Insight: Undercurrents – GCC Monarchies Contend with Gaza & Trump II
Despite the facade of a united front, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are pursuing separate paths in dealing with Trump on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
The GCC monarchies are all grappling with the implications of a second Trump administration for regional politics. The most challenging policy issue they face remains the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly with renewed Israeli airstrikes on Gaza and accelerating settlement activity in the West Bank.
In some respects, there are clear efforts to at least appear on the same page – official statements from all six monarchies denounced comments last month by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that (likely as a joke) suggested displacing all Palestinians to Saudi Arabia. Yet within the GCC, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are those facing the most pressing challenges in this relationship – chiefly how to maintain good ties with the mercurial Trump while also navigating the politics regarding an uneasy ceasefire and potential reconstruction of Gaza. (Among the remaining three, either Kuwait, Oman, or Bahrain complained about being “excluded” from a Riyadh summit regarding a potential Arab plan for Gaza – the summit was rescheduled so all GCC countries could be represented.)
Beyond this united front, there are subtle yet meaningful differences in terms of how each of the three main countries is responding to Trump. Saudi Arabia is seeking to build up a sense of new importance for the Trump administration as both a mediator for international conflicts and a useful economic partner outside the realm of oil – even as it backs away from past efforts at normalizing relations with Israel. More secure at home, Emirati leaders are pushing for their preferred plans regarding the future of Gaza even as they harbor private reservations about Trump’s reliability. Meanwhile, Qatari officials intend to rely on their existing reputation for being able to speak to “all sides” to shield the country from criticism over its open channels of communication with Hamas; concerted lobbying efforts will seek to remind U.S. stakeholders of the value of this reputation.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia broadly welcomed Trump’s first administration as a clear shift from the Obama administration, which Riyadh perceived as hesitant to involve itself in the region’s politics and overly conciliatory towards Iran. MBS courted Trump early on through a personal visit to the White House, helped welcome the President to the Kingdom as part of his first visit abroad, and counted on the administration’s support in blockading neighboring Qatar a few months later.
The Trump I administration ultimately proved a mixed bag for Saudi Arabia – and for MBS personally. On the one hand, the President offered a full-throated defense of MBS amid the fallout from media figure Jamal Khashoggi, and ensured the regular sale of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the President also shied away from direct military confrontation with Iran, even when Iranian proxies launched direct attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and crucial shipping lanes in the Gulf. Trump also turned on the Kingdom periodically whenever Saudi policies clashed with domestic U.S. considerations, like ensuring low oil prices at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Trump’s second inauguration saw all the signs of a typical Saudi welcome of a new U.S. presidential administration. Mohammad bin Salman called the president to “discuss key regional issues and investment opportunities,” even as Saudi officials floated vague plans to invest $600 billion in the U.S. economy over the next four years – a very transactional approach to a very transactional president. Asharq al-Aawsat columnist Abdulrahman al-Rashed penned his usual laudatory column for an incoming president, looking forward to a “closer and warmer” U.S.-Saudi relationship.
However, Trump’s press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid bare some of the growing differences between Riyadh and Washington – chiefly over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Much as Saudi-Israel normalization remains a guiding star for many U.S. policy commentators, Saudi officials and even from MBS himself have been backing away from the idea for over a year. Any Saudi hopes that the politics of Gaza could be safely set aside (for a time) amid ceasefire negotiations, however, were dashed when Trump discussed a direct takeover of Gaza and its development as the “Riviera of the Middle East” – heavily implying Palestinians would be forcibly removed from the Strip.
Gone are the days when MBS openly discussed getting gradually “closer” to a U.S.-Saudi-Israel deal of normalization for U.S. security guarantees. Instead, the Crown Prince now sees a relatively independent stance on Gaza and the Palestinian file more broadly as a means of building support at home (by seeming to resist U.S. pressure) and demonstrating regional leadership (by organizing a regional response to U.S. and Israeli plans). Hence where Saudi media outlets once castigated Palestinian leaders for undermining their own cause, they now attack Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Israeli government for “extremist” rhetoric.
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia thus far seems to have adopted a “split-screen” approach to the Trump administration – working to shore up an Arab counter-proposal to Trump’s Gaza plan while courting the president’s attention and goodwill in other ways. In suitably diplomatic language, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed Saudi positions while reserving most of its criticism for Israeli officials; the initial response to Trump’s plan merely noted that Saudi positions have been “previously been clarified to both the former and current administration.” Saudi Arabia also hosted an emergency summit on February 21 to discuss an Egyptian proposal to counter Trump’s Gaza plan, although few details have yet occurred.
In contrast to relatively quiet and secretive Saudi diplomacy regarding Gaza, Saudi Arabia has sought to openly market its value as a partner to the Trump administration in other areas. Saudi officials competed with the UAE, for example, to host talks between U.S. and Russian officials about ending the war in Ukraine. In doing so, Saudi officials literally got a seat at the table for negotiations, trading off their relatively strong ties with Russia (stemming from OPEC+ negotiations) as well as the United States.
On a more personal level, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) hosted a major investment conference in Miami – near the presidential compound in Mar-a-Lago – where President Trump made an appearance. Saudi Arabia also announced plans to open an investment office in Southern Florida, atop longstanding and substantial investments with Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE finds itself in a similar position to Saudi Arabia, albeit trying more erring more on the side of presenting itself as in line with the President’s regional policy priorities. Although denying it has anything to do with politics, Emirati businessman Hussain Sajwani, of Emirati contracting and real estate conglomerate DAMAC, rushed to commit $20 billion in investments in the United States – announcing the proposal from the President’s home in Mar-A-Lago. The UAE’s existing normalization of ties with Israel cuts both ways – providing less reason for the Trump administration to bring pressure to bear on Abu Dhabi, but also less leverage for Emirati rulers in pressing for policy concessions from the United States. Emirati ruler MBZ likely has less to fear from domestic public opinion than his counterpart, MBS; the UAE has likewise firmly committed to repressing individual-level criticisms of normalization or policy choices regarding Israel and Palestine (at least beyond a few individuals granted special dispensation to do so). Further afield, the Al Habtoor Research Center, affiliated with another well-connected Emirati businessman, Khalaf Al Habtoor, put out its own Gaza Reconstruction Plan on February 20 – a business-forward approach to managing Gaza’s reconstruction through an international holding company, with limited discussion of Palestinian politics.
While nominally aligned with Saudi Arabia, Emirati officials have been less resolutely opposed to Trump’s initiatives. Even before Trump’s inauguration, Israel Hayom reported that the UAE had agreed in principle to effectively manage the Gaza strip once the present war comes to a close. Although Trump’s Gaza proposal seems to have derailed this approach, the UAE’s statement condemning the plan were fairly tepid in comparison to those of neighboring states – rejecting attempts at displacement but otherwise placing “eliminating extremism” as the top priority following the establishment of a permanent ceasefire. The statement neither criticizes Israel nor even mentions the United States.
The statement reflects the way that the UAE has sought to advance its own interests – namely limiting the influence of Hamas and installing a UAE-friendly Palestinian leadership in Gaza. For years, the UAE has repeatedly put forward former Palestinian Authority Security Minister Mohammad Dahlan as a potential leader of the Palestinian territories; this is hardly surprising, given that Dahlan is a longstanding UAE resident and an advisor to MBZ. This maneuvering was in turn reflected in comments by Emirati ambassador to the U.S. Yousef Otaiba, who cautioned that he had not seen an “alternative” plan to Trump’s. In all, the UAE may view cozying up to the Trump II administration as a way to advance its own interests at the expense of neighbors – chiefly Qatar. The UAE will also seek to avoid any pressure over its role in the Sudanese Civil War, particularly as Sudan’s government accuses the UAE of complicity in genocide by supporting the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces within the conflict. The UAE may attempt to link the issues of Gaza and Sudan in trying to deter Congressional intervention from Democratic politicians and support Trump’s efforts to expel Palestinians to countries as far away as Sudan.
Still, the UAE does have to contend with the priorities of other Arab states – and especially Saudi Arabia – in figuring out how to respond to Trump. After Netanyahu made an offhand comment about displacing Palestinian to Gaza, for example, Emirati Minister of State Khalifa Bin Shaheen Al Marar joined other Gulf officials in rejecting the Israeli Prime Minister’s comments. More recently, Emirati statements have tended to align with Saudi Arabia regarding the Gaza conflict, with MBZ emphasizing to Secretary of State Marco Rubio his rejection of any displacement of Palestinians. Like Saudi officials, Emirati leaders also seem concerned about Trump’s unpredictability and its potential impact on security and economic relations.
Qatar
Compared with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar has more cards to play with regards to Trump’s immediate policy priorities in the region – namely its fraught, but working, relationships with both Hamas leadership and the Israeli government. At the same time, Qatar’s global economic and security relationships are perhaps less diversified than its two neighbors – particularly when it comes to China. This may leave Qatar with less room to maneuver vis-à-vis the United States given that there are fewer credible partners it can turn to if it faces the ire of the Trump administration.
To be sure, Qatar has massively increased its lobbying operations in the United States since the blockade of 2017-2021, spending hundreds of millions on key consultants and steering investments towards key U.S. districts. Numerous incoming Trump administration officials have in turn received payments from Qatar-related entities in the past, for a wide variety of consulting firms, and Qatari officials made sure to meet with Trump and his staff during the presidential campaign. These relationships have been put to the test in recent months due to the fallout from October 7th and Qatar’s ongoing contact with Hamas officials, much as these have proven useful to U.S. and Israeli officials alike.
Qatari officials are banking on their portfolio of contacts proving just as indispensable to the second Trump administration as the first. Certainly, Qatari domestic media – and satellite channel Al Jazeera – feel no need for restraint in discussing “heinous crimes” against Palestinians or forecasting the “collapse of Zionism.” Interestingly, Qatari officials do not seem to have commented directly on President Trump’s press conference presenting his Gaza proposal, perhaps seeking to avoid complicating fraught shuttle diplomacy regarding the ceasefire in Gaza.
Still, they had already pushed back on earlier comments suggesting the forced displacement of Palestinians to Egypt or Jordan. Qatar also announced its “full solidarity… with the sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” following Prime Minister Netanyahu’s remarks about displacing Palestinians to the Kingdom – an indication that Qatar’s Emir Tamim seeks to stay on MBS’s good side as Qatari officials maneuver for advantage against Emirati counterparts. On a different policy front, Qatari officials have sought to position themselves as a go-between with new political leadership in Syria, most recently securing tacit U.S. approval to provide the country with natural gas via Jordan.