This insight article argues that the pandemic did have an effect on Saudi politics, yet different from most comparative cases. The pandemic and the comparatively successful and effective Saudi policy response created a new collective nationalist confidence and increased trust in Saudi state capacity and MBS’ top-down style of governing. Due to the global nature of the pandemic, the Saudi success story was turned into a narrative of Saudi superiority over the perceived failures of toothless Western democracies and totalitarian Chinese (and Australian) zero Covid policies. For many Saudis, this was not a battle between democracies and autocracies – but the conviction that the Saudi system and its newly built state capacity under MBS beats any other political system. This created a blueprint to assess international affairs, where criticism of Western powers is seen as justified and grounded in empirical facts.

The Effective Saudi Response to Covid-19

Saudi Arabia had implemented robust policies to curb the virus early on. The WHO confirmed that in Saudi Arabia “strong governance and intersectoral coordination have led to evidence-based decision making” and acknowledged that free COVID-19 services regardless of residency or citizenship status resulted in “equal access to services for everyone and minimized the impact of COVID-19 on migrants and other vulnerable groups.” The draconian measures included extensive limitations on both domestic and international travel, a socially distanced Hajj pilgrimage, lockdown and curfews. Corroborating both official claims and widespread public perceptions, Saudi Arabia’s policy response began more harshly than in many other countries. However, restrictions were then lifted gradually and steadily, avoiding the ‘ping-pong’ effect seen elsewhere—where premature easing of measures was repeatedly followed by renewed restrictions (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Stringency Index for Measures to Curb the Pandemic for Select Countries. Note: The index is based on nine response indicators including school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest response). Source: WHO, downloaded via Our World in Data. Visuals created by the author and are taken from a publication in Perspectives on Politics (2024).

Indeed, there is evidence based on WHO data that the Saudi policy response was effective, leading to fewer cases and deaths than in other benchmark countries (see Figures 2 and 3).

Figure 2: Cumulative Confirmed COVID-19 Cases for Selected Countries. Sources: See Figure 1.

Figure 3: Cumulative Confirmed COVID-19 Deaths for Select Countries. Sources: See Figure 1.

Covid-19 and the Birth of “Saudi Way” Nationalist Politics

These relatively effective measures and their fairly stringent implementation raise the question how they were justified politically. Over the course of the pandemic, the Saudi government and its relative independent intermediaries in the media developed a more robust narrative. While the Saudi government largely limited its communication strategy to explaining the Saudi approach and contributions to global public health, Saudi commentators in newspapers and on Twitter spun out these talking points. The commentators championed a cautious balancing act in the beginning – between praise and criticism for both the US and China – yet attacked what they perceived as a toothless approach in Western democracies increasingly over time.

By summer 2020, commentators celebrated the “Saudi way” of the pandemic response, having avoided a meltdown of the healthcare system and a broadly unexpected state capacity and effectiveness. Importantly, it was not so much the Saudi government that drove a more assertive media campaign but the Saudi media commentators, effectively blaming other states to have failed the test of managing the pandemic.

This newly gained confidence was not limited to commentators and intermediaries. The Saudi public voiced the globally second largest increase in public trust in the provision of healthcare between October 2018 and 2020, jumping by 21 points to 67% (only second to China). One main reason for this optimistic uptick may have been the previously notoriously dysfunctional Saudi bureaucracy. And among Saudi political institutions, the Ministry of Health was seen as particularly inefficient, even branded as the “graveyard of ministers” by some commentators. Thus, the effective public health policies were a pleasant surprise for many Saudis, lending credibility to MBS’ claims to ramp up Saudi state capacity as part of the Vision 2030 reform program.

In Saudi newspapers and social media, this new confidence in Saudi state capacity was translated into a belief of superiority of the Saudi system, compared with Western democracies as well as other non-democratic polities such as China. Western democracies were seen as toothless polities prioritizing individual interest while China’s zero covid policy was framed as a totalitarian but eventually in-effective state overreach. The “Saudi way” was seen as the golden mean. Thus, the soft power of Western democracies and to some extent China in Saudi Arabia went down the drain while giving MBS’ top-down governing style quite some significant credit. Importantly, this new confidence was not limited to the pandemic but translated into a broader nationalist confidence in the “Saudi way” among at least some segments of Saudi society. For them, the Saudi response to the pandemic was a global exam that the Saudi government excelled in – it became a blueprint to assess current global affairs.

Two major political crises of the past years attest to this. First, subsequent to Russia’s unprovoked attack of Ukraine in 2022 and Western countries’ (desperate) calls for the world to unite against the aggressor, Saudi commentators built on the newly found nationalist confidence to rebuff these demands. Equally, the Saudi government caused a massive outbreak of nationalist celebrations on Twitter when they disregarded US President Biden’s request to increase oil production in the early phase of the war. The “Saudi way” that was born in the pandemic became the mid-wife to the “Saudi national interest” on the global stage. Second, the Gaza war since October 2023 reinforced a sense among at least some segments of the Saudi public that Western political leaders and publics assessed political realities with a double standard when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Arab world more broadly, further damaging Western soft power. At the same time, the strong Saudi state capacity was presented in contrast with militant groups like Hamas, failing to produce improved socio-economic conditions for Palestinians in Gaza.

To conclude, the pandemic response has fueled Saudi nationalism and justified in the eyes of many Saudis MBS’ top-down governing style, ramping up state capacity and effectiveness. Saudi Arabia thereby stands in notable contrast to the global surge in anti-incumbent politics around the world. The Saudi government seems to have earned substantial credit among wide segments of the Saudi population through performance legitimacy. It remains to be seen whether the government will invest this political capital effectively to avoid growing discontent over shiny prestige projects that are seen as wasteful while cost of living and labor market hardships are ever increasing.

In some respects, there are clear efforts to at least appear on the same page – official statements from all six monarchies denounced comments last month by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that (likely as a joke) suggested displacing all Palestinians to Saudi Arabia. Yet within the GCC, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are those facing the most pressing challenges in this relationship – chiefly how to maintain good ties with the mercurial Trump while also navigating the politics regarding an uneasy ceasefire and potential reconstruction of Gaza. (Among the remaining three, either Kuwait, Oman, or Bahrain complained about being “excluded” from a Riyadh summit regarding a potential Arab plan for Gaza – the summit was rescheduled so all GCC countries could be represented.)

Beyond this united front, there are subtle yet meaningful differences in terms of how each of the three main countries is responding to Trump. Saudi Arabia is seeking to build up a sense of new importance for the Trump administration as both a mediator for international conflicts and a useful economic partner outside the realm of oil – even as it backs away from past efforts at normalizing relations with Israel. More secure at home, Emirati leaders are pushing for their preferred plans regarding the future of Gaza even as they harbor private reservations about Trump’s reliability. Meanwhile, Qatari officials intend to rely on their existing reputation for being able to speak to “all sides” to shield the country from criticism over its open channels of communication with Hamas; concerted lobbying efforts will seek to remind U.S. stakeholders of the value of this reputation.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia broadly welcomed Trump’s first administration as a clear shift from the Obama administration, which Riyadh perceived as hesitant to involve itself in the region’s politics and overly conciliatory towards Iran. MBS courted Trump early on through a personal visit to the White House, helped welcome the President to the Kingdom as part of his first visit abroad, and counted on the administration’s support in blockading neighboring Qatar a few months later.

The Trump I administration ultimately proved a mixed bag for Saudi Arabia – and for MBS personally. On the one hand, the President offered a full-throated defense of MBS amid the fallout from media figure Jamal Khashoggi, and ensured the regular sale of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the President also shied away from direct military confrontation with Iran, even when Iranian proxies launched direct attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and crucial shipping lanes in the Gulf. Trump also turned on the Kingdom periodically whenever Saudi policies clashed with domestic U.S. considerations, like ensuring low oil prices at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Trump’s second inauguration saw all the signs of a typical Saudi welcome of a new U.S. presidential administration. Mohammad bin Salman called the president to “discuss key regional issues and investment opportunities,” even as Saudi officials floated vague plans to invest $600 billion in the U.S. economy over the next four years – a very transactional approach to a very transactional president. Asharq al-Aawsat columnist Abdulrahman al-Rashed penned his usual laudatory column for an incoming president, looking forward to a “closer and warmer” U.S.-Saudi relationship.

However, Trump’s press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid bare some of the growing differences between Riyadh and Washington – chiefly over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Much as Saudi-Israel normalization remains a guiding star for many U.S. policy commentators, Saudi officials and even from MBS himself have been backing away from the idea for over a year. Any Saudi hopes that the politics of Gaza could be safely set aside (for a time) amid ceasefire negotiations, however, were dashed when Trump discussed a direct takeover of Gaza and its development as the “Riviera of the Middle East” – heavily implying Palestinians would be forcibly removed from the Strip.

Gone are the days when MBS openly discussed getting gradually “closer” to a U.S.-Saudi-Israel deal of normalization for U.S. security guarantees. Instead, the Crown Prince now sees a relatively independent stance on Gaza and the Palestinian file more broadly as a means of building support at home (by seeming to resist U.S. pressure) and demonstrating regional leadership (by organizing a regional response to U.S. and Israeli plans). Hence where Saudi media outlets once castigated Palestinian leaders for undermining their own cause, they now attack Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Israeli government for “extremist” rhetoric.

Accordingly, Saudi Arabia thus far seems to have adopted a “split-screen” approach to the Trump administration – working to shore up an Arab counter-proposal to Trump’s Gaza plan while courting the president’s attention and goodwill in other ways. In suitably diplomatic language, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed Saudi positions while reserving most of its criticism for Israeli officials; the initial response to Trump’s plan merely noted that Saudi positions have been “previously been clarified to both the former and current administration.” Saudi Arabia also hosted an emergency summit on February 21 to discuss an Egyptian proposal to counter Trump’s Gaza plan, although few details have yet occurred.

In contrast to relatively quiet and secretive Saudi diplomacy regarding Gaza, Saudi Arabia has sought to openly market its value as a partner to the Trump administration in other areas. Saudi officials competed with the UAE, for example, to host talks between U.S. and Russian officials about ending the war in Ukraine. In doing so, Saudi officials literally got a seat at the table for negotiations, trading off their relatively strong ties with Russia (stemming from OPEC+ negotiations) as well as the United States.

On a more personal level, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) hosted a major investment conference in Miami – near the presidential compound in Mar-a-Lago – where President Trump made an appearance. Saudi Arabia also announced plans to open an investment office in Southern Florida, atop longstanding and substantial investments with Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner.

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United Arab Emirates

The UAE finds itself in a similar position to Saudi Arabia, albeit trying more erring more on the side of presenting itself as in line with the President’s regional policy priorities. Although denying it has anything to do with politics, Emirati businessman Hussain Sajwani, of Emirati contracting and real estate conglomerate DAMAC, rushed to commit $20 billion in investments in the United States – announcing the proposal from the President’s home in Mar-A-Lago. The UAE’s existing normalization of ties with Israel cuts both ways – providing less reason for the Trump administration to bring pressure to bear on Abu Dhabi, but also less leverage for Emirati rulers in pressing for policy concessions from the United States. Emirati ruler MBZ likely has less to fear from domestic public opinion than his counterpart, MBS; the UAE has likewise firmly committed to repressing individual-level criticisms of normalization or policy choices regarding Israel and Palestine (at least beyond a few individuals granted special dispensation to do so). Further afield, the Al Habtoor Research Center, affiliated with another well-connected Emirati businessman, Khalaf Al Habtoor, put out its own Gaza Reconstruction Plan on February 20 – a business-forward approach to managing Gaza’s reconstruction through an international holding company, with limited discussion of Palestinian politics.

While nominally aligned with Saudi Arabia, Emirati officials have been less resolutely opposed to Trump’s initiatives. Even before Trump’s inauguration, Israel Hayom reported that the UAE had agreed in principle to effectively manage the Gaza strip once the present war comes to a close. Although Trump’s Gaza proposal seems to have derailed this approach, the UAE’s statement condemning the plan were fairly tepid in comparison to those of neighboring states – rejecting attempts at displacement but otherwise placing “eliminating extremism” as the top priority following the establishment of a permanent ceasefire. The statement neither criticizes Israel nor even mentions the United States.

The statement reflects the way that the UAE has sought to advance its own interests – namely limiting the influence of Hamas and installing a UAE-friendly Palestinian leadership in Gaza. For years, the UAE has repeatedly put forward former Palestinian Authority Security Minister Mohammad Dahlan as a potential leader of the Palestinian territories; this is hardly surprising, given that Dahlan is a longstanding UAE resident and an advisor to MBZ. This maneuvering was in turn reflected in comments by Emirati ambassador to the U.S. Yousef Otaiba, who cautioned that he had not seen an “alternative” plan to Trump’s. In all, the UAE may view cozying up to the Trump II administration as a way to advance its own interests at the expense of neighbors – chiefly Qatar. The UAE will also seek to avoid any pressure over its role in the Sudanese Civil War, particularly as Sudan’s government accuses the UAE of complicity in genocide by supporting the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces within the conflict. The UAE may attempt to link the issues of Gaza and Sudan in trying to deter Congressional intervention from Democratic politicians and support Trump’s efforts to expel Palestinians to countries as far away as Sudan.

Still, the UAE does have to contend with the priorities of other Arab states – and especially Saudi Arabia – in figuring out how to respond to Trump. After Netanyahu made an offhand comment about displacing Palestinian to Gaza, for example, Emirati Minister of State Khalifa Bin Shaheen Al Marar joined other Gulf officials in rejecting the Israeli Prime Minister’s comments. More recently, Emirati statements have tended to align with Saudi Arabia regarding the Gaza conflict, with MBZ emphasizing to Secretary of State Marco Rubio his rejection of any displacement of Palestinians. Like Saudi officials, Emirati leaders also seem concerned about Trump’s unpredictability and its potential impact on security and economic relations.

Qatar

Compared with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar has more cards to play with regards to Trump’s immediate policy priorities in the region – namely its fraught, but working, relationships with both Hamas leadership and the Israeli government. At the same time, Qatar’s global economic and security relationships are perhaps less diversified than its two neighbors – particularly when it comes to China. This may leave Qatar with less room to maneuver vis-à-vis the United States given that there are fewer credible partners it can turn to if it faces the ire of the Trump administration.

To be sure, Qatar has massively increased its lobbying operations in the United States since the blockade of 2017-2021, spending hundreds of millions on key consultants and steering investments towards key U.S. districts. Numerous incoming Trump administration officials have in turn received payments from Qatar-related entities in the past, for a wide variety of consulting firms, and Qatari officials made sure to meet with Trump and his staff during the presidential campaign. These relationships have been put to the test in recent months due to the fallout from October 7^th and Qatar’s ongoing contact with Hamas officials, much as these have proven useful to U.S. and Israeli officials alike.

Qatari officials are banking on their portfolio of contacts proving just as indispensable to the second Trump administration as the first. Certainly, Qatari domestic media – and satellite channel Al Jazeera – feel no need for restraint in discussing “heinous crimes” against Palestinians or forecasting the “collapse of Zionism.” Interestingly, Qatari officials do not seem to have commented directly on President Trump’s press conference presenting his Gaza proposal, perhaps seeking to avoid complicating fraught shuttle diplomacy regarding the ceasefire in Gaza.

Still, they had already pushed back on earlier comments suggesting the forced displacement of Palestinians to Egypt or Jordan. Qatar also announced its “full solidarity… with the sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” following Prime Minister Netanyahu’s remarks about displacing Palestinians to the Kingdom – an indication that Qatar’s Emir Tamim seeks to stay on MBS’s good side as Qatari officials maneuver for advantage against Emirati counterparts. On a different policy front, Qatari officials have sought to position themselves as a go-between with new political leadership in Syria, most recently securing tacit U.S. approval to provide the country with natural gas via Jordan.

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Saudi-Israeli Normalization

Before the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, Saudi-Israeli normalization seemed within reach, marking what many saw as a historic breakthrough in regional diplomacy. Advocates framed it as the next major step after the Abraham Accords, which, brokered by the U.S. in 2020, had already established formal ties between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. These agreements were the most significant Israeli-Arab diplomatic developments since Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan in the late 20th century. For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia promised deeper regional integration without requiring concessions on Palestinian statehood—long the central issue in Israeli-Arab relations. The Abraham Accords had already delivered economic and security benefits, from trade and tourism to technological cooperation, at little political cost for Israel. A deal with Riyadh would have further solidified these gains while strengthening the regional front against Iran.

Saudi Arabia has approached normalization with Israel cautiously, shaped by several key considerations. First, as the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, Riyadh occupies a unique position in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Any move toward normalization would be subject to intense scrutiny, both domestically and across the broader Muslim community, in a way that Bahrain or the UAE have not faced. Second, King Salman has remained a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause, consistently reaffirming Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), which conditions normalization on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. Third, and perhaps most crucially, for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), normalization was not primarily about Israel itself but about leveraging the process to secure strategic concessions from the United States. Riyadh sought a defence pact, civil nuclear cooperation, and other security guarantees from Washington as part of any potential deal. In this context, the Palestinian issue functioned less as an ideological red line and more as a bargaining chip for advancing Saudi national interests.

The push for normalization gained momentum in part due to the Biden administration’s active involvement. President Joe Biden invested considerable political capital in advancing the process, viewing it not just as a diplomatic breakthrough but as a strategic culmination of U.S.-led efforts to redefine Israel’s regional role following the Abraham Accords. Beyond policy considerations, Biden and his core foreign policy advisors appeared to hold a deep personal belief in the significance of Saudi-Israeli normalization. This enthusiasm may have signaled to Riyadh that it could demand an even higher price from Washington in exchange for a deal.

The outbreak of war in 2023 effectively put Saudi-Israeli normalization on hold, with MBS claiming that any agreement would have to align with the Arab Peace Initiative—most crucially, the establishment of a Palestinian state. MBS explicitly stated that diplomatic relations with Israel would be contingent on achieving a two-state solution—an outcome that any Israeli government, especially one reliant on far-right constituencies, would categorically reject. Moreover, Israel’s actions in Gaza have drawn strong condemnation from Saudi elites. MBS reportedly labelled the war as a genocide, while Prince Turki Al-Faisal described Israel as a “genocidal apartheid state.” That said, Saudi Arabia in 2025 is not the Saudi Arabia of 1973—it will not weaponize oil supplies over U.S. support for Israel. However, domestic political pressures, outrage over Israeli actions, and President Biden’s unwillingness—or inability—to exert meaningful pressure on Israel make it difficult for MBS to move forward with normalization without appearing weak. While Donald Trump’s return to power may shift Saudi calculations, reversing such strong rhetoric and proceeding with normalization under current conditions would be a formidable challenge.

UAE-Israel trade

The war had a far less significant impact on Emirati-Israeli relations, leaving trade ties between Israel and the UAE largely intact. The Abraham Accords not only facilitated Israeli tourism to an Arab country but also fostered trade—particularly in diamonds—and investment opportunities. According to Emirati authorities, tourism flourished, with over one million Israelis visiting the UAE by 2023. As expected, Emirati exports to Israel declined from $237 million in August 2023 to $135 million by October 2023 but quickly returned to pre-war levels. Overall, the economic relationship between the UAE and Israel appears to have remained largely resilient in the face of the conflict.

Although overall trade levels remained relatively stable, reports suggest that the war has dampened the public enthusiasm that once characterized Emirati-Israeli economic ties. High-profile celebrations of bilateral trade on social media have waned, and business dealings have become more discreet, as Emirati businesspeople seek to avoid reputational risks associated with maintaining commercial ties with Israel. Ultimately, however, these changes appear largely cosmetic, reflecting a strategic political decision rather than a fundamental shift in relations. This stands in contrast to Turkish-Israeli trade, which collapsed by April 2024 after President Erdogan halted exports to Israel, citing blocked humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza. A month later, he escalated the measure to a full trade embargo, marking a stark divergence from the UAE’s approach.

Red Sea & The Houthis

The Red Sea serves as a vital artery for global commerce, linking Asia, Europe, and Africa and for oil and gas shipped from the Arab Gulf states in particular. Around 15% of worldwide trade flows through its waters, making it a strategic lifeline for the global economy. The Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Suez Canal, two critical chokepoints, are essential for maritime traffic, particularly for energy exports from the Middle East. Any disruption in this corridor has widespread economic consequences. The latest instability stems from the broader fallout of the Israel-Hamas war, which has triggered regional conflicts. Among the most disruptive actors are Yemen’s Houthis, who, despite not being direct participants in the war, have launched attacks on both Israeli and commercial shipping, citing their support for the Palestinian cause.

Houthi assaults on maritime vessels have escalated dramatically, causing widespread alarm in the shipping industry. More than 134 attacks have been recorded, with multiple cargo ships damaged, two vessels sunk, and a Japanese-operated ship hijacked and held in Houthi-controlled territory. The crew was only released in January 2025 after the ceasefire was announced, having spent more than a year in captivity. These threats have forced major shipping companies to reroute their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, leading to soaring transportation costs and longer delivery times. The economic consequences are stark: trade through the Suez Canal plunged by 50% in early 2024, and by September, shipping volumes had fallen even further. The energy sector has been particularly affected, with oil shipments via Bab al-Mandab collapsing from 2 million barrels per day to just a fraction of that within months of the outbreak of the war.

Efforts to curb the Houthis’ activities have included airstrikes by the US, UK, and Israel, as part of a broader military coalition aimed at securing the Red Sea. However, these measures have done little to fully neutralize the threat. Rising fuel prices and shipping delays have sent shockwaves through global supply chains, particularly affecting industries that rely on precision logistics, such as automobile manufacturing. Factory shutdowns, shipment bottlenecks, and logistical challenges have highlighted the vulnerability of international trade routes. Although some degree of stability has returned, the fundamental risks remain, and shipping costs continue to reflect the unpredictability of Red Sea transit.

While ideological factors drive much of the Houthis’ aggression, there are indications that financial motives are also at play. Reports suggest they may be extracting payments from shipping companies in exchange for safe passage, allegedly generating significant revenue. If true, this financial windfall provides a powerful incentive for prolonging hostilities, ensuring that either Red Sea trade remains costly or vessels are forced into longer, more expensive routes. The implications extend beyond immediate economic disruptions—this evolving crisis underscores the broader fragility of global trade networks and the increasing influence of non-state actors in shaping economic security.

Although the Houthis released the Galaxy crew from captivity and implied they would scale back their attacks following the ceasefire agreement, we can reasonably expect them to resume their attacks if Gaza were to be ethnically cleansed as proposed by US President Donald Trump. This is particularly relevant given that the Houthis are the only remaining capable military force in the Iran-led axis of resistance after the fall of the Assad regime and the significant weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah.

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Outlook

The war in Gaza has reshaped regional geopolitics. Saudi-Israeli normalization has been postponed if not taken off the table, while Israeli-Emirati trade has proved resilient. Meanwhile, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea remain a persistent security challenge, particularly for global trade and Gulf energy shipments. Although the ceasefire agreement has temporarily halted these strikes, any political resolution for Gaza perceived as unfavorable to the Palestinians could reignite them. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE may welcome the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas, the long-term consequences of the Houthis’ growing prominence within the so-called “axis of resistance” remain uncertain. This shift could complicate Saudi Arabia’s broader efforts to end its protracted conflict with the Houthis in Yemen.