strike on Tehran.” WSJ, January 13, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia pledges $500 million Yemen development after UAE withdrawal.” Reuters, January 15, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia has announced a slew of development projects across southern Yemen worth about $500 million, many in areas long-held by the United Arab Emirates and allied separatists.”

  Go Deeper: “The Saudi–Emirati Drama in Yemen.” Arab Center [D.C], January 13, 2026.

• “Somalia cancels all agreements with the UAE, including at major ports.” Middle East Eye, January 12, 2026.

  “According to a senior Somali government source and a document seen by Middle East Eye, the move by the Mogadishu government includes all agreements with government agencies, related entities and regional administrations.”

  Go Deeper: “Why Somalia drew a line with the UAE.” Aljazeera, January 14, 2026.

• “Saudi Arabia in Talks With Egypt, Somalia on Military Coalition.” Bloomberg, January 16, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia is finalizing an agreement on a new military coalition with Somalia and Egypt, part of its bid to curtail the United Arab Emirates’ regional influence.”

  “Saudi Arabian officials have pushed the Somali government to curb ties with the UAE. Tensions between the two OPEC+ members have risen after the kingdom ordered the UAE to withdraw its troops from Yemen as it seeks to reduce its rival’s sway.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia moving towards military coalition with Somalia and Egypt.” Middle East Eye, January 16, 2026.

• “US halts immigrant visas for 75 nations, including Kuwait.” Kuwait Times, January 14, 2026.

  “The countries include Kuwait, Somalia, Russia, Afghanistan, Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Nigeria, Thailand, Yemen and more, according to Fox News.”

Market & Economy

• “IMF praises Oman but urges faster diversification.” AGBI, January 16, 2026.

  “The IMF’s executive directors joined staff in applauding Oman’s reform agenda, highlighting efforts to deepen the financial sector, bolster the labour market, streamline regulations and advance renewable energy production and digitalisation.”

  Go Deeper: “Oman: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Oman.” IMF, January 15, 2026.

• “Saudi Public Investment Fund plans to spin off mining firm Manara.” Reuters, January 14, 2026.

  “Manara, a joint venture between the Saudi Arabian Mining Company, also known as Maaden, and the $925 billion PIF, was established in 2023 to invest in critical minerals abroad. But, although it has bid for assets across Africa and Asia, it has so far completed only one deal: a $2.5 billion 10% stake in Vale Base Metals, which was spun off from Brazilian iron ore giant Vale in 2024.”

  Go Deeper: “The Saudi Arabian Mining Sector: Ongoing Investments Propel Long-term Growth.” The U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council, 2019.[PDF].

• “UAE’s Masdar reaches global clean energy capacity of 65 GW.” Reuters, January 13, 2026.

  “United Arab Emirates’ state-owned firm Masdar, has reached global capacity of 65 gigawatts of clean energy as it heads towards its goal of 100 GW by 2030.”

  Go Deeper: “Delivering on the UAE Consensus: Tracking progress toward tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling energy efficiency by 2030.” IRENA, 2025. [PDF].

• “Qatar joins US-led Pax Silica Alliance to secure semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains.” Arab News, January 13, 2026.

  “The alliance was launched last month in Washington with the aim of securing global supply chains for semiconductors, artificial intelligence technology, critical minerals and digital infrastructure.”

Domestics

• “Oman hands economic control to crown prince.” SEMAFOR, January 16, 2026.

  “Oman’s Sultan Haitham Al-Said has gained plaudits for transforming the country’s economic outlook since taking power six years ago this month. Now his son and anointed successor Theyazin is set to become an increasingly important figure. A cabinet reshuffle saw him promoted from the prosaic position of culture, sports, and youth minister to become deputy prime minister for economic affairs.”

  Go Deeper: “What Oman’s Constitutional Change Means for Omanis.” Carnegie, January 14, 2021.

• “Abu Dhabi crown prince chairs new sovereign wealth fund.” SEMAFOR, January 13, 2026.

  “Bankers will be familiar with the leadership of the fund, which joins an expanding alphabet soup that includes ADIA, ADQ, and Mubadala — together controlling roughly $2 trillion in assets. L’IMAD will be chaired by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, with Mubadala’s Khaldoon Al Mubarak on the board. CEO Jassem Al Zaabi also serves as vice chairman of the UAE Central Bank.”

  Go Deeper: “Making Sense of the UAE’s Latest Leadership Appointments.” The Washington Institute, May 12, 2023.

• UAE: “Establishing General Secretariat as executive body for ‘National Anti-Money Laundering Committee’.” Emirates News Agency (WAM), January 16, 2026.

  “It will also spearhead the implementation of policies aimed at combating money laundering, terrorism financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as defined related activities.”

• “Eric Trump markets $10B in Saudi real estate projects.” SEMAFOR, January 12, 2026.

  “Dar Global CEO Ziad El Chaar said the Diriyah project will include 500 mansions, priced between $6.7 million and $24 million. The company also launched a $1 billion project in Jeddah on Monday.”

  Go Deeper: “Why Trump’s Middle East trip should set sights beyond business deals.” Atlantic Council, May 9, 2025.

• “Kuwait Cancels Licenses of 516 Companies.” Arab Times, January 11, 2026.

  “Article 1 of the decree states that the commercial licenses of 516 companies listed in the attached appendix have been revoked due to their failure to submit financial statements for three consecutive years, in accordance with Paragraph (7) of Article 266 of the Companies Law.”

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Gulf Opinions

Following unofficial mediation efforts by Gulf states—including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—to avert any military action against Iran amid repeated threats by U.S. President Donald Trump, a clear consensus has emerged among Gulf commentators rejecting external interference in Iranian affairs. Saudi columnist Mishary Dhayidi argues that if a U.S. strike is framed merely as “deterrence” or as a symbolic “message,” rather than a decisive transformation of realities, it would likely consolidate the Iranian regime rather than undermine it. Such a move would rally public opinion around the idea that “the homeland” itself is under attack, a sentiment with deep emotional resonance in a society shaped by historical pride and national consciousness. In this reading, military action would once again exhaust the region, adding to a long record of wars that have drained resources, destroyed opportunities, and repeatedly extinguished hopes for stability.

Similar concerns are echoed by Saudi writer Majid bin Nuwaisir, who warns that the collapse of the Iranian regime would not produce a viable alternative but could fracture the country along ethnic and sectarian lines, turning it into a “Middle Eastern Yugoslavia.” Such a scenario, he argues, would export instability beyond Iran’s borders, destabilizing Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Gulf, while transforming Iran’s military assets into decentralized threats spread across militias, smuggling routes, and maritime choke points. In this context, the Strait of Hormuz would shift from a strategic pressure point into an open arena of chaos, underscoring that war on Iran would endanger regional and global security rather than enhance it. From Kuwait, Dr. Abdullah Al-Shayji offers a more structural reading of U.S. intentions, suggesting that Washington aims to force Iran into concessions far beyond the 2015 nuclear agreement, moving from the permitted 3.67 percent enrichment toward a complete halt—effectively terminating Iran’s nuclear program—while simultaneously responding to pressure from Netanyahu and his far-right government to neutralize Iran’s missile capabilities.

Bahraini commentators extend this critique to the internal Iranian scene. Saad Al Rashid argues that any foreign intervention in Iranian protests would drain them of momentum and ultimately serve the regime, which would reframe popular dissent as “foreign-backed” agitation, thereby reinforcing its legitimacy. Abdulnabi Al Shoala similarly observes that Iran stands at a historic crossroads, facing a choice between undertaking deep reforms that rebuild the social contract on new foundations or persisting with old crisis-management methods that will only intensify tension and instability. From Oman, Murtada bin Hassan bin Ali concludes that even if Washington ultimately steps back from military action—as some of President Trump statements suggest—”this would not end the crisis, but merely entrench ‘a fragile deterrence.’” The Middle East shaped by the Iran question, he argues, will not necessarily be calmer, but fundamentally different, and potentially “more dangerous” during a volatile transitional phase.

Nashra Picks

• Book: McPherson-Smith, Oliver, “Crude Calculations: Regime Stability, Economic Liberalization, and the Energy Transition.” Cambridge University Press, January 8, 2026.

• Analysis: “How Gulf Engagement Could Shape Syria’s Reconstruction.” Nicholas Lyall, Gulf International Forum, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Saudi–Emirati Drama in Yemen.” Nabeel Khoury, Arab Center [D.C], January 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “What Ankara Sees in Riyadh — and Why It Still Needs Abu Dhabi.” Gönül Tol, Middle East Institute, January 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “Should Saudi Policymakers Be Concerned About Rising Unemployment?” Tim Callen, AGSI, January 16, 2026.

• Analysis: “Venezuela, Trump, and Implications for OPEC’s Middle Eastern Core.” Kate Dourian, AGSI, January 13, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Emerging ‘Hybrid Professional’: GenAI’s Impact on Skill Demand Changes in the UAE.” Ahmed Dawoud & Ahmed Habashy, ORF, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Ship of Tolerance sails into Jeddah.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, Al-monitor, January 15, 2026.

• Analysis: “The Manager-Monarch Who Saved Oman.” Bobby Ghosh, Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2026.

• Analysis: “From partners to rivals: What the Saudi-UAE rupture means for Europeans.” Cinzia Bianco, European Council on Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2026.

• Podcast: “An Unscripted Conversation with Nada Baeshen & Ahd Kamel.” Mo Show, January 11, 2026.

• Podcast: “The Expat Experience in Saudi Arabia - Frankie Hilton & Lily Moffatt | One in Tribe - Ep 30” One in Tribe, January 7, 2026.

• Webinar: “Outlook 2026: Prospects and Priorities for U.S.-Gulf Relations in the Year Ahead” AGSI, January 16, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Turkey Said to Seek Membership of Saudi-Pakistan Defense Pact.” Bloomberg, January 9, 2026.

  “Should Turkey ink its membership in the alliance, it would underscore the new era in relations with Saudi Arabia as the erstwhile rival leaders of the Sunni Muslim world. After turning the page on years of rancor, the countries are working to develop economic and defense cooperation. They held their first ever naval meeting in Ankara this week, according to the Turkish Defense Ministry.”

  Go Deeper: “Turkish-Saudi Convergence in the New Middle East.” AGSI, May 21, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia Moves to Rein In UAE as Yemen Exposes Rivalry.” Bloomberg, January 9, 2026.

  “The fallout between the Arab world’s two biggest economies — and key American allies — will have repercussions far beyond Yemen. It could impact efforts to contain Iran and ensure the Gaza ceasefire endures, as well as hit companies using Dubai as a hub to conduct business in Saudi Arabia.”

  Go Deeper: “How Saudi-UAE tensions could reshape regional alignments in 2026.” Middle East Eye, January 1, 2026.

• “Advisor to Prime Minister and Spokesperson for Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Qatar Engaged with Mediators to Reach Second Phase of Gaza Agreement.” Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 6, 2026.

  “Contacts are still ongoing to reach the second phase of the agreement.”

  “However, there are still obstacles under discussion, in addition to several obstacles on which agreements have been reached.”

  Go Deeper: “Qatar’s Adroit Post-October 7 Diplomacy.” Hussein Ibish, Arab Gulf States Institute, January 4, 2026.

• “Bahrain begins UN Security Council membership for 2026-27.” MSN, January 3, 2026.

  “Ambassador Jamal Fares Al Rowaiei, Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations in New York, attended a flag-raising ceremony at the UN headquarters to mark the start of the term.”

  “It is the second time in Bahrain’s history that the kingdom has served on the Security Council.”

• Exclusive-Pakistan, Saudi in talks on JF-17 jets-for-loans deal, sources say.” Al-Monitor, January 7, 2026.

  “The first source said the total deal was worth $4 billion, with an additional $2 billion to be spent on equipment over and above the loan conversion. The sources close to the military with knowledge of the matter spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the deal.”

  Go Deeper: “Why It Took Pakistan So Long To Sell JF-17 Fighters To An Arab Country.” Forbes, December 28, 2025.

Market & Economy

• “Saudi Stocks Climb on Hopes for More Market Liberalization.” Bloomberg, January 7, 2026.

  “Lifting restrictions on foreign ownership also stands to boost the weight of Saudi equities in MSCI Inc. benchmarks. The kingdom’s $2.3 trillion equity market’s weight in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index currently stands at 2.9%.”

• “Minister Sidhu to visit Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE to promote Canadian trade.” Global Affairs Canada, January 5, 2026.

  “In 2024, Canada-Qatar merchandise trade was valued at $325.4 million, comprising $159.2 million in exports from Canada and $166.2 million in imports.”

• “Oman Launches 11th Five-Year Development Plan (2026-2030).” Oman News Agency, January 1, 2026.

  “The plan targets an economic growth rate of approximately 4 percent at constant prices.”

  “The Eleventh Five-Year Plan necessitates additional investments estimated at RO 15.6 billion, channeled towards pivotal economic and social sectors to accelerate economic growth and realize a target rate of 5 percent.”

  Go Deeper: “Ultimate of Oman Ministry of Commerce and Industry Action Plan: Roadmap for the Implementation of the Manufacturing Strategy 2040, “Manufacturing for Well-being” [PDF].

• “Saudi Arabia approves annual borrowing plan for 2026.” Arab News, January 4, 2026.

  “the Kingdom’s projected funding needs for 2026 are estimated at approximately SR217 billion ($57.8 billion).”

  “This is intended to cover an anticipated budget deficit of SR165 billion, as well as principal repayments on debt maturing during the year.”

  Go Deeper: Saudi Arabia: “​2026​ ​Annual Borrowing Plan.” National Debt Management Center, 2026. [PDF].

• “Revenues of Oman’s 2026 Budget Exceed RO 11.4 Billion.” Oman News Agency, January 1, 2026.

  “Total public expenditure was estimated at approximately RO 11.977 billion, rising by 1.5 percent from the approved expenditure for 2025. Meanwhile, the estimated budget deficit for 2026 stands at approximately RO 530 million, a decrease of 14.5 percent from the deficit approved in the 2025 budget, constituting 4.6 percent of total revenues and 1.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).”

• Kuwait: “Committee reviews progress on major development projects.” Kuwait Times, January 8, 2026.

  “Discussions covered Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port, the electricity and power system, renewable energy development and a low-carbon system for waste recycling.”

  Go Deeper: “Kuwait: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission.” IMF, December 18, 2025.

• Saudi Arabia: “Soudah Development and National Grid sign SAR 1.3 billion agreement to power Soudah Peaks.” Public Investment Fund, January 4, 2026.

  “This strategic partnership marks a critical milestone in the development of Soudah Peaks, an ultra-luxury mountain destination rising 3,015 meters above sea level.”

  “National Grid will design and construct the integrated electrical network that includes a 380/132 kilovolt central substation with a capacity of 500 megavolt-amperes.”

• “OPEC+ Country Members Reaffirm Commitment to Market Stability.” Energy News Beat, January 4, 2026.

  “Notably, the countries confirmed their November 2, 2025, agreement to pause planned production increments for February and March 2026, citing seasonal demand factors.”

  “This pause affects approximately 1.65 million barrels per day (mb/d), which could be gradually reintroduced—either partially or fully—depending on market developments.”

Domestics

• “UAE Raises Minimum Wage for Emiratis in the Private Sector to AED 6,000 from January 2026.” Middle East Briefing, January 5, 2026.

  “a further increase in the minimum wage for Emirati employees working in the private sector, raising it to AED 6,000 per month effective January 1, 2026. The move continues the UAE’s phased Emiratization wage strategy and aims to enhance labor market competitiveness while strengthening incentives for citizens to join private sector roles.”

• “Bahrain announces electricity and water tariff updates for 2026.” The Daily Tribune, January 4, 2026.

  “The rates for the first and second consumption tiers in primary residences will remain unchanged for citizens, with consideration for extended families.”

  “For all other non-subsidized categories, electricity rates will increase from 29 fils to 32 fils per kilowatt-hour, effective January 2026.”

• “Oman to host second Middle East Space Conference in January 2026.” SatellitePro ME, December 20, 2025.

  “Building on the strong momentum of its inaugural edition, MESC 2026 will convene more than 450 senior-ranking decision-makers representing over 190 organisations from more than 20 countries.”

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Gulf Opinions

Gulf commentators focused on widening Saudi–UAE differences over Yemen as events accelerated on the ground, particularly after the announcement surrounding the dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council and Aidarous Al Zubaidi refusal to attend the Riyadh dialogue conference, developments that deepened doubts over coordination between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. From Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Al Otaibi framed Riyadh approach as consistent support for southern rights within a legitimate, Saudi-backed political framework, arguing that the “Riyadh Conference” aimed to support what southerners agree upon “under legitimacy and in coordination with it,” and portraying engagement with the political track as a “wise and courageous” choice. From Saudi Arabia, Turki Al Qoblan linked Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia as interconnected arenas of state fragmentation threatening Arab national security, warning that failure in Yemen would trigger cascading instability because “Arab national security is an integrated system,” while emphasizing that the priority is restoring a unified Yemeni state rather than managing fragmentation. Also from Saudi Arabia, Shaher Al-Nahari argued that the real threat to Arab states, directly accused the UAE. comes from “clear interventions” that empower militias, mercenaries, arms proliferation, and covert alliances, warning that this kind of politics fragments societies and undermines state-building; he stressed that influence should not be pursued through coercion or proxy warfare, and cautioned against turning conflict into a marketplace for “buying blood, ports, waterways, and economies,” because the danger lies in how these practices branch outward and convert internal divisions into lasting tools of control.

From the United Arab Emirates side, Abdullah Majed Al Ali defended Abu Dhabi role as part of a collective Arab responsibility rooted in counterterrorism, aimed at confronting sectarian militias and preventing extremist groups from exploiting post-Houthi chaos, presenting the UAE approach as a comprehensive strategy combining military action with humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and reconstruction. Mohammed Faisal Al Dosari warned that “every rift in the Gulf ranks whets the appetite of extremist organizations and gives them an opportunity to expand, encouraging forces that thrive on chaos and seek to transform division into a permanent reality,” framing Gulf cohesion as a security necessity while arguing that stability depends on balanced regional roles rather than a single center and that the UAE rejects subordination to a “single-axis” logic. Finally, Abdullah Alhashmi urged judging policies by outcomes rather than intentions, stressing that this position “does not mean defending mistakes or claiming infallibility, but a clear call to judge outcomes, not motives,” and pointing to Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, and Sudan as cases where upheaval produced state collapse rather than reform, turning manageable disagreements into fragmented agendas that now threaten Gulf cohesion itself.

Other Gulf voices positioned Yemen within a wider strategic rethinking. From Qatar, Ahmed Khalifa revived a long-standing argument for integrating Yemen into the Gulf framework, recalling that “Gulf security cannot be separated from its natural environment in the Arabian Peninsula,” and warning that exclusion deepens demographic and strategic vulnerabilities. From Kuwait, Badr Khalid called for a “Gulf confederation” and a reinforced security–military alliance supported by international powers to confront what he described as a “new Middle East led by Israel,” presenting unified Gulf security as an urgent strategic response. From Oman, Khamis Al Adawai argued that the absence of a unified Gulf strategic and media vision since the post–Cold War order has fragmented Gulf discourse and weakened coordination, making the revival of an integrated Gulf vision toward Yemen a strategic necessity rather than a rhetorical aspiration.

Nashra Picks

• Analysis: “Saudi Emirati Tensions and the Struggle for Influence in Southern Yemen.” Arab Center, January 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Wage growth provides some relief as food inflation resumes climb.” Saudi Labor Pulse, January 8, 2026.

• Analysis: “How to Make EU-GCC Ties Beneficial for Small States.” Máté Szalai, Trends Research & Advisory, January 2, 2026.

• Analysis: “Exporting Fossil Fuels Through Cloud Computing.” Camille Ammoun, Carnegie, January 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “The STC Makes its Move in Yemen: What it Means for the Country’s Future.” Alexander Langlois, Gulf International Forum, January 7, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia approves 2026 debt plan.” Daniel Richards, Emirates NBD Research, January 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia kicks off 2026 borrowing.” Edward Bell, Emirates NBD Research, January 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “Yemen separatists accuse Saudi Arabia of ‘betrayal’ as pro-Riyadh forces advance.” Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, January 7, 2026.

• Analysis: “Amid Yemen tensions, how can the Gulf states avoid another rift?” Bader Al-Saif, Chatham House, January 8, 2026.

• Analysis: “Bahrain’s Difficult Yet Necessary Fiscal Turn.” Mahdi Ghuloom, ORF, January 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “A new Gulf order? What December’s Bahrain summit tells us about the future of the GCC.” Arab Business, January 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “A Silent Withdrawal: How Bahrain Has Emerged as a New Front in the Growing Saudi Emirati Rift.” Dark Box, January 6, 2026.

• Analysis: “U.S.-UAE AI Cooperation: Future Trajectories.” Newlines, January 7, 2026.

• Analysis: “The UAE and the Sudan Civil War: Strategy and Regional Consequences.” The Times of Israel, January 5, 2026.

• Analysis: “From coalition to confrontation: Saudi-UAE rivalry in Yemen and its regional implications.” Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Middle East Institute, January 05, 2026.

• Analysis: “Buckle Your Seatbelts: The U.S. National Security Strategy and the Coming Turbulence in the Gulf.” Patrick Theros, Gulf International Forum, January 8, 2026, English.

• Analysis: “Oman, eastern Yemen, and the fragile geometry of neutrality.” Farea Al-Muslimi, Chatham House, January 8, 2026.

• Podcast: “The Saudi–UAE Rift: Yemen and the End of an Alliance? | Dr Andreas Krieg.” The Thinking Muslim, January 5, 2026.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Saudi Arabia bombs Yemen port city over weapons shipment from UAE for separatists.” AP News, December 30, 2025.

  “The bombing followed tensions over the advance of Emirates-backed separatist forces known as the Southern Transitional Council. The council and its allies issued a statement supporting the UAE’s presence, even as others allied with Saudi Arabia demanded that Emirati forces withdraw from Yemen in 24 hours’ time.”

  Go Deeper: “How the UAE-Saudi Arabia alliance ruptured.” Financial Times, December 31, 2025.

• “UAE says it ends mission of remaining forces in Yemen voluntarily.” Reuters, December 30, 2025.

  “The United Arab Emirates’ defence ministry said on Tuesday it has voluntarily ended the mission of its counterterrorism units in Yemen, the only remaining forces it has in the country after ending its military presence in 2019.

  It said the decision came after a comprehensive assessment following recent developments, state news agency WAM reported.”

  Go Deeper: “Gulf Rivals Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. Come to Blows in Yemen.” WSJ, December 30, 2025.

Market, Economy & Domestics

• “Bahrain Unveils Package of Reforms to Fight Fiscal Woes.” Bloomberg, December 29, 2025.

  “A new law on corporate tax will apply to local companies, the government said in a statement on Monday, without disclosing detail on the change..”

  “Reforms also include plans to raise fuel and natural gas prices, increase dividends from state-owned companies and cut administrative government expenditures by 20%.”

  Go Deeper: “IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to The Kingdom of Bahrain.” IMF, November 24, 2025.

• “Saudi Stocks’ Worst Year in a Decade Leaves Traders Grim on 2026.” Bloomberg, December 11, 2025.

  “The dismal outlook comes on top of this year’s 11% selloff in the Tadawul All Share Index, the biggest drop since 2015. Earnings growth is also expected to be sluggish, with analysts predicting a 2% increase in profit next year, compared with 13% growth for the MSCI benchmark.”

• “UAE advances AI strategy with 97% adoption, major infrastructure plans in 2025.” CXO Insight, December 29, 2025.

  “The United Arab Emirates reinforced its standing as a global centre for artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure in 2025, recording a world-leading 97 percent utilisation rate of AI tools across government entities and surpassing 450,000 programmers nationwide.”

  Go Deeper: “Dubai’s State of Al Report: The Public Sector Version.” Digital Dubai Authority, 2025. [PDF].

• “Saudi Arabia finalizes arrangement of $13bln syndicated loan to fund utilities.” Zawya, January 1, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia’s National Debt Management Center ​said on Wednesday it had finalized the arrangement ⁠of a $13 billion, seven-year syndicated loan to ⁠help finance power, water ‌and public utilities projects..”

  “The transaction is a part of the ⁠kingdom’s medium-term debt strategy, which aims to diversify funding sources and meet financing needs over the medium to long ⁠term.”

  Go Deeper: “Annual Borrowing Plan Report: Fiscal Year 2025.” National Debt Management Center, 2025. [PDF].

• “Saudi FDI net inflows in Q3 surge 34% to $6.6bln.” Zawya, January 1, 2026.

  “Saudi Arabia’s foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows for the third quarter of 2025 surged to SAR24.9 billion, up 34.5% over the previous year when its net inflows hit SAR18.5 billion, reported SPA, citing the the General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT) data.”

  “This figure also shows a 5.2% rise from the previous quarter, which recorded SAR23.7 billion, according to the FDI Statistics bulletin issued by GASTAT.”

  Go Deeper: “Understanding Saudi Foreign Direct Investment Data.” Tim Callen, Arabian Gulf States Institute, February 12, 2025.

• “Oman approves 2026 budget with deficit of $1.4bln, state news agency says.” Zawya, January 1, 2026.

  “Oman, ‍a ‍small Gulf oil producer, approved ​on Thursday its 2026 budget with ⁠a deficit of 530 million Omani Rials ($1.38 ⁠billion), which ‌accounts for 1.3% of national output, the state news agency ⁠reported..”

  “Oman expects total spending of 11.977 billion rials in 2026, up 1.5% from 2025, ⁠the state news agency ​said.”

  Go Deeper: “Final Performance: A Quarterly Bulletin Issued by the Minister of Finance, Second Quarter.” Ministry of Finance, 2025. [PDF].

• Qatar: “Ports activity accelerates with 64% rise in cargo movement.” The Peninsula, January 2, 2026.

  “With rapid growth in transhipment — accounting for nearly 50 percent of total volumes handled (January to November 2025)— the port solidified Qatar’s status as a vital regional hub for trade and logistics, in line with the Ministry of Transport’s strategic plan.”

  Go Deeper: “Qatar Freight And Logistics Market Size & Share Analysis - Growth Trends And Forecast (2026 - 2031).” Mordor Intelligence, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia arrests 116 government officials in anti-corruption crackdown.” Gulf News, January 01, 2026.

  “Nazaha questioned 466 people during a nationwide campaign targeting bribery and the abuse of official positions in December 2025.”

  Go Deeper: “The Saudi Anticorruption Drive Moves Beyond Frying a Few Big Fish.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, December 10, 2024.

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Gulf Opinions

Following Saudi Arabia’s bombing of Yemen port city of Mukalla on Tuesday, 30 December 2025, after a weapons shipment from the United Arab Emirates reportedly arrived for southern separatists, commentators in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE sharply debated the strike and the broader tension between the two countries. Emirati voices largely condemned the episode. Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdullah argued that such tensions often stem from a “big brother complex,” stressing that while Gulf states respect an elder role, they reject “subordination,” remain committed to “plural centers of influence,” and do not compromise their sovereign decision-making. Hani Mas’hour, warned that the Muslim Brotherhood sought to advance southward “riding on the back of the Saudi tank,” tracing the problem to unilateralism and what he described as dealing with the Houthis through a “logic of surrender.” In Al Etihad, Abdullah Al Hashmi characterized Yemen current leadership as merely “formal legitimacy,” arguing that demands for a different political future in the south reflect the failure of the unity model and the center inability to protect or fairly represent the peripheries. Dr Ali Al Nuaimi, meanwhile, cautioned that disputes between partners should be handled “within the framework, not in public,” warning that public doubt and “friendly fire” erode trust, weaken deterrence, and undermine any effective alliance.

Saudi commentators, by contrast, framed the strike as a defense of Yemen legitimacy and Saudi national security. Dr Abdulghani Al Kindi drew no distinction between Hezbollah, the Rapid Support Forces, the Houthis, and southern separatists, arguing that all risk sliding into a “de facto militia” model. Adhwan Al Ahmari similarly maintained that the Southern Transitional Council does not represent the south as a whole but is one armed faction whose presence in Hadramawt was imposed “by force” and reversed “by force,” driven by access to “oil, maritime, and natural resources,” while Aden functions largely as a “logistical hub” with weaker economic fundamentals. Hamoud Abu Talib went further, arguing that Saudi Arabia now faces “new facts” that cannot be ignored, as weapons shipments from an Emirati port to a faction rebelling against Yemen legitimate authority constitute a “blatant violation” of the coalition mandate and a “direct threat” to Saudi security, making claims of mere “militia smuggling” implausible without official knowledge. Finally, Khaled Al Malik stressed that Saudi Arabia does not deny southern Yemenis their rights, but argued that the problem lies with Aidarous Al Zubaidi, who he said placed “personal interests” above the south, “overturned legitimacy,” and instrumentalized the “southern cause” in ways that undermined gains achieved through the “2014 National Dialogue,” the “2019 Riyadh Agreement,” and the “2022 transfer of power.”

More Gulf Opinions

• “The United States has effectively ‘laid its hand’ on the Venezuelan state, at least for the time being, in a striking development at the start of 2026, but Trump did so in the mold of his Republican predecessors Reagan and George H. W. Bush with Noriega, who was also implicated in the Iran arms deal known as ‘Iran-Contra.’ This dramatic episode reveals a new American order in which the sole criterion is direct US interest, with little regard for any other consideration.”

Mishary Dhayidi, Asharq Al-Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), January 4, 2026.

• “What are the risks facing the Gulf middle class? The most serious of these risks is that it becomes suspended or gradually erodes when confronted with pressures such as the cost of living and housing rising far faster than income growth, inflation in consumption patterns, weak governance, and blocked channels of fairness in promotion, ownership, and saving. Under such conditions, pressure intensifies when people feel they are working hard without advancing, striking at the very core of ‘what it means to be middle class,’ as this sense of purpose is undermined by feelings of neglect, lack of recognition, and a broader atmosphere of indifference.”

Abdulaziz Alkhater, Al Raya, (Qatar), January 4, 2026.

• “The Iranian and Venezuelan experiences, among others, reveal that US interventions are driven by a logic of dominance and colonial-style subordination rather than partnership, and by the manufacture of instability and the so-called discredited concept of “creative chaos,” rather than support for stability. While such policies may temporarily succeed in unsettling targeted states, they often fail to break the will of peoples and instead leave behind deeper crises, with moral rhetoric serving merely as a cover for pressure and disorder that advance narrow interests at the expense of national sovereignty and global stability.”

Khalid bin Salem Al Ghasani, Al Roya, (Oman), January 3, 2026.

• “The United Arab Emirates adopts a different approach to media diplomacy, one based on managing the narrative rather than confronting it. The state does not rely on reactive media, nor does it engage in emotional polemics or escalation campaigns; instead, it adheres to a balanced discourse grounded in the presentation of verified information, the rapid and professional release of official data, and engagement with regional and international public opinion in multiple languages, thereby breaking the monopoly of a single narrative and strengthening the presence of the Emirati narrative in the global media space. At the same time, the UAE systematically invests in international media, research centers, and digital diplomacy, recognizing that winning global public opinion increasingly depends on a state’s ability to address international audiences in a rational language that respects the awareness and intelligence of the recipient.”

Ahmed Al Hosani, Al Etihad, (UAE), December 30, 2025.

• “The Gulf banking sector, in turn, continued to record strong performance in 2025, with the total assets of Gulf banks estimated at more than $3.7 trillion, alongside continued growth in credit directed to the private sector at rates ranging between 5 percent and 7 percent. Banks also recorded high levels of capital adequacy and liquidity, and achieved solid profits supported by a relatively high interest rate environment.”

Adnan Ahmed Yousef, Akhbar Al Khaleej, (Bahrain), December 29, 2025.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Naim, Nadia., AlDebasi, Alhanoof., and Price, David., “Intellectual Property and Innovation: Contemporary Developments in the GCC Member States.” Springer, 2025.

• Research: “A two-way path: State-driven and bottom-up social change in contemporary Arab Gulf monarchies.” Sara Brzuszkiewicz, European View, April 20, 2025. [PDF].

• Research: “Assessment of Political Principles in the Constitution of Oman from International Law Perspectives.” Fahad Al Aghbari, Muhamad Sayuti Hassan, and Nurhafilah Musa, Law Reform, March, 2025. [PDF].

• Research: “Government Ownership in GCC Countries: Toward Institutional and Governance Development and Reforms.” Julia Barbar, Springer, December 2025. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Saudi Arabia’s Path Forward Amid Lower Oil Prices.” Amine Mati and Yuan Rollinson, IMF, December 18, 2025.

• Analysis: “From Sputnik to satellites: How China is pulling Egypt and Gulf into its space orbit.” Al-Monitor, December 30, 2025.

• Analysis: “Abu Dhabi’s Big Bid on Culture.” Rebecca Anne Proctor, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 30, 2025.

• Analysis: “A New Posture: How Saudi Arabia is Reshaping its Military Readiness.” Gulf International Forum, Leonardo Mazzucco, December 29, 2025.

• Analysis: “Understanding the Saudi Reaction to the Escalation in Yemen.” Michael Ratney, CSIS, December 31, 2025.

• Analysis: “Foresight For Resilience: The Oman Clean Energy Strategic Outlook.” Dawud Ansari, The Majan Council, December 30, 2025. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Mixed signals from the new Q3 2025 labor market data.” Meshal Alkhowaiter, Saudi Labor Pulse, January 01, 2026.

• Podcast: “HRH Prince Faisal bin Bandar Al-Saud: Chairman of Saudi Esports Federation.” The Mo Show, December 30, 2025.

• Podcast: “How Does Oman View Yemen? And Where Does It Stand Among the Gulf Powers?” Hosts Mohammed Al-Araimi, Yemen Podcast, December 30, 2025.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Saudi Arabia demands Yemeni separatists leave seized governorates.” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2025.

  “Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the demand on Thursday, describing military operations by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) as an “unjustified escalation” after the group took control of the oil-rich Hadramout and al-Mahra governorates earlier in December.”

  Go Deeper: “Yemen’s Seismic Shift Has Consequences Beyond Its Borders.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 22, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia rejects unilateral Israeli recognition of Somaliland.” Alarabiya, December 27, 2025.

  “Israel became the first country to formally recognize the self-declared Republic of Somaliland ‍as an independent and sovereign state, with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu claiming this was done “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.”..”

  “For its part, Saudi Arabia expressed its full support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.”

  Go Deeper: “Somaliland: How Trump, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others reacted to Israeli recognition.” Middle East Eye, December 27, 2025.

Market, Economy & Domestics

• “Qatar awards $4B gas deal in push to meet LNG output.” Yahoo Finance, December 24, 2025.

  “The engineering, procurement, construction, and installation contract will take five years to complete. Italian energy services company Saipem will take on the majority of the work, worth $3.1 billion, alongside China’s Offshore Oil Engineering Co.”

  Go Deeper: “Qatar Plans Major Expansion of Physical LNG Trading Volumes.” Bloomberg, May 20, 2025.

• “Oman’s United Solar to receive $30m from Waaree Solar Americas.” Semafor, December 22, 2025.

  “When complete, the plant will produce 100,000 tons a year of polysilicon — enough to support 40 gigawatts of solar module production — offering customers an alternative to China, which has a near-monopoly on the market. It is part of a growing trend for Gulf countries to develop renewable energy manufacturing capabilities, with some analysts predicting the region will become a hub for solar panel exports.”

  Go Deeper: “Middle East, North Africa solar manufacturing capacity to reach 44 GW by 2029, says WoodMac.” PV Magazine, May 13, 2025.

• “Exclusive / Prince Alwaleed nears $400 million deal for Saudi soccer team.” Semafor, December 24, 2025.

  “Kingdom Holding Company, Prince Alwaleed’s investment vehicle, has been in talks with Saudi’s Public Investment Fund for several months. The remaining stake in the club is owned by a Saudi non-profit organization that’s mostly funded by Prince Alwaleed.”

  “The deal could value the team — currently ranked second in the Saudi Pro League — at about 2 billion riyals ($530 million).”

  Go Deeper: “Beyond Football: Saudi Arabia’s Rise Through Soccer and Statecraft.” Gulf International Forum, July 29, 2025.

• “Rights groups condemn new record number of executions in Saudi Arabia.” BBC, December 21, 2025.

  “At least 347 people have now been put to death this year, up from a total of 345 in 2024, according to the UK-based campaign group Reprieve, which tracks executions in Saudi Arabia and has clients on death row.”

• “Kuwait closes the ‘exceptional services’ citizenship file and revokes nationality in cases of fraud and forgery.” Alarabiya, December 25, 2025.

  “Kuwait has closed the ‘exceptional services’ citizenship file by completing the revocation of nationality from those who obtained it under this provision, reaching back to the country’s first naturalization case in 1968, according to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai.”

• “Bahrain: Tourism revenues rise 27% since 2022.” Khaleej Online, December 24, 2025.

  “It noted that the number of tourists recorded an annual increase ranging between 18% and 20% during the past period, which helped strengthen the sector’s performance and raise its contribution to GDP.”

  “The tourism sector’s contribution to GDP reached 6.8%, a relatively high level compared with other GCC countries, reflecting the structural transformation underway in the sector.”

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Gulf Opinions

This week, Saudi and Emirati commentators engaged in a wide-ranging debate over the prospects of Southern Yemen and its political future. In Saudi Arabia, commentary largely emphasized restraint, legitimacy, and institutional order. Writing in Asharq Al-Awsat, Yemeni Shura Council member Lutfi Fouad Numan aligned his argument with the message delivered by Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, asserting that Yemenis assuming greater responsibility for their own affairs would ease the burden on regional allies and noting that recent Saudi statements carry “signals that the discerning will readily understand.” Indeed, Prince Khalid urged the Southern Transitional Council to prioritize “reason, wisdom, and unity of ranks” by responding to Saudi-Emirati mediation efforts, de-escalating tensions, and transferring military camps to the National Shield Forces and local authorities. Together, these positions reflect a Saudi emphasis on gradual stabilization through recognized frameworks and coordinated diplomacy.

Emirati commentators, however, advanced a different reading of the situation. Hani Mas’hor criticized what he described as a persistent assumption in Yemeni discourse that political outcomes are always “shaped from outside,” arguing instead that the crisis predates 2014 and stems from decades of exclusion, denial of pluralism, and the imposition of a single center over a diverse geography. From this perspective, developments in Hadramawt and Al-Mahrah cannot be reduced to mere “escalation” devoid of historical context. Similarly, Dhahi Khalfan questioned Saudi opposition to southern independence, arguing that rejecting both an independent south and a strong north is an unsustainable position, while warning that calls for unity may ultimately serve Iranian influence. Other Emirati voices, including Mohammed Faisal Al-Dosari, framed the southern project not as secession but as the restoration of a previously recognized state. At the same time, Mohammed Al-Hamadi cautioned against turning political disagreement into conspiracy narratives, stressing that differences must remain “objective and fair to the facts.”

By contrast, Saudi commentators remained firmly anchored in the language of unity and international legitimacy. Abdulrahman Al-Rashed argued that secessionist movements rarely succeed, noting that the international community broadly rejects them because they threaten global stability. Without legitimacy, he warned, the South risks “long years of war, misery, and dangerous fragmentation.” Shaher Al-Nahari echoed this concern, portraying southern fragmentation as a pathway to disorder reminiscent of earlier conflicts in Hodeidah and Sana’a driven by factional ambitions and regional interference. This line of argument culminated in a broader institutional critique articulated by Firas Traboulsi, who stressed that legitimacy is not a procedural formality but a “political safety valve,” concluding that bypassing agreed frameworks only compounds crises rather than resolving them.

More Gulf Opinions

• “It appears that the ‘Republic’ of Somaliland—if it truly exercises sovereign decision-making—must navigate a three-dimensional dilemma that could unsettle its very existence: domestically, the challenge of preserving social cohesion; regionally, the need to account for the repercussions of intense geopolitical competition over its strategic ports; and internationally, confronting the reality that breaking diplomatic isolation through a controversial Israeli recognition would further complicate its path toward stability and development.”

Fayez bin Abdullah Al-Shehri, Al Riyadh, (Saudi Arabia), December 29, 2025.

• “The essence of the BRICS project does not lie in its summits or final communiqués, but in its attempt to break the dollar’s monopoly over global trade. Conducting transactions in local currencies and building alternative financial systems is not merely an economic step; it is a political declaration of reclaiming sovereign decision-making and freeing itself from the instruments of pressure the West has employed for decades, whether through sanctions or control over international financial institutions.”

Dhari Al-Mir, Al Jarida, (Kuwait), December 28, 2025.

• “Freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia is not a matter of legal dispute, as it is guaranteed by law; however, it is not an unrestricted right. Rather, it is a conscious freedom exercised within a clear legal framework that balances the individual right to expression with society’s right to security and stability. In an era of accelerating platforms and increasingly intense discourse, the central message remains that words carry responsibility, and freedom is not measured by the absence of law.”

Mohamed Al Rashid, Al Bilad, (Bahrain), December 27, 2025.

• “In today’s world, power is no longer measured solely by the scale of a state economy or influence, but by its ability to project a cultural narrative capable of crossing borders and shaping perceptions. This is where the Doha Dictionary emerges as an instrument of soft power. By documenting the Arabic language historically through a rigorous scholarly methodology, it enhances Arabic capacity to engage more fully with global platforms, universities, research centers, and digital technologies. It also places Arabic on equal footing with major languages that preceded it in large-scale linguistic historiography projects, while breaking the stereotype that confines Arabic to heritage or sacredness alone, without recognizing its dynamism and capacity to interact with modernity.”

Hisah Al Marwani, Al Sharq, (Qatar), December 24, 2025.

• “There are strategic plans aimed at control and influence over maritime corridors stretching from Yemen and the Horn of Africa to Sudan and the African continent; this suggests that these wars form a chain of carefully calculated schemes that will ultimately coalesce into a fully integrated strategic project, complete in both structure and mechanisms.”

Awadh bin Saeed, Oman Daily, (Oman), December 23, 2025.

• “This concern cannot be separated from a Sudanese memory burdened by the experience of the “Inqaz” regime, which led to a devastating civil war, suffocating international isolation, and the transformation of Sudan into a haven for figures associated with extremism and terrorism. It was this very experience that drove Sudanese civil forces themselves to agree on the necessity of excluding the Muslim Brotherhood from governance and political life.”

Anwar Mohammed Gargash, Al Etihad, (UAE), December 23, 2025.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Sfakianakis, John, “The Economy of Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century.” Oxford Press University, June, 2024.

• Research: “Strategic Energy Convergence: US Policy and Saudi Arabia’s Transition in Critical Minerals and Civil Nuclear Cooperation.” Umud Shokri, Sakarya University, November, 2025. [PDF].

• Research: “Between Brussels and Beijing: Strategic Choices for the GCC Member States in the Era of Fourth Energy Transition.” Nikolay Kozhanov and Saban Kardas, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, December 23, 2025.

• Analysis: “Southern Yemen’s Power Shift: the Houthis and the UAE-Saudi Rivalry.” Burcu Ozcelik, Baraa Shiban and Alaa Zoubi, RUSI, December 15, 2025.

• Analysis: “The Gulf’s Return to Lebanon?” Paul Shaya, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 23, 2025.

• Analysis: “Kuwait Turns East: The Rise of Chinese Investment in the Gulf.” Courtney Freer, Gulf International Forum, December 23, 2025.

• Analysis: “Gulf Mediation in Focus: Regional Implications of Renewed US-Iran Nuclear Talks.” Layla Ali, Gulf Research Center, December 23, 2025.

• Analysis: “The Red Sea Story Behind Saudi Arabia’s Oldest Global Ties.” Saudi Times, December 11, 2025.

• Analysis: “GCC Hiring Q3 2025: UAE Drives Growth While KSA Slows and Bahrain, Kuwait Contracts.” Angus Anderson, Finance Middle East, December 6, 2025.

• Analysis: “Beijing’s Gulf trade charm offensive meets familiar resistance.” Jonathan Fulton, AGBI, December 18, 2025.

• Analysis: “Nowcasting GCC GDP: A Machine Learning Solution for Enhanced Non-Oil GDP Prediction.” IMF, December 19, 2025.

• Podcast: “Inside the 5th International Red Sea Film Festival: CEO & Directors Roundtable.” Mo Show Podcast, December 25, 2025.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “China calls for deeper Gulf ties, urges free trade agreement.” Semafor, December 15, 2025.

  “Wang Yi used a trip to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE this week to lobby the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to conclude the talks as a “strong signal defending multilateralism.” China is keen to deepen economic, trade, and investment ties with the GCC, Wang said.”

  Go Deeper: “Imports and Influence: China’s Growing Economic Presence in the Gulf.” Carnegie, October 30, 2025.

• “French, Saudi and US officials push Hezbollah disarmament plan.” Arab News, December 18, 2025.

  “Speaking after the meeting, France’s foreign ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux said the talks had agreed to document seriously with evidence the Lebanese army’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah as well as strengthening the existing ceasefire mechanism.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia and Lebanon: A Love-Hate Relationship.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 12, 2023.

Market, Economy & Domestics

• “Saudi Arabia proposes to host WTO meeting in 2028.” Reuters, December 18, 2025.

  “The request was on the agenda of a WTO meeting being held in Geneva on December 16-17, and 22 countries welcomed the proposal, but a final decision was not yet made, a WTO spokesperson said on Thursday.”

  Go Deeper: “Saudi Arabia’s next horizon: Building human capital beyond Vision 2030.” Atlantic Council, November 20, 2025.

• “Qatar bets on cheap power to catch up in Gulf AI race.” Reuters, December 17, 2025.

  “The launch of Qai, backed by the country’s $526 billion sovereign wealth fund and a $20 billion joint venture with Brookfield , marks Qatar’s most ambitious move yet into a sector that is reshaping global technology and economics.”

  Go Deeper: “Artificial Intelligence in Qatar: Assessing the Potential Economic Impacts.” IMF, March, 2025. [PDF].

• UAE: “ADNOC Secures Landmark Structured Financing of up to $11 Billion for Hail and Ghasha Gas Development.” ADNOC, December 18, 2025.

  “Hail and Ghasha is part of the larger Ghasha Concession, located offshore Abu Dhabi, which is expected to produce 1.8 billion standard cubic feet per day (bscfd) of gas. It is also the world’s first offshore gas project of its kind that aims to operate with net zero emissions, capturing 1.5 million tonnes per year (mtpa) of carbon dioxide (CO2), equivalent to removing over 300,000 cars off the road every year.”

  Go Deeper: “UAE natural gas production: data and insights.” Offshore Technology, July 11, 2024.

• “Kuwait To Reportedly Sign Nearly $4B Port Project Contract With Chinese State-Owned Firm.” Middle East Forbes, December 19, 2025.

  “Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port was initiated by Kuwait’s Ministry of Public Works to boost the country’s position as a shipping hub and enhance access to the Red Sea, according to infrastructure consulting firm AECOM, which is advising on the project.”

  Go Deeper: “Beyond the Arabian Sea: Bridging the gap between Kuwait and China.” KPMG, November, 2024. [PDF].

• “India signs deal with Oman as it tries to counter US tariffs by accelerating free trade agreements.” AP, December 18, 2025.

  “The deal aims to boost bilateral trade and push India’s exports of engineering goods, textiles, leather, pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. It will provide Indian goods zero-duty market access on 98.08% of Oman’s tariff lines, India’s Trade Ministry said in a statement.”

  Go Deeper: “India-Oman joint statement outlines roadmap for deeper cooperation across trade, energy, maritime security and people-to-people ties.” The Economic Times, December 19, 2025.

• “Egypt, Qatar’s Al Mana Holding sign $200 million sustainable aviation fuel deal.” Reuters, December 14, 2025.

  “The project will be developed in three phases and will span 100,000 square metres in the Integrated Sokhna Zone on Egypt’s Red Sea coast. The first phase will have an estimated annual production capacity of 200,000 tonnes, the cabinet said in a statement.”

• “UAE cybersecurity boost: 5,000 Emiratis join private sector to combat threats.” Gulf News, December 20, 2025.

  “Dr. Al Kuwaiti stated that the UAE confronts nearly 200,000 cyberattacks daily targeting various vital sectors. He emphasized that the country’s high level of cyber readiness enables it to detect and thwart these attacks before they can impact service continuity or data security.”

  Go Deeper: “The power of partnership: How the UAE is securing cyberspace.” World Economic Forum, June 20, 2025.

• “Saudi Arabia, India agree visa waiver for diplomatic passports.” Gulf News, December 20, 2025.

  “Under the agreement, eligible passport holders from both countries will be able to enter for short stays without the need to obtain visas in advance, cutting administrative procedures and facilitating smoother official travel.”

  Go Deeper: “India-Gulf relations are muted—but mobilizing.” Atlantic Council, June 3, 2025.

• Bahrain: “Banking sector balance sheet rises to $252.5 billion by end-October 2025.” Alwatan, December 15, 2025.

  “The consolidated balance sheet of the banking system — covering both retail and wholesale banks — reached $252.5 billion at the end of October 2025, marking a 1.8% increase compared with the end of October 2024.”

  Go Deeper: Bahrain: “Fiscal Year Budget Stats” Ministry of Finance and National Economy, 2025. [PDF].

• Kuwait: “The drive to localize leadership positions gets underway.” Aljarida, December 15, 2025.

  “In a move signaling the launch of the ‘localization of leadership positions’ drive, four Amiri decrees were issued yesterday at once. One decree promoted Brigadier Abdulwahab Al-Wuhaib to the rank of Major General and appointed him Undersecretary at the Ministry of Interior.”

  Go Deeper: “New developments in the leadership positions crisis: posts vacant for five years.” Alqabas, January 2, 2025.

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Gulf Opinions

This week, Saudi and Emirati commentators engaged in a pointed debate over Yemen’s unity and the prospect of southern secession. In his latest column, former Al-Arabiya general manager Abdulrahman Al-Rashed argued that Saudi Arabia remains “the only state with a lasting and structural influence on Yemen,” whether unified or fragmented, followed at a secondary level by Oman, grounding his view in Napoleon’s dictum that “geography is the only permanent truth in politics.” He added that “geography and demography” reinforce this reality, noting that more than “two million Yemenis live in the Kingdom,” and concluded that the Southern Transitional Council “cannot advance” its secessionist project “without broad Yemeni acceptance and Saudi backing.” These claims prompted sharp responses from Emirati commentators, most notably Dhahi Khalfan, Lieutenant General of Dubai Police, who argued that while such reasoning may be defensible within international relations, it becomes analytically reductive when transformed into a definitive judgment on the fate of peoples and political projects. Geography, he stressed, is constraining but not a closed political destiny, warning that conditioning any southern project on “the neighbor’s consent” risks reducing sovereignty to a mere geopolitical function. Khalfan further criticized Al-Rashed for conflating leadership failure with the legitimacy of the cause itself, concluding that the article “offers an intelligent reading of geography, but pushes realism so far that it empties politics of meaning,” while overlooking the fact that fragmentation has existed since 1994, not since the emergence of the Southern Transitional Council.

Other Emirati voices echoed this critique. Hani Mas’hour insisted that Al-Rashed’s article is padded with references meant to signal mastery of southern history, describing the comparison between Al-Dhalea and Hadramawt as “a flimsy argument that falls short of Al-Rashed’s established journalistic stature,” and invoking another Napoleonic maxim: “Hesitation and half-measures lead to losing everything in war,” urging a focus on confronting the Houthis while leaving the South to its people to decide its future. In the same vein, Emirati academic Abdulkhaleq Abdullah praised an article by Sheikh Ould Salek, emphasizing that southern Yemenis hold a deep and enduring gratitude for Emirati support, a conviction that “shapes both attitudes and behavior.” On the Saudi side, Khaled Al-Suliman countered that Saudi support cannot be met with “ingratitude,” warning that attempts to dominate other Yemeni regions render opportunistic forces little different from the Houthis, and asserting that “the only safety net Yemen possesses today is Saudi Arabia.” Similarly, Saleh Al-Baidhani, media adviser at the Yemeni Embassy in Riyadh, wrote in Okaz that: “Saudi Arabia remains the country most deeply tied to Yemen’s fate, arguing that history, a 1,300-kilometer shared border, and intertwined security, economic, and social interests make Yemen’s stability a strategic necessity, and that Saudi Arabia has played an indispensable role throughout the conflict in containing crises and preventing collapse.”

More Gulf Opinions

• “The collapse of the Assad regime is not merely an internal Syrian event, but a pivotal moment in the region’s history that exposes the limits of power, the failure of governance built on exclusion, the dangers of politicizing identities, and the cost of turning nations into open arenas of conflict. The most important lesson is that genuine stability is not built with tanks, nor are states preserved by postponing explosion, but through early reform, political justice, and inclusive national partnership. Unless these lessons are fully absorbed, tragedies may recur under different names, but with the same pain.”

Abdullnabi Alshoala, Al Bilad, (Bahrain), December 21, 2025.

• “Generation Z has grown up in a world of networks rather than ladders, where the internet has leveled the playing field and a teenager on TikTok can wield more influence than the CEO of a major corporation. As a result, this generation favors flattening organizational hierarchies, placing far less value on grand titles or years of experience than on competence and the ability to persuade. The challenge for managers is that position alone no longer guarantees automatic obedience or respect. Added to this is a strong desire for participation: Gen Z employees want a seat at the table and a voice in decision-making from day one. While managers may view this as arrogance or impatience, it is driven by a genuine desire to make an immediate impact.”

Hussain Habib Alsayed, Al Arab, (Qatar), December 20, 2025.

• “Al-Burhan fears dismantling his alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and the organizations aligned with it, foremost among them the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, because these groups supply his army with fighters and shape its war strategy. They are fully aware that any peace in Sudan, or a transition to civilian and democratic rule, would remove them from the political scene altogether. For this reason, they exert pressure to sabotage any move toward peace. When the revolution rose against Bashir’s Brotherhood-backed regime, one of the Sudanese people’s earliest demands was the removal of this group, which had brought disaster upon Sudan and its people.”

Dr. Amal Alhaddabi, Al Bayan, (UAE), December 19, 2025.

• “Trump, who repeatedly promised his voters that he would end America’s foreign wars and focus on ‘America First,’ now appears to be recalibrating the compass toward a logic of preemptive war, albeit under a new slogan and justification. Instead of spreading democracy, the pretext this time is combating drug trafficking, a rationale being used to legitimize military moves.”

Khaled bin Salem Al Ghassani, Al Roya, (Oman), December 16, 2025.

Nashra Picks

• Book: De Bel-Air, Françoise, and Shah, Nasra M., “The Future of Migration to GCC Countries.” Spring, November 22, 2025.

• Report: “Kuwait: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission.” IMF, December 18, 2025.

• Analysis: “Recasting Syria After Assad: Saudi Arabia’s Bid to Shape a Gulf-Led Regional Order.” John Calabrese, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 19, 2025.

• Analysis: “Why Saudi Arabia Has Become America’s Most Difficult Ally.” Layan Mandani, Medium, December 21, 2025.

• Analysis: “GCC: Growth set to strengthen in 2026 as hydrocarbons production picks up.” Daniel Richards, NBD Research, December 18, 2025.

• Analysis: “Tracing King Salman Energy Park: Saudi Arabia’s Drive for Localisation of Energy Supply Chain.” Swapnil Sujal, Middle East Political and Economic Institute, December 14, 2025.

• Analysis: “GCC Joint Defence Integration and the US Factor.” Mahdi Ghuloom, ORF, December 15, 2025.

• Analysis: “From Crude to Compute: Building the GCC AI Stack.” Mohammed Soliman, Middle East Institute, December 15, 2025. [PDF].

• Analysis: “Friends in Need: Morocco’s Gen Z Protests and the GCC Response.” Bouchra Lawrence and William Lawrence, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 18, 2025.

• Analysis: “Russia is weakened, but its influence in the Middle East should not be underestimated.” Nikolay Kozhanov, Chatham House, December 11, 2025.

• Research: “China’s Partnership Diplomacy and the Formation of Gulf Regional Order.” Zhou Yiqi, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, December 18, 2025.

• Research: “Khaleeji Entrepreneurial Ecosystems: Development Visions, and Precarity in the Neoliberal Gulf.” Spring, November 22, 2025.

• Webinar: “The GCC AI Stack: A Roadmap for Gulf Leadership in the Global Technology Race.” The Middle East Institute, December 16, 2025.

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Saudi-UAE tensions rise over Yemen clashes.” Financial Times, December 10, 2025.

  “The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council this month seized control of two provinces, including Hadhramaut, the nation’s largest and richest region bordering Saudi Arabia, after clashing with Riyadh-affiliated tribal factions.”

  Go Deeper: “The UAE is leaving Saudi Arabia squeezed in Yemen.” The Conversation, December 12, 2025.

• “Saudi crown prince receives China FM in Riyadh.” Arab News, December 14, 2025.

  “During the reception, aspects of Saudi-Chinese relations were reviewed, along with ways to develop them in a manner that serves the common interests of both countries.”

• “China’s Wang Yi seeks deeper oil and gas ties with UAE on Middle East tour.” Reuters, December 13, 2025.

  “China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his United Arab Emirates counterpart on Friday, pledging deeper cooperation in investment, oil and gas, and infrastructure with the Gulf country, China’s foreign ministry said on Saturday.”

• “US will host Doha conference Dec 16 on Gaza stabilization force plans.” Reuters, December 12, 2025.

  “More than 25 countries are expected to send representatives to the conference, which will include sessions on the command structure and other issues related to the Gaza force, the officials said.”

Market, Economy & Domestic

• “GCC outlook strengthens with 3.3% growth forecast for 2025, IMF says.” Arab News, December 7, 2025.

  “In its latest regional assessment, the International Monetary Fund said the GCC output is forecast to accelerate to an average 3.3 percent in 2025, up from 1.7 percent in 2024, as members unwind oil-production cuts under the OPEC+ agreement.”

  Go Deeper: “Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)— Enhancing Resilience to Global Shocks: Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries.” IMF, December 6, 2025.

• “Gulf central banks cut rates by 25 basis points after Fed move.” Arab News, December 11, 2025.

  “Saudi Arabia, the region’s biggest economy, cut its repurchase agreement, or repo, rate by 25 bps to 4.25 percent and its reverse repo rate to 3.75 percent.”

  “The UAE’s central bank reduced the base rate applied to its overnight deposit facility to 3.65 percent, effective Dec. 11.”

• “Gulf Railway Project: Key routes, travel plans and cross-border links revealed.” Gulf News, December 10, 2025.

  “While the region’s train systems are still developing at different speeds, the foundations are already in place. Saudi Arabia operates established networks such as Saudi Arabia Railways (SAR) and the Haramain High-Speed Rail. Etihad Rail in the UAE is running freight services, with passenger operations expected to launch in 2026, connecting 11 cities.”

  Go Deeper: “How a 2,177-kilometer Gulf Railway could transform the region.” ET Edge Insight, July 11, 2025.

• “Saudi real estate giant Dar Global plans $4.2B project in Muscat.” Samafor, December 10, 2025.

  “The project, being developed in partnership with Art District Real Estate Development, will cover 1.5 million square meters and is expected to take more than 12 years to complete.”

• “Qatar launches $20B AI push to compete with Saudi, UAE.” Samafor, December 10, 2025.

  “Qai’s mandate is to build the platforms and systems needed to speed up AI adoption across Qatar, according to its chief executive. The new unit is the most significant swing yet from the $550 billion Qatari sovereign wealth fund in an otherwise busy year on the technology front: QIA has backed OpenAI rival Anthropic and teamed up with alternative asset manager Blue Owl to invest $3 billion in data centers.”

• “Saudi Arabia’s PIF Expands MENA Investment Footprint with Over 10 Regional Deals, Strengthening Vision 2030 Goals.” BBC, December 12, 2025.

  “Muteb Al-Shathri, Head of the Securities Investments Private Equity Section at PIF, confirmed that these investments span several key regional markets, including Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, and Oman.”

• “Hollywood-hungry Gulf states bankroll Paramount’s Warner Bros bid.” Reuters, December 9, 2025.

  “Paramount Skydance’s addition of three Gulf sovereign wealth funds to the cast of its $108 billion hostile bid for Warner Bros Discovery marks a relatively rare alliance among the states as they build their own entertainment industries.”

  “Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF,) Abu Dhabi’s L’imad Holding Company, and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) have agreed to back the deal, Paramount.”

  Go Deeper: “Hollywood for Sale? Gulf Billionaires Back $24 Billion Blitz on Warner Bros. Discovery.” Yahoo Finance, December 11, 2025.

• Saudi Arabia: “Mideast Amazon rival noon raises $500M.” Samafor, December 12, 2025.

  “The Middle East’s homegrown Amazon rival, noon, has raised $500 million in new funding from backers including Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund as it works towards a potential initial public offering, according to people familiar with the matter.”

• “UAE aims to boost LNG exports as global demand outpaces supply, minister says.” Reuters, December 8, 2025.

  “The United Arab Emirates plans not only to meet domestic demand for liquefied natural gas, but also to grow its exports, Energy Minister Suhail al-Mazrouei said on Monday.”

  “Mazrouei said he agreed with Qatar’s energy minister that global demand for natural gas is outstripping investment in production projects.”

• “France’s Ardian Set to Join Global Firms Planning Kuwait Offices.” Bloomberg, December 11, 2025.

  “The plans come weeks after Wafra Inc., a $28 billion money manager owned by the state pension agency of Kuwait, purchased a minority stake in Ardian. In late October, Bloomberg News reported that the pension fund — Public Institution for Social Security — was restarting private equity allocations after a hiatus, potentially unleashing billions of dollars in fresh capital into the industry.”

• “Kuwait citizenship crackdown leaves widows stateless and critics in exile.” Middle East Eye, December 11, 2025.

  “At least 50,000 people in Kuwait have lost their citizenship since September 2024.”

  “Campaigners suggest the figure could be as high as 200,000. However, the government stopped regularly announcing figures in September 2025.”

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Gulf Opinions

This week, Saudi and Qatari commentators highlighted Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani visit to Riyadh on Monday, December 8, which was followed by deeper and broader cooperation through the eighth meeting of the Saudi–Qatari Coordination Council and the signing of several agreements, most notably a high-speed rail link between Riyadh and Doha. Faleh bin Hussein Al Hajeri, Editor in Chief of Qatar’s Al Arab, argues that the deepening strategic partnership between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is reshaping the future of the Gulf by advancing a cooperative vision of political, economic, and infrastructural integration, concluding that the Qatar–Saudi alliance is pivotal in redefining Gulf geopolitics and economic architecture within a more unified and forward-looking GCC framework, particularly as the rail project “represents a clear example of a qualitative shift in the region’s economic structure, confirming that the Gulf is moving towards an interconnected network of ports, airports, and railways, which will enhance its position as a global economic corridor.” From the Saudi side, Sari Shaaban describes this cooperation as “a major Gulf power at the heart of the new world order,” emphasizing that Saudi–Qatari relations have entered a new phase of comprehensive strategic partnership across defense, economic, political, cultural, and security domains, symbolized by the Riyadh–Doha high-speed rail project as a catalyst for connectivity, trade, investment, job creation, Vision 2030 objectives, and sustainable regional integration. In a similar vein, Majed Aljuraywi underscores the electric rail link as a cornerstone of economic integration, enabling “fast and low-cost mobility” that attracts joint investment, streamlines logistics, and strengthens industrial and commercial growth, while also extending into energy security, environmental sustainability, national resilience, and social connectivity. Counselor Abdullah bin Mohammed Al Sheikh further notes that reducing travel time between the two capitals to around two hours positions the rail link as a flagship cross-border initiative that deepens Gulf economic integration, enhances defense and security coordination based on the principle that Gulf security is indivisible, and delivers tangible social benefits through improved mobility, tourism, and family connectivity. Commentators also point to the project projected economic impact, employment creation, and alignment with national development visions, framing it as part of a broader shift toward integrated regional infrastructure and long-term planning. The rail link is repeatedly presented as a practical mechanism for facilitating trade flows, supporting supply chains, and strengthening links between key economic centers in both countries. Concluding this consensus, Mohammed Hajji, Editor in Chief of Qatar’s Al Watan, writes that “today, it can be said that Saudi–Qatari relations are strategic and forward-looking, with many achievements and successes anticipated across all fields, and that both sides will not hesitate to continue strengthening and developing these ties while working to fulfill the aspirations and ambitions of their peoples.”

More Gulf Opinions

• “But what about our region, the Arab Gulf, within the United States national security strategy? This question is increasingly being raised by Gulf allies and across the Middle East: are we witnessing a post-hegemony phase and the end of the era of absolute American dominance in the region, along with the erosion of President Carter’s 1980 doctrine that placed the Gulf at the center of vital US interests and committed to countering any external influence, even through military force? This shift appears to be unfolding despite the continuation of reciprocal economic and investment relations, raising questions about its implications for Gulf and regional security. It also prompts broader reflection on how to interpret the American pullback from both allies and adversaries, not only in the Middle East and the Gulf but also toward European partners and East Asia, as US security strategy increasingly moves away from a model based on ‘security in exchange for oil and investments’ toward arrangements centered on coordination and the development of shared and self-reliant defense and security capabilities.”

Dr. Abdullah Khalifa Al-Shayji [Kuwait], Al Sharq, (Qatar), December 14, 2025.

• “In this sense, the [Yemen’s] Transitional Council has fallen into the same mistake made by the Houthis when it assumed that force alone could produce legitimacy. However, Hadramout today possesses a cohesive tribal structure and a strategic connection with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that make replicating the northern model nearly impossible. The valley is not a vacuum but a fully formed society that understands its own composition, protects its interests, and rejects becoming subordinate to a project in whose formulation it had no role. To understand the depth of the crisis, it is necessary to recall Hadramout’s historical specificity, as even prior to Yemeni unification the governorate was characterized by a quasi-independent administration and a social environment highly sensitive to influence emanating from major political centers.”

Yousef Al Dayni, Asharq Al-Awsat, (Saudi Arabia), December 14, 2025.

• “It is only fair to acknowledge that the Gulf Cooperation Council has achieved significant accomplishments throughout its journey, whether in advancing Gulf citizenship, enhancing security coordination, or consolidating a shared identity, forming an exceptional case within an Arab environment marked by unity experiments that failed to endure. However, these achievements must keep pace with the rapid transformations of the international system, where political and economic maps are being redrawn at an unprecedented speed, leaving room only for major economies and cohesive blocs. The path ahead now lies in completing the project of economic unity, beginning with the establishment of a genuine Gulf market, moving toward a fully realized customs union, and culminating in a unified currency, a joint Gulf sovereign fund, and integrated industrial and financial policies that lay the foundation for deeper integration and multiply Gulf collective strength.”

Abbas Al-Omani, Al Bilad, (Bahrain), December 13, 2025.

• “This is the worst moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood since its establishment nearly a century ago, not only because its sources of funding are being besieged—funding that constitutes the primary driver of the organization and which it raises by exploiting humanitarian causes, particularly the Palestinian cause, to collect donations worldwide in order to finance its terrorist projects—but also because the regional and international context no longer requires the services of this organization. The group, which has long practiced political subcontracting against Arab states, now finds itself sidelined, much as reflected in the current actions of the Port Sudan government led by Abdel Fattah al Burhan, the army commander whose forces are described as being controlled by Brotherhood affiliates.”

Mohammed Khalfan Al-Sawafi, Al Bayan, (UAE), December 11, 2025.

• “Yemen today stands at a crossroads between two paths: one that restores its role as a civilizational bridge linking North and South, East and West, and another that leads it toward deeper loss and fragmentation. What remains certain, however, is that the future of this nation will ultimately be shaped by the resilience and determination of the Yemeni people.”

Khaled Al Ghassani, Al Roya, (Oman), December 10, 2025.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Bishara, Fahad, “Monsoon Voyagers: An Indian Ocean History.” University of California, October, 2025.

• Research: “Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)— Enhancing Resilience to Global Shocks: Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries.” IMF, December 6, 2025.

• Analysis: “Compute Is the New Oil: America and the Gulf Must Work Together on Artificial Intelligence.” Daniel Benaim, Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2025.

• Analysis: “The Many Faces of Abu Dhabi’s Trillions.” Bloomberg, Priyanjana Bengani, Nicolas Parasie, Alex Dooler, Dinesh Nair, Demetrios Pogkas, December 7, 2025.

• Analysis: “After Washington: Consolidating U.S.–Saudi Strategic Alignment.” Amnah Mosly, Gulf Research Center, December 11, 2025.

• Analysis: “Beyond the End of The Line: Rethinking Saudi Arabia’s Urban Future.” Yasser Elsheshtawy, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 12, 2025.

• Analysis: “Narrow Channel: Navigating Competition and Cooperation in Iraq–Kuwait Relations.” John Calabrese, Gulf International Forum, December 12, 2025.

• Analysis: “The Role of E-commerce in Empowering Women in Saudi Arabia: Assessing the Policy Potential.” Hannan Hussain, Carnegie, December 5, 2025.

• Analysis: “The New Gulf IPO Playbook: Sector Diversification and Growing Investor Selectivity.” Said Bakr, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 10, 2025.

• Analysis: “Saudi Stocks’ Worst Year in a Decade Leaves Traders Grim on 2026.” Tugce Ozsoy, Bloomberg, December 11, 2025.

• Analysis: “Is India losing clout in the Gulf?” Jean-Loup Samaan, Atlantic Council, December 9, 2025.

• Podcast: “Why Did the Government Decide to Establish Royal Reserves?” host Talal Al-Harigi, Socrates Podcast, December 2, 2025. [Eng Subtitle].

• Podcast: “Between Journalism, Publishing, and Diplomacy” hosting Turki Al-Dakhil, Arab Cast Podcast, December 12, 2025. [Eng Subtitle].

Media Coverage

Geopolitics

• “Manama Summit Seeks to Bolster Joint Gulf Work, Int’l Partnerships.” Asharq Al-Awsat, December 3, 2025.

  “The leaders welcomed the outcomes of the Sharm el-Sheikh Peace Summit, held in October, and underlined their support for regional and international efforts aimed at ensuring full adherence to the agreement to end the war in Gaza, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and reconstruction.”

  Go Deeper: “Security and prosperity of Gulf states ‘indivisible’, says Bahrain’s King Hamad.” The National, December 03, 2025.

• “Russia and Saudi Arabia sign deal for visa-free travel.” Reuters, December 1, 2025.

  “Russia and Saudi Arabia on Monday signed an agreement to implement a visa-free regime for tourists and business people from the two countries for up to 90 days, the Russian government and the Saudi foreign ministry said.”

• “Saudi Arabia provides over $142 billion in aid to 173 countries.” Arab News, November 28, 2025.

  “Since its establishment in 2015, KSrelief alone has implemented 3,881 projects valued at over $8.25 billion in 109 countries, covering key sectors including health, food security, education and water.”

• “Oman joins other Gulf powers in African renewables race.” Samafor, December 5, 2025.

  “An Omani investment roadshow landed in South Africa in early December; last year, Oman’s Maaden International Group (not to be confused with the Saudi mining giant also called Maaden), acquired a 41% stake in Angolan diamond miner Catoca.”

Market & Economy

• “GCC debt issuance hits record $226bln in 2025, while IPO activity sharply declines.” Zawya, December 5, 2025.

  “GCC debt issuance surged to its highest level this past decade, totalling $226 billion in the year to November 11, 2025, while surpassing last year’s record of $136.3 billion.”

• “World Bank Forecasts 4.3% Growth for Saudi Economy, Supported by Non-Oil Activities.” Asharq Al-Awsat, December 5, 2025.

  “Non-oil activities expanded by 4.8% over the period, in line with the performance of 2024 while non-oil growth was driven by the wholesale, retail trade, restaurants, and hotels sector (+7.5% y/y in the first half of 2025), consolidating the role of hospitality and tourism as engines of economic diversification.”

  Go Deeper: “Gulf Economic Update : The Gulf’’s Digital Transformation - A Powerful Engine for Economic Diversification.” World Bank, December 4, 2025. [PDF].

• “Saudi Arabia forecasts deficit of $44 billion in 2026 budget.” Reuters, December 2, 2025.

  “The kingdom projected a deficit of 165 billion riyals ($44 billion), or about 3.3% of gross domestic product. That would be down from the 245 billion riyals it now estimates for this year after lower oil prices and production weighed on revenue and spending overshot the budgeted level by around 4%.”

  Go Deeper: “Putting the 2026 Saudi Budget Under the Microscope.” Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 4, 2025.

• “China and UAE top Saudi export markets in third quarter.” AGBI, December 5, 2025.

  “China accounted for 15 percent of the kingdom’s total exports, valued at SAR45 billion ($12 billion), the state-run Saudi Press Agency reported, quoting the General Authority for Statistics data.”

  Go Deeper: “Imports and Influence: China’s Growing Economic Presence in the Gulf.” Carnegie, October 30, 2025.

• “Oman set to finalise 2GW green projects by year-end.” AGBI, December 5, 2025.

  “A consortium comprising OQAE, the UAE’s Masdar and South Korea’s Midland Power last week appointed Chinese state-owned CPECC as the engineering, procurement and construction contractor for the 500-megawatt Ibri III independent solar power project in northwest Oman.”

  Go Deeper: “Reforming for Resilience in Oman: Environmental Risk and Policy Capacity.” Carnegie, September 12, 2025.

• “Kuwait moves to shut down informal money networks with new ban on alternative remittance systems.” Zawya, December 3, 2025.

  “The Alternative Remittance System is an informal method of transferring funds outside the official financial system. It relies on individual brokers who receive money in Kuwait and deliver its equivalent abroad through unlicensed networks, without passing through regulated banks or licensed exchange companies, and without any formal documentation or financial records.”

• “World Bank report forecasts UAE economy to grow by 4.8%.” Zawya, December 4, 2025.

  “The report also projected economic growth of 3.8 percent for Saudi Arabia, 3.5 percent for Bahrain, 3.1 percent for Oman, 2.8 percent for Qatar, and 2.7 percent for Kuwait.”

  “The report highlights three main pillars: the evolution of economic diversification indicators over the past decade, tracking macroeconomic developments, and focusing on digital transformation.”

• “Polysilicon project in Oman gets $200m financing loan.” AGBI, December 5, 2025.

  “Oman is targeting a 40 percent contribution from renewables to its electricity requirements by 2040 as it looks to wean its economy off a reliance on hydrocarbons and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.”

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Gulf Opinions

This week, Gulf commentators devoted extensive attention to the forty-sixth GCC Summit, held in Bahrain on December 3rd, underscoring its political, economic, and strategic significance. From Kuwait, Dr. Fawzi Salman Al-Khawari emphasized that the GCC firm adherence to international commitments reinforces its reputation as a reliable strategic partner and a stabilizing force in global affairs. He noted that the Sakhir Declaration reaffirmed the council’s long-standing commitment to collective security, unified foreign policy, and a deeply integrated economic model that has strengthened regional stability and improved the welfare of Gulf citizens for more than four decades. Kuwait’s Dr. Mohammed Al-Rumaihi echoed this view in Asharq Alawsat, arguing that the summit most defining feature was its unequivocal assertion that Gulf security is indivisible—a principle now grounded not only in rhetoric but in concrete joint-defense agreements and clear positions on Iran, regional disruptions, and the protection of vital maritime corridors. Together, these perspectives present a summit determined to translate collective security from aspiration to actionable policy.

From Oman, a parallel debate unfolded over the internal dynamics of Gulf integration and the evolving expectations of Gulf citizens. Hamid bin Mohammed Al-Busaidi argued that citizens now seek more than freedom of mobility; they expect deeper economic integration, seamless cross-border investment, unified labor opportunities that prioritize GCC nationals, and renewed trust in the political will of the six states. He observed that although the GCC has achieved notable economic milestones, the next phase requires faster, more inclusive growth—leveraging the region strategic geography, its influence within OPEC, and its longstanding international partnerships. Fellow Omani commentator Awadh bin Saeed Baquwir added that the path forward depends on accelerating economic and social integration and harmonizing legislation to create a unified economic space capable of elevating the GCC into a major global economic bloc. Commenting on foreign policy, Lolowa Budolama welcomed the summit reaffirmation of its stance on the Palestinian cause, writing that “the leaders welcomed the outcomes of the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit, endorsed the agreement to end the war in Gaza, supported the facilitation of humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts, and reaffirmed the imperative of establishing an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative.”

Beyond politics and economics, Bahraini writer Ali Abdulkhaleq praised the summit unprecedented technological agenda, describing its roadmap for a unified digital Gulf—built on shared infrastructure, harmonized payment systems, cloud services, cybersecurity cooperation, and joint work in artificial intelligence—as a transformative opportunity to shift the region toward a knowledge-based economy. Concluding the discussion, Bahrain’s Salah Al-Jawdar underscored the long-standing call for unity: moving from cooperation to union, a vision first introduced by the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, to form a single, stronger entity capable of meeting global challenges while deepening regional stability, expanding international partnerships, and advancing sustainable development.

More Gulf Opinions

• “A close reading of the Muslim Brotherhood’s reality reveals that the issue is not a matter of political failure here or collapse there, but rather a flaw inherent in the Brotherhood project itself. It is a project built on extremist ideological ideas, loyalty to the organization, and a vision that extends beyond the nation-state, treating state institutions as arenas for infiltration and control, and society as a field for polarization and recruitment into its partisan agendas. It embraces dangerous operational strategies such as secrecy, dissimulation, and feigned weakness as a path to empowerment, along with the methods of organizational cells, including sleeper cells. Its leaders operate on the principle that the end justifies the means, manipulating the jurisprudence of necessity to legitimize what they call ‘phase-specific jurisprudence’ and long-term planning. Thus, anyone who attempts to domesticate the Brotherhood is like someone raising a snake in his home: it may appear gentle on the outside, but it is venomous and deadly, and will not hesitate to strike whenever the opportunity arises.”

Ahmad Al Shehi, Al Bayan, (UAE), December 6, 2025.

• “We look forward with great enthusiasm to our esteemed government adopting our initiative to establish an Omani research center that would undertake independent studies and research, offering qualitative insights that address societal needs and anticipate the future in a neutral and objective manner—far from the perspectives issued by government institutions, which are often shaped by formal, cautious considerations. All that the relevant government bodies would need to provide is logistical and financial support to ensure the center is founded on solid pillars that guarantee its sustainability, such as allocating a headquarters and an annual funding amount to cover expenses, researchers’ and experts’ costs, and other operational needs.”

Hatim Al-Tai, Al Roya, (Oman), December 6, 2025.

• “The conflict in Sudan, which ignited over trivial causes, could have been extinguished early had the right approach been taken. During the Lebanese civil war, several external actors sought to prolong the conflict, yet the intervention that eventually occurred blocked their influence and brought the war to an end. The suffering endured by the people of Sudan is immense: loss of life, hunger, displacement, instability, loss of livelihoods, stalled development, and an almost complete collapse of basic services in the areas of fighting. This is the reality facing the Sudanese people, who are an integral part of the Arab and Islamic world, and there is a pressing need to form a joint committee from the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the African Union. This committee must continue its work until the war stops and a settlement acceptable to all warring parties is reached.”

Dr. Khaled Mohammed Boodi, Al Qabas, (Kuwait), December 3, 2025.

• “In the end, ‘America First’ is no longer merely a political wave tied to Trump’s rise, but has evolved into a fully integrated current reshaping the American right from within. As its media and grassroots influence expands, the movement appears poised to remain a central player in American politics, whether it continues as a powerful faction within the Republican Party or develops in the future into an independent current with clear contours.”

Majed bin Nuwaiser, Makkah, (Saudi Arabia), December 2, 2025.

• “The Earth is 4.5 billion years old, while the emergence of modern humans appears as nothing more than a fleeting moment on its surface, dating back around 200,000 years. If we compressed the entire history of the planet into one calendar year, human existence would amount to only a few minutes.”

  “This perspective clarifies where our vision should lie: nations have economic life cycles, and institutions have temporal rhythms that rise and fall, just like living organisms. What determines their longevity is rarely their size, but rather their ability to adapt.”

  “In today’s fast-moving global economy, the same pattern repeats itself—only faster. Companies that once dominated their industries now have an average lifespan of no more than fifteen to twenty years. Technological change reshapes markets, converting economic power from one entity to another in a continuous cycle. The lifespan of companies no longer depends on their size or financial capital but on speed, flexibility, and the ability to read time and adapt to it.”

Dr. Abdulraheem Alhour, Al Raya, (Qatar), December 2, 2025.

Nashra Picks

• Book: Almezaini, Khalid, and Alexander, Kristian, “An Introduction to Gulf Politics.” Cambridge Press, June 2026.

• Analysis: “Is Tehran Rethinking Its Approach to the GCC States?” Ali Alfoneh, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 3, 2025.

• Analysis: “How Abu Dhabi’s economy came to be dominated by IHC.” Chloe Cornish, Financial Times, December 4, 2025.

• Analysis: “Why the world suddenly depends on the Gulf more than ever?” Layan Mandani, Medium, December 3, 2025.

• Analysis: “Diverging Paths: Gulf Critical Mineral Strategies.” Said Bakr, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 5, 2025.

• Analysis: “Guarding the Gulf: EU-GCC Efforts to Strengthen Nuclear Preparedness.” Leonardo Mazzucco, Gulf International Forum, December 4, 2025.

• Analysis: “The Saudi Nuclear Gambit: Atomic Leverage and the U.S. Red Line.” Abdullah Alrebh, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 4, 2025.

• Analysis: “Navigating Rocky Waters: GCC Strategies for Maritime Security.” Rory Miller, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, November 26, 2025.

• Analysis: “Blueprints for Autonomy: Turkey and the Gulf Partnership on Defense Industrialization.” Riccardo Gasco and Francesco Schiavi, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 2, 2025.

• Analysis: “Kuwait’s Vision 2035 plan reaches critical juncture.” Gavin Gibbon, AGBI, December 5, 2025.

• Analysis: “Two Pillars, One Gulf: China’s High-Stakes Balancing Act between Iran and the GCC.” Yuan Zhang, Gulf Research Center, December 3, 2025.

• Analysis: “Putting the 2026 Saudi Budget Under the Microscope.” Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, December 4, 2025.

• Podcast: “Why did the government decide to establish royal reserves?” hosts Talal Al-Harqi, Socrates Podcast, December 2, 2025.

• Podcast: “What the West Gets WRONG About Saudi Arabia.” hosts Mo Islam, Biohack-it podcast, December 4, 2025.