The Gulf Nashra Weekly Digest
Eid Special: Three Weeks of War | February 28 – March 21, 2026
From all of us at The Gulf Nashra: Eid Mubarak! May the next one arrive in peace.
This Eid, the Gulf is at war. This digest covers the first twenty two days: what happened, what it cost, and what it means. For readers joining us for the first time: welcome. For those who have been with us since Day 1: thank you.
Eid Under Fire
Eid al-Fitr arrives this year against a backdrop that would have been unthinkable twelve months ago.
Kuwait has banned public celebrations. Bahrain has intercepted 139 missiles and 238 drones in three weeks. Across the UAE, air defense systems stand on permanent alert. In Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, the oilfields that power the global economy have been absorbing drone swarms in the dark. In Oman, two expatriates were killed when drones came down in Sohar. Qatar’s Ras Laffan, the largest LNG complex in the world, has been struck. The facility that supplies 17% of global LNG output is damaged.
This is not the Eid the Gulf planned for.
Yet, the Gulf is still holding. Markets have partially recovered from their worst levels. Air defenses have performed. Governments have maintained order. The region’s states have, with discipline and at great cost, refused to be drawn into a war not of their making.
That refusal is the story of the first twenty two days, even though it’s quiet, deliberate, and expensive.
Three Weeks in Numbers
Energy
Oil price rise since Feb 28: +47%
Brent crude peak (Mar 19): $113.71/barrel
War risk insurance on tankers: +1,100%
Strait of Hormuz
Weekly vessel transits: 17 (down from 839 pre-war)
Traffic collapse: –98%
Maritime incidents recorded: 21
Attacks on Gulf States
Missiles & drones fired: +3,917
Killed: 17
Injured: 290
Markets & Economy
GCC market cap lost at peak: $380B
Bank deposit flight risk (S&P): $307B
Tadawul worst drawdown: –14.2%
Three Turning Points
Three moments defined the first three weeks.
The Hormuz Blockade (Day 1): Within the first 72 hours, commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz effectively collapsed. What followed was not a temporary disruption but a reconfiguration of global energy logistics. The world’s most critical chokepoint, through which roughly 20% of global oil and 25% of LNG normally moves, went from 138 daily transits to near-zero in days. Every subsequent development of the past three weeks has unfolded in the shadow of that single fact. Twenty million barrels a day backed up. Five million finding their way out through pipelines. The rest waiting.
The Strike on Oman (Day 12): On March 11, strikes hit oil storage facilities in Salalah, Oman’s largest port. The significance was not just strategic. It was symbolic. Oman had maintained open channels with Tehran throughout. Sultan Haitham had personally congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader days earlier. The attack shattered the assumption that neutrality provides protection. Gulf commentators were divided: Iran asserting dominance, or a third party eliminating the region’s last diplomatic bridge? The debate remains open. What is clear is that the attack changed the calculus. No Gulf state is insulated by good intentions.
South Pars and Ras Laffan (Day 19): On March 18, Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gasfield. Iran retaliated by hitting Qatar’s LNG mega-complex and the single most important natural gas facility on the planet: Ras Laffan. The damage cut 17% of global LNG output. The potential annual cost: $20 billion. The hit to Qatar’s GDP: an estimated 9%. This was no longer a war over military positions. It was a war over the architecture of global energy. The escalatory loop that Gulf analysts had warned about for weeks had arrived.
The Economic Toll No One Is Counting
The macro numbers (including oil prices, market indices, maritime incidents) tell one story. The story they don’t tell is the one being lived by the Gulf’s 56 million residents.
Aviation has been in effective shutdown across multiple Gulf airports. Thousands of expatriate workers (who constitute the majority of the Gulf’s population) face uncertainty about employment, mobility, and safety. The construction projects, hospitality expansions, and Vision 2030 programs that defined the region’s transformation have not stopped, but they have slowed. Food prices have risen. Fuel subsidy systems are under pressure. In Kuwait, drone debris damaged six power transmission lines on a single day. In Bahrain, visa fines were waived as a small official gesture acknowledging that normal life has been suspended.
For workers whose remittances home fund families across South Asia and Africa, the war is not an abstraction. It is a paycheck at risk, a flight that doesn’t exist, a future that has been placed on hold by a conflict they did not choose and cannot leave.
What the Gulf Is Actually Saying
The most important coverage gap in this conflict is not data. Rather, it is voice.
Western media has covered this war through the lens of US military strategy, Israeli intelligence operations, and Iranian nuclear calculations. The Gulf has been largely absent from that framing, although it’s the region absorbing the strikes, the economic damage, and the political pressure. The Gulf Nashra exists to correct that.
Across twenty two days of commentary from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain, several threads have emerged with consistency:
On being dragged in: Gulf commentators have uniformly rejected external pressure from Washington, from Tel Aviv, and implicitly from Tehran to take sides. The dominant voice has been one of strategic autonomy: the Gulf’s interests are the Gulf’s interests, and they do not map cleanly onto any outside power’s agenda. As one Saudi analyst wrote: the Gulf states are “the pillars of the temple” and they must remain standing while others exhaust themselves.
On Iran’s new leadership: The selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader dominated Gulf commentary in the first week. Emirati voices were largely pessimistic. “more radical, more dangerous, more aggressive.” Saudi analysts focused on whether the new leadership brings pragmatism or continuity, invoking the precedent of Khomeini’s eventual decision to end the Iraq war. Kuwaiti commentators described Iran as evolving into a “religious hereditary republic.” No one was optimistic. The assassination of Ali Larijani only deepened that pessimism. He was regarded across the Gulf as a pragmatic voice and potential negotiating partner. As one analyst put it: Israel killed not just a man, but “the opportunity for negotiation.”
On American reliability: A recurring and pointed question: where are US intelligence assets when missiles and drones are being launched at Gulf cities? One UAE commentator asked directly “Is it possible that the technology you boast about suddenly goes blind when it comes to our security? Or do those eyes open only for your interests?” The question has not received an answer. Meanwhile, Trump branded NATO allies “cowards” for not supporting military action, and the Pentagon requested an additional $200 billion for the war. The Gulf is watching who its allies actually are.
On Oman’s role: Oman’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran (even after being struck) has divided Gulf opinion sharply. Critics called it a provocation to Gulf brothers. Defenders argued that quiet diplomacy is not abandonment but a tool for regional stability. Omani commentators were unequivocal: Oman’s policy is guided by its own national interest, not regional alignment.
What to Watch in Week 4
Ras Laffan and LNG recovery: Qatar’s facility supplies 17% of global LNG. The pace of damage assessment and any restart timeline will determine whether the energy crisis deepens or stabilizes. Europe and Asia are watching closely.
Iran’s “zero restraint” threat: Tehran has signaled it has deployed only a fraction of its firepower and threatened zero restraint on further energy targeting. Whether that threat is posture or policy will define the next phase.
UAE posture shift: Senior UAE officials have signaled readiness to support US-led efforts to secure the Strait. If the UAE moves from strategic ambiguity to active involvement, the regional map changes significantly.
Ground operation signals: Netanyahu’s comment that “there has to be a ground component” is the most significant escalatory signal of the three weeks. A ground operation would transform the conflict entirely, and its implications for Gulf states would be direct and immediate.
The Abraham Accords: As one Saudi commentator observed: after this war, it is difficult to imagine any Gulf state moving forward with expanding the Accords without a deep reassessment. The normalization architecture of the past five years is under fundamental review.
Oil at $150. It is no longer a fringe scenario. If Ras Laffan damage is confirmed as severe, if Hormuz remains closed, and if Iran follows through on energy targeting threats, the market does not have a ceiling most analysts are comfortable naming.
Nashra Picks
Analysis: “Iran expands energy targets beyond Gulf as Red Sea and East Med come into play.” Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 19, 2026.
Analysis: “How long can markets hold their bet on Gulf resilience as war drags on?” Jack Dutton, Al-Monitor, March 17, 2026.
Analysis: “Iran war tests Gulf dealmaking as foreign investors assess risks.”Samuel Wendel, Al-Monitor, March 18, 2026.
Analysis: “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Geoeconomic Stabilisation.” Akram Zaoui, ORF, March 18, 2026.
Analysis: “What Does the Strait of Hormuz’s Closure Mean?” Nur Arafeh, Carnegie, March 19, 2026.
Analysis: “Europe and the Arab Gulf Must Come Together.” Rym Momtaz, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.
Analysis: “Duqm at the Crossroads: Oman’s Strategic Port and Its Role in Vision 2040.” Giorgio Cafiero and Samuel Ramani, Carnegie, March 17, 2026.
Analysis: “What vulnerabilities has the Iran crisis exposed in GCC economies?” Karen E. Young, Middle East Institute, March 20, 2026.
Analysis: “How hard will war hit the Gulf’s economies?” Financial Times, March 18, 2026.
Analysis: “Qatar’s gas empire comes under fire.” Financial Times, March 19, 2026.
Analysis: “Caught in the Crossfire: Gulf Security and Strategy in the US–Israel War on Iran.” Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.
Analysis: “The GCC States and the War on Iran: Rethinking Responses to Unwanted Consequences.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Center in Washington, March 19, 2026.
Analysis: “Should the Gulf Arab states join the war against Iran?” Chatham House, March 19, 2026.
Analysis: “The Iran war is exacting a heavy toll on Gulf oil and gas exporters – and creating risk and opportunity in North Africa.” Chatham House, March 17, 2026.
Analysis: “Iran and Gaza conflicts teach Gulf states a hard-power lesson.” Chatham House, March 16, 2026.
Analysis: “The Gulf Goes Backward.” Amr Hamzawy, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2026.
Podcast: “The New Gulf Reality: America’s Role & What Comes Next.” Bernard Haykel, Mo Show, March 18, 2026.