Expert Interviews is a new series at The Gulf Nashra, where we sit down with leading researchers, policymakers, and analysts to examine the political, economic, and geopolitical dynamics shaping the Gulf, and what they mean for the rest of the world.
In this issue, we share our conversation with Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Her work focuses on Gulf politics, society, and political economy, with particular emphasis on generational change, nationalism, and the evolution of Islamism in the GCC. She has previously taught at the American University and held visiting positions at George Washington University and Georgetown University. She earned her PhD from Harvard University and holds an MA from Johns Hopkins SAIS.
If Gulf states fundamentally distrust Iran yet continue to maintain or reopen channels of coordination, does this reflect strategic pragmatism, or a failure of deterrence?
It is hard to escape the fact that the Iranian attacks on the Gulf states represent a failure of deterrence. The presence of the American bases was to deter Iran from attacking Gulf states for fear of an American counterattack. But once the US launched a major attack on Iran - and especially in a fashion deemed to be existential - the bases served only to provoke Iran to attack. In this case, Iranian generals came to see the détente with Iran as a limit on Iranian action. It isn’t clear how the Gulf states will regain that deterrent, nor if any coordination with Iran can be trusted were Iran to find itself at risk yet again.
Your “United States plus” framework assumes continued reliance on Washington; how sustainable is this model if Gulf confidence in U.S. commitment continues to erode?
The Gulf states have felt increasingly uneasy with their reliance on Washington. They have pursued contradictory policies, both seeking a broader network of strategic and security partners, while at the same time pursuing stronger security guarantees from the Americans. I don’t see this changing. While I think ties with new security partners - such as Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan - will deepen, I don’t expect defense arrangements with the US will be dropped. They are still too important, even if problematic.
You suggest that regionalization is accelerating. Does this signal a transition toward a multipolar Gulf security order, or merely a temporary adaptation under crisis conditions?
Ever since emerging reluctantly from under the US security umbrella, the GCC states have faced the problem of leadership. There is a strong desire for a unified position that will strengthen the Gulf’s hand vis a vis regional threats and rivals. But there is no unified regional vision. The Qatar boycott was an attempt to force unity. The recent Saudi rift with the UAE is another. But different regional alignments are already apparent: UAE and Bahrain’ normalization with Israel; Oman’s “positive neutrality” with Iran; Saudi Arabia and Qatar ’s outreach with Turkey and Pakistan. Kuwait may champion the GCC, and the logic of monarchical solidarity still holds on many issues, but strategically these different regional alignments will tell. I don’t see them disappearing even if the current crisis with Iran is tempered.
If the war ends permanently in the near term, what are the most critical lessons GCC states should draw from it?
The lessons are bitter as they do not hold easy answers. They have a security dilemma which neither greater reliance on the United States nor closer coordination with Iran will solve. I imagine all Gulf states will be racing to strengthen their aerial defense and resiliency in terms multiple defense partners and new and redundant trade corridors. They will want to end dependency on any one path or partner. I still believe cooperation and coordination amongst Gulf states will be useful, even as they pursue different regional tracks. For example, Oman’s closer ties to Iran may prove useful in context, as will the UAE’s with Israel. But I suspect there may be greater suspicion as well as competition to attract and to hold foreign talent and investment which may prove a bigger challenge after this war.
Finally, if you have any comment you’d like to add, regarding the war or any other topic, feel free to do so.
The war has tested the Gulf’s ability to maintain its spectacular development pathway amongst the collapse of security in the Levant and Iran’s deepening internal crisis. There may be even more incentives to focus on internal economic recovery and growth. But there is no escaping the regional crises in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Iran. Engagement, investment, and deconfliction, will be required, but will remain dependent on the US playing a constructive role. It is a tall ask.