Our conversation today is with Dr. Neil Quilliam. He is an energy policy, geopolitics, and foreign affairs specialist focused on the Middle East and North Africa region. He is a partner at Azure Strategy Consulting and previously led Gulf-focused projects at Chatham House, including the Future Dynamics in the Gulf initiative. He has also served as senior MENA energy adviser at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, senior MENA analyst at Control Risks, and senior programme officer at the United Nations University in Amman. His research and analysis focus on Gulf politics, regional security, and the intersection between energy strategy and geopolitical developments across the Arab world.

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Today, we share our conversation with Professor F. Gregory Gause III. He is a Visiting Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., and a Professor Emeritus of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service in Texas A&M University. Between 2014 and 2022, he served as Head of the School’s Department of International Affairs. His work focuses on Middle East politics and international relations, with particular expertise in the Arabian Peninsula. He is the author of three books and numerous scholarly articles examining Gulf politics, regional security, and state dynamics in the Middle East. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University in 1987 and his A.B. (summa cum laude) from Saint Joseph’s University in 1980. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo and Middlebury College.

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1. Given your long academic engagement with Gulf politics, you have witnessed major turning points in the region, from the Iran–Iraq War and Kuwait War to the 2003 Iraq War and today’s U.S.–Israeli confrontation with Iran. How does the current conflict compare to these earlier wars in terms of its impact on the Gulf? Do you see it as a continuation of past regional dynamics, or the beginning of a new phase in Gulf security and deterrence?

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Today, we share our conversation with Dr. Bruno Schmidt-Feuerheerd. He is a Fellow by Examination (Junior Research Fellow) in Political and Developmental Studies at Magdalen College. He earned a PhD in Political Science from Trinity College. His research specializes in comparative politics and international relations, with a particular focus on the Arab Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf monarchies. His work examines authoritarian politics, political legitimation, nationalist mobilization, and grassroots movements, using both qualitative and computational methods to analyze Arabic-language sources, including about 100 original interviews with Saudi nationalists and patriots, archival work covering some 30,000 pages of a cultural magazine dating to the 1970s, and social media data that he collected over several months of field research in Saudi Arabia.

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In this issue, we share our conversation with Dr. Andrew Leber, an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and the Middle East and North Africa Studies program at Tulane University, and a nonresident scholar with the Carnegie Middle East Program. His research focuses on the domestic politics and international relations of the MENA region, with particular attention to Saudi Arabia, as well as public policymaking and media ecosystems under non-democratic systems. His work also examines foreign policymaking in the United States and its security partnerships in the Middle East, especially the US–Saudi relationship.

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In this issue, we share our conversation with Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Her work focuses on Gulf politics, society, and political economy, with particular emphasis on generational change, nationalism, and the evolution of Islamism in the GCC. She has previously taught at the American University and held visiting positions at George Washington University and Georgetown University. She earned her PhD from Harvard University and holds an MA from Johns Hopkins SAIS.

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1. If Gulf states fundamentally distrust Iran yet continue to maintain or reopen channels of coordination, does this reflect strategic pragmatism, or a failure of deterrence?

It is hard to escape the fact that the Iranian attacks on the Gulf states represent a failure of deterrence. The presence of the American bases was to deter Iran from attacking Gulf states for fear of an American counterattack. But once the US launched a major attack on Iran - and especially in a fashion deemed to be existential - the bases served only to provoke Iran to attack. In this case, Iranian generals came to see the détente with Iran as a limit on Iranian action. It isn’t clear how the Gulf states will regain that deterrent, nor if any coordination with Iran can be trusted were Iran to find itself at risk yet again.

2. Your “United States plus” framework assumes continued reliance on Washington; how sustainable is this model if Gulf confidence in U.S. commitment continues to erode?

The Gulf states have felt increasingly uneasy with their reliance on Washington. They have pursued contradictory policies, both seeking a broader network of strategic and security partners, while at the same time pursuing stronger security guarantees from the Americans. I don’t see this changing. While I think ties with new security partners - such as Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan - will deepen, I don’t expect defense arrangements with the US will be dropped. They are still too important, even if problematic.

3. You suggest that regionalization is accelerating. Does this signal a transition toward a multipolar Gulf security order, or merely a temporary adaptation under crisis conditions?

Ever since emerging reluctantly from under the US security umbrella, the GCC states have faced the problem of leadership. There is a strong desire for a unified position that will strengthen the Gulf’s hand vis a vis regional threats and rivals. But there is no unified regional vision. The Qatar boycott was an attempt to force unity. The recent Saudi rift with the UAE is another. But different regional alignments are already apparent: UAE and Bahrain’ normalization with Israel; Oman’s “positive neutrality” with Iran; Saudi Arabia and Qatar ’s outreach with Turkey and Pakistan. Kuwait may champion the GCC, and the logic of monarchical solidarity still holds on many issues, but strategically these different regional alignments will tell. I don’t see them disappearing even if the current crisis with Iran is tempered.

4. If the war ends permanently in the near term, what are the most critical lessons GCC states should draw from it?

The lessons are bitter as they do not hold easy answers. They have a security dilemma which neither greater reliance on the United States nor closer coordination with Iran will solve. I imagine all Gulf states will be racing to strengthen their aerial defense and resiliency in terms multiple defense partners and new and redundant trade corridors. They will want to end dependency on any one path or partner. I still believe cooperation and coordination amongst Gulf states will be useful, even as they pursue different regional tracks. For example, Oman’s closer ties to Iran may prove useful in context, as will the UAE’s with Israel. But I suspect there may be greater suspicion as well as competition to attract and to hold foreign talent and investment which may prove a bigger challenge after this war.

5. Finally, if you have any comment you’d like to add, regarding the war or any other topic, feel free to do so.

The war has tested the Gulf’s ability to maintain its spectacular development pathway amongst the collapse of security in the Levant and Iran’s deepening internal crisis. There may be even more incentives to focus on internal economic recovery and growth. But there is no escaping the regional crises in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Iran. Engagement, investment, and deconfliction, will be required, but will remain dependent on the US playing a constructive role. It is a tall ask.

Expert Interviews is a new series at The Gulf Nashra, where we sit down with leading researchers, policymakers, and analysts to examine the political, economic, and geopolitical dynamics shaping the Gulf, and what they mean for the rest of the world.

We're starting this week with Kate Dourian, an energy expert and nonresident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI) in Washington D.C., with extensive experience in global energy markets and Middle East energy dynamics. She previously served as editor of Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) and has held senior roles in energy analysis and media. Her work focuses on oil markets, energy security, and the geopolitical implications of energy developments in the Gulf and beyond.

In the context of the ongoing Gulf war, energy infrastructure and supply chains have emerged as central vulnerabilities shaping both regional stability and global markets. Disruptions to shipping routes, attacks on production facilities, and uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have underscored the strategic importance of Gulf energy systems as critical nodes in the global energy order.

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Q&A

1. The war has exposed the vulnerability of critical Gulf energy infrastructure. How structurally resilient are current systems, and what does this reveal about long-term energy security in the region?

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has set a precedent and it’s difficult to see how flows through the chokepoint can return to pre-conflict status without a comprehensive solution. Iran for years repeatedly threatened to shut down the waterway but never did until now. Given this ever-present risk, only two GCC countries – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – were prepared, having invested in bypass routes. Saudi Aramco once again showed itself to be an efficient operator and reliable supplier, having switched exports to Yanbu at the start of the Iran war and quickly ramp up flows through the East-West pipeline. Abu Dhabi was already exporting Murban crude through Fujairah and a new pipeline linking its offshore fields should be completed in 2027, allowing it to export oil without going through the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait, which has no other option, could eventually link up with Saudi pipeline infrastructure. But that would not allow the UAE to export LNG. Qatar has no fallback option and could be the most affected by a protracted shutdown.

2. To what extent has the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz reshaped global energy flows, and are we seeing the early stages of a permanent reconfiguration of export routes?

The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has already reshaped global energy flows, accelerating a shift towards alternative export routes, particularly Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea outlet at Yanbu and the UAE’s Fujairah terminal, which are likely to become more permanent features of regional export strategy. While seaborne trade will remain dominant, recent events have underscored the vulnerability of Gulf transit routes and prompted producers to prioritize bypass options where available. At the same time, Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure across the GCC have eroded the fragile trust that had emerged during the recent period of détente, raising longer-term political risk. Taken together, these developments point not to a wholesale reconfiguration of global energy flows, but to a gradual and likely lasting adjustment, with greater emphasis on diversification, redundancy and security of export routes. It’s worth noting that many of the changes in energy flows that were due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in 2023 have become permanent as some ship owners still avoid the Bab el Mandeb.

3. Gulf states have long relied on energy exports for economic and geopolitical leverage. Does the current conflict strengthen or undermine that leverage?

The conflict has had a mixed impact on Gulf leverage. On the one hand, higher prices should in theory strengthen the region’s economic and geopolitical weight. But in practice, the inability of several producers to fully access export markets has limited those gains. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and, to a lesser extent, Oman have been best placed to benefit thanks to their ability to route volumes outside the Strait of Hormuz, while Qatar — heavily reliant on uninterrupted LNG flows — is among the most exposed, and Kuwait remains constrained until it can secure alternative outlets for its crude and products. More broadly, the disruption risks undermining the Gulf’s role as a stabilizing force in the global economy: strong GCC balance sheets and outward investment, particularly via sovereign wealth funds, have been an important source of global liquidity. A prolonged hit to export revenues would therefore have knock-on effects not just for domestic economies, but for global investment flows as well.

4. How viable are proposed alternatives, such as pipeline diversification or bypass routes, for reducing dependence on chokepoints like Hormuz?

The viability of alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz is limited. The most credible is the UAE’s planned new pipeline to enable exports from its offshore fields, for which a contract has already been awarded, building on existing bypass infrastructure. Beyond that, most proposed pipeline projects have been discussed for decades but have failed to materialize due to political disputes, security concerns and a lack of sustained commitment or funding. Many of these proposals also target the European market but the main growth in demand is in Asia, undermining their commercial logic. Crucially, even if export routes can be diversified, Hormuz remains indispensable as a conduit for imports, with most countries in the region reliant on it for seaborne inflows. As a result, while bypass options can provide some mitigation, they are unlikely to significantly reduce the region’s structural dependence on the strait.

5. In a scenario where Iran retains or increases its influence over maritime routes, what would be the most immediate economic consequences for Gulf producers and global markets?

If Iran retains or expands its influence over maritime routes, the immediate economic consequences would be severe for both Gulf producers and global markets. For exporters, the key impact would be constrained volumes rather than higher revenues: even as prices rise — with crude already pushed above $100/b following tanker attacks — the inability to move barrels would limit income, particularly for producers without alternative routes. At the same time, shipping risks would surge, with insurance premiums spiking and vessel traffic collapsing, effectively throttling trade regardless of physical supply availability. For global markets, the result would be a sustained supply shock.

6. What are the most critical lessons Gulf energy policymakers should draw from this conflict, particularly regarding balancing market stability, infrastructure protection, and geopolitical risk?

The conflict underscores three core lessons for Gulf energy policymakers. First, market stability cannot be taken for granted: even short-lived disruptions can upend supply flows and undermine confidence, reinforcing the need for diversified export routes and greater redundancy. Second, infrastructure protection has become as critical as production capacity, with attacks on ports, pipelines and storage facilities highlighting the vulnerability of concentrated energy systems and the importance of investing in both physical and cyber resilience. Third, geopolitical risk is no longer a vague threat but a reality that needs to shape future energy strategy. GCC policymakers should consider closer integration and interconnections to insulate themselves and withstand this type of shock. A common gas grid, train links and a focus on shared economic benefits rather than political and ideological differences would make for a much stronger bloc and benefit all.

7. Do you see this war accelerating the Gulf’s long-term energy transition strategies, or reinforcing its dependence on hydrocarbons as a security asset?

I think the current crisis will accelerate the energy transition in importing countries but will likely delay some renewables projects in the Gulf as the priority will be to recoup the loss of oil and gas import revenues in the aftermath of the war. The conflict has reinforced the world’s dependence on hydrocarbons while exposing the vulnerability of the world’s most important energy chokepoint. Solar and wind offer not only lower emissions but a degree of insulation. The crisis has also exposed just how concentrated the global energy system remains. A solar panel once installed stays in place and produces energy that does not require a tanker to travel by sea and neither does a wind turbine.